MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
tIn simple terms how do you market a product which has a tainted past?
Boeing have very few simulators for the Max and I doubt any airline insurers will be happy with an Ipad conversion.
On top of that we have pilots unions and foreign aviation legislation to deal with. Then we have the public perception of a flying coffin.
They will be very lucky to get these aircraft flying early next year.
This reminds me of the Kodak camera and film story.
A company run by accountants who failed to keep up with technology.
Boeing have very few simulators for the Max and I doubt any airline insurers will be happy with an Ipad conversion.
On top of that we have pilots unions and foreign aviation legislation to deal with. Then we have the public perception of a flying coffin.
They will be very lucky to get these aircraft flying early next year.
This reminds me of the Kodak camera and film story.
A company run by accountants who failed to keep up with technology.
Last edited by Mike Flynn; 28th Jun 2019 at 19:56.
Salute!
Yeah.Mike. but more than technology. A few dollars saved there and now a billion to spend here, looks like.
Face it. The Max is a new plane!! It has aero characteristics that are sufficiently different from the earlier versions that it needed kludges and such to meet the cert requirements. The aero changes would have likely taken lots more test flights and maybe even a new type cert. A lot of the old stuff would not have required new tests and such - seat dimensions, hydraulic systems, electric systems, and more. But that aero thing was the biggie.
Gums sends...
Yeah.Mike. but more than technology. A few dollars saved there and now a billion to spend here, looks like.
Face it. The Max is a new plane!! It has aero characteristics that are sufficiently different from the earlier versions that it needed kludges and such to meet the cert requirements. The aero changes would have likely taken lots more test flights and maybe even a new type cert. A lot of the old stuff would not have required new tests and such - seat dimensions, hydraulic systems, electric systems, and more. But that aero thing was the biggie.
Gums sends...
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Re: Regulators joining forces (post #779 c.f.)
Back in the 1930s, when the FAA and the EASA's British and French precursors were in their formative stages, there were lots of airplane manufacturers. And lots of companies exploring ways of commercializing the new technology. There was so much anarchy for the *AAs to tame that they were able to use common sense, without any political interference to speak of, while they set up the rules. The rules were pretty good, and have left aviation with a first century to be proud of.
That's all gone now. The number of airplane manufacturers is not so much a handful as a fingerful. Just in the last year, national champions in Canada and Brazil (were) bowed out. You have your basic A and B, of course, but C (China) is just now taking off. Although J (Japan) is still at the gate, it would be premature to count them out now that Mitsubishi can build on Canadair's RJ program.
The FAA's decision-making is easy. It needs to re-establish its bona fides. Just enough resistance to show independence, I should think, then good-to-go. (God forbid that something really serious comes to light during testing.)
The EASA needs to show a little backbone, too. Not from A in this case, but from the FAA.
Even so, the EASA's decision will be a lot tougher than the FAA's. Long-term versus short-term interests are at stake. Like the FAA, the EASA knows that the ChineseAA's blessing of the MAX-fix is going to be a political decision taken as a minor part of the Xi-Trump tariff tiff. The most likely outcome is that the Max will not return to service in the Eastern hemisphere until a couple of months after it starts flying again in the USA and Europe. (Unless there's a big breakthrough on the tariff front.)
Longer term, say 20 or 30 years, A's primary competitor is going to be C, not B. Access to markets is going to be just as important as good design. (Ask any big tech company how things work in China.) I think the French political elite will guide the EASA through the thought process. Should the EASA/A simply maximize short-term profits from the FAA/B's stumble? Or should the EASA/A softly co-operate with the FAA/B now in order to establish a basis for long-term cooperation against C? Or should the EASA/A maximize medium-term gain by using the MCAS fiasco as a launch pad to force B to make the same transition from pilot-in-control to computer-in-control that A made 30 years ago?
It's inevitable. When each big country has just one airplane maker, the rules for making airplanes, and for using airplanes made by others, become matters of national interest. While the various *AAs may be able to remain independent in certain areas, like engineering analysis, their conclusions will increasingly flow through political channels. Regulation in aviation's second century might be quite different from its first.
It is going to be very interesting to watch how well the EASA co-operates with the FAA in getting the MAX airborne again. In practice, there is lots of room to maneuver while being "co-operative" and nobody knows this better than senior politicians.
YYZjim
Back in the 1930s, when the FAA and the EASA's British and French precursors were in their formative stages, there were lots of airplane manufacturers. And lots of companies exploring ways of commercializing the new technology. There was so much anarchy for the *AAs to tame that they were able to use common sense, without any political interference to speak of, while they set up the rules. The rules were pretty good, and have left aviation with a first century to be proud of.
That's all gone now. The number of airplane manufacturers is not so much a handful as a fingerful. Just in the last year, national champions in Canada and Brazil (were) bowed out. You have your basic A and B, of course, but C (China) is just now taking off. Although J (Japan) is still at the gate, it would be premature to count them out now that Mitsubishi can build on Canadair's RJ program.
The FAA's decision-making is easy. It needs to re-establish its bona fides. Just enough resistance to show independence, I should think, then good-to-go. (God forbid that something really serious comes to light during testing.)
The EASA needs to show a little backbone, too. Not from A in this case, but from the FAA.
Even so, the EASA's decision will be a lot tougher than the FAA's. Long-term versus short-term interests are at stake. Like the FAA, the EASA knows that the ChineseAA's blessing of the MAX-fix is going to be a political decision taken as a minor part of the Xi-Trump tariff tiff. The most likely outcome is that the Max will not return to service in the Eastern hemisphere until a couple of months after it starts flying again in the USA and Europe. (Unless there's a big breakthrough on the tariff front.)
Longer term, say 20 or 30 years, A's primary competitor is going to be C, not B. Access to markets is going to be just as important as good design. (Ask any big tech company how things work in China.) I think the French political elite will guide the EASA through the thought process. Should the EASA/A simply maximize short-term profits from the FAA/B's stumble? Or should the EASA/A softly co-operate with the FAA/B now in order to establish a basis for long-term cooperation against C? Or should the EASA/A maximize medium-term gain by using the MCAS fiasco as a launch pad to force B to make the same transition from pilot-in-control to computer-in-control that A made 30 years ago?
It's inevitable. When each big country has just one airplane maker, the rules for making airplanes, and for using airplanes made by others, become matters of national interest. While the various *AAs may be able to remain independent in certain areas, like engineering analysis, their conclusions will increasingly flow through political channels. Regulation in aviation's second century might be quite different from its first.
It is going to be very interesting to watch how well the EASA co-operates with the FAA in getting the MAX airborne again. In practice, there is lots of room to maneuver while being "co-operative" and nobody knows this better than senior politicians.
YYZjim
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Two v Three AOA or Inertial compare ?
https://www.isasi.org/Documents/libr...ducing-787.pdf
Seems that 0n 787 and maybe 777 Boeing decided to make use of Inertial system and GPS as a non external sensor comparison
Go to pages 35 to 43for what they do. Probably too expensive to do for MAX ...
Seems that 0n 787 and maybe 777 Boeing decided to make use of Inertial system and GPS as a non external sensor comparison
Go to pages 35 to 43for what they do. Probably too expensive to do for MAX ...
Thanks for the reply Gums,
Sadly people with your experience no longer have input in to Boeing aircraft development and design.
Accountants now rule the roost.
This issue should have been resolved at the test flight stage.
The feedback from the sim tests are quite revealing.
Boeing have made a fortune over decades from the 737.
Sadly they have milked the old cow until it is dry.
Sadly people with your experience no longer have input in to Boeing aircraft development and design.
Accountants now rule the roost.
This issue should have been resolved at the test flight stage.
The feedback from the sim tests are quite revealing.
Boeing have made a fortune over decades from the 737.
Sadly they have milked the old cow until it is dry.
https://www.isasi.org/Documents/libr...ducing-787.pdf
Seems that on 787 and maybe 777 Boeing decided to make use of Inertial system and GPS as a non external sensor comparison
Go to pages 35 to 43 for what they do. Probably too expensive to do for MAX ...
Seems that on 787 and maybe 777 Boeing decided to make use of Inertial system and GPS as a non external sensor comparison
Go to pages 35 to 43 for what they do. Probably too expensive to do for MAX ...
Whether you can do it the other way round, i.e. generate a synthetic AoA from IRS and IAS, isn't immediately obvious.
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Given that AOA and pitch angles are slightly different ( within one or two degrees ? ) , and that Inertial data can output/measure pitch along with motion vectors and constantly comparing to two AOA sensors, I would guess that any sudden or major AOA change above a realistic amount would trip appropriate alarms etc.- thus the inertial system would be a basckup. And while a bit off topic- Boeing has been flying an orbital bird ( similar to space shuttle ) for months and then under full autocontrol brings it back for a ' normal' style aircraft landing. Obviously there are NO external AOA probes or probably no external pitot sensors. My guess/speculation is that they do it all with internal- inertial sensors...
Salute!
Dave! You can get a fairly accurate AoA by comparing the inertial velocity vector with the chord of the wing.
I use "body" coordinates. So if my flight path vector is "x" degrees below/above the wing/fuselage reference line, then that is my AoA. Might have some very small corrections for yaw, and the Earth ellipsoid and such,, but the basic calculation is where you are pointed and where the wing is pointed, right?
Gums suggests....
Dave! You can get a fairly accurate AoA by comparing the inertial velocity vector with the chord of the wing.
I use "body" coordinates. So if my flight path vector is "x" degrees below/above the wing/fuselage reference line, then that is my AoA. Might have some very small corrections for yaw, and the Earth ellipsoid and such,, but the basic calculation is where you are pointed and where the wing is pointed, right?
Gums suggests....
This is early generation video cassette recorder level technology which Boeing are trying to make work in the days of Netflix. Engineers will need to be brought out of retirement to work on it, similar to Y2K where the younger generation of computer programmers didn't know about the old operating systems.
Are Boeing using vacuum tubes on this aircraft or have they moved on to transistors ?
Are Boeing using vacuum tubes on this aircraft or have they moved on to transistors ?
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Given that it is unthinkable that all potential outcomes weren’t modelled, who on earth decided that this was an acceptable risk to take? 😵
Psychophysiological entity
It's astonishing how one search leads to another:-
https://www.news.com.au/travel/trave...befd6d0f6ac64a
https://www.news.com.au/travel/trave...befd6d0f6ac64a
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To quote myself from a previous thread:
And now this from the news:
"Increasingly, the iconic American planemaker and its subcontractors have relied on temporary workers making as little as $9 an hour to develop and test software, often from countries lacking a deep background in aerospace -- notably India.In offices across from Seattle’s Boeing Field, recent college graduates employed by the Indian software developer HCL Technologies Ltd. occupied several rows of desks, said Mark Rabin, a former Boeing software engineer who worked in a flight-test group that supported the Max."
When reality is stranger than an ironic post.
The more I read about it, the more MCAS sounds like something implemented by summer interns over a few weekends.
And now this from the news:
"Increasingly, the iconic American planemaker and its subcontractors have relied on temporary workers making as little as $9 an hour to develop and test software, often from countries lacking a deep background in aerospace -- notably India.In offices across from Seattle’s Boeing Field, recent college graduates employed by the Indian software developer HCL Technologies Ltd. occupied several rows of desks, said Mark Rabin, a former Boeing software engineer who worked in a flight-test group that supported the Max."
When reality is stranger than an ironic post.
What has always bothered me right from the beginning of this whole thing is that at some point in the design process the one, two, three or synthetic AoA input question must have come up. And when it did, surely someone put their hand up and said “With only one AoA vane feeding the FCC, an early failure of the sensor will only come to light when either the AP is switched off and/or the flaps are retracted. This really is not the time/speed/altitude/phase of flight to have large amounts of AND.”
Given that it is unthinkable that all potential outcomes weren’t modelled, who on earth decided that this was an acceptable risk to take? 😵
The AOA redundancy management logic uses a modified average calculation. The modified average calculation calculates an average of three AOA values, the left corrected AOA, the right corrected AOA, and a calculated AOA. The calculated AOA logic receives inputs from the inertial and air data systems to calculate the calculated AOA.
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What has always bothered me right from the beginning of this whole thing is that at some point in the design process the one, two, three or synthetic AoA input question must have come up. And when it did, surely someone put their hand up and said “With only one AoA vane feeding the FCC, an early failure of the sensor will only come to light when either the AP is switched off and/or the flaps are retracted. This really is not the time/speed/altitude/phase of flight to have large amounts of AND.”
Given that it is unthinkable that all potential outcomes weren’t modelled, who on earth decided that this was an acceptable risk to take? ��
Minimizing changes
Throughout the MAX’s development, Boeing was intent on minimizing design changes that could require extra pilot training, said Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing engineer who worked on 737 MAX cockpit features but not the MCAS system. Extra training could have added costs for airlines introducing the MAX into service.
The company had promised Southwest Airlines Co. , the plane’s biggest customer, to keep pilot training to a minimum so the new jet could seamlessly slot into the carrier’s fleet of older 737s, according to regulators and industry officials.
Mr. Ludtke recalled midlevel managers telling subordinates that Boeing had committed to pay the airline $1 million per plane if its design ended up requiring pilots to spend additional simulator time. “We had never, ever seen commitments like that before,” he said.
You are exactly right, internally there would have been good people advising their managers of possibility of accidents. The managers appear to have taken the chance that this would never surface. This is why, in my view, there was not a whisper of the MCAS in the pilot manuals. They wanted this thing hidden should an accident happen, and then attempt to blame the pilots as nobody had knowledge of this new system.
This is the most repugnant, cynical and craven aspect of the whole episode. Their strategy was "we will always blame the crew" should, what they convinced themselves was a remote possibility of an accident. I also believe that the outstanding & expert investigation by PPRuNe contributors was, and continues to be a thorn in their side for this strategy. In the future, they may reconsider how their skimp on the engineering based on the realisation there is a group of anonymous uncorruptables who don't like seeing their dead colleagues carrying the can of responsibility for the profit above all strategy engineering failure.
Last edited by CurtainTwitcher; 29th Jun 2019 at 03:50.
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Because Boeing has become a fully financialized company, beholden to Wall Street, profit & greed above all. The lack of sensor testing ensured there was no additional simulator training requirement for crews. It is alleged there was a $1 million penalty for Boeing per airframe with one large customer if simulator training was required.
WSJ How Boeing’s 737 MAX Failed [article non-paywalled]
You are exactly right, internally there would have been good people advising their managers of possibility of accidents. The managers appear to have taken the chance that this would never surface. This is why, in my view, there was not a whisper of the MCAS in the pilot manuals. They wanted this thing hidden should an accident happen, and then attempt to blame the pilots as nobody had knowledge of this new system.
This is the most repugnant, cynical and craven aspect of the whole episode. Their strategy was "we will always blame the crew" should, what they convinced themselves was a remote possibility of an accident. I also believe that the outstanding & expert investigation by PPRuNe contributors was, and continues to be a thorn in their side for this strategy. In the future, they may reconsider how their skimp on the engineering based on the realisation there is a group of anonymous uncorruptables who don't like seeing their dead colleagues carrying the can of responsibility for the profit above all strategy engineering failure.
WSJ How Boeing’s 737 MAX Failed [article non-paywalled]
You are exactly right, internally there would have been good people advising their managers of possibility of accidents. The managers appear to have taken the chance that this would never surface. This is why, in my view, there was not a whisper of the MCAS in the pilot manuals. They wanted this thing hidden should an accident happen, and then attempt to blame the pilots as nobody had knowledge of this new system.
This is the most repugnant, cynical and craven aspect of the whole episode. Their strategy was "we will always blame the crew" should, what they convinced themselves was a remote possibility of an accident. I also believe that the outstanding & expert investigation by PPRuNe contributors was, and continues to be a thorn in their side for this strategy. In the future, they may reconsider how their skimp on the engineering based on the realisation there is a group of anonymous uncorruptables who don't like seeing their dead colleagues carrying the can of responsibility for the profit above all strategy engineering failure.
The FAA was there to keep Boeing honest but got captured.
This is a case which demonstrates how money will circumvent regulation in a democracy until some incident creates an outcry. You can see the same thing happening in construction standards eg. the Greenfell Tower fire in the UK.
Edmund
Because Boeing has become a fully financialized company, beholden to Wall Street, profit & greed above all. The lack of sensor testing ensured there was no additional simulator training requirement for crews. It is alleged there was a $1 million penalty for Boeing per airframe with one large customer if simulator training was required.
WSJ How Boeing’s 737 MAX Failed [article non-paywalled]
You are exactly right, internally there would have been good people advising their managers of possibility of accidents. The managers appear to have taken the chance that this would never surface. This is why, in my view, there was not a whisper of the MCAS in the pilot manuals. They wanted this thing hidden should an accident happen, and then attempt to blame the pilots as nobody had knowledge of this new system.
This is the most repugnant, cynical and craven aspect of the whole episode. Their strategy was "we will always blame the crew" should, what they convinced themselves was a remote possibility of an accident. I also believe that the outstanding & expert investigation by PPRuNe contributors was, and continues to be a thorn in their side for this strategy. In the future, they may reconsider how their skimp on the engineering based on the realisation there is a group of anonymous uncorruptables who don't like seeing their dead colleagues carrying the can of responsibility for the profit above all strategy engineering failure.
WSJ How Boeing’s 737 MAX Failed [article non-paywalled]
You are exactly right, internally there would have been good people advising their managers of possibility of accidents. The managers appear to have taken the chance that this would never surface. This is why, in my view, there was not a whisper of the MCAS in the pilot manuals. They wanted this thing hidden should an accident happen, and then attempt to blame the pilots as nobody had knowledge of this new system.
This is the most repugnant, cynical and craven aspect of the whole episode. Their strategy was "we will always blame the crew" should, what they convinced themselves was a remote possibility of an accident. I also believe that the outstanding & expert investigation by PPRuNe contributors was, and continues to be a thorn in their side for this strategy. In the future, they may reconsider how their skimp on the engineering based on the realisation there is a group of anonymous uncorruptables who don't like seeing their dead colleagues carrying the can of responsibility for the profit above all strategy engineering failure.
Now it is up to Boeing to see who willing pick up the damaged can - last week did not turn out well!
History may need to repeat itself to avoid failure in the future
At a guess a few contributors on PPRuNe may have been "contacted" for interviews, several very knowledgeable and sometimes vocal persons are currently absent on this topic now.
Now it is up to Boeing to see who willing pick up the damaged can - last week did not turn out well!
Now it is up to Boeing to see who willing pick up the damaged can - last week did not turn out well!
In Australia, quite a few years ago, there were only two major political parties - Labor (a somewhat Australian version of the Democrats) and the Liberals (akin to the Republicans (USA) or Tories (UK). What was needed at the time, and subsequently occurred, was for another party to be formed. This new third party's mantra was "to keep the bastards honest".
Over time, it worked. (Ultimately self-vested interests caused its destruction through implosion).
Now, fast-forward to Boeing's (and FAA's) MCAS (and self-certification) debacle - who is going to "keep the bastards honest"? Perhaps the US Senate or Congress Transportation Committee; or EASA and other *AA's with B737-MAX on, or about to be on their registers, or flying in, out or over their airspace.
I doubt it is a good time to be holding Boeing shares.
Not quite on-topic but:
In Australia, quite a few years ago, there were only two major political parties - Labor (a somewhat Australian version of the Democrats) and the Liberals (akin to the Republicans (USA) or Tories (UK). What was needed at the time, and subsequently occurred, was for another party to be formed. This new third party's mantra was "to keep the bastards honest".
Over time, it worked. (Ultimately self-vested interests caused its destruction through implosion).
Now, fast-forward to Boeing's (and FAA's) MCAS (and self-certification) debacle - who is going to "keep the bastards honest"? Perhaps the US Senate or Congress Transportation Committee; or EASA and other *AA's with B737-MAX on, or about to be on their registers, or flying in, out or over their airspace.
I doubt it is a good time to be holding Boeing shares.
In Australia, quite a few years ago, there were only two major political parties - Labor (a somewhat Australian version of the Democrats) and the Liberals (akin to the Republicans (USA) or Tories (UK). What was needed at the time, and subsequently occurred, was for another party to be formed. This new third party's mantra was "to keep the bastards honest".
Over time, it worked. (Ultimately self-vested interests caused its destruction through implosion).
Now, fast-forward to Boeing's (and FAA's) MCAS (and self-certification) debacle - who is going to "keep the bastards honest"? Perhaps the US Senate or Congress Transportation Committee; or EASA and other *AA's with B737-MAX on, or about to be on their registers, or flying in, out or over their airspace.
I doubt it is a good time to be holding Boeing shares.
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.
Unfortunately, all of this detail still does not tell us what happens if the FCC does not correctly process the MAIN ELEC TRIM INTLK signal.
Both the Main and Automatic trim signals are sent to the stab trim motor Controller. I could find no information regarding this component, which again, I am told is housed within the motor assembly itself. The motor is made by Eaton and is similar to the one on the 737NG. If a malfunction in the FCC allows simultaneous signals from the Automatic and Main Electric trim to arrive at the Controller, then that might explain the reported test results - just speculating here.
.
Unfortunately, all of this detail still does not tell us what happens if the FCC does not correctly process the MAIN ELEC TRIM INTLK signal.
Both the Main and Automatic trim signals are sent to the stab trim motor Controller. I could find no information regarding this component, which again, I am told is housed within the motor assembly itself. The motor is made by Eaton and is similar to the one on the 737NG. If a malfunction in the FCC allows simultaneous signals from the Automatic and Main Electric trim to arrive at the Controller, then that might explain the reported test results - just speculating here.
.