MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
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Implications of AF447 lawsuit
It has been disclosed (see another thread) that prosecutors in France have brought a lawsuit against Air France in the matter of AF447's mid-Atlantic crash. I haven't seen any real details, but it seems that:
1. The lawsuit is not being brought against Airbus, the manufacturer.
2. The regulator EASA is not participating as a plaintiff in this lawsuit.
3. Since the lawsuit is being brought by the public prosecutor, it is a criminal matter (people go to jail), as opposed to a civil matter (people pay a fine).
I am guessing that the principal grounds of the lawsuit are that Air France did not train its pilots well enough. This has interesting implications both for pilot training in general and for the return of the MAX to service.
1. It's a good bet that AIr France's training meets all the rules set out by the EASA regarding hours in the simulator and hours in the classroom. It's another good bet that the syllabus of Air France's training program is comparable to those of all other major airlines. Furthermore, it's likely that Airbus knew enough about Air France`s training program to have complained about any shortcoming, but didn't. What, then, should Air France have done? Did it not do enough basic training? More hours in the sim? Some hours in the air?
2. If Air France should have given special training to deal with peculiarities of the sidestick and, in particular, the absence of any annunciator to show each pilot what theother was doing, then part of the fault would lie with Airbus. Since Airbus is not a defendant, the sidestick must not be an issue.
3. If a 4,000-hour Air France co-pilot isn't good enough, then a 300-hour Ethiopian co-pilot doesn't have a prayer.
4. What would the French prosecutor say about Ethiopian Airlines, who failed to train their pilots to deal with an MCAS failure? Boeing, who didn't tell anybody about MCAS, would have to bear a lot of the blame.
5. All airlines should be shocked by this lawsuit. They have relied on the rules set by the regulators. They have set up their training programs in much the same way, and have done so for decades. What is the new standard going to be?
6. All regulators should also be shocked by this lawsuit. If a major airline failed to the point of criminality despite meeting the rules, then there need to be some new
rules. It is the regulators' job to produce these new rules.
Question: So, why this lawsuit now? The answer rests on realizing how the world works. (Please, moderators, do not delete this post because I say the following, which is simply how the world works.) The French prosecutors did not bring this lawsuit without the knowledge of EASA.
Answer #1: This lawsuit ties in very nicely with the ICAO talks going on in Montreal. Regulators from around the world are trying to figure out how to re-define the minimum training standards for pilots. It is well known that the U.S. favours the traditional total-hour approach and that many other countries, including Europe, favour a different approach, in which fewer hours are accepted in exchange for other tests based on quality or diversity of those hours. This lawsuit goes right to the heart of the matter, that the number of hours does not necessarily correspond with ability to perform.
Answer #2: The lawsuit also buttresses EASA if it takes a hard line in the negotiations about returning the MAX to service. In the face of this lawsuit, it is going to be
awfully hard for Boeing to argue that no real training is needed.
YYZjim
It has been disclosed (see another thread) that prosecutors in France have brought a lawsuit against Air France in the matter of AF447's mid-Atlantic crash. I haven't seen any real details, but it seems that:
1. The lawsuit is not being brought against Airbus, the manufacturer.
2. The regulator EASA is not participating as a plaintiff in this lawsuit.
3. Since the lawsuit is being brought by the public prosecutor, it is a criminal matter (people go to jail), as opposed to a civil matter (people pay a fine).
I am guessing that the principal grounds of the lawsuit are that Air France did not train its pilots well enough. This has interesting implications both for pilot training in general and for the return of the MAX to service.
1. It's a good bet that AIr France's training meets all the rules set out by the EASA regarding hours in the simulator and hours in the classroom. It's another good bet that the syllabus of Air France's training program is comparable to those of all other major airlines. Furthermore, it's likely that Airbus knew enough about Air France`s training program to have complained about any shortcoming, but didn't. What, then, should Air France have done? Did it not do enough basic training? More hours in the sim? Some hours in the air?
2. If Air France should have given special training to deal with peculiarities of the sidestick and, in particular, the absence of any annunciator to show each pilot what theother was doing, then part of the fault would lie with Airbus. Since Airbus is not a defendant, the sidestick must not be an issue.
3. If a 4,000-hour Air France co-pilot isn't good enough, then a 300-hour Ethiopian co-pilot doesn't have a prayer.
4. What would the French prosecutor say about Ethiopian Airlines, who failed to train their pilots to deal with an MCAS failure? Boeing, who didn't tell anybody about MCAS, would have to bear a lot of the blame.
5. All airlines should be shocked by this lawsuit. They have relied on the rules set by the regulators. They have set up their training programs in much the same way, and have done so for decades. What is the new standard going to be?
6. All regulators should also be shocked by this lawsuit. If a major airline failed to the point of criminality despite meeting the rules, then there need to be some new
rules. It is the regulators' job to produce these new rules.
Question: So, why this lawsuit now? The answer rests on realizing how the world works. (Please, moderators, do not delete this post because I say the following, which is simply how the world works.) The French prosecutors did not bring this lawsuit without the knowledge of EASA.
Answer #1: This lawsuit ties in very nicely with the ICAO talks going on in Montreal. Regulators from around the world are trying to figure out how to re-define the minimum training standards for pilots. It is well known that the U.S. favours the traditional total-hour approach and that many other countries, including Europe, favour a different approach, in which fewer hours are accepted in exchange for other tests based on quality or diversity of those hours. This lawsuit goes right to the heart of the matter, that the number of hours does not necessarily correspond with ability to perform.
Answer #2: The lawsuit also buttresses EASA if it takes a hard line in the negotiations about returning the MAX to service. In the face of this lawsuit, it is going to be
awfully hard for Boeing to argue that no real training is needed.
YYZjim
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The text of the prosecution has been published ;
The SNPL issued a statement earlier today attacking Airbus . Unfortunately only in French here : https://snpl.com/cp-requisitoire-inc...nsible-airbus/
The SNPL issued a statement earlier today attacking Airbus . Unfortunately only in French here : https://snpl.com/cp-requisitoire-inc...nsible-airbus/
While this indictment concludes that AIR FRANCE has been referred to the Correctional Tribunal because of "insufficient information to its crews about the incidents
(of PITOT probes) that occurred in the previous months, their consequences and the procedure apply, in the context of insufficient training of pilots at high altitudes,
a lack of adaptation of their training and a faulty operational treatment, it would be incomprehensible if, for the same reasons, AIRBUS was not dismissed before the
Tribunal to be tried.
Indeed, it was the AIRBUS crew training manual that stated "the effectiveness of the architecture of electric flight controls and the existence of flight laws eliminate
the need to be trained in the recovery manoeuvres of a loss of control of the aircraft on "protected AIRBUS aircraft" by omitting a major fact: after the autopilot is cut
off due to the icing of the PITOT probes the aircraft is no longer protected.
Regards, Peter
PS Used Translate.com as Google Translate seemed to introduce an erroneous negative.
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Todays news on quality...these are prolems on military aircraft with significant oversight...just think of the production line for civilian aircraft....
Bloomberg has reported that the Pentagon is faulting Boeing for continuing quality, management and other deficiencies in the production of F-15s and F/A-18 fighters at its St Louis production facility.
Undelivered aircraft have been found with missing, backwards and out-of-specification fasteners. Jets under assembly are inadvertently damaged when they hit maintenance work stands or other equipment on the floor.
However the company said it’s addressing the watchdog’s concerns.
“Boeing and the Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA] work together to address open corrective action requests through the evaluation and implementation of solutions that resolve identified issues,” spokesman Philip Carder said in an email response to questions about the unresolved alerts.
“Boeing is either currently implementing corrective plans already approved by DCMA or awaiting approval from the agency on corrective plans we have submitted” for the four open requests, Carder added.
According Bloomberg the watchdog is responsible for monitoring the performance of defense contracts at company facilities. It issues Corrective Action Requests (CARs) of varying degrees of severity from a Category I (the most basic) to Category III and IV alerts that go to top management. Boeing has four Category III requests outstanding.
The cases have been ongoing for years, with two stretching more than 800 days. The oldest was issued because Boeing had an ineffective corrective system that “failed to prevent recurrence of” deficiencies “identified through multiple repeat ‘safety of flight’” flaws, or “non-conformances.”
The second-oldest unresolved alert was issued for what’s called “ineffective control” of material that didn’t meet specifications because of the company’s “departure from contractual requirements regarding the identification, control and disclosure of non-conforming material,” the agency said.
A third unresolved request, originally issued to highlight inadequate “management responsibility” on the F-15 program, has been lingering for more than 737 days. The agency found “repeat instances of aircraft damage” and safety “non-compliances” to technical orders that “demonstrated a failure in Boeing St. Louis top management” of a “commitment to ensure compliance to requirements.”
Bloomberg has reported that the Pentagon is faulting Boeing for continuing quality, management and other deficiencies in the production of F-15s and F/A-18 fighters at its St Louis production facility.
Undelivered aircraft have been found with missing, backwards and out-of-specification fasteners. Jets under assembly are inadvertently damaged when they hit maintenance work stands or other equipment on the floor.
However the company said it’s addressing the watchdog’s concerns.
“Boeing and the Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA] work together to address open corrective action requests through the evaluation and implementation of solutions that resolve identified issues,” spokesman Philip Carder said in an email response to questions about the unresolved alerts.
“Boeing is either currently implementing corrective plans already approved by DCMA or awaiting approval from the agency on corrective plans we have submitted” for the four open requests, Carder added.
According Bloomberg the watchdog is responsible for monitoring the performance of defense contracts at company facilities. It issues Corrective Action Requests (CARs) of varying degrees of severity from a Category I (the most basic) to Category III and IV alerts that go to top management. Boeing has four Category III requests outstanding.
The cases have been ongoing for years, with two stretching more than 800 days. The oldest was issued because Boeing had an ineffective corrective system that “failed to prevent recurrence of” deficiencies “identified through multiple repeat ‘safety of flight’” flaws, or “non-conformances.”
The second-oldest unresolved alert was issued for what’s called “ineffective control” of material that didn’t meet specifications because of the company’s “departure from contractual requirements regarding the identification, control and disclosure of non-conforming material,” the agency said.
A third unresolved request, originally issued to highlight inadequate “management responsibility” on the F-15 program, has been lingering for more than 737 days. The agency found “repeat instances of aircraft damage” and safety “non-compliances” to technical orders that “demonstrated a failure in Boeing St. Louis top management” of a “commitment to ensure compliance to requirements.”
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Todays news on quality...these are prolems on military aircraft with significant oversight...just think of the production line for civilian aircraft....
Bloomberg has reported that the Pentagon is faulting Boeing for continuing quality, management and other deficiencies in the production of F-15s and F/A-18 fighters at its St Louis production facility.
Undelivered aircraft have been found with missing, backwards and out-of-specification fasteners. Jets under assembly are inadvertently damaged when they hit maintenance work stands or other equipment on the floor.
However the company said it’s addressing the watchdog’s concerns.
“Boeing and the Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA] work together to address open corrective action requests through the evaluation and implementation of solutions that resolve identified issues,” spokesman Philip Carder said in an email response to questions about the unresolved alerts.
“Boeing is either currently implementing corrective plans already approved by DCMA or awaiting approval from the agency on corrective plans we have submitted” for the four open requests, Carder added.
According Bloomberg the watchdog is responsible for monitoring the performance of defense contracts at company facilities. It issues Corrective Action Requests (CARs) of varying degrees of severity from a Category I (the most basic) to Category III and IV alerts that go to top management. Boeing has four Category III requests outstanding.
The cases have been ongoing for years, with two stretching more than 800 days. The oldest was issued because Boeing had an ineffective corrective system that “failed to prevent recurrence of” deficiencies “identified through multiple repeat ‘safety of flight’” flaws, or “non-conformances.”
The second-oldest unresolved alert was issued for what’s called “ineffective control” of material that didn’t meet specifications because of the company’s “departure from contractual requirements regarding the identification, control and disclosure of non-conforming material,” the agency said.
A third unresolved request, originally issued to highlight inadequate “management responsibility” on the F-15 program, has been lingering for more than 737 days. The agency found “repeat instances of aircraft damage” and safety “non-compliances” to technical orders that “demonstrated a failure in Boeing St. Louis top management” of a “commitment to ensure compliance to requirements.”
Bloomberg has reported that the Pentagon is faulting Boeing for continuing quality, management and other deficiencies in the production of F-15s and F/A-18 fighters at its St Louis production facility.
Undelivered aircraft have been found with missing, backwards and out-of-specification fasteners. Jets under assembly are inadvertently damaged when they hit maintenance work stands or other equipment on the floor.
However the company said it’s addressing the watchdog’s concerns.
“Boeing and the Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA] work together to address open corrective action requests through the evaluation and implementation of solutions that resolve identified issues,” spokesman Philip Carder said in an email response to questions about the unresolved alerts.
“Boeing is either currently implementing corrective plans already approved by DCMA or awaiting approval from the agency on corrective plans we have submitted” for the four open requests, Carder added.
According Bloomberg the watchdog is responsible for monitoring the performance of defense contracts at company facilities. It issues Corrective Action Requests (CARs) of varying degrees of severity from a Category I (the most basic) to Category III and IV alerts that go to top management. Boeing has four Category III requests outstanding.
The cases have been ongoing for years, with two stretching more than 800 days. The oldest was issued because Boeing had an ineffective corrective system that “failed to prevent recurrence of” deficiencies “identified through multiple repeat ‘safety of flight’” flaws, or “non-conformances.”
The second-oldest unresolved alert was issued for what’s called “ineffective control” of material that didn’t meet specifications because of the company’s “departure from contractual requirements regarding the identification, control and disclosure of non-conforming material,” the agency said.
A third unresolved request, originally issued to highlight inadequate “management responsibility” on the F-15 program, has been lingering for more than 737 days. The agency found “repeat instances of aircraft damage” and safety “non-compliances” to technical orders that “demonstrated a failure in Boeing St. Louis top management” of a “commitment to ensure compliance to requirements.”
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This whole drama is getting out of control
1. Rewire the switches 1 switch is cut out automation , 2 is cut out all power to trim motor - if this needs pilots to go to the sim sorry but go.
2. Trim wheel design incorporate a small gear box to extend the turn of the trimwheel or make the trimwheel handle extend beyond the size of of the trimwheel , but then from kneebuster it would become kneekiller. So i guess put a compensating gear box / damper under the floor.
Happy days again , and all the a321 has a pitch condition also
1. Rewire the switches 1 switch is cut out automation , 2 is cut out all power to trim motor - if this needs pilots to go to the sim sorry but go.
2. Trim wheel design incorporate a small gear box to extend the turn of the trimwheel or make the trimwheel handle extend beyond the size of of the trimwheel , but then from kneebuster it would become kneekiller. So i guess put a compensating gear box / damper under the floor.
Happy days again , and all the a321 has a pitch condition also
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This whole drama is getting out of control
2. Trim wheel design incorporate a small gear box to extend the turn of the trimwheel or make the trimwheel handle extend beyond the size of of the trimwheel , but then from kneebuster it would become kneekiller. So i guess put a compensating gear box / damper under the floor.
2. Trim wheel design incorporate a small gear box to extend the turn of the trimwheel or make the trimwheel handle extend beyond the size of of the trimwheel , but then from kneebuster it would become kneekiller. So i guess put a compensating gear box / damper under the floor.
The trim wheel speed when powered by the motor will also increase.
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Must read "it would be incomprehensible if, for the same reasons, AIRBUS was
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That A330 did not actively and without a warning try to kill everyone though. It told the crew it's going to direct law, it produced stall warnings. If anything, what that A330 didn't do was drop the nose rather than
. If it did, probably everyone in the cockpit would recognise it was a stall. Ok, another thing that A330 didn't do was saying "hey guys, are you sure pulling the stick is a good idea under these circumstances?".
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That A330 did not actively and without a warning try to kill everyone though. It told the crew it's going to direct law, it produced stall warnings. If anything, what that A330 didn't do was drop the nose rather than maintain high AoA when it was stalled. If it did, probably everyone in the cockpit would recognise it was a stall. Ok, another thing that A330 didn't do was saying "hey guys, are you sure pulling the stick is a good idea under these circumstances?".
For the Max, the airlines could/should say how often pilots trained in manual flight and maintaining neutral trim with the thumb switch on the control column?
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so even if you end up doing a 100 or 200 but you are able to do it makes a big difference
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How long is it going to take for Boeing to admit that moving the engines forward to accomodate bigger engines results in increasing amounts of lift forward of the CoG depending on AoA and that they were trying to address an engineering design issue with a software fix. Would it not have been better to use 757 type undercarriage and leave the engines under the wing?
How long is it going to take for Boeing to admit that moving the engines forward to accomodate bigger engines results in increasing amounts of lift forward of the CoG depending on AoA and that they were trying to address an engineering design issue with a software fix. Would it not have been better to use 757 type undercarriage and leave the engines under the wing?
B757 gear swing.
As you can see room is an issue, as the 757 gear is also longer the gear would need to be moved outboard - such changes might require "training" take time and cost money.
Ennhh - longer stuts for better engine clearance does not require a 4-wheel bogey. Just - a longer strut.
The MAX10 was already planned to have a "shrink link" on the gear plus an extension lever - to give another 9"/24cm of strut length at rotation, while still fitting into the 7-8-9 wheel bay.
I notice Boeing just announced an expected write-down of $4.9 BILLION due to the MAX8 mess - that would have paid for a lot of landing gear mods.
https://www.latimes.com/business/sto...lout-new-story
The MAX10 was already planned to have a "shrink link" on the gear plus an extension lever - to give another 9"/24cm of strut length at rotation, while still fitting into the 7-8-9 wheel bay.
I notice Boeing just announced an expected write-down of $4.9 BILLION due to the MAX8 mess - that would have paid for a lot of landing gear mods.
https://www.latimes.com/business/sto...lout-new-story
50 revolutions of the trim wheel is nowhere near end-to-end - that number of turns only moves the stab about 3 degrees (units).
Ennhh - longer stuts for better engine clearance does not require a 4-wheel bogey. Just - a longer strut.
The MAX10 was already planned to have a "shrink link" on the gear plus an extension lever - to give another 9"/24cm of strut length at rotation, while still fitting into the 7-8-9 wheel bay.
I notice Boeing just announced an expected write-down of $4.9 BILLION due to the MAX8 mess - that would have paid for a lot of landing gear mods.
https://www.latimes.com/business/sto...lout-new-story
The MAX10 was already planned to have a "shrink link" on the gear plus an extension lever - to give another 9"/24cm of strut length at rotation, while still fitting into the 7-8-9 wheel bay.
I notice Boeing just announced an expected write-down of $4.9 BILLION due to the MAX8 mess - that would have paid for a lot of landing gear mods.
https://www.latimes.com/business/sto...lout-new-story
There may now never be a MAX 10 as it may be best to scrap that idea and return orders - that would be an accounting decision based on how lifting this grounding goes I expect.
I think the value in the MAX 10 is now gone and best that money put towards a clean sheet type.
The next Bloomberg item will be on the KC program i guess finding tools and rubbish in the planes , but this has nothing todo with the 737 program in renton which has been running like clockwork for all these years. Yeap the other Boeing facilities might need to go take a look there.
If Concorde engineers, 50 years ago, could design a “ shortening” main gear to enable retraction into the available space, it seems strange that Boeing did not leave the engines in the original location and incorporate a longer strut on the original Max design.
I am fairly sure Safran could have solved the issue.
Its a long time since I flew 737 but I hear, from colleagues who flew the 800, the risk of tailstrikes on the Max, which might have been eliminated with longer gear was “ fixed” by increasing V ref to lead to a lower body angle at touchdown. Sounds strange as higher V ref equals longer landing distance etc, higher brake wear etc etc.
Anyone in the know ?
I am fairly sure Safran could have solved the issue.
Its a long time since I flew 737 but I hear, from colleagues who flew the 800, the risk of tailstrikes on the Max, which might have been eliminated with longer gear was “ fixed” by increasing V ref to lead to a lower body angle at touchdown. Sounds strange as higher V ref equals longer landing distance etc, higher brake wear etc etc.
Anyone in the know ?
If Concorde engineers, 50 years ago, could design a “ shortening” main gear to enable retraction into the available space, it seems strange that Boeing did not leave the engines in the original location and incorporate a longer strut on the original Max design.
I am fairly sure Safran could have solved the issue.
Its a long time since I flew 737 but I hear, from colleagues who flew the 800, the risk of tailstrikes on the Max, which might have been eliminated with longer gear was “ fixed” by increasing V ref to lead to a lower body angle at touchdown. Sounds strange as higher V ref equals longer landing distance etc, higher brake wear etc etc.
Anyone in the know ?
I am fairly sure Safran could have solved the issue.
Its a long time since I flew 737 but I hear, from colleagues who flew the 800, the risk of tailstrikes on the Max, which might have been eliminated with longer gear was “ fixed” by increasing V ref to lead to a lower body angle at touchdown. Sounds strange as higher V ref equals longer landing distance etc, higher brake wear etc etc.
Anyone in the know ?
Concord, B747, Apollo 13
Only 2 things since have dramatically changed.