MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
I hate the cold but snowflakes are pretty.
The commentary of the last few posts suggests that something very important is broken at Boeing and it is not being fixed, if that problem is not fixed it is going to be very hard to fix the MAX correctly.
There is a hole in the bucket dear Boeing, dear Boeing!
Those effected seek help if you need, no shame and better than passing on the pain.
The commentary of the last few posts suggests that something very important is broken at Boeing and it is not being fixed, if that problem is not fixed it is going to be very hard to fix the MAX correctly.
There is a hole in the bucket dear Boeing, dear Boeing!
Those effected seek help if you need, no shame and better than passing on the pain.
Re stan- yep my fat finger issue again.
And also a moving issue re the DER-AR thing was the SPEEA strike.
My point is still the same - a few of the senior level grunts in the trenches most likely had to choose between certanity ( being sent to alaska to count snowflakes for two years temp duty ) by speaking up to power or the probablitly that maybe- just maybe based on past " history " of the NG, all would be OK.
And also a moving issue re the DER-AR thing was the SPEEA strike.
My point is still the same - a few of the senior level grunts in the trenches most likely had to choose between certanity ( being sent to alaska to count snowflakes for two years temp duty ) by speaking up to power or the probablitly that maybe- just maybe based on past " history " of the NG, all would be OK.
Letting Alan Mulally go to Ford (instead of making him Boeing CEO) is one of the biggest mistakes Boeing ever made.
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I think it is important to note that whether Boeing was the impetus or involved at all in the transition to ARs is sort of meaningless. The AR was the person(s) who were supposed to be the safety-net, to catch schlock work like that that was done on MCAS. The problem was/is Boeing as a company and an institution did schlock work that resulted in 300+ deaths. The problem was not the AR(s) on the project. (Yes, that system is effed and needs to be killed in short order, and yes, by not forcing the work to be redone until it was satisfactory they contributed, but the problem, the root of the problem, is Boeing deliberately did schlock work.)The AR facilitating that process would have been meaningless if Boeing had done quality work in the first place.
For anyone involved in this project I can only imagine how devastating it must be to have or suspect knowledge that they may have contributed to the sick joke of a solution that was MCAS and the resultant outcome of that solution.
People of conscience, when faced with the reality that their creation killed 300+ people respond with contrition and empathy for the loss. In extreme cases they look within and find it lacking to the point of considering personal harm- which is an absolute tragedy piled onto an already tragic situation.
Boeing executives on the other hand, when faced with the same reality blame the crews, airlines and pretty much anyone they can come up with to put the finger on. For them it isn't "I'm sorry." Its repeating insults like "Safety is ALWAYS Boeing's first priority." Which is exactly what you would expect to hear from an executive in the wake of a tragedy if he did not in fact care a whit.
I feel very bad for the people of conscience and I fear that there will be more victims of this debacle before it is truly over. Equally I revile the execs as they are the ultimate corporate shill- something Boeing has seemed to have many of in the past 15 or so years.
Regards,
dce
For anyone involved in this project I can only imagine how devastating it must be to have or suspect knowledge that they may have contributed to the sick joke of a solution that was MCAS and the resultant outcome of that solution.
People of conscience, when faced with the reality that their creation killed 300+ people respond with contrition and empathy for the loss. In extreme cases they look within and find it lacking to the point of considering personal harm- which is an absolute tragedy piled onto an already tragic situation.
Boeing executives on the other hand, when faced with the same reality blame the crews, airlines and pretty much anyone they can come up with to put the finger on. For them it isn't "I'm sorry." Its repeating insults like "Safety is ALWAYS Boeing's first priority." Which is exactly what you would expect to hear from an executive in the wake of a tragedy if he did not in fact care a whit.
I feel very bad for the people of conscience and I fear that there will be more victims of this debacle before it is truly over. Equally I revile the execs as they are the ultimate corporate shill- something Boeing has seemed to have many of in the past 15 or so years.
Regards,
dce
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At the risk of further thread drift - yes Boeing embraced going to a delegated authority in the aftermath of the strike, but it wasn't their idea - it came from DC. After watching in horror as the engineer strike effectively shut down the commercial aircraft side of the company down (zero deliveries during the strike), they naively believed moving to a delegated authority would make aircraft deliveries less dependent on engineering (which was laughably wrong)
No can do. Already taken by Airbus Helicopters.
Kinda neatly explains the spin: "This MCAS, we previously told you nothing about, ıs merely a pitch feel modifier and absolutely not SAS or anti-stall device", doesn't it?
Oh, BTW, if you hang larger diameter engines a bit forward on the same old airframe, do you really expect that the pitch will be the only affected axis?
I'd say that Loren Thompson's piece can be useful as a stark reminder how Richard Feynman was right when he gave his final verdict on STS-51-L catastrophe:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/23.672
14 CFR 23.672 - Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems
14 CFR 23.672 - Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems
Oh, BTW, if you hang larger diameter engines a bit forward on the same old airframe, do you really expect that the pitch will be the only affected axis?
I'd say that Loren Thompson's piece can be useful as a stark reminder how Richard Feynman was right when he gave his final verdict on STS-51-L catastrophe:
For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature can not be fooled.
Moderator
This MCAS, we previously told you nothing about, ıs merely a pitch feel modifier and absolutely not SAS or anti-stall device
Is not any longitudinal SAS a pitch feel modifier ? .. inadequate pitch forces being the reason for SAS in the first place ? I concur with the inference that the anti-stall call was a media mis-hype mistake.
Is not any longitudinal SAS a pitch feel modifier ? .. inadequate pitch forces being the reason for SAS in the first place ? I concur with the inference that the anti-stall call was a media mis-hype mistake.
This MCAS, we previously told you nothing about, ıs merely a pitch feel modifier and absolutely not SAS or anti-stall device
Is not any longitudinal SAS a pitch feel modifier ? .. inadequate pitch forces being the reason for SAS in the first place ? I concur with the inference that the anti-stall call was a media mis-hype mistake.
Is not any longitudinal SAS a pitch feel modifier ? .. inadequate pitch forces being the reason for SAS in the first place ? I concur with the inference that the anti-stall call was a media mis-hype mistake.
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This MCAS, we previously told you nothing about, ıs merely a pitch feel modifier and absolutely not SAS or anti-stall device
Is not any longitudinal SAS a pitch feel modifier ? .. inadequate pitch forces being the reason for SAS in the first place ? I concur with the inference that the anti-stall call was a media mis-hype mistake.
Is not any longitudinal SAS a pitch feel modifier ? .. inadequate pitch forces being the reason for SAS in the first place ? I concur with the inference that the anti-stall call was a media mis-hype mistake.
Perhaps part of the problem is the absence of a crisp - but mildly pejorative - term for the unwanted behaviour. Maybe "oversteer in pitch" captures some of the semantics, while still being somewhat clumsy.
Moderator
I would be interested in your opinion on the automatic use of stabiliser trim to correct pitch feel
In respect of the Boeing, I can only speculate.
For lighties, the normal way to influence stability deficiencies is by means of elevator circuit downsprings or bob weights depending on what problems are being tweaked. For a typical SAS requirement, the use of a variable downspring for the high alpha, low speed, high thrust environment is usual. With a bit of clever engineering, this latter widget modifies the speed-force characteristic away from whatever the engine normal forces might be doing in the way of nasty things.
My guess, and I emphasise that is all it is, is that Boeing cast about for, and used, something the aircraft had (a controllable stab) to mimic the more conventional techniques. One presumes, when it worked OK (ie no failure consideration), the TPs were happy to sign off ? From my reading of the tea leaves, it was just such a tragedy that the FMECA deficiencies had such a profoundly undesired outcome with the two mishap aircraft.
Perhaps part of the problem is the absence
There's naught unusual about stick force stability problems and the relevant design engineering folks have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence whatever undesirable stuff might come out of the FT program. Very few aircraft have no stability problems to sort out during the work up program. Boeing's approach might have been a tad unusual but the gameplan, presumably, was to get over the certification bar .. somewhere along the way, though, the design review processes fell down somewhat ...
In respect of the Boeing, I can only speculate.
For lighties, the normal way to influence stability deficiencies is by means of elevator circuit downsprings or bob weights depending on what problems are being tweaked. For a typical SAS requirement, the use of a variable downspring for the high alpha, low speed, high thrust environment is usual. With a bit of clever engineering, this latter widget modifies the speed-force characteristic away from whatever the engine normal forces might be doing in the way of nasty things.
My guess, and I emphasise that is all it is, is that Boeing cast about for, and used, something the aircraft had (a controllable stab) to mimic the more conventional techniques. One presumes, when it worked OK (ie no failure consideration), the TPs were happy to sign off ? From my reading of the tea leaves, it was just such a tragedy that the FMECA deficiencies had such a profoundly undesired outcome with the two mishap aircraft.
Perhaps part of the problem is the absence
There's naught unusual about stick force stability problems and the relevant design engineering folks have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence whatever undesirable stuff might come out of the FT program. Very few aircraft have no stability problems to sort out during the work up program. Boeing's approach might have been a tad unusual but the gameplan, presumably, was to get over the certification bar .. somewhere along the way, though, the design review processes fell down somewhat ...
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I lived through the transition from FAA to delegated authority (morphing from a DER to an Authorized Representative - AR - in the process - all of which predated McNearney by a few years). It wasn't Boeing's idea -
I remember the transition as well, from the avionics perspective..those departments, like AFS 440/460, within the FAA did NOT want to loose any control, and with delegated authority, it made it very, very difficult to get anything done....airspace and procedure design still are far behind as a result.
I moved on to work only outside of the US as a result.
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At the risk of further thread drift - yes Boeing embraced going to a delegated authority in the aftermath of the strike, but it wasn't their idea - it came from DC. After watching in horror as the engineer strike effectively shut down the commercial aircraft side of the company down (zero deliveries during the strike), they naively believed moving to a delegated authority would make aircraft deliveries less dependent on engineering (which was laughably wrong). That's apparently why Boeing jumped into the delegated authority with both feet, while most companies (GE and Pratt, to name two) took a very cautious wait and see approach (I was occasionally asked for my opinion of delegated authority by my friends at GE and Pratt - my actual response would get me banned from PPRuNe, but basically I told them look at what Boeing did, and then do something completely different). But make no mistake - delegated authority was driven from Washington DC.
Letting Alan Mulally go to Ford (instead of making him Boeing CEO) is one of the biggest mistakes Boeing ever made.
Letting Alan Mulally go to Ford (instead of making him Boeing CEO) is one of the biggest mistakes Boeing ever made.
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A reminder that, excepting what caused the AOA vane failure in the first place, that this was from the drafting board to the cockpit a long chain of human errors that led to tragedy. I seriously doubt anyone thought they were being willfully careless, but a strong safety culture requires more than just assuming that things will go as planned. Hopefully all the appropriate lesson will be learned.
I would be interested in your opinion on the automatic use of stabiliser trim to correct pitch feel
In respect of the Boeing, I can only speculate.
For lighties, the normal way to influence stability deficiencies is by means of elevator circuit downsprings or bob weights depending on what problems are being tweaked. For a typical SAS requirement, the use of a variable downspring for the high alpha, low speed, high thrust environment is usual. With a bit of clever engineering, this latter widget modifies the speed-force characteristic away from whatever the engine normal forces might be doing in the way of nasty things.
My guess, and I emphasise that is all it is, is that Boeing cast about for, and used, something the aircraft had (a controllable stab) to mimic the more conventional techniques. One presumes, when it worked OK (ie no failure consideration), the TPs were happy to sign off ? From my reading of the tea leaves, it was just such a tragedy that the FMECA deficiencies had such a profoundly undesired outcome with the two mishap aircraft.
Perhaps part of the problem is the absence
There's naught unusual about stick force stability problems and the relevant design engineering folks have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence whatever undesirable stuff might come out of the FT program. Very few aircraft have no stability problems to sort out during the work up program. Boeing's approach might have been a tad unusual but the gameplan, presumably, was to get over the certification bar .. somewhere along the way, though, the design review processes fell down somewhat ...
In respect of the Boeing, I can only speculate.
For lighties, the normal way to influence stability deficiencies is by means of elevator circuit downsprings or bob weights depending on what problems are being tweaked. For a typical SAS requirement, the use of a variable downspring for the high alpha, low speed, high thrust environment is usual. With a bit of clever engineering, this latter widget modifies the speed-force characteristic away from whatever the engine normal forces might be doing in the way of nasty things.
My guess, and I emphasise that is all it is, is that Boeing cast about for, and used, something the aircraft had (a controllable stab) to mimic the more conventional techniques. One presumes, when it worked OK (ie no failure consideration), the TPs were happy to sign off ? From my reading of the tea leaves, it was just such a tragedy that the FMECA deficiencies had such a profoundly undesired outcome with the two mishap aircraft.
Perhaps part of the problem is the absence
There's naught unusual about stick force stability problems and the relevant design engineering folks have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence whatever undesirable stuff might come out of the FT program. Very few aircraft have no stability problems to sort out during the work up program. Boeing's approach might have been a tad unusual but the gameplan, presumably, was to get over the certification bar .. somewhere along the way, though, the design review processes fell down somewhat ...
The engineers will not have relied solely on failure mode analysis software I imagine, but will have gone through the mechanics and electronics / electrics design with a fine tooth comb too?
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In the case of Nasa there was no fix for the STS, it turned out to be a flawed design and prone to failure, and in the end rather than attempt the impossible and fix NASA and redesign the vehicle, the US chose to entrust the crewed earth to LEO mission to the soviets or their successors who had a reliable process, and presumably abandon the miltary crewed LEO civilian missions entirely.
In the case of Boeing, as Loren Thompson’s piece points out, a million jobs in the US depend on Boeing. And the government is not allowed to step in and fix Boeing by enforcing regime change, and swapping out management, so they are reduced to grounding the planes and hope that Boeing will get the message and fix them, and improve the rpocess for the next design. Unfortunately Boeing believes that the tail can wag the dog, and that they can lobby their way out of a real fix, and bribe their customers to accept a fig leaf.
It is now pretty clear to all bystanders that Boeing will win. Capitalism has its adavantages and disadvantages, and that is why it has beeen historically more pleasant to live in the US than in the Soviet Union, unless you happened to be an astronaut and wanted to stay alive, and the job made you get into an STS that had a 2% chance of failure per mission. For a civilian transport, The 737 Max has a pretty bad statistic on its side now too, I understand that in a hard job market pilots can accept the risk it poses for themseves, but is it necessary to inflict this risk on the innocent passngers?
Edmund
In the case of Boeing, as Loren Thompson’s piece points out, a million jobs in the US depend on Boeing. And the government is not allowed to step in and fix Boeing by enforcing regime change, and swapping out management, so they are reduced to grounding the planes and hope that Boeing will get the message and fix them, and improve the rpocess for the next design. Unfortunately Boeing believes that the tail can wag the dog, and that they can lobby their way out of a real fix, and bribe their customers to accept a fig leaf.
It is now pretty clear to all bystanders that Boeing will win. Capitalism has its adavantages and disadvantages, and that is why it has beeen historically more pleasant to live in the US than in the Soviet Union, unless you happened to be an astronaut and wanted to stay alive, and the job made you get into an STS that had a 2% chance of failure per mission. For a civilian transport, The 737 Max has a pretty bad statistic on its side now too, I understand that in a hard job market pilots can accept the risk it poses for themseves, but is it necessary to inflict this risk on the innocent passngers?
Edmund
No can do. Already taken by Airbus Helicopters.
Kinda neatly explains the spin: "This MCAS, we previously told you nothing about, ıs merely a pitch feel modifier and absolutely not SAS or anti-stall device", doesn't it?
Oh, BTW, if you hang larger diameter engines a bit forward on the same old airframe, do you really expect that the pitch will be the only affected axis?
I'd say that Loren Thompson's piece can be useful as a stark reminder how Richard Feynman was right when he gave his final verdict on STS-51-L catastrophe:
Kinda neatly explains the spin: "This MCAS, we previously told you nothing about, ıs merely a pitch feel modifier and absolutely not SAS or anti-stall device", doesn't it?
Oh, BTW, if you hang larger diameter engines a bit forward on the same old airframe, do you really expect that the pitch will be the only affected axis?
I'd say that Loren Thompson's piece can be useful as a stark reminder how Richard Feynman was right when he gave his final verdict on STS-51-L catastrophe:
Last edited by edmundronald; 14th Jul 2019 at 15:35.
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2020 Anyone?
WSJ: By Andy Pasztor , Alison Sider and Andrew Tangel (Updated July 14, 2019 12:07 pm ET )
Instead, they have had to cope without their MAX jets through what has proven an exceptionally busy summer. The Transportation Security Administration has notched eight of the 10 busiest days in its history since May.Senior Boeing executives and some FAA leaders have told government and industry officials they still expect the agency to be ready to lift the grounding in the fall, which presumably would enable the jets to resume carrying passengers before the end of the year. But based on a history of previous delays and unexpected technical challenges, many of these officials said, at this point sentiment seems to be building that a conservative January timeline is more realistic.The FAA has said it is following a thorough process that has no timetable, with agency leaders vowing to resolve all safety issues before allowing the planes back in the air.
Boeing has said it intends to “provide the FAA and the global regulators whatever information they need,” noting that the company won’t offer the 737 MAX “for certification by the FAA until we have satisfied all requirements” for such approval and safe return to service.The specific software fix for MCAS, an automated system that misfired, overpowered pilot commands and strongly pushed down the noses of both of the MAX airliners that crashed, has been essentially completed and awaiting formal FAA approval for months. But in the intervening period, Boeing and safety regulators have been delving into various related issues that cropped up from earlier engineering studies, ground-simulator sessions and flight tests.
During early stages of work on the fix, Boeing and FAA officials disagreed behind the scenes about the extent of changes needed to reduce hazards posed by the MCAS system, according to people familiar with the details. Then in March, just as Boeing was slated to submit a long-awaited proposal with the goal of jump-starting the process, new questions arose about related software systems and emergency checklists, requiring weeks of additional intense evaluation.
The topics included concerns about whether the average pilot has enough physical strength to manually crank a flight-control wheel in extreme emergencies.In late June, Boeing and the FAA disclosed still another flight-control problem on the MAX, involving failure of a microprocessor that meant test pilots couldn’t counteract a potential misfire of MCAS as quickly as required.Since the 737 MAX and its earlier version, called the 737 NG, share the same flight-control computer, fixes related to the microprocessor also apply to NG models, thousands of which remain in service around the world. Boeing also faces the task of convincing the FAA that a software fix, instead of physically replacing the suspect electronic component on all MAX planes, will suffice.
Even assuming new MAX issues don’t crop up, Boeing will need FAA approval for its entire suite of fixes, not just those directly related to MCAS, along with a new round of flight tests, a green light for enhanced training procedures and approval of updated simulator software. In addition, airlines have said it could take them up to 45 days to complete necessary maintenance procedures and other mandatory checks by mechanics to bring MAX aircraft out of storage.From a purely technical standpoint, some senior FAA officials believe they could be in a position to approve Boeing’s proposed fix at some point in October, though working with international regulators on a coordinated return to service could cause a delay, according to one person briefed on the matter. Another wild card, this person added, relates to the potential impact of new FAA leadership if the U.S. Senate confirms Stephen Dickson in the fall as the next agency administrator.Each month the plane’s return is delayed means a new puzzle for airlines: how to build a new schedule that covers as much flying as possible with fewer jets. Some customers who had already planned flights have to be rebooked—sometimes at a less convenient time or with an added stop. Pilots and flight attendants also have to be reshuffled.Now, carriers are nervously eyeing the holiday season, when they will face a crush of travelers whose Thanksgiving and Christmas travel plans leave little wiggle room. United was supposed to have 30 MAXes in the coming months, up from 14. As a result it is cutting 2,900 flights in October—more than twice the number it has had to cull in July. American Airlines had 24 MAXes in its fleet at the time of the grounding—less than 3% of its total. But it was supposed to have 40 by the end of the year.At Southwest Airlines Co. , Alan Kasher, vice president of flight operations, said in a message to employees Friday that the airline is “overstaffed,” with more pilots than it needs to operate a shrunken schedule stemming from the grounding of its 34 MAX jets. Some Southwest pilots have complained of lost earnings from fewer flying opportunities.With the timing of the MAX’s return still murky, the airline is postponing training for some newly hired pilots who were set to start this fall and pushing back training for some current Southwest co-pilots on track to upgrade to captain.
Write to Andy Pasztor at [email protected], Alison Sider at [email protected] and Andrew Tangel at [email protected]
Fixing the Boeing Co. BA 1.76% 737 MAX’s flight-control software and completing other steps to start carrying passengers is likely to stretch into 2020, an increasing number of government and industry officials say, even as the company strives to get its jet back into service this year.The situation remains fluid, no firm timeline has been established and Boeing still has to satisfy U.S. regulators that it has answered all outstanding safety questions. But under the latest scenario, the global MAX fleet is now anticipated to return to the air in January 2020, a full 12 months after the plane maker proposed its initial replacement of software eventually implicated in a pair of fatal crashes, according to some Federal Aviation Administration officials and pilot-union leaders.
The process of developing and certifying revised software and pilot-training changes has been repeatedly delayed, with airlines scrambling to cope with slips month after month. Boeing executives, FAA engineers and international aviation regulators have steadily expanded their safety analyses to cover a growing list of issues spanning everything from emergency recovery procedures to potentially suspect electronic components. Some of those assessments are further complicated because they cover earlier 737 models.
Already, carriers have given up on flying their MAX planes until late this year. American Airlines Group Inc. said Sunday that it would keep the plane off its schedules through Nov. 2, two months beyond its previous target of an early September return. It’s the fifth time American has pushed off MAX flying since it first had to call off flights when regulators grounded the plane in March. United Airlines Holdings Inc. announced a similar move on Friday, but FAA officials and others tracking the issue said there’s no assurance the November date will hold.Airlines didn’t expect to be in this position at this point in the year, with no end to the grounding in sight. When American first decided to scrub MAX flights for much of the summer, executives said they were doing it to save customers from last minute cancellations but were still “highly confident” the plane would return sooner.
The process of developing and certifying revised software and pilot-training changes has been repeatedly delayed, with airlines scrambling to cope with slips month after month. Boeing executives, FAA engineers and international aviation regulators have steadily expanded their safety analyses to cover a growing list of issues spanning everything from emergency recovery procedures to potentially suspect electronic components. Some of those assessments are further complicated because they cover earlier 737 models.
Already, carriers have given up on flying their MAX planes until late this year. American Airlines Group Inc. said Sunday that it would keep the plane off its schedules through Nov. 2, two months beyond its previous target of an early September return. It’s the fifth time American has pushed off MAX flying since it first had to call off flights when regulators grounded the plane in March. United Airlines Holdings Inc. announced a similar move on Friday, but FAA officials and others tracking the issue said there’s no assurance the November date will hold.Airlines didn’t expect to be in this position at this point in the year, with no end to the grounding in sight. When American first decided to scrub MAX flights for much of the summer, executives said they were doing it to save customers from last minute cancellations but were still “highly confident” the plane would return sooner.
How Boeing’s 737 MAX Troubles Ripple Through the Industry
Boeing has said it intends to “provide the FAA and the global regulators whatever information they need,” noting that the company won’t offer the 737 MAX “for certification by the FAA until we have satisfied all requirements” for such approval and safe return to service.The specific software fix for MCAS, an automated system that misfired, overpowered pilot commands and strongly pushed down the noses of both of the MAX airliners that crashed, has been essentially completed and awaiting formal FAA approval for months. But in the intervening period, Boeing and safety regulators have been delving into various related issues that cropped up from earlier engineering studies, ground-simulator sessions and flight tests.
During early stages of work on the fix, Boeing and FAA officials disagreed behind the scenes about the extent of changes needed to reduce hazards posed by the MCAS system, according to people familiar with the details. Then in March, just as Boeing was slated to submit a long-awaited proposal with the goal of jump-starting the process, new questions arose about related software systems and emergency checklists, requiring weeks of additional intense evaluation.
The topics included concerns about whether the average pilot has enough physical strength to manually crank a flight-control wheel in extreme emergencies.In late June, Boeing and the FAA disclosed still another flight-control problem on the MAX, involving failure of a microprocessor that meant test pilots couldn’t counteract a potential misfire of MCAS as quickly as required.Since the 737 MAX and its earlier version, called the 737 NG, share the same flight-control computer, fixes related to the microprocessor also apply to NG models, thousands of which remain in service around the world. Boeing also faces the task of convincing the FAA that a software fix, instead of physically replacing the suspect electronic component on all MAX planes, will suffice.
Even assuming new MAX issues don’t crop up, Boeing will need FAA approval for its entire suite of fixes, not just those directly related to MCAS, along with a new round of flight tests, a green light for enhanced training procedures and approval of updated simulator software. In addition, airlines have said it could take them up to 45 days to complete necessary maintenance procedures and other mandatory checks by mechanics to bring MAX aircraft out of storage.From a purely technical standpoint, some senior FAA officials believe they could be in a position to approve Boeing’s proposed fix at some point in October, though working with international regulators on a coordinated return to service could cause a delay, according to one person briefed on the matter. Another wild card, this person added, relates to the potential impact of new FAA leadership if the U.S. Senate confirms Stephen Dickson in the fall as the next agency administrator.Each month the plane’s return is delayed means a new puzzle for airlines: how to build a new schedule that covers as much flying as possible with fewer jets. Some customers who had already planned flights have to be rebooked—sometimes at a less convenient time or with an added stop. Pilots and flight attendants also have to be reshuffled.Now, carriers are nervously eyeing the holiday season, when they will face a crush of travelers whose Thanksgiving and Christmas travel plans leave little wiggle room. United was supposed to have 30 MAXes in the coming months, up from 14. As a result it is cutting 2,900 flights in October—more than twice the number it has had to cull in July. American Airlines had 24 MAXes in its fleet at the time of the grounding—less than 3% of its total. But it was supposed to have 40 by the end of the year.At Southwest Airlines Co. , Alan Kasher, vice president of flight operations, said in a message to employees Friday that the airline is “overstaffed,” with more pilots than it needs to operate a shrunken schedule stemming from the grounding of its 34 MAX jets. Some Southwest pilots have complained of lost earnings from fewer flying opportunities.With the timing of the MAX’s return still murky, the airline is postponing training for some newly hired pilots who were set to start this fall and pushing back training for some current Southwest co-pilots on track to upgrade to captain.
Write to Andy Pasztor at [email protected], Alison Sider at [email protected] and Andrew Tangel at [email protected]
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putting Lindblad at the helm....look for nothing to happen for at least that long....(2020) or longer...that choice made NO sense.
I suspect that while the high profile positions are being "retired", I will bet a whole bunch of other positions are being vacated...
You are funny!
I suspect that while the high profile positions are being "retired", I will bet a whole bunch of other positions are being vacated...
Thank you for the answer. Much appreciated.
The engineers will not have relied solely on failure mode analysis software I imagine, but will have gone through the mechanics and electronics / electrics design with a fine tooth comb too?
The engineers will not have relied solely on failure mode analysis software I imagine, but will have gone through the mechanics and electronics / electrics design with a fine tooth comb too?
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It may be inferred that Thompson is suggesting that ""expeditious" RTF" is needed, but it is also able to be inferred that the importance of Boeing to the US economy is so large that they need to get it right, as in ensure they do not make it worse than it has been. Taking expedient short cuts in sorting out the problems would be a risky proposition, as the customer airlines and pax have the ability to choose with their pocket book, the consequences of which would be far reaching.
