MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
My experience was that light weight, aft CG, turning flight stalls, power on, at high deceleration rates were most likely to indicate any tendency toward longitudinal stick force lightening or pitch up.
So, with absolutely no evidence, my guess is this would be where the MAX 8 was found non-compliant. I posted my thoughts many months ago on at least one MAX 8 thread.
It should be noted that 1lbf stick force reduction below the requirement is just as non-compliant as, say, some pitch up - they both require a fix.
Plenty of posters here make assumptions about the pitching moment curves and how bad the MAX 8 is - I am in no position to make any assumptions.
A turning flight accelerated stall programme can be a very exciting exercise, even at the current FAA requirement of about 3kts/sec deceleration.
During these test it is pretty well inevitable that you will find yourself at about 40 degress nose up, 30 degrees of bank and a speed well below the 1g stall speed.
Not sure if many airline pilots would want to go there to witness the operation of a SAS system which should be transparent anyway.
For what it is worth......
Last edited by zzuf; 16th Jun 2019 at 04:44.
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lets not forget Trump's White House is an interested party, so I'm sure the politically appointed FAA top ranks are having things whispered in their ears about trade wars, America First, too big to fail etc etc.
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Latest on return to service....
Boeing 737 MAX Return-To-Service Path Taking Shape
Sean Broderick | Aviation Daily June 16,2019
As the 53rd Paris Air Show opens, industry remains in the dark about when the Boeing 737 MAX fleet will be cleared to fly again. But there are signs that Boeingis nearing the next key milestones on an increasingly emerging path to get the grounded fleet airborne.
The manufacturer is working through questions posed by FAA, an independent technical advisory board and its own experts about the updated maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) software it is developing. Issues are being validated on the MAX e-cab engineering flight simulator, and a source with knowledge of the work tells Aviation Week that the e-cab sessions could wrap up within days.
Once the simulation work is done, the stage should be set for a certification flight by FAA pilots. The flight is not expected to take place this week, the source said, but is likely to happen in June.
The flight sets the stage for FAA to produce a key report for Boeing that the manufacturer must include in its final MCAS update package submission to the agency. Preparing the report will take at least a week, a source familiar with the process tells Aviation Week.
Once the FAA has Boeing’s package, the agency is expected to review it for several weeks. FAA’s scrutiny will not focus on details such as software code, but rather ensuring regulatory compliance. While the agency and Boeing have been analyzing Boeing’s MCAS changes to help avoid any last-minute surprises, the agency's final-package review "will be more than a simple rubber-stamping exercise," the second source explains.
Boeing’s package also will include training elements that meet FAA’s requirements. The agency is still reviewing comments on draft training standards made public in April, and must finalize those standards before Boeing can wrap up its training program. A key question is how simulator training on the MCAS’s operation and related failure scenarios will be integrated into the updated 737 instruction. U.S. pilot groups representing pilots at MAX operators American Airlines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines support adding simulator sessions, but have signaled that they can be part of recurrent training, instead of mandatory steps that must take place before the fleet returns to service. The baseline training on the MCAS should be very detailed, the pilots emphasize, and must include system functionality descriptions and videos that walk the crews through failure scenarios and related procedures.
Once the FAA approves Boeing’s MCAS package and training, it will issue an airworthiness directive mandating installation of the software update. That would clear the way for the 72 MAXs operated by the three U.S. carriers to fly again. Estimates vary, but airlines are expected to need up to a month to re-integrate their aircraft, including the time needed to remove them from storage.
CFM International Executive VP Allen Paxson, speaking to reporters on the eve of the Air Show, projected that engine-specific return-to-service work on the fleet’s Leap-1Bs would take about two days per aircraft. But each airline is different, and CFM’s dedicated teams are preparing for myriad approaches that meet specific customer needs.
“Some customers may need their aircraft right away, while others may have leased aircraft and want to finish the leases,” he says.
Southwest and American—which operate 34 and 24 MAXs, respectively--have removed the aircraft from their flight schedules through early September, which suggests that FAA’s all-clear would need to come by Aug. 1 or so to align with their current plans.
Outside of the U.S., many questions remain. The European Aviation Safety Agency is conducting its own review of the MAX, and other regulators are expected to supplement the FAA’s work with their own analysis. This could set the stage for a phased return to service over several months. While a lack of consensus could harm public perception of the MAX’s safety, the fleet’s gradual re-integration could help Boeing and suppliers by allowing them to prioritize resources. The nearly 390 grounded MAXs are stored at 92 airports, and Boeing has 120 more MAXs built but not delivered that it is storing at several more locations.
The MAX fleet was grounded in mid-March when regulators detected similarities in two fatal MAX accidents—Lion Air Fight 610 in October and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10—within five months. The MCAS, which provides automatic horizontal stabilizer inputs to enhance handling characteristics in certain flight profiles, was quickly identified as a contributor to both accident sequences. Boeing’s MCAS changes focus on improving its reliability and making it easier for pilots to over-ride.
Sean Broderick | Aviation Daily June 16,2019
As the 53rd Paris Air Show opens, industry remains in the dark about when the Boeing 737 MAX fleet will be cleared to fly again. But there are signs that Boeingis nearing the next key milestones on an increasingly emerging path to get the grounded fleet airborne.
The manufacturer is working through questions posed by FAA, an independent technical advisory board and its own experts about the updated maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) software it is developing. Issues are being validated on the MAX e-cab engineering flight simulator, and a source with knowledge of the work tells Aviation Week that the e-cab sessions could wrap up within days.
Once the simulation work is done, the stage should be set for a certification flight by FAA pilots. The flight is not expected to take place this week, the source said, but is likely to happen in June.
The flight sets the stage for FAA to produce a key report for Boeing that the manufacturer must include in its final MCAS update package submission to the agency. Preparing the report will take at least a week, a source familiar with the process tells Aviation Week.
Once the FAA has Boeing’s package, the agency is expected to review it for several weeks. FAA’s scrutiny will not focus on details such as software code, but rather ensuring regulatory compliance. While the agency and Boeing have been analyzing Boeing’s MCAS changes to help avoid any last-minute surprises, the agency's final-package review "will be more than a simple rubber-stamping exercise," the second source explains.
Boeing’s package also will include training elements that meet FAA’s requirements. The agency is still reviewing comments on draft training standards made public in April, and must finalize those standards before Boeing can wrap up its training program. A key question is how simulator training on the MCAS’s operation and related failure scenarios will be integrated into the updated 737 instruction. U.S. pilot groups representing pilots at MAX operators American Airlines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines support adding simulator sessions, but have signaled that they can be part of recurrent training, instead of mandatory steps that must take place before the fleet returns to service. The baseline training on the MCAS should be very detailed, the pilots emphasize, and must include system functionality descriptions and videos that walk the crews through failure scenarios and related procedures.
Once the FAA approves Boeing’s MCAS package and training, it will issue an airworthiness directive mandating installation of the software update. That would clear the way for the 72 MAXs operated by the three U.S. carriers to fly again. Estimates vary, but airlines are expected to need up to a month to re-integrate their aircraft, including the time needed to remove them from storage.
CFM International Executive VP Allen Paxson, speaking to reporters on the eve of the Air Show, projected that engine-specific return-to-service work on the fleet’s Leap-1Bs would take about two days per aircraft. But each airline is different, and CFM’s dedicated teams are preparing for myriad approaches that meet specific customer needs.
“Some customers may need their aircraft right away, while others may have leased aircraft and want to finish the leases,” he says.
Southwest and American—which operate 34 and 24 MAXs, respectively--have removed the aircraft from their flight schedules through early September, which suggests that FAA’s all-clear would need to come by Aug. 1 or so to align with their current plans.
Outside of the U.S., many questions remain. The European Aviation Safety Agency is conducting its own review of the MAX, and other regulators are expected to supplement the FAA’s work with their own analysis. This could set the stage for a phased return to service over several months. While a lack of consensus could harm public perception of the MAX’s safety, the fleet’s gradual re-integration could help Boeing and suppliers by allowing them to prioritize resources. The nearly 390 grounded MAXs are stored at 92 airports, and Boeing has 120 more MAXs built but not delivered that it is storing at several more locations.
The MAX fleet was grounded in mid-March when regulators detected similarities in two fatal MAX accidents—Lion Air Fight 610 in October and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10—within five months. The MCAS, which provides automatic horizontal stabilizer inputs to enhance handling characteristics in certain flight profiles, was quickly identified as a contributor to both accident sequences. Boeing’s MCAS changes focus on improving its reliability and making it easier for pilots to over-ride.
Afraid that all reads too much like something written by Boeing's PR team yet again, everything under control, flying again by (September this time), but nothing attributable that the SEC can come back and nail them with.
Meanwhile a proper on-the record comment from an FAA senior says December at least :
https://www.businessinsider.com/boei...19-6?r=US&IR=T
Sorry Boeing, but it still all looks like your business is being run by highly paid lawyers and stock price boosters from Chicago, who not only do not know one end of an aircraft from the other, but possibly have never even been to this place called Seattle ...
Meanwhile a proper on-the record comment from an FAA senior says December at least :
https://www.businessinsider.com/boei...19-6?r=US&IR=T
Sorry Boeing, but it still all looks like your business is being run by highly paid lawyers and stock price boosters from Chicago, who not only do not know one end of an aircraft from the other, but possibly have never even been to this place called Seattle ...
Regrets expressed by Boeing CEO:
Guardian
Boeing Max 737 jet crisis: we should've been more open, says CEO
Boss says aircraft maker failed to communicate properly with regulators and customers
Miles Brignall
Sun 16 Jun 2019 18.20 BST
Last modified on Sun 16 Jun 2019 19.55 BST
The head of Boeing has admitted the company made communications errors in its dealings with regulators and airlines in the wake of the 737 Max jet crisis that grounded the entire fleet.
Speaking on the eve of the Paris air show, the Boeing chief executive, Dennis Muilenburg, said the company’s communications were “not consistent” and that was “unacceptable”. Muilenburg added that the US aerospace group had failed to communicate “crisply” with regulators and carriers about the plane.
The 737 Max was grounded globally in the aftermath of an Ethiopian Airlines crash outside Addis Ababa in March that killed all 157 people on board. It was the 737 Max’s second disaster in five months, after 189 people were killed on a Lion Air flight in Indonesia in October.
Asked how the design and constructions of the 737 Max failed to capture apparent flaws in the software and sensors behind the airplane, Muilenburg said: “Clearly, we can make improvements, and we understand that and we will make those improvements.”
Investigations into the Ethiopia and Indonesia accidents have centred on the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which was designed to keep the aircraft stable in flight. An investigation into the Ethiopia crash has reportedly found that the MCAS software – which automatically pushes the aircraft’s nose down to guard against a loss of lift – was activated by erroneous “angle of attack” data from a single sensor, forcing the pilots into a doomed struggle to control the aircraft.
Muilenburg added: “When I make comments about the previous design and how we followed those processes, that’s something we put a lot of thought and depth of analysis into. That doesn’t mean that it can’t be improved.”
The Boeing boss, who has been under fire over the 737 MAX design and Boeing’s handling of the crisis, said he expected the plane to return to service this year.
Muilenburg said he was “disappointed” the company wasn’t more forthcoming with information when engineers in 2017 learned that cockpit alerts intended to warn pilots about certain sensor malfunctions didn’t work or weren’t operating as intended due to a software error. The company previously said senior Boeing leaders didn’t learn about the issue until after the second crash.
The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has faulted Boeing for not telling regulators for more than year that a safety indicator in the Max cockpit didn’t work. Pilots are angry that the company didn’t tell them about the MCAS system.
Boeing has been working round the clock on a fix to allay safety concerns, and it is likely to remain out of service until August at the earliest, which is well into peak season for many airlines. American Airlines, a major US customer of the aircraft, has pushed its cancellations of 737 Max services into September.
Reuters has reported that the FAA has tentative plans to begin test flights of proposed software fixes, possibly as early as this week.
The long-anticipated certification tests, which will take several weeks to complete, have been planned with the support of European and Canadian regulators, its source reported.
The 737 Max disasters have ignited tensions between air regulators on either side of the Atlantic, amid concerns over the FAA’s relationship with Boeing, including the degree of self-certification.
Ethiopia chose to send the data recorders from the crash to safety investigators in Paris, and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency has indicated it would carry out its own assessment of the fix, rather than rely on the FAA in America.
On Sunday, the Observer reported that pilots have also voiced fears over the safety of Boeing Dreamliners after a crucial fire-fighting system has been found to have the potential to malfunction.
Boeing has issued an alert to airlines using its flagship B787 Dreamliner, warning that the switch used to extinguish an engine fire has failed in a “small number” of instances. The switch also severs the fuel supply and the hydraulic fluid to prevent flames spreading.
In its alert to airlines, Boeing warns that long-term heating can cause the fire switch to stick in the locked position so it can’t be used to release the two fire extinguishers in each engine.
UK airlines Tui, British Airways and Virgin Atlantic operate more than 60 Dreamliners between them. The FAA has decided not to ground the fleet, despite admitting a “risk to the flying public”.
Boss says aircraft maker failed to communicate properly with regulators and customers
Miles Brignall
Sun 16 Jun 2019 18.20 BST
Last modified on Sun 16 Jun 2019 19.55 BST
The head of Boeing has admitted the company made communications errors in its dealings with regulators and airlines in the wake of the 737 Max jet crisis that grounded the entire fleet.
Speaking on the eve of the Paris air show, the Boeing chief executive, Dennis Muilenburg, said the company’s communications were “not consistent” and that was “unacceptable”. Muilenburg added that the US aerospace group had failed to communicate “crisply” with regulators and carriers about the plane.
The 737 Max was grounded globally in the aftermath of an Ethiopian Airlines crash outside Addis Ababa in March that killed all 157 people on board. It was the 737 Max’s second disaster in five months, after 189 people were killed on a Lion Air flight in Indonesia in October.
Asked how the design and constructions of the 737 Max failed to capture apparent flaws in the software and sensors behind the airplane, Muilenburg said: “Clearly, we can make improvements, and we understand that and we will make those improvements.”
Investigations into the Ethiopia and Indonesia accidents have centred on the Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which was designed to keep the aircraft stable in flight. An investigation into the Ethiopia crash has reportedly found that the MCAS software – which automatically pushes the aircraft’s nose down to guard against a loss of lift – was activated by erroneous “angle of attack” data from a single sensor, forcing the pilots into a doomed struggle to control the aircraft.
Muilenburg added: “When I make comments about the previous design and how we followed those processes, that’s something we put a lot of thought and depth of analysis into. That doesn’t mean that it can’t be improved.”
The Boeing boss, who has been under fire over the 737 MAX design and Boeing’s handling of the crisis, said he expected the plane to return to service this year.
Muilenburg said he was “disappointed” the company wasn’t more forthcoming with information when engineers in 2017 learned that cockpit alerts intended to warn pilots about certain sensor malfunctions didn’t work or weren’t operating as intended due to a software error. The company previously said senior Boeing leaders didn’t learn about the issue until after the second crash.
The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has faulted Boeing for not telling regulators for more than year that a safety indicator in the Max cockpit didn’t work. Pilots are angry that the company didn’t tell them about the MCAS system.
Boeing has been working round the clock on a fix to allay safety concerns, and it is likely to remain out of service until August at the earliest, which is well into peak season for many airlines. American Airlines, a major US customer of the aircraft, has pushed its cancellations of 737 Max services into September.
Reuters has reported that the FAA has tentative plans to begin test flights of proposed software fixes, possibly as early as this week.
The long-anticipated certification tests, which will take several weeks to complete, have been planned with the support of European and Canadian regulators, its source reported.
The 737 Max disasters have ignited tensions between air regulators on either side of the Atlantic, amid concerns over the FAA’s relationship with Boeing, including the degree of self-certification.
Ethiopia chose to send the data recorders from the crash to safety investigators in Paris, and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency has indicated it would carry out its own assessment of the fix, rather than rely on the FAA in America.
On Sunday, the Observer reported that pilots have also voiced fears over the safety of Boeing Dreamliners after a crucial fire-fighting system has been found to have the potential to malfunction.
Boeing has issued an alert to airlines using its flagship B787 Dreamliner, warning that the switch used to extinguish an engine fire has failed in a “small number” of instances. The switch also severs the fuel supply and the hydraulic fluid to prevent flames spreading.
In its alert to airlines, Boeing warns that long-term heating can cause the fire switch to stick in the locked position so it can’t be used to release the two fire extinguishers in each engine.
UK airlines Tui, British Airways and Virgin Atlantic operate more than 60 Dreamliners between them. The FAA has decided not to ground the fleet, despite admitting a “risk to the flying public”.
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Psychophysiological entity
Well the motor is of course adjacent to the jackscrew, but my suggested boost would need to be like powered steering, sensing the applied effort on the cables and boosting that long run. It would also have to be at the rear.
My concerns were for a situation where the European agency - and others - continue to refuse recertification due to control loads. A worst case scenario.
From John's post above:
It's hard to imagine what was in Muilenburg's mind as he sat down to write his release. He can't say, 'we messed up', the lawyers brief must be extensive, and he also has to be guarded about just how sorry Boeing is, for the same reason. Building, maintaining and flying huge airliners carries a fearsome responsibility, which I for one started to feel at the end of my career. But it's the business we're in, having gone from a handful of people receiving waiter service in Lloyd Loom chairs to hundreds of souls being conveyed in unprecedented statistical safety. When an accidents happen it's not altogether surprising - until they cluster and reveal a mass of issues that leave the aviation world breathless. It simply isn't the world we thought we were in, the subterfuge, the downright lies, a shift in our perception that brings a loss of faith in the main players. We'd like to believe that no one would have risked a single life, it's beyond credulity, but there it is, increasing evidence that some folk manipulated difficulties just assuming the worst scenarios just wouldn't become reality. Denial has gone from meaning self-deception, to the misuse of words like, 'unacceptable'.
My concerns were for a situation where the European agency - and others - continue to refuse recertification due to control loads. A worst case scenario.
From John's post above:
Speaking on the eve of the Paris air show, the Boeing chief executive, Dennis Muilenburg, said the company’s communications were “not consistent” and that was “unacceptable”. Muilenburg added that the US aerospace group had failed to communicate “crisply” with regulators and carriers about the plane.
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Well the motor is of course adjacent to the jackscrew, but my suggested boost would need to be like powered steering, sensing the applied effort on the cables and boosting that long run. It would also have to be at the rear.
My concerns were for a situation where the European agency - and others - continue to refuse recertification due to control loads. A worst case scenario.
My concerns were for a situation where the European agency - and others - continue to refuse recertification due to control loads. A worst case scenario.
Either you have a mechanical solution to handle put of trim situations, or your have a system with electronics software etc.
If the current system had fulfilled DAL A, then we would not have had the two accidents.
MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
25.671: Control systems: General
The aeroplane must be shown by analysis, tests, or both, to be capable of continued safe flight within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength after the following failures:
-A runaway of a flight control to an adverse position and jam must be accounted for if such runaway and subsequent jamming is not extremely improbable (Probability of 1 x 10-9 or less per flying hour )
The aeroplane must be shown by analysis, tests, or both, to be capable of continued safe flight within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength after the following failures:
-A runaway of a flight control to an adverse position and jam must be accounted for if such runaway and subsequent jamming is not extremely improbable (Probability of 1 x 10-9 or less per flying hour )
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True +1Allegedly, a conversation, which was overheard near a lift (elevator) stated that Boeing lawyers would spend a million USD on a case worth 10K.One word comes to mind, "honesty".
Once more a statement from Boeing that's been authored by their endless parade of lawyers. He only admits to not having been clear in communications following the accidents, nothing more or less. But to actually admitting Boeing built a duffer, or ever retracting the remarks he made about the pilots, is seemingly beyond their level of capability. And that, right there, tells you all you need to know about a sick corporate culture, which ultimately manifested itself in two of their newest products going lawn dart.
I find it troubling that a bloke making 20M USD a year is not expected to deliver a world-class performance every single minute of every single day. Anything less than that should be rewarded with a kick up the backside, sending him off for a spin on the executive career carrousel. But, apparently, making a pigs ear of things is perfectly acceptable to the board of Boeing. Glad I'm no longer holding any shares in that circus.
I find it troubling that a bloke making 20M USD a year is not expected to deliver a world-class performance every single minute of every single day. Anything less than that should be rewarded with a kick up the backside, sending him off for a spin on the executive career carrousel. But, apparently, making a pigs ear of things is perfectly acceptable to the board of Boeing. Glad I'm no longer holding any shares in that circus.
Maybe I miss the point here, but to me, it seems that the MCAS is a device intended to keep the aircraft below a certain critical AOA and, therefore, in essence a stick pusher.
Now, Stick pushers have been around in many aircraft types, jet and prop, of eastern and western provenience, since the mid-1960s and seem to be a well understood and safe system. They are known to the crews operating the type, they rely on at least two separate AOA sensors and they can not only be cancelled via a prominently placed push button but also be overpowered by the crew in case of undesired activation.
With the type in question being fly-by-wire, why is it not possible to introduce a stick pusher software that introduces the required nose-down input not via the stabilizer trim but via the elevators and can be cancelled, if so desired by the crew, via e. g. a glareshield-mounted push button?
Now, Stick pushers have been around in many aircraft types, jet and prop, of eastern and western provenience, since the mid-1960s and seem to be a well understood and safe system. They are known to the crews operating the type, they rely on at least two separate AOA sensors and they can not only be cancelled via a prominently placed push button but also be overpowered by the crew in case of undesired activation.
With the type in question being fly-by-wire, why is it not possible to introduce a stick pusher software that introduces the required nose-down input not via the stabilizer trim but via the elevators and can be cancelled, if so desired by the crew, via e. g. a glareshield-mounted push button?
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Maybe I miss the point here, but to me, it seems that the MCAS is a device intended to keep the aircraft below a certain critical AOA and, therefore, in essence a stick pusher.
Now, Stick pushers have been around in many aircraft types, jet and prop, of eastern and western provenience, since the mid-1960s and seem to be a well understood and safe system. They are known to the crews operating the type, they rely on at least two separate AOA sensors and they can not only be cancelled via a prominently placed push button but also be overpowered by the crew in case of undesired activation.
With the type in question being fly-by-wire, why is it not possible to introduce a stick pusher software that introduces the required nose-down input not via the stabilizer trim but via the elevators and can be cancelled, if so desired by the crew, via e. g. a glareshield-mounted push button?
Now, Stick pushers have been around in many aircraft types, jet and prop, of eastern and western provenience, since the mid-1960s and seem to be a well understood and safe system. They are known to the crews operating the type, they rely on at least two separate AOA sensors and they can not only be cancelled via a prominently placed push button but also be overpowered by the crew in case of undesired activation.
With the type in question being fly-by-wire, why is it not possible to introduce a stick pusher software that introduces the required nose-down input not via the stabilizer trim but via the elevators and can be cancelled, if so desired by the crew, via e. g. a glareshield-mounted push button?
FrequentSLF, DaveReidUK - thank you, I had somehow assumed that Boeing had gone for a full FBW on this type. Adding a proper stick pusher instead of the discussed MCAS function would likely be quite a task and not a viable option then.
Thats the problem with the MAX being a hybrid between analogue and digital. If they had changed it to FBW then it would have required re certification. The crux of the whole mess has been Boeings desire to avoid re certification.
If this goes on much longer, B had better build the next few batches with uninstalled stab gear and a few panels off - the better to install possible mods for certification.
Just in time inventory control is used in the automotive industry, and occasionally critical parts need to be delivered in a chartered aircraft to keep the line going. A few thousand dollars to fly in a couple of crate loads of ignition sensors is nothing compared to the thousands of dollars a minute halting production would cost.
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