MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Psychophysiological entity
Erm, I don't think so.
Originally Posted by glofish 
Well, i guess because the engines had to be mounted fwd/up and their power was increased, their increased pitch-up thrust moment incited Boeing to install the MCAS instead of training the pilots.
Pitch control with engines is absolutely possible and was spectacularly demonstrated with the Sioux City accident on a DC-10. . . . continued.
Well, i guess because the engines had to be mounted fwd/up and their power was increased, their increased pitch-up thrust moment incited Boeing to install the MCAS instead of training the pilots.Pitch control with engines is absolutely possible and was spectacularly demonstrated with the Sioux City accident on a DC-10. . . . continued.
Psychophysiological entity
Jim59 #1525
I don't buy this average pilot stuff. If the trim can only be operated by a pilot with average strength or higher, in some circumstances, then assuming a normal distribution of strength then 50% of pilots will have less than average strength. If strength greater than that deliverable by 50% of pilots is required to trim in some scenarios then certification should specify the minimum strength required by the pilot and a relevant method for evaluating a pilot's fitness to fly the type.
I don't buy this average pilot stuff. If the trim can only be operated by a pilot with average strength or higher, in some circumstances, then assuming a normal distribution of strength then 50% of pilots will have less than average strength. If strength greater than that deliverable by 50% of pilots is required to trim in some scenarios then certification should specify the minimum strength required by the pilot and a relevant method for evaluating a pilot's fitness to fly the type.
Last edited by Loose rivets; 27th Jul 2019 at 23:50.
Psychophysiological entity
When considering the human eye's characteristics, one of the more impressive is our peripheral vision. It's quite capable of seeing the white stripe flashing away while looking forward, but then comes the bad news: our brains will tunnel it out when we're stressed targeting on say, a major issue with the horizon and speeds.
It's hard to test this in a sim, quite simply because our brains have . . . erm, a mind of their own.
It's hard to test this in a sim, quite simply because our brains have . . . erm, a mind of their own.
When considering the human eye's characteristics, one of the more impressive is our peripheral vision. It's quite capable of seeing the white stripe flashing away while looking forward, but then comes the bad news: our brains will tunnel it out when we're stressed targeting on say, a major issue with the horizon and speeds.
It's hard to test this in a sim, quite simply because our brains have . . . erm, a mind of their own.
It's hard to test this in a sim, quite simply because our brains have . . . erm, a mind of their own.
Would that make it more or less distinctive in the peripheral vision?
Psychophysiological entity
Would that make it more or less distinctive in the peripheral vision?
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With regard to parking space, although dramatic pictures exist, there is much real estate available and when needs must, I have noted MAX flights, thank you, FR24,
and in denial..
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Current on the 737 but also used to fly other aircraft which did not have a "Boeing" trim wheel so let me throw out another consideration that seemingly is being overlooked. If a pilot was truly hand flying, hands on the controls and looking at his instruments, the obvious indication that something is wrong with the trim is that the control feel starts getting heavier for no apparent reason. You could cover up the trim wheel entirely and you should still be able to feel that the trim is doing something that it is not supposed to be doing. It really should not matter whether the pilot sees the trim wheel or not because he should be getting direct feedback through the controls. I think a big part of the problem with at least the Ethiopian accident is that it seems the pilot was highly automation dependent, trying to put on the A/P multiple times when he should have focused on hand flying through what was initially a simple case of a false stick shaker. This malfunction does happen on occasion and yes it is a bit confusing at first but many other crews have survived this just fine once they figure out the stick shaker warning is false. I suspect the Ethiopian pilot was not terribly familiar with how the 737 controls feel during the takeoff phase because he was always engaging the A/P right after takeoff. There are a lot of trim changes as you accelerate and retract flaps but you get used to it if you regular hand fly the maneuver. He was apparently uncomfortable with hand flying duties which would explain why he try to fight MCAS with elevator and not electric trim. That and leaving the throttles at takeoff thrust sealed their fate. Would have helped if he had a reasonably experienced FO to help him out. Very sad all way around.
Current on the 737 but also used to fly other aircraft which did not have a "Boeing" trim wheel so let me throw out another consideration that seemingly is being overlooked. If a pilot was truly hand flying, hands on the controls and looking at his instruments, the obvious indication that something is wrong with the trim is that the control feel starts getting heavier for no apparent reason. You could cover up the trim wheel entirely and you should still be able to feel that the trim is doing something that it is not supposed to be doing. It really should not matter whether the pilot sees the trim wheel or not because he should be getting direct feedback through the controls. I think a big part of the problem with at least the Ethiopian accident is that it seems the pilot was highly automation dependent, trying to put on the A/P multiple times when he should have focused on hand flying through what was initially a simple case of a false stick shaker. This malfunction does happen on occasion and yes it is a bit confusing at first but many other crews have survived this just fine once they figure out the stick shaker warning is false. I suspect the Ethiopian pilot was not terribly familiar with how the 737 controls feel during the takeoff phase because he was always engaging the A/P right after takeoff. There are a lot of trim changes as you accelerate and retract flaps but you get used to it if you regular hand fly the maneuver. He was apparently uncomfortable with hand flying duties which would explain why he try to fight MCAS with elevator and not electric trim. That and leaving the throttles at takeoff thrust sealed their fate. Would have helped if he had a reasonably experienced FO to help him out. Very sad all way around.
At 08:39:50, the selected heading started to change from 072 to 197 degrees and at the same time the Captain asked the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading.
The autopilot then disengaged and at 08:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.
At 08:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.
This suggests something was wrong 3 or 10 seconds prior to the start of MCAS first activation. Would you check and initially disregard the elevator trim wheel (as it was not moving) in that first 3 or 10 seconds and start focusing on other things?
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At 08:39:45, Captain requested flaps up and First-Officer acknowledged. One second later, the flap handle moved from 5 to 0 degrees and flaps retraction began.
At 08:39:50, the selected heading started to change from 072 to 197 degrees and at the same time the Captain asked the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading.
The autopilot then disengaged and at 08:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.
At 08:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.
This suggests something was wrong 3 or 10 seconds prior to the start of MCAS first activation. Would you check and initially disregard the elevator trim wheel (as it was not moving) in that first 3 or 10 seconds and start focusing on other things?
At 08:39:50, the selected heading started to change from 072 to 197 degrees and at the same time the Captain asked the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading.
The autopilot then disengaged and at 08:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.
At 08:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.
This suggests something was wrong 3 or 10 seconds prior to the start of MCAS first activation. Would you check and initially disregard the elevator trim wheel (as it was not moving) in that first 3 or 10 seconds and start focusing on other things?
So disregard current available information of facts & assume personal beliefs?
Best then the grounding of the MAX remain until both reports have been completely synced and then we can determinate if the pilot/s were doing what was required, and when it was required - and exactly when the pilot realised there was a flight control issue.
"A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way" just the reason that computer based training is recommended.
Best then the grounding of the MAX remain until both reports have been completely synced and then we can determinate if the pilot/s were doing what was required, and when it was required - and exactly when the pilot realised there was a flight control issue.
"A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way" just the reason that computer based training is recommended.
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So disregard current available information of facts & assume personal beliefs?
Best then the grounding of the MAX remain until both reports have been completely synced and then we can determinate if the pilot/s were doing what was required, and when it was required - and exactly when the pilot realised there was a flight control issue.
"A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way" just the reason that computer based training is recommended.
Best then the grounding of the MAX remain until both reports have been completely synced and then we can determinate if the pilot/s were doing what was required, and when it was required - and exactly when the pilot realised there was a flight control issue.
"A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way" just the reason that computer based training is recommended.
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Trimming should be instinctive and second nature well before pilots are licensed. The first Lion Air flight PF kept the aircraft in trim as did the second Lion Air captain and the aircraft remained controllable. Is there new training to _not_ trim the loads off the control column?
Since then we learn of microprocessor issues.
Ringing in my ears is "trim with me" - not help me with the ***ing trim wheel.
They knew they needed to trim- even if that was a bit late.
Actually the Lion guys kept the aircraft flying - not in a neutral trim but +/- a fair amount.
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Best then the grounding of the MAX remain until both reports have been completely synced and then we can determinate if the pilot/s were doing what was required, and when it was required - and exactly when the pilot realised there was a flight control issue.
"A 737 is a real hands on kind of aircraft in this way" just the reason that computer based training is recommended.
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The 737 is fundamentally a 50 year old design and that design assumed some things about pilot proficiency that may not apply today.
The issue really boils down to the beancounters in the company boards who don't respect the people in their employment or contractors in some cases.
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I've been criticized for blaming the pilots for the accidents because they perished and should be respected for that. I guess there is truth in that, and I don't mean to put the blame on them specifically but what about the passengers and their families? Don't they get respect too? Did they not deserve to be flown safely to their destinations? Is there not an implied contract between the passengers and the crew, and of course also between the airline company and the passengers that they will be given at least the minimum standard of professionalism to ensure that this happens? Sure Boeing has made errors but the airline that employed these pilots and did not give them the required training/checking to handle a trim runaway was the start of the problem, not the MCAS/Boeing input. A runaway trim can happen from many causes/failures and MCAS is only one. The problem presented was the trim moving without pilot command. The fix was to trim against it (which was always possible in this case) and retain control. The QRH required that the airplane be trimmed using the trim switch, then if the runaway persisted, turning off the trim switches and proceeding with manual trim. Another way to stop the runaway was to hold the manual trim wheel while turning off the trim switches. All low key stuff with no drama and for this to degenerate into a situation that caused the loss of two aircraft and 300 people is incomprehensible to me. Sure there were distractions caused by the failure of the angle of attack sensor mucking up the stall warning system, but the real problem, screaming out to the pilots, was the way the nose was going down. Simple self-preservation would force them to deal with this first. The ground was coming up fast; nobody could ignore that and there is no indication that these pilots were not aware of that or that they were not trying to stop it from happening. There is further evidence that they were successful, at first, but also evidence that they were not aware of the correct procedures to be used and evidence that they did not follow those procedures, except sporadically and piece-meal. Not professionally or correctly, as a trained flight crew would be expected to do. So what is the answer? Go down the rabbit hole of the MCAS/What did Boeing Do or Not Do, or fight for better pilot training and checking? As we lose the experience of the current airline pilots who are reaching mandatory retirement (they were trained in these procedures and have the cunning necessary to recognize a problem and have a way to handle it) and replace them with pilots who have a far more superficial training experience (CBT is the best you can get now, forget hands on) it is vital that we do more than just V1 cuts, steep turns and approach to stalls during initial and recurrent training. We must identify and train for those loss of control accidents that seem to be increasing, and I am not singling out any country/airline because failures such as this can happen to anybody. Are you ready? Would you know what to do?
it is vital that we do more than just V1 cuts,
totally agree
Has Boeing ever admitted any sort of mistake or wrongdoing? Or the FAA? It's still the "bad" pilots. Seriously?
Might be for legal reasons but I think it would be a better and more credible strategy to come up with openness and the will to change. This is still way too defensive but not constructive enough from my point of view. Share what Is changed and why. I wish the MAX some safe return but not just because of time rush and financial pressure. Real world pilots will fly it in real world weather. 5000 were sold. So make sure not one will crash like that again please. Change what needs to be changed that goes beyond Boeing and beyond just pilots for sure.
Might be for legal reasons but I think it would be a better and more credible strategy to come up with openness and the will to change. This is still way too defensive but not constructive enough from my point of view. Share what Is changed and why. I wish the MAX some safe return but not just because of time rush and financial pressure. Real world pilots will fly it in real world weather. 5000 were sold. So make sure not one will crash like that again please. Change what needs to be changed that goes beyond Boeing and beyond just pilots for sure.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/b...7-max-faa.html
the rudder cable mod is news to me....
with reference to previous posts, the trim wheel rotation is completely inaudible at high airspeed such as 280kts or greater, I've tried it recently in the NG, particularly if you are wearing a noise cancelling headset which does what it's designed to do- the simulator brigade probably don't realise this as they don't need a noise attenuating headset since most simulators have a volume control so that the critical ballast can be heard pontificating.
the rudder cable mod is news to me....
with reference to previous posts, the trim wheel rotation is completely inaudible at high airspeed such as 280kts or greater, I've tried it recently in the NG, particularly if you are wearing a noise cancelling headset which does what it's designed to do- the simulator brigade probably don't realise this as they don't need a noise attenuating headset since most simulators have a volume control so that the critical ballast can be heard pontificating.