MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
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Sometimes I disagree with his opinions, but at least for the facts part I didn't find anything wrong in his posts. At some point me and other posters thought we caught an obvious error in his claims, but when doing a bit of research I realized he was actually right.
He does seem to have a lot of information that most people don't have, which suggests he has access to some inside information directly or indirectly. But I regard that as a positive thing. We have a lot of questions that are not answered yet, and I for one welcome informed posts instead of assumptions and speculation.
That being said, he posts a lot. He seems to have a compulsion to reply to anyone that has an opinion that is even slightly different from his. That is becoming a bit annoying, but I think I can live with that, considering the rest of his contributions.
Psychophysiological entity
He seems to have a compulsion to reply to anyone that has an opinion that is even slightly different from his.
The sheer work in posting well written and factual opinions is, as he says, an investment in time. It makes a huge difference to the readers' ability to comprehend, and indeed enjoy, the interaction.
You can design the crew around the airplane and you can design the airplane around the crew, preferably both for best results.
Difficult aircraft with undesirable characteristics require highly trained crews. The military know this and have stringent selection criteria, only the best are going onto single pilot fast jets and a fortune is spent training them.
Airbus recognised years ago that experience levels and training standards were dropping and designed airliners to cater for this. Protections to prevent stalling, over speeding and excessive control force being applied were built in. Something goes wrong and a checklist pops on a screen.
These two methods worked well, Boeing put a poor aircraft in the hands of inadequately trained crew and we've seen the results. I'm not blaming the crews concerned, if Boeing had designed a better system and the crew were fully informed and trained in its operation the accidents wouldn't have happened.
Difficult aircraft with undesirable characteristics require highly trained crews. The military know this and have stringent selection criteria, only the best are going onto single pilot fast jets and a fortune is spent training them.
Airbus recognised years ago that experience levels and training standards were dropping and designed airliners to cater for this. Protections to prevent stalling, over speeding and excessive control force being applied were built in. Something goes wrong and a checklist pops on a screen.
These two methods worked well, Boeing put a poor aircraft in the hands of inadequately trained crew and we've seen the results. I'm not blaming the crews concerned, if Boeing had designed a better system and the crew were fully informed and trained in its operation the accidents wouldn't have happened.
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I saw your post before it got deleted. Try to post it again. It was a factual mathematical chart, should be no reason whatsoever to delete it.
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Mid last century such risks from a malfunction where accepted i.e. in the military because otherwise the performance would have suffered. But for today the system reliability need to be much higher. There are still risks like dual engine failures which would be very expensive to mitigate, but their probability and survivability is on an acceptable level.
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IMO the chart does not contain information that cannot be conveyed in a single well written paragraph. This is sometimes given the derogatory term 'chartjunk'.
Someone may not have liked it because it is hypothetical, and gives a gloss of fact, in a thread already full of rumour and speculation.
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Let's see, caught up with my morning's to-do and I see there's been a few more missives arrive tossed over the transom. How to respond.....
Sock Puppets. Apparently there are sock puppets among us. (Okay, I'll admit I had to go look this one up.) However, that would explain a great deal. Otherwise it is hard to imagine why certain people are trying so hard to deflect culpability away from Ethiopian (and maybe a bit of Lion Air) for their role in these tragedies. Ethiopian in particular has been a case study of "Deny, deny, deny" in regards to concerns with their operation since ET409 first splashed down in the Mediterranean nearly a decade ago. I imagine they have a number suitable english-proficient speakers (or other willing agents) that are more than happy to run cover so as not to endanger their source of low cost pilots and even lower cost training. Now that I think of it, it seems like a lot of airlines would like to deflect attention from the sorry state of their pilot training programs, so this really could be an international conspiracy being coordinated at the highest levels. So everyone please, please be on your guard for posters who rely heavily on emotion, ad hominem attacks, positions that are not supported by evidence, or other attempts to completely derail this thread (and maybe even get it locked out by the moderators).
He's too good. Some posters apparently have issue with the fact that I present articulate, well-researched, and persuasive arguments. I really don't know what to do with this one. I guess I could throw out a few alcohol-fueled, ungrammatical, and largely unstructured missives from time to time if that would balance the scales, but I'm not sure we need more detritus clogging up the threads.
Inside Information. I'll concede that over 30 years of operating heavy metal, to include a number of Boeings, having held a variety of jobs with various aviation-related organizations, and being a long-time subscriber to various aviation publications has given me a depth and breadth of experience that one might classify as unavailable to the average PPruNe denizen. However, aside from the anecdotes from my personal experience, much of the material I cite is available online if you take the time to go looking for it - which I do. There are lots of other people maintaining discussion forums and blogs on the subject with lots of good information (sometimes in other languages, so that's a challenge). Peter Lemme and Bjorn's Corner have been two particularly valuable sources. Maybe it's worth pointing out that all those schematics and technical information that you see popping up both here and on some of these other blogs and online forums are not locked up in Boeing's vault. They are, at a minimum, distributed to every airline that operates their aircraft and many of the vendors who do work for them. There are literally thousands and thousands of people spread across dozens, if not hundreds, of organizations that have access to these specs and are willing to share items of particular interest.
He's trying to pin the blame on the pilots. Yep, one of those useful canards employed by the sock puppets. Just as the MAX was a product of it's design environment, the pilots were a product of their training and organizational environment. If certain airlines took certain shortcuts in hiring and training to save money (can't endanger those management bonuses or investor dividends wasting money on pilot training!), then I think that's worth looking at. I'm going to go out on a limb here and suggest that the reason that none of the crews ever considered the Runaway Stab Trim checklist as a potential solution to the MCAS event was not because of the way the procedure is written (granted, some improvements needed here), but because they were never properly trained on it in the first place. Before MCAS, Runaway Stab Trim had been such an exceedingly rare event that some airlines had relegated the subject to the margins, providing perfunctory training, if at all. I have been on the 737 for quite awhile now, and I have not seen a Runaway Stab Trim drill in the sim for quite a long time, though I suspect that will change next time through the box. So if the pilots were never properly trained in this procedure, and that procedure might have saved the day, where does that responsibility fall? What say you sock puppets?
He posts too often. It seems lately there have been more than a few queries specifically directed at me, so it seems rude not to respond. In fact, one of the critiques posted by someone in the past day or two was that I didn't respond to their question. Damned if I do, damned if I don't. Maybe if I stop responding to the sock puppets.....
The real agenda. There's an old saying in the legal profession that goes, "If the facts are against you, argue the law. If the law if against you, argue the facts. If the facts and the law are against you, throw mud!" It has become quite apparent that certain sacred cows are being crushed under the weight of the accumulating evidence. Rather than deal with that evidence and the (perhaps uncomfortable) direction that evidence is pointing, what we have witnessed in the past 48 hours has been nothing short of a desperate attempt (probably organized by sock puppets) to derail this thread, perhaps even get it locked out by the moderators. I will point out that the title of this is "MAXs Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures" and not "Who is this Yoko1, why does he know so much, and how can we get him to shut up?"
So it's up to you folks. You can let this thread descend into the mud with all these ad hominem attacks that have little to do with the matter at hand and pretty soon we will have another locked thread, or we can keep to the facts and a respectful exchange and maybe we can all learn something.
p.s. For all you sock puppets with stop watches and word counters, the above and immediately following post represent a little over two hours of personal effort. You're welcome.
Sock Puppets. Apparently there are sock puppets among us. (Okay, I'll admit I had to go look this one up.) However, that would explain a great deal. Otherwise it is hard to imagine why certain people are trying so hard to deflect culpability away from Ethiopian (and maybe a bit of Lion Air) for their role in these tragedies. Ethiopian in particular has been a case study of "Deny, deny, deny" in regards to concerns with their operation since ET409 first splashed down in the Mediterranean nearly a decade ago. I imagine they have a number suitable english-proficient speakers (or other willing agents) that are more than happy to run cover so as not to endanger their source of low cost pilots and even lower cost training. Now that I think of it, it seems like a lot of airlines would like to deflect attention from the sorry state of their pilot training programs, so this really could be an international conspiracy being coordinated at the highest levels. So everyone please, please be on your guard for posters who rely heavily on emotion, ad hominem attacks, positions that are not supported by evidence, or other attempts to completely derail this thread (and maybe even get it locked out by the moderators).
He's too good. Some posters apparently have issue with the fact that I present articulate, well-researched, and persuasive arguments. I really don't know what to do with this one. I guess I could throw out a few alcohol-fueled, ungrammatical, and largely unstructured missives from time to time if that would balance the scales, but I'm not sure we need more detritus clogging up the threads.
Inside Information. I'll concede that over 30 years of operating heavy metal, to include a number of Boeings, having held a variety of jobs with various aviation-related organizations, and being a long-time subscriber to various aviation publications has given me a depth and breadth of experience that one might classify as unavailable to the average PPruNe denizen. However, aside from the anecdotes from my personal experience, much of the material I cite is available online if you take the time to go looking for it - which I do. There are lots of other people maintaining discussion forums and blogs on the subject with lots of good information (sometimes in other languages, so that's a challenge). Peter Lemme and Bjorn's Corner have been two particularly valuable sources. Maybe it's worth pointing out that all those schematics and technical information that you see popping up both here and on some of these other blogs and online forums are not locked up in Boeing's vault. They are, at a minimum, distributed to every airline that operates their aircraft and many of the vendors who do work for them. There are literally thousands and thousands of people spread across dozens, if not hundreds, of organizations that have access to these specs and are willing to share items of particular interest.
He's trying to pin the blame on the pilots. Yep, one of those useful canards employed by the sock puppets. Just as the MAX was a product of it's design environment, the pilots were a product of their training and organizational environment. If certain airlines took certain shortcuts in hiring and training to save money (can't endanger those management bonuses or investor dividends wasting money on pilot training!), then I think that's worth looking at. I'm going to go out on a limb here and suggest that the reason that none of the crews ever considered the Runaway Stab Trim checklist as a potential solution to the MCAS event was not because of the way the procedure is written (granted, some improvements needed here), but because they were never properly trained on it in the first place. Before MCAS, Runaway Stab Trim had been such an exceedingly rare event that some airlines had relegated the subject to the margins, providing perfunctory training, if at all. I have been on the 737 for quite awhile now, and I have not seen a Runaway Stab Trim drill in the sim for quite a long time, though I suspect that will change next time through the box. So if the pilots were never properly trained in this procedure, and that procedure might have saved the day, where does that responsibility fall? What say you sock puppets?
He posts too often. It seems lately there have been more than a few queries specifically directed at me, so it seems rude not to respond. In fact, one of the critiques posted by someone in the past day or two was that I didn't respond to their question. Damned if I do, damned if I don't. Maybe if I stop responding to the sock puppets.....
The real agenda. There's an old saying in the legal profession that goes, "If the facts are against you, argue the law. If the law if against you, argue the facts. If the facts and the law are against you, throw mud!" It has become quite apparent that certain sacred cows are being crushed under the weight of the accumulating evidence. Rather than deal with that evidence and the (perhaps uncomfortable) direction that evidence is pointing, what we have witnessed in the past 48 hours has been nothing short of a desperate attempt (probably organized by sock puppets) to derail this thread, perhaps even get it locked out by the moderators. I will point out that the title of this is "MAXs Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures" and not "Who is this Yoko1, why does he know so much, and how can we get him to shut up?"
So it's up to you folks. You can let this thread descend into the mud with all these ad hominem attacks that have little to do with the matter at hand and pretty soon we will have another locked thread, or we can keep to the facts and a respectful exchange and maybe we can all learn something.
p.s. For all you sock puppets with stop watches and word counters, the above and immediately following post represent a little over two hours of personal effort. You're welcome.
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In other news, the latest from Aviation Week on delays to the MAX re-certification efforts:
Boeing Faces New Hurdle In MAX Recertification Effort
There is some detailed discussion of the test failure of the new FCC software followed by this:
Of particular interest to recent discussions here is the one item that is conspicuously absent - redesign of the Main Electric Trim system. Granted, Aviation Week doesn't include an itemized list of everything the FAA is looking at, but you would think that these very knowledgeable aviation reporters would certainly realize that problems with this critical system would be a HUGE story worthy of it's own separate treatment. Another dog not barking.
.
However, we do have this recent item from the United Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), discussed extensively in another thread but largely ignored in this one:
Avoidance of Loss of Control In-Flight – Flight Crew Training
Relevant excepts:
.
Now THAT is what I call one big, barking dog.
Boeing Faces New Hurdle In MAX Recertification Effort
There is some detailed discussion of the test failure of the new FCC software followed by this:
Boeing characterizes the latest finding as “an additional requirement that [the FAA] has asked the company to address through the software changes that the company has been developing for the past eight months,” or since just after the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610. “Boeing agrees with the FAA’s decision and request, and is working on the required software.”
Discovery of the computer-chip issue is the latest, and arguably most visible, item on an extensive list the FAA has flagged in its review of Boeing’s MCAS software changes and of related systems. Not long after the MAX’s grounding, some within the agency expressed confidence that Boeing’s changes, triggered by early findings in the Lion Air accident investigation and well into development, would be finalized by early May. The FAA arranged a May 23 meeting of global regulators in Fort Worth, with the intent of presenting its analysis of Boeing’s changes and justification of why the updates alleviated the U.S. regulator’s concerns about the MAX’s safety.
By early May, however, it became clear the timeline would be stretched. The FAA compiled a list of all the items its separate teams of engineers were working on with Boeing—one source described it as a glorified spreadsheet—and soon realized the project’s scope. More than 200 items were listed, ranging from straightforward questions double-checking facts to queries that required Boeing to make changes.
Discovery of the computer-chip issue is the latest, and arguably most visible, item on an extensive list the FAA has flagged in its review of Boeing’s MCAS software changes and of related systems. Not long after the MAX’s grounding, some within the agency expressed confidence that Boeing’s changes, triggered by early findings in the Lion Air accident investigation and well into development, would be finalized by early May. The FAA arranged a May 23 meeting of global regulators in Fort Worth, with the intent of presenting its analysis of Boeing’s changes and justification of why the updates alleviated the U.S. regulator’s concerns about the MAX’s safety.
By early May, however, it became clear the timeline would be stretched. The FAA compiled a list of all the items its separate teams of engineers were working on with Boeing—one source described it as a glorified spreadsheet—and soon realized the project’s scope. More than 200 items were listed, ranging from straightforward questions double-checking facts to queries that required Boeing to make changes.
.
However, we do have this recent item from the United Kingdom's Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), discussed extensively in another thread but largely ignored in this one:
Avoidance of Loss of Control In-Flight – Flight Crew Training
Relevant excepts:
.
- Loss of Control In-Flight is a significant safety concern and major contributor to worldwide aircraft accidents.
- Over the last five years, there have been number of large commercial air transport aircraft accidents and incidents which were attributed to lack of awareness of the aircraft’s trim condition. Factors which contributed to loss of control in-flight were inappropriate trim inputs or mishandled automatic trim malfunctions, especially during a high energy state or at low altitude, which resulted in excessive elevator or stabiliser load forces.
- The purpose of this Safety Notice is to draw attention to the causes of loss of control in-flight and poor aircraft energy management; and promote the avoidance of undesirable aircraft trim conditions. This is with particular reference to aircraft equipped with conventional trimming systems (i.e. non-fly-by-wire) and aircraft which use manual trim back-up systems in the event of an electronic trim system malfunction. Utilising their Safety Management System (SMS), training organisations, operators and flight crew training departments should identify potential gaps in manual flying skills and intervention methods amongst crews. Particular consideration should be given to type-specific control issues and flight-control downgrade scenarios where manual intervention may not have been comprehensively practised. The effects of startle factor and the crew’s ability to manually control the aircraft in an undesired state when the malfunction/s cannot be accurately diagnosed should be thoroughly evaluated and assessed with training interventions, when required.
Now THAT is what I call one big, barking dog.
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Personally, I consider the community of professional aviators to be one of my many tribes, so if anyone is "foreign" to that group, it would be those individuals and organizations that make our professional and personal lives more difficult and dangerous than they need to be..... like the cabal of manufacturers, regulators, and operators who have conspired to gut pilot (and maintenance!) training and experience requirements in the never-ending search for lower cost labor. But hey, enjoy those cheap tickets while you can!
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Does that count, or is it apples and oranges ?
Isn't it that MAX incidents only occured on foreign airlines ?
What makes you so sure pilots from the "correct" side of the Pond would have fared better, should an MCAS event have happened on a non-foreign airline ?
Maybe it's my poor mastery of English (I'm a foreigner, as you may have noticed ;-), but your question sounds a bit well, weird.
"The incidents occured on foreign planes, proof that their pilots are poorly trained"
"No incidents occured on non-foreing planes ergo our pilots are better trained"
Well, makes you wonder...
Last edited by Fly Aiprt; 5th Jul 2019 at 13:27.
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Let's see, caught up with my morning's to-do and I see there's been a few more missives arrive tossed over the transom. How to respond.....
Sock Puppets. Apparently there are sock puppets among us. (Okay, I'll admit I had to go look this one up.) However, that would explain a great deal. Otherwise it is hard to imagine why certain people are trying so hard to deflect culpability away from Ethiopian (and maybe a bit of Lion Air) for their role in these tragedies. Ethiopian in particular has been a case study of "Deny, deny, deny" in regards to concerns with their operation since ET409 first splashed down in the Mediterranean nearly a decade ago. I imagine they have a number suitable english-proficient speakers (or other willing agents) that are more than happy to run cover so as not to endanger their source of low cost pilots and even lower cost training. Now that I think of it, it seems like a lot of airlines would like to deflect attention from the sorry state of their pilot training programs, so this really could be an international conspiracy being coordinated at the highest levels.
Sock Puppets. Apparently there are sock puppets among us. (Okay, I'll admit I had to go look this one up.) However, that would explain a great deal. Otherwise it is hard to imagine why certain people are trying so hard to deflect culpability away from Ethiopian (and maybe a bit of Lion Air) for their role in these tragedies. Ethiopian in particular has been a case study of "Deny, deny, deny" in regards to concerns with their operation since ET409 first splashed down in the Mediterranean nearly a decade ago. I imagine they have a number suitable english-proficient speakers (or other willing agents) that are more than happy to run cover so as not to endanger their source of low cost pilots and even lower cost training. Now that I think of it, it seems like a lot of airlines would like to deflect attention from the sorry state of their pilot training programs, so this really could be an international conspiracy being coordinated at the highest levels.
Psychological projection. From Wikipedia: "Psychological projection is a defence mechanism in which the human ego defends itself against unconscious impulses or qualities (both positive and negative) by denying their existence in themselves while attributing them to others. For example, a person who is habitually rude may constantly accuse other people of being rude. It incorporates blame shifting."
It's time for you to be honest about your identity, given that you are in fact yourself using a sock puppet account. What is your personal interest in defending Boeing? Specifically, after doing some digging, I must ask: do you now work for a consulting firm that has a financial interest in a recent large sale of Max aircraft to a foreign state-owned airline?
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In addition a "bad design" cheese hole propagates out. Every aircraft added to the fleet has the same hole, increasing the chances that we'll get a line-up event.
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The percentage of foreign crews that failed when confronted with a MAX incident is 67%.
What is the percentage of US crews that failed when confronted with a MAX incident ?
Debunking Dis-information.
Choice of selective wording; ‘Deny’, but where world reports use of ‘Refute’ would be more accurate, countering unfounded allegations of poor training standards (who made those). Subsequent, one sided discussion fails to provide data - evidence which could be evaluated against published standards.
Self-delusion; judging oneself against perceived norms within the industry; using history - time as a substitute for meaningful experience; which with application could be demonstrated now.
A weak understand of world safety views, the interaction of man - machine - environment, thus quote / misquote international safety standards, but each within the home culture,
The apparent inability to accept that work as done is not the same as work as imagined, is offset by management of hindsight, a bias which we all suffer, and which our default is to accept unless the issues are critically reviewed.
Critical thinking takes time, it rarely occurs while we write, more thinking time implies less writing time.
See below; the second link has the same item, but in other languages.
https://www.skepticalscience.com/doc...g_Handbook.pdf
https://skepticalscience.com/Debunki...-download.html
Note the importance of not repeating disinformation; easy overlooked with Pprune ‘Quote’ button - which also clutters the forum with endless grey boxed text, which itself highlights the disinformation.
It’s not what we think, but how we think which is important. Think before Quote, (are you really agreeing with text). If yes say so; if not then identify the substance of the argument and argue both sides based on your data - it’s difficult to argue where there is no substance
Also, https://betterhumans.coach.me/cognit...t-55a472476b18
and a view from the other direction. https://qz.com/1051397/know-how-fake...xicon-of-lies/
P.S. avoid distracting ‘barking dogs’: an alternative, counter view, relevant to that thread -
Loss of Control In-Flight - Flight Crew training
Self-delusion; judging oneself against perceived norms within the industry; using history - time as a substitute for meaningful experience; which with application could be demonstrated now.
A weak understand of world safety views, the interaction of man - machine - environment, thus quote / misquote international safety standards, but each within the home culture,
The apparent inability to accept that work as done is not the same as work as imagined, is offset by management of hindsight, a bias which we all suffer, and which our default is to accept unless the issues are critically reviewed.
Critical thinking takes time, it rarely occurs while we write, more thinking time implies less writing time.
See below; the second link has the same item, but in other languages.
https://www.skepticalscience.com/doc...g_Handbook.pdf
https://skepticalscience.com/Debunki...-download.html
Note the importance of not repeating disinformation; easy overlooked with Pprune ‘Quote’ button - which also clutters the forum with endless grey boxed text, which itself highlights the disinformation.
It’s not what we think, but how we think which is important. Think before Quote, (are you really agreeing with text). If yes say so; if not then identify the substance of the argument and argue both sides based on your data - it’s difficult to argue where there is no substance
Also, https://betterhumans.coach.me/cognit...t-55a472476b18
and a view from the other direction. https://qz.com/1051397/know-how-fake...xicon-of-lies/
P.S. avoid distracting ‘barking dogs’: an alternative, counter view, relevant to that thread -
Loss of Control In-Flight - Flight Crew training
Last edited by safetypee; 5th Jul 2019 at 14:15.
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Isn't it that MAX incidents only occured on foreign airlines ?
Should I also make the obvious point that from your perspective, Boeing is a "foreign" entity? It seems you have no problem criticizing "foreigners," so excuse me if I wonder of the lack of consistency here.
That said, I really dislike these attempts to derail this discussion with references to racism, xenophobia, exceptionalism or whatever. People are dead because certain organizations failed to dedicate resources to provide for a safe operating environment. Boeing was one of those organizations, but there are others.
What makes you so sure pilots from the "correct" side of the Pond would have fared better, should an MCAS event have happened on a non-foreign airline ?
I would recommend a stroll over to the "Loss of Control In-Flight - Flight Crew training" thread for some non-MAX related discussions regarding the state of flight crew training. That thread makes reference to a series of videos produced by American Airlines and narrated by Capt Warren Vanderburgh (they are available on YouTube). These lectures were created way back in 1997 by a major U.S. airline because even then issues of automation dependency and poor crew response to aircraft upsets were seen as a trending issue at that airline. Sadly, that trend is still alive and well.
Maybe it's my poor mastery of English (I'm a foreigner, as you may have noticed ;-), but your question sounds a bit well, weird.
"The incidents occured on foreign planes, proof that their pilots are poorly trained"
"No incidents occured on non-foreing planes ergo our pilots are better trained"
"The incidents occured on foreign planes, proof that their pilots are poorly trained"
"No incidents occured on non-foreing planes ergo our pilots are better trained"
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If PPruNe wants to start enforcing this disclosure criteria on everyone, I'll be happy to respect it. However, as you note the end result will be less, and not more, information. I know it will on my part because I'm pretty sure my employer (not-Boeing, btw) would take issue with some of the things I've said. Otherwise requiring such disclosures only for select individuals whose commentary is at odds with certain "sacred cow" beliefs is pretty much tantamount to an attempt to silence them.
I will let the facts and reasoned arguments I present speak for themselves. If someone has an issue with that, they are more than willing to counter with facts and reasoned arguments of their own.
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Three out of four Lion Air pilots who were the flying pilot with an active MCAS malfunction were able to maintain aircraft control.
Zero out of one Ethiopian pilot who was the flying pilot during an active MCAS malfunction did not.
What were the key differences in how the first three pilots (Capt & FO of the penultimate JT610 flight and Capt of the JT610 accident flight) versus the next two pilots (JT610 First Officer and ET302 Captain) managed the aircraft to keep the blue side up? What were the difference in the training, experience, or recent history of all these pilots that made the difference?