MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
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What about the one that's near the bottom of the picture, just right of centre, with nose pointing right?
Looks like Canadian operator 'Sunwings'.
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I see that Southwest has cancelled one destination and moved their possible use of the MAX back to Jan 2020.
737 Max grounding prompts Southwest to cease Newark service
- 25 July, 2019
- SOURCE: Flight Dashboard
- BY: Jon Hemmerdinger
- Boston
Southwest Airlines will end service at Newark Liberty International airport on 3 November in response to constraints created by the grounding of the Boeing 737 Max, the airline says on 25 July.
Southwest will consolidate its New York operations at LaGuardia airport. The airline has also removed the 737 Max from its schedules for another two months, to 5 January 2020.
Southwest says the Max grounding will cause its 2019 capacity to decline 1-2% year-on-year. The airline had hoped to grow capacity nearly 5% this year.
"As such, we are taking necessary steps to mitigate damages and optimise our aircraft and resources," chief executive Gary Kelly says in a media release. "We will cease operations at Newark Liberty International airport and consolidate our New York City presence at New York LaGuardia Airport, effective November 3, 2019."
"The financial results at Newark have been below expectations, despite the efforts of our excellent team at Newark," Kelly adds.
The airline will give Newark employees the option to transfer to other locations. The Max grounding reduced Southwest's second quarter operating income by $175 million. Southwest earned a net second quarter profit of $741 million, up about 1% year-on-year.
The decision to remove the 737 Max from schedules through 5 January follows "our most-recent guidance from Boeing", Southwest says.
"We currently are assuming regulatory approval of Max return-to-service during the fourth quarter 2019. With this in mind, we will proactively extend the Max-related flight schedule adjustments through January 5," Southwest says.
The change will help the airline ensure it runs a reliable operation during the busy end-of-year holiday travel season, it says. But Southwest adds it may need more time to comply with regulations put in place as part of the Max's regulatory clearance.
"Following a rescission of the Federal Aviation Administration order to ground the Max, we estimate it will take us one to two months to comply with prospective FAA directives, including all necessary pilot training," Southwest says. "The FAA will determine the timing of Max return to service, and we offer no assurances that our current assumptions and timelines are correct."
Southwest and other airlines have pushed back the Max's scheduled return several times. Earlier this month Southwest removed the aircraft through 2 November.
Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg said on 24 July that Boeing is working under the assumption that it will conduct a 737 Max test flight and submit test data to regulators in September.
The airframer expects regulators will need several weeks to review test data and that they will lift the grounding early in the fourth quarter. However, Muilenburg cautions Boeing's timeline remains only an estimate. Regulators grounded the 737 Max in March
Southwest will consolidate its New York operations at LaGuardia airport. The airline has also removed the 737 Max from its schedules for another two months, to 5 January 2020.
Southwest says the Max grounding will cause its 2019 capacity to decline 1-2% year-on-year. The airline had hoped to grow capacity nearly 5% this year.
"As such, we are taking necessary steps to mitigate damages and optimise our aircraft and resources," chief executive Gary Kelly says in a media release. "We will cease operations at Newark Liberty International airport and consolidate our New York City presence at New York LaGuardia Airport, effective November 3, 2019."
"The financial results at Newark have been below expectations, despite the efforts of our excellent team at Newark," Kelly adds.
The airline will give Newark employees the option to transfer to other locations. The Max grounding reduced Southwest's second quarter operating income by $175 million. Southwest earned a net second quarter profit of $741 million, up about 1% year-on-year.
The decision to remove the 737 Max from schedules through 5 January follows "our most-recent guidance from Boeing", Southwest says.
"We currently are assuming regulatory approval of Max return-to-service during the fourth quarter 2019. With this in mind, we will proactively extend the Max-related flight schedule adjustments through January 5," Southwest says.
The change will help the airline ensure it runs a reliable operation during the busy end-of-year holiday travel season, it says. But Southwest adds it may need more time to comply with regulations put in place as part of the Max's regulatory clearance.
"Following a rescission of the Federal Aviation Administration order to ground the Max, we estimate it will take us one to two months to comply with prospective FAA directives, including all necessary pilot training," Southwest says. "The FAA will determine the timing of Max return to service, and we offer no assurances that our current assumptions and timelines are correct."
Southwest and other airlines have pushed back the Max's scheduled return several times. Earlier this month Southwest removed the aircraft through 2 November.
Boeing chief executive Dennis Muilenburg said on 24 July that Boeing is working under the assumption that it will conduct a 737 Max test flight and submit test data to regulators in September.
The airframer expects regulators will need several weeks to review test data and that they will lift the grounding early in the fourth quarter. However, Muilenburg cautions Boeing's timeline remains only an estimate. Regulators grounded the 737 Max in March
"One possible explanation is that the loads on the jackscrew due to the severe stabilizer nose down out-of-trim situation were too great for the pilot to overcome using the trim wheel with folding handle. The pilots restored electric trim as a means to trim.
Boeing published a technique in the past that discussed this issue and the need to release the column briefly in a series of "roller coaster" or "yo yo" maneuvers, by cranking in stabilizer trim alternatively with large column commands."
"This is in the 737NG training manual:
Manual Stabilizer TrimIf manual stabilizer trim is necessary, ensure both stabilizer trim cutout switches are in CUTOUT prior to extending the manual trim wheel handles.Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.Anticipate the trim changes required for the approach. Configure the airplane early in the approach. When reaching the landing configuration, maintain as constant a trim setting as possible. If a go-around is required, anticipate the trim changes as airspeed increase."
https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stab...and-range.html
Yes they did. The information below is apparently NOT in the current release of the pilot's documentation.
"One possible explanation is that the loads on the jackscrew due to the severe stabilizer nose down out-of-trim situation were too great for the pilot to overcome using the trim wheel with folding handle. The pilots restored electric trim as a means to trim.
Boeing published a technique in the past that discussed this issue and the need to release the column briefly in a series of "roller coaster" or "yo yo" maneuvers, by cranking in stabilizer trim alternatively with large column commands."
"This is in the 737NG training manual:
Manual Stabilizer TrimIf manual stabilizer trim is necessary, ensure both stabilizer trim cutout switches are in CUTOUT prior to extending the manual trim wheel handles.Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.Anticipate the trim changes required for the approach. Configure the airplane early in the approach. When reaching the landing configuration, maintain as constant a trim setting as possible. If a go-around is required, anticipate the trim changes as airspeed increase."
https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stab...and-range.html
"One possible explanation is that the loads on the jackscrew due to the severe stabilizer nose down out-of-trim situation were too great for the pilot to overcome using the trim wheel with folding handle. The pilots restored electric trim as a means to trim.
Boeing published a technique in the past that discussed this issue and the need to release the column briefly in a series of "roller coaster" or "yo yo" maneuvers, by cranking in stabilizer trim alternatively with large column commands."
"This is in the 737NG training manual:
Manual Stabilizer TrimIf manual stabilizer trim is necessary, ensure both stabilizer trim cutout switches are in CUTOUT prior to extending the manual trim wheel handles.Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.Anticipate the trim changes required for the approach. Configure the airplane early in the approach. When reaching the landing configuration, maintain as constant a trim setting as possible. If a go-around is required, anticipate the trim changes as airspeed increase."
https://www.satcom.guru/2019/04/stab...and-range.html
Things that were acceptable, often are not today.
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I'm guessing that in a MAX a stab trim runaway is maybe 100 times more likely than an NG, maybe more. Maybe Boeing didn't know that before the first accident. But it's unlikely the didn't know that before the second accident. And it's even less likely they didn't know that AFTER the second accident. And, having that knowledge, they still tried to keep the aircraft flying, even after the second accident. That's disgusting, bordering on criminal.
So, please, don't cry for Boeing. They did the minimum required to pass the regulation requirements, focusing on profits, instead of having safety as their first priority, as they claim, and now they are reaping the reward.
Psychophysiological entity
Boofhead, I'm frankly surprised at your post, not least of all because the argument has been discussed in hundreds of posts.
gums even stated that he may not have known what was going on, and even Sully has said that it would 'probably have claimed him. Yes, a 9-second run is too long to ignore, but it followed not only STS pulses but a slew of other jarring distractions. We need not just more training, but a world-wide increase in the experience on the flight deck. It will be interesting to see what the major symposium on that very subject comes up with.
***
It's strange how the word Ethos springs to mind, both when thinking of the culture of Boeing management and the steel cable from stem to stern. That cable was a promise cast in stone for many years and it seem ironic that honoring that promise of a manual link to the tail may cause more damage to Boeing than generations of deceitful managerial bullying.
gums even stated that he may not have known what was going on, and even Sully has said that it would 'probably have claimed him. Yes, a 9-second run is too long to ignore, but it followed not only STS pulses but a slew of other jarring distractions. We need not just more training, but a world-wide increase in the experience on the flight deck. It will be interesting to see what the major symposium on that very subject comes up with.
***
It's strange how the word Ethos springs to mind, both when thinking of the culture of Boeing management and the steel cable from stem to stern. That cable was a promise cast in stone for many years and it seem ironic that honoring that promise of a manual link to the tail may cause more damage to Boeing than generations of deceitful managerial bullying.
Salute!
I am not sure which procedure I should follow, especially if I cannot assess the nose down pitch moment as being "runaway trim".
My stick shaker is vibrating in all its full glory and I have unreliabke speed warnings. Do I raise my flaps? Oh well, I raise the suckers. And try to handle the stall warning. Then I get a nose down pitch moment but I can stop it and even reverse it using the handy manual switches on the wheel. Is it related to the stall warning? Maybe a structural problem? So back to the stall warning procedure.... and then I get another nose down moment, but it too stops soon as I beep the trim switch. Not being in the habit of staring at the trim wheel on the center pedestal while trying to gain altitude and handle the shaking wheel, I continue using manual trim and finally conclude the STS is working backwards and is trimming nose down when speed is increasing ( I assume speed is increasing in spite of the unreliable speed indication because the trees seem to be moving faster under the nose). I finally turn off the stab trim switch that is supposed to stop AP/STS trim, but now my manual trim switch doesn't work 'cause the two switches are wired in series. I never saw the classic runaway trim, and the 5 second pause after manually trimming further complicates my assessment of what is wrong and what procedure should be executed.
GASP!
And so on.
We really do not know the extent that the jump seat dude halped in the next to last Lion flight, and haven't heard a peep from the other two dudes either. So maybe it was that fellow who thot the STS was working backwards. Hopefully this will come out in the report.
++++++++++++++++++++
So I cut the Lion crew a bit of slack, moreso than ET. Nevertherless, neither plane should have gone down had they knew about MCAS and understood the collection of cues that indicated its failure.
Gums sends...
I am not sure which procedure I should follow, especially if I cannot assess the nose down pitch moment as being "runaway trim".
My stick shaker is vibrating in all its full glory and I have unreliabke speed warnings. Do I raise my flaps? Oh well, I raise the suckers. And try to handle the stall warning. Then I get a nose down pitch moment but I can stop it and even reverse it using the handy manual switches on the wheel. Is it related to the stall warning? Maybe a structural problem? So back to the stall warning procedure.... and then I get another nose down moment, but it too stops soon as I beep the trim switch. Not being in the habit of staring at the trim wheel on the center pedestal while trying to gain altitude and handle the shaking wheel, I continue using manual trim and finally conclude the STS is working backwards and is trimming nose down when speed is increasing ( I assume speed is increasing in spite of the unreliable speed indication because the trees seem to be moving faster under the nose). I finally turn off the stab trim switch that is supposed to stop AP/STS trim, but now my manual trim switch doesn't work 'cause the two switches are wired in series. I never saw the classic runaway trim, and the 5 second pause after manually trimming further complicates my assessment of what is wrong and what procedure should be executed.
GASP!
And so on.
We really do not know the extent that the jump seat dude halped in the next to last Lion flight, and haven't heard a peep from the other two dudes either. So maybe it was that fellow who thot the STS was working backwards. Hopefully this will come out in the report.
++++++++++++++++++++
So I cut the Lion crew a bit of slack, moreso than ET. Nevertherless, neither plane should have gone down had they knew about MCAS and understood the collection of cues that indicated its failure.
Gums sends...
Well, i guess because the engines had to be mounted fwd/up and their power was increased, their increased pitch-up thrust moment incited Boeing to install the MCAS instead of training the pilots.
Pitch control with engines is absolutely possible and was spectacularly demonstrated with the Sioux City accident on a DC-10.
We were later trained to accomplish that on the DC-10 and MD11 (yes Sirs!).
It is possible to train pilots, at least those who are still trainable.
I am a heavy sceptic of all these artificial pullers/pushers/inhibitors/limiters when aircraft re-design pushes nicely and well balanced/designed aircraft out of a certain envelope.
Pitch control with engines is absolutely possible and was spectacularly demonstrated with the Sioux City accident on a DC-10.
We were later trained to accomplish that on the DC-10 and MD11 (yes Sirs!).
It is possible to train pilots, at least those who are still trainable.
I am a heavy sceptic of all these artificial pullers/pushers/inhibitors/limiters when aircraft re-design pushes nicely and well balanced/designed aircraft out of a certain envelope.
But if you are correct the pilots of the crashed aircraft pulling back power would have a LARGE pitch down effect, not good when low.
The Japanese pilots had some success for some time, using power for pitch also in the 747.
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It was indeed, but not quite as spectacular as Eric, Mario and Steve in an A300 over Baghdad, when they took a hit from a SAM at climb out, lost all hydraulics and was flying in a war zone with the left wing on fire. They managed to get it down, performed a go around, landed on all 3 and could walk away from the aircraft.
gums:
How much, if any, audible warning do the manual trim wheels on the MAX give when rotating rapidly?
Not being in the habit of staring at the trim wheel on the center pedestal while trying to gain altitude and handle the shaking wheel, I continue using manual trim and finally conclude the STS is working backwards and is trimming nose down when speed is increasing ( I assume speed is increasing in spite of the unreliable speed indication because the trees seem to be moving faster under the nose).
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With regard to parking space, although dramatic pictures exist, there is much real estate available and when needs must, I have noted MAX flights, thank you, FR24, (at 41,000ft, no European restrictions here) moving grounded airframes to, eg. Lackland AFB, San Antonio, TX, and New Iberia, LA. I somehow think that won't be the knockout blow.
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"This is in the 737NG training manual:
Excessive airloads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct the mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the airloads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually.Anticipate the trim changes required for the approach.