MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
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Its a long time since I flew 737 but I hear, from colleagues who flew the 800, the risk of tailstrikes on the Max, which might have been eliminated with longer gear was “ fixed” by increasing V ref to lead to a lower body angle at touchdown. Sounds strange as higher V ref equals longer landing distance etc, higher brake wear etc etc.
Anyone in the know ?
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How long is it going to take for Boeing to admit that moving the engines forward to accomodate bigger engines results in increasing amounts of lift forward of the CoG depending on AoA and that they were trying to address an engineering design issue with a software fix. Would it not have been better to use 757 type undercarriage and leave the engines under the wing?
Keep in mind the MCAS was known to maintenance staff before the first crash - just not customers or pilots.
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There have been ( at least it seems) quite a few 737-8 overruns, is the increased approach speed one possible cause?
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Longtimer!
Not main cause, but contributing factor in many 737-800 over runs.
Also the fact that most airlines use F30 as standard to save fuel, ergo lots of pilots are not good at F40 landing.
Typically a 738 at F30 with say 61 ton has a Vref of 143
Vref+5 becomes 148kts and Autobrake 3 stop distance of 1768m.
That is rather fast
Not main cause, but contributing factor in many 737-800 over runs.
Also the fact that most airlines use F30 as standard to save fuel, ergo lots of pilots are not good at F40 landing.
Typically a 738 at F30 with say 61 ton has a Vref of 143
Vref+5 becomes 148kts and Autobrake 3 stop distance of 1768m.
That is rather fast
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There have been ( at least it seems) quite a few 737-8 overruns, is the increased approach speed one possible cause?
Yes, of late there have been quite a few 738 over-runs...the common SOP of brakes over rev thrust, along with flaps 30, has likely contributed
I have not heard of any 8MAX over-runs...other than impeding on employee parking space.
I guess now at least Ryanair is calling it a 737-8200...still the ICAO designation stands. (the 737-MAX 10 if it ever flies, will be a nomenclature quandary...
the 737-MAX 10 if it ever flies, will be a nomenclature quandary...
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Probably also eliminating the ability to stop a runaway trim by grapping the running wheel with the hand? While you have more momentum due to the gear to prevent the motor from spinning, the higher trim wheel speed will have considerable kinetic energy while spinning.
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I imagine a secondary motor in the tail (perhaps with an independent power supply and battery if you want to really put a stake through Murphy) whose one job is to return the stabilizer to neutral whenever the pilots switch off the electric trim (using either one of those handy switches.) Located right at the jackscrew it would surely have more chances of moving a mechanically (or aerodynamically) "stuck" stabilizer than any system of wires and wheels running the entire length of the plane.
Obviously this negates MCAS but that is going to have to be solved another way.
The idea is not perfect, it introduces another motor freeze or go haywire, but it could be designed so that a haywire "return to neutral" motor can be overcome by the electric trim. The worst case seems to be that a failed backup motor could jam the jackscrew in a bad position, although without MCAS is the stabilizer ever going to be in a position that can't be counteracted by the elevator?
Expensive, but probably less than a billion and no new training required.
Sooner or later for the release of possibly the final report on the Lion Air crash?
And the implications of a re-certification will soon come into play.
If it takes longer will it be more likely a delay for the Ethiopian report to be released?
Lion Air should contain some CVR references as well as the mystery jump seat pilot info I expect. The living crew statements could be interesting.
And the implications of a re-certification will soon come into play.
If it takes longer will it be more likely a delay for the Ethiopian report to be released?
Lion Air should contain some CVR references as well as the mystery jump seat pilot info I expect. The living crew statements could be interesting.
Release of the Ethiopian and Lion Air crash reports may very well be the elephants in the room.
With the animosity Boeing and the FAA have managed to muster, it would not surprise me if one of more NAA would want to keep the aircraft grounded until the cause of the accidents has been properly identified via an official accident investigation report. Which would bring the grounding well into 2020, while the actual length of the grounding will be, at least partially, decided by how many objections Boeing and/or the FAA will lodge against the findings prior to to the official release.
With the animosity Boeing and the FAA have managed to muster, it would not surprise me if one of more NAA would want to keep the aircraft grounded until the cause of the accidents has been properly identified via an official accident investigation report. Which would bring the grounding well into 2020, while the actual length of the grounding will be, at least partially, decided by how many objections Boeing and/or the FAA will lodge against the findings prior to to the official release.
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No more of a quandary than the 787-10 posed. The Max 10 will be B3XM - those who remember their Roman numerals will understand why.
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I tell you what, this whole MCAS and other changes, have thrown the coding for quite the adventure...the cascading changes are unpredictable given the legacy programming involved...
trying to smash these changes into the FMS....
in debugging, many more legacy errors have cropped up, this has profound changes in the FMS programming, tracing back to the legacy V1.0...how this reacts with current programming, and current coded procedures....****.
I fear there will be unpredictable results when certain combinations of conditions occur...skip tracing this ...fk. I actually found an old ref to a simple radius of the Earth, before the 1984 geoid...who knows what function looked up that number...
AC need a new FMS, fk v14 or whatever, just cert an FMS with todays tech, not 1978 and a 486 processor....the ac deserve better.
2019V1.0!
trying to smash these changes into the FMS....
in debugging, many more legacy errors have cropped up, this has profound changes in the FMS programming, tracing back to the legacy V1.0...how this reacts with current programming, and current coded procedures....****.
I fear there will be unpredictable results when certain combinations of conditions occur...skip tracing this ...fk. I actually found an old ref to a simple radius of the Earth, before the 1984 geoid...who knows what function looked up that number...
AC need a new FMS, fk v14 or whatever, just cert an FMS with todays tech, not 1978 and a 486 processor....the ac deserve better.
2019V1.0!
Last edited by Smythe; 21st Jul 2019 at 20:49.
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. . . this has profound changes in the FMS programming, tracing back to the legacy V1.0...how this reacts with current programming, and current coded procedures....****.
I fear there will be unpredictable results when certain combinations of conditions occur . . .
I fear there will be unpredictable results when certain combinations of conditions occur . . .
AC need a new FMS, fk v14 or whatever, just cert an FMS with todays tech, not 1978 and a 486 processor . . .
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NYT - FAA/Boeing Leadership Failed
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/o...g-737-max.html
The Boeing 737 Max Crisis Is a Leadership Failure
Safety begins at the top, and the top officials at Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration have let us down.
By Jim Hall and Peter Goelz
Mr. Hall was chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001. Mr. Goelz was managing director of the board from 1996 to 2000.
July 17, 2019
We’ve seen this before: A Boeing airliner crashes, killing all aboard. Investigators believe a design flaw in the aircraft played a major role in the accident, but Boeing blames the pilots. Eventually, the design flaw is corrected, but not before another plane crashes, leaving more deaths in its wake.
In our time at the National Transportation Safety Board we saw this happen — long before the two Boeing crashes in the past year.
On March 3, 1991, a United Airlines Boeing 737 crashed on approach to Colorado Springs, killing all 25 people aboard. After an investigation of almost two years, the N.T.S.B. concluded that one of the two likely causes was a malfunctioning rudder power control unit, which moved the rudder in the opposite direction to that intended by the pilots. The agency recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require airlines to install a modified part, to prevent future rudder reversals, as soon as Boeing made them available, but Boeing failed to do that.
On Sept. 8, 1994, a USAir 737 crashed as it neared Pittsburgh, killing all 132 people aboard. Despite the obvious similarities between the two crashes that were revealed during the investigation, Boeing insisted even to the final stages of the second inquiry that there was nothing wrong with the design of the aircraft, and the company again pointed to improper pilot rudder commands as the cause.
In the end, the rudder was indeed determined to have malfunctioned and caused both crashes. Boeing redesigned the part, and it was retrofitted in all 737s. There has not been a crash caused by that issue since then.
But this disturbing culture of denial persists today at Boeing, as shown by the revelations following the crashes of two 737 Max 8 aircraft in Indonesia and Ethiopia, which killed 346 people. The company has an institutional reluctance to even examine potential design flaws in its product.
Boeing’s stubborn resistance to admit its mistakes — even as those mistakes have delayed the return to operation of 737 Max planes by several months, according to The Wall Street Journal — are turning into a disaster for the company and its customers. Some of the families of the victims testified before Congress on Wednesday.
Even worse, Boeing has found a willing partner in the F.A.A., which allowed the company to circumvent standard certification processes so it could sell aircraft more quickly. Boeing’s inadequate regard for safety and the F.A.A.’s complicity display an unconscionable lack of leadership at both organizations.
Boeing’s first public statements after the Indonesia crash in October, supported by the F.A.A., questioned the abilities of the pilots, even though subsequent reporting has shown that pilots were not given the information they needed to properly react to the aircraft’s unexpected descents. Only after the crash of the second Max 8 in Ethiopia, in March, did Boeing acknowledge that software in the planes’ cockpits played a major role in the accidents.
The 737 Max of today — a 143-foot-long plane seating more than 230 people — is a very different aircraft from the humble 737 of the 1960s, which was only 94 feet long and seated no more than 118. But the current regulatory system allows for significant modifications of an aircraft design without requiring a new certification review. Even though the new plane had different flight characteristics, larger engines and a new flight management system, no simulator training was required for pilots familiar with older model 737s, a marketing move designed by Boeing to increase sales. And the F.A.A. allowed this.
Safety begins at the top, and the top at both Boeing and the F.A.A. has let us down. Boeing’s board must find out who has enabled and encouraged this corporate culture, and hold those leaders accountable, beginning with the chief executive, Dennis Muilenburg.
But this is bigger than the Max 8. We now have an airline safety agency that has become less and less forceful in exercising its regulatory authority over an aircraft manufacturer, even one that appears to be aggressively prioritizing profits over safety. It hasn’t helped that, like many government agencies, the F.A.A. has been without a permanent leader for 18 months.
Congress has permitted this to occur, but it can make the system much stronger. Two decades ago, lawmakers wisely sought to remove the F.A.A. from the political process by giving its administrator a five-year term so that the agency would have continuity of leadership. Congress can push for a permanent F.A.A. administrator, and use its oversight authority to make sure that the new leadership re-establishes the proper relationship between the regulator and the regulated.
The bottom line is that two nearly new, American-built airliners crashed within a few months of each other and nearly 350 people died. No one should be proud of the regulatory structure that put these planes in the air. We need major changes now.
Jim Hall was chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001. Peter Goelz was managing director of the board from 1996 to 2000.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: [email protected].
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.
Safety begins at the top, and the top officials at Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration have let us down.
By Jim Hall and Peter Goelz
Mr. Hall was chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001. Mr. Goelz was managing director of the board from 1996 to 2000.
July 17, 2019
We’ve seen this before: A Boeing airliner crashes, killing all aboard. Investigators believe a design flaw in the aircraft played a major role in the accident, but Boeing blames the pilots. Eventually, the design flaw is corrected, but not before another plane crashes, leaving more deaths in its wake.
In our time at the National Transportation Safety Board we saw this happen — long before the two Boeing crashes in the past year.
On March 3, 1991, a United Airlines Boeing 737 crashed on approach to Colorado Springs, killing all 25 people aboard. After an investigation of almost two years, the N.T.S.B. concluded that one of the two likely causes was a malfunctioning rudder power control unit, which moved the rudder in the opposite direction to that intended by the pilots. The agency recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require airlines to install a modified part, to prevent future rudder reversals, as soon as Boeing made them available, but Boeing failed to do that.
On Sept. 8, 1994, a USAir 737 crashed as it neared Pittsburgh, killing all 132 people aboard. Despite the obvious similarities between the two crashes that were revealed during the investigation, Boeing insisted even to the final stages of the second inquiry that there was nothing wrong with the design of the aircraft, and the company again pointed to improper pilot rudder commands as the cause.
In the end, the rudder was indeed determined to have malfunctioned and caused both crashes. Boeing redesigned the part, and it was retrofitted in all 737s. There has not been a crash caused by that issue since then.
But this disturbing culture of denial persists today at Boeing, as shown by the revelations following the crashes of two 737 Max 8 aircraft in Indonesia and Ethiopia, which killed 346 people. The company has an institutional reluctance to even examine potential design flaws in its product.
Boeing’s stubborn resistance to admit its mistakes — even as those mistakes have delayed the return to operation of 737 Max planes by several months, according to The Wall Street Journal — are turning into a disaster for the company and its customers. Some of the families of the victims testified before Congress on Wednesday.
Even worse, Boeing has found a willing partner in the F.A.A., which allowed the company to circumvent standard certification processes so it could sell aircraft more quickly. Boeing’s inadequate regard for safety and the F.A.A.’s complicity display an unconscionable lack of leadership at both organizations.
Boeing’s first public statements after the Indonesia crash in October, supported by the F.A.A., questioned the abilities of the pilots, even though subsequent reporting has shown that pilots were not given the information they needed to properly react to the aircraft’s unexpected descents. Only after the crash of the second Max 8 in Ethiopia, in March, did Boeing acknowledge that software in the planes’ cockpits played a major role in the accidents.
The 737 Max of today — a 143-foot-long plane seating more than 230 people — is a very different aircraft from the humble 737 of the 1960s, which was only 94 feet long and seated no more than 118. But the current regulatory system allows for significant modifications of an aircraft design without requiring a new certification review. Even though the new plane had different flight characteristics, larger engines and a new flight management system, no simulator training was required for pilots familiar with older model 737s, a marketing move designed by Boeing to increase sales. And the F.A.A. allowed this.
Safety begins at the top, and the top at both Boeing and the F.A.A. has let us down. Boeing’s board must find out who has enabled and encouraged this corporate culture, and hold those leaders accountable, beginning with the chief executive, Dennis Muilenburg.
But this is bigger than the Max 8. We now have an airline safety agency that has become less and less forceful in exercising its regulatory authority over an aircraft manufacturer, even one that appears to be aggressively prioritizing profits over safety. It hasn’t helped that, like many government agencies, the F.A.A. has been without a permanent leader for 18 months.
Congress has permitted this to occur, but it can make the system much stronger. Two decades ago, lawmakers wisely sought to remove the F.A.A. from the political process by giving its administrator a five-year term so that the agency would have continuity of leadership. Congress can push for a permanent F.A.A. administrator, and use its oversight authority to make sure that the new leadership re-establishes the proper relationship between the regulator and the regulated.
The bottom line is that two nearly new, American-built airliners crashed within a few months of each other and nearly 350 people died. No one should be proud of the regulatory structure that put these planes in the air. We need major changes now.
Jim Hall was chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001. Peter Goelz was managing director of the board from 1996 to 2000.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: [email protected].
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.
