MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
As you do not seem to like the socialists, you should not be comfortable in Zurich as I think the mayor still is a socialist (for a number of years).
.
The entire point of the introduction of MCAS is that the 737 MAX without MCAS responds to pitch control inputs differently to earlier models. In particular, runaway pitch-up is possible.
How many times...
Last edited by Icarus2001; 30th May 2019 at 10:07.
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: Zurich
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
IATA is a trade body of all the mainstream carriers, on the commercial side. They represent interline agreements, revenue division, commercial policies, relations with travel agencies and other sales agents, and such like. This mirrors what ICAO do on the operational and technical side.
Their relevance to the situation is in the forward planning of schedules and making reservations, where the aircraft provision and schedules are currently substantially disorganised by the grounding, such that carriers currently are unsure what capacity they may have available for the season ahead. It now looks likely the Max is going to be grounded right through the summer peak period, and carriers affected are going to be facing up to different timetables, and offering different fare structures through their yield management plans, to what they might have hoped.
Their relevance to the situation is in the forward planning of schedules and making reservations, where the aircraft provision and schedules are currently substantially disorganised by the grounding, such that carriers currently are unsure what capacity they may have available for the season ahead. It now looks likely the Max is going to be grounded right through the summer peak period, and carriers affected are going to be facing up to different timetables, and offering different fare structures through their yield management plans, to what they might have hoped.
And another thing that caught my eye is "revenue division". How do they do that? Airlines pay to some kind of fund which then gets redistributed? I have never heard of any of this. Very interesting.
Is membership in IATA mandatory for any airline?
Just trying to understand how it works. (insert confused smiley)
Join Date: Jul 2015
Location: Scotland
Posts: 157
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Making schedules and reservations. IATA does that? Not the airlines themselves? So if, say, Lufthansa or British Airways want to open a new route, they have to go through IATA?
And another thing that caught my eye is "revenue division". How do they do that? Airlines pay to some kind of fund which then gets redistributed? I have never heard of any of this. Very interesting.
Is membership in IATA mandatory for any airline?
Just trying to understand how it works. (insert confused smiley)
And another thing that caught my eye is "revenue division". How do they do that? Airlines pay to some kind of fund which then gets redistributed? I have never heard of any of this. Very interesting.
Is membership in IATA mandatory for any airline?
Just trying to understand how it works. (insert confused smiley)
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: Zurich
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
not really for this thread but IATA covers things like interlining bags from one airline to another, tickets so that BA can ticket on AA and the like, they collect revenue from one airline that needs to pay another for services. They also cover route fares (an airline can reduce tickets from the IATA fare) ie a single from NY to LHR economy would be say $1,500. You don’t have to be a member but then you working with other airlines can be difficult. If you a small airline and you want to sell a route where one leg is with you and another is on a major airline, they won’t entertain you unless you have an IATA registration as it’s an insurance they’ll get paid if you go bust.
Nah. I got all the info I wanted... for now. :-)
Thanks.
IATA does many things for the aviation industry in addition to acting as a clearing house, such as training courses for airlines, publishing manuals like this one on dangerous goods:- https://www.iata.org/publications/dgr/Pages/index.aspx
and this one on ground handling:- https://www.iata.org/publications/st...ns-manual.aspx
These manuals and the work of the various specialist groups help to standardise procedures across the whole industry.
IATA also works with ICAO, national ANSPs and airports to improve facilities for international aviation:- https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/workgr...perations.aspx
ProPax, it helps to do your homework!!
and this one on ground handling:- https://www.iata.org/publications/st...ns-manual.aspx
These manuals and the work of the various specialist groups help to standardise procedures across the whole industry.
IATA also works with ICAO, national ANSPs and airports to improve facilities for international aviation:- https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/workgr...perations.aspx
ProPax, it helps to do your homework!!
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 59
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
IATA
Non of the big European Low Cost airlines are IATA members.
IATA is a club for the Big Flag carriers of old with any Commuters that wants business joining for a hefty fee.
The ONLY thing effecting me as a 737-800 pilot and future Max pilot from IATA is the Dangerous Goods Manual , once a Year on the Swimming Course ( Safety Course) with the girls.
IATA has NOTHING to do with the Certification of any Aircraft, they just have members that has bought a few 737 Max.
As a potentially united customer group they could push Boeing, but I doubt they are able to agree on any specific and productive demands.
So
ICAO and FAA issue Recommendations, NCAA, FAA and EASA set Rules, Regulations and Practices for Certification of Aircraft.
IATA play with the Toy and the Money.
This is the bigger picture , the way I see it.
Regards
Cpt B
IATA is a club for the Big Flag carriers of old with any Commuters that wants business joining for a hefty fee.
The ONLY thing effecting me as a 737-800 pilot and future Max pilot from IATA is the Dangerous Goods Manual , once a Year on the Swimming Course ( Safety Course) with the girls.
IATA has NOTHING to do with the Certification of any Aircraft, they just have members that has bought a few 737 Max.
As a potentially united customer group they could push Boeing, but I doubt they are able to agree on any specific and productive demands.
So
ICAO and FAA issue Recommendations, NCAA, FAA and EASA set Rules, Regulations and Practices for Certification of Aircraft.
IATA play with the Toy and the Money.
This is the bigger picture , the way I see it.
Regards
Cpt B
Last edited by BluSdUp; 30th May 2019 at 12:53. Reason: y
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 487
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
AP
https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-...ore-max-crash/
Ethiopian pilot pleaded for training weeks before Max crash
May 29, 2019 at 12:47 pm Updated May 30, 2019 at 7:35 am
By BERNARD CONDON
The Associated Press
NEW YORK (AP) — Just days after a Lion Air Boeing 737 Max nosedived in Indonesia and killed all 189 people aboard, an Ethiopian Airlines pilot began pleading with his bosses for more training on the Max, warning that crews could easily be overwhelmed in a crisis and that one of their planes could be the next to go down.
“We are asking for trouble,” veteran pilot Bernd Kai von Hoesslin wrote in a December email obtained by The Associated Press, adding that if several alarms go off in the cockpit at once, “it will be a crash for sure.”
That prediction proved all too accurate.
What Ethiopian Airlines did in response to his warnings is unclear, and whether it made any difference is a matter of dispute. But within weeks, an Ethiopian Max indeed went down, killing all 157 people on board. It slammed into the ground amid a flurry of alarms as the pilots struggled to control a malfunction in the automatic anti-stall system.
While the anti-stall system has gotten most of the scrutiny in the two Max crashes five months apart that have led to a worldwide grounding of the planes, the concerns raised by von Hoesslin have added to a debate on the role pilot error played, and whether Ethiopian’s pilots were as prepared as they could have been to avert disaster.
Von Hoesslin, a Canadian citizen who resigned from Ethiopian last month, argued in three emails to senior managers after the anti-stall system came under scrutiny in the Lion Air crash that crews flying Ethiopian’s five Max jets should have been given more information and training on how the system worked. He also said pilots should be drilled on the steps to override it if it faltered. Von Hoesslin’s emails were first reported by Bloomberg.
The Max’s system, called MCAS, for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, automatically pushes the plane’s nose down when it is at risk of stalling. It misfired in both fatal crashes, with pilots losing control of the plane as they fought against it.
According to the email chain obtained by the AP, Ethiopian responded to the Oct. 29 Lion Air crash with a few emails to pilots detailing bulletins from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing on what do if the anti-stall system malfunctioned. Other Ethiopian pilots who spoke to the AP say those emails required no signoffs that pilots actually read and understood the directives, and no mandated additional training.
“Ethiopian Airlines is a rapidly expanding airline and they have extremely inexperienced crews,” von Hoesslin said in documents obtained by the AP. “You need to spoon-feed them the information and make sure they understand.”
To underscore his point, von Hoesslin made a video shortly after the Ethiopian crash in which he quizzed a Max pilot on a Boeing list of warning signs on the stall system that crew members were required to commit to memory. That video, obtained by AP, shows him going blank on most of it.
“You have to have confirmation that they opened it, that they read it and that they understood it,” von Hoesslin said in a document obtained by the AP. “They should have done a little online test with 10 questions. You don’t pass until you get the 10 questions.”
Ethiopian Airlines tweeted Wednesday that “the source of these false allegations is a disgruntled former employee … who has left the airline after many administrative problems.”
Von Hoesslin’s lawyer, Darryl Levitt, issued a statement saying the pilot was not fired but “resigned due to legitimate concerns he had raised that he felt were not adequately addressed.” He added that von Hoesslin will be cooperating with regulators and authorities “with his sole objective of contributing to make air travel safe.”
Ethiopian has said that the requirements for warning and training Max pilots after the Lion Air crash were set by the FAA and Boeing and that their directives were used to “brief all our pilots” and incorporated into flight manuals.
CEO Tewolde Gebremariam said in an interview shortly after the Ethiopian crash, “Today we believe that might not have been enough.”
Gebremariam declined to say whether the pilots on the doomed flight took additional training after the Lion Air crash on Ethiopian’s Max simulator, a multimillion-dollar piece of equipment most airlines don’t have, but said “it wouldn’t have made any difference” because the simulator wasn’t designed to imitate problems in the new jet’s flight-control system.
Ethiopian has said both the captain and co-pilot followed all the steps Boeing laid out in its bulletin on how to respond to a malfunction in the anti-stall system.
But the preliminary report on the March 10 crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 from Addis Ababa to Nairobi showed that the pilots deviated from the directives and made other mistakes, notably flying the plane at an unusually high speed and inexplicably reactivating the anti-stall system shortly after manually overriding it.
Six minutes into its flight, the plane with passengers from nearly a dozen countries cratered into the ground about 40 miles from the airport.
Former FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said the Ethiopian pilots clearly bear some of the blame.
“So Boeing was at fault because a light came on or this thing tripped mistakenly, but it shouldn’t have brought the airplane down,” Babbitt said of the anti-stall system. “That was very fixable and a pretty simple solution. And they didn’t come to grips with it. … They let the plane get away from them.”
Peter Lemme, a former Boeing engineer who worked on flight control systems, said apportioning blame between Boeing and the crew is difficult.
“Some pilots in their easy chairs are saying they would have known how to react, but it’s not so easy,” he said. “Did the pilots cause the accident? No. Could they have prevented it? Yes.”
Von Hoesslin, a 56-year-old pilot with three decades of flying experience, initially wrote to his bosses Nov. 11 in response to the airline’s five-sentence email to dozens of pilots alerting them to the Boeing bulletin and reminding them about the checklist of steps to perform should something similar go wrong.
He urged Ethiopian to give more information because pilots are not “fully or even aware of how” the MCAS works. That prompted a second email from the airline with more detail.
A month later, on Dec. 12, von Hoesslin sent another email, urging a close reading of a preliminary report from Indonesian regulators on the crash there. He pointed out several potential problems with the Max and recommended steps be taken to make sure pilots know the checklist.
The next day, he sent a third email recommending new simulator training designed to roughly re-create what went wrong in the Indonesian flight, adding that he had already practiced in a simulator rigged in such a way and his experience with all the alarms going off was frightening.
“Throw in a GPWS PULL UP” — a warning to pilots that the plane is in danger of crashing into the ground — “and it would be a crash for sure.”
Boeing has said that its fix to software on the Max’s anti-stall system will be accompanied by additional training for pilots. The acting chief of the FAA, Daniel Elwell, said last week that his agency hasn’t decided whether that training should be conducted on computers or in flight simulators.
___
AP writer David Koenig in Dallas and researchers Jennifer Farrar, Randy Herschaft and Rhonda Shafner in New York contributed to this report.
BERNARD CONDON
May 29, 2019 at 12:47 pm Updated May 30, 2019 at 7:35 am
By BERNARD CONDON
The Associated Press
NEW YORK (AP) — Just days after a Lion Air Boeing 737 Max nosedived in Indonesia and killed all 189 people aboard, an Ethiopian Airlines pilot began pleading with his bosses for more training on the Max, warning that crews could easily be overwhelmed in a crisis and that one of their planes could be the next to go down.
“We are asking for trouble,” veteran pilot Bernd Kai von Hoesslin wrote in a December email obtained by The Associated Press, adding that if several alarms go off in the cockpit at once, “it will be a crash for sure.”
That prediction proved all too accurate.
What Ethiopian Airlines did in response to his warnings is unclear, and whether it made any difference is a matter of dispute. But within weeks, an Ethiopian Max indeed went down, killing all 157 people on board. It slammed into the ground amid a flurry of alarms as the pilots struggled to control a malfunction in the automatic anti-stall system.
While the anti-stall system has gotten most of the scrutiny in the two Max crashes five months apart that have led to a worldwide grounding of the planes, the concerns raised by von Hoesslin have added to a debate on the role pilot error played, and whether Ethiopian’s pilots were as prepared as they could have been to avert disaster.
Von Hoesslin, a Canadian citizen who resigned from Ethiopian last month, argued in three emails to senior managers after the anti-stall system came under scrutiny in the Lion Air crash that crews flying Ethiopian’s five Max jets should have been given more information and training on how the system worked. He also said pilots should be drilled on the steps to override it if it faltered. Von Hoesslin’s emails were first reported by Bloomberg.
The Max’s system, called MCAS, for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, automatically pushes the plane’s nose down when it is at risk of stalling. It misfired in both fatal crashes, with pilots losing control of the plane as they fought against it.
According to the email chain obtained by the AP, Ethiopian responded to the Oct. 29 Lion Air crash with a few emails to pilots detailing bulletins from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing on what do if the anti-stall system malfunctioned. Other Ethiopian pilots who spoke to the AP say those emails required no signoffs that pilots actually read and understood the directives, and no mandated additional training.
“Ethiopian Airlines is a rapidly expanding airline and they have extremely inexperienced crews,” von Hoesslin said in documents obtained by the AP. “You need to spoon-feed them the information and make sure they understand.”
To underscore his point, von Hoesslin made a video shortly after the Ethiopian crash in which he quizzed a Max pilot on a Boeing list of warning signs on the stall system that crew members were required to commit to memory. That video, obtained by AP, shows him going blank on most of it.
“You have to have confirmation that they opened it, that they read it and that they understood it,” von Hoesslin said in a document obtained by the AP. “They should have done a little online test with 10 questions. You don’t pass until you get the 10 questions.”
Ethiopian Airlines tweeted Wednesday that “the source of these false allegations is a disgruntled former employee … who has left the airline after many administrative problems.”
Von Hoesslin’s lawyer, Darryl Levitt, issued a statement saying the pilot was not fired but “resigned due to legitimate concerns he had raised that he felt were not adequately addressed.” He added that von Hoesslin will be cooperating with regulators and authorities “with his sole objective of contributing to make air travel safe.”
Ethiopian has said that the requirements for warning and training Max pilots after the Lion Air crash were set by the FAA and Boeing and that their directives were used to “brief all our pilots” and incorporated into flight manuals.
CEO Tewolde Gebremariam said in an interview shortly after the Ethiopian crash, “Today we believe that might not have been enough.”
Gebremariam declined to say whether the pilots on the doomed flight took additional training after the Lion Air crash on Ethiopian’s Max simulator, a multimillion-dollar piece of equipment most airlines don’t have, but said “it wouldn’t have made any difference” because the simulator wasn’t designed to imitate problems in the new jet’s flight-control system.
Ethiopian has said both the captain and co-pilot followed all the steps Boeing laid out in its bulletin on how to respond to a malfunction in the anti-stall system.
But the preliminary report on the March 10 crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 from Addis Ababa to Nairobi showed that the pilots deviated from the directives and made other mistakes, notably flying the plane at an unusually high speed and inexplicably reactivating the anti-stall system shortly after manually overriding it.
Six minutes into its flight, the plane with passengers from nearly a dozen countries cratered into the ground about 40 miles from the airport.
Former FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said the Ethiopian pilots clearly bear some of the blame.
“So Boeing was at fault because a light came on or this thing tripped mistakenly, but it shouldn’t have brought the airplane down,” Babbitt said of the anti-stall system. “That was very fixable and a pretty simple solution. And they didn’t come to grips with it. … They let the plane get away from them.”
Peter Lemme, a former Boeing engineer who worked on flight control systems, said apportioning blame between Boeing and the crew is difficult.
“Some pilots in their easy chairs are saying they would have known how to react, but it’s not so easy,” he said. “Did the pilots cause the accident? No. Could they have prevented it? Yes.”
Von Hoesslin, a 56-year-old pilot with three decades of flying experience, initially wrote to his bosses Nov. 11 in response to the airline’s five-sentence email to dozens of pilots alerting them to the Boeing bulletin and reminding them about the checklist of steps to perform should something similar go wrong.
He urged Ethiopian to give more information because pilots are not “fully or even aware of how” the MCAS works. That prompted a second email from the airline with more detail.
A month later, on Dec. 12, von Hoesslin sent another email, urging a close reading of a preliminary report from Indonesian regulators on the crash there. He pointed out several potential problems with the Max and recommended steps be taken to make sure pilots know the checklist.
The next day, he sent a third email recommending new simulator training designed to roughly re-create what went wrong in the Indonesian flight, adding that he had already practiced in a simulator rigged in such a way and his experience with all the alarms going off was frightening.
“Throw in a GPWS PULL UP” — a warning to pilots that the plane is in danger of crashing into the ground — “and it would be a crash for sure.”
Boeing has said that its fix to software on the Max’s anti-stall system will be accompanied by additional training for pilots. The acting chief of the FAA, Daniel Elwell, said last week that his agency hasn’t decided whether that training should be conducted on computers or in flight simulators.
___
AP writer David Koenig in Dallas and researchers Jennifer Farrar, Randy Herschaft and Rhonda Shafner in New York contributed to this report.
BERNARD CONDON
Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: FRANCE
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Water Pilot wrote :
That is right of course and for the disputes there is a brief on this website ::
:
Good evening to everyone.
I don't think the MAX will be flying in Europe any time soon, there is a very nasty trade war brewing. The WTO has found that Airbus has been illegally subsidized by the government and so the US will be able to impose tariffs. Boeing is also illegally subsidized but the case is not as far along so there is going to be five or six months of one-sided tariffs (affecting cheese makers, etc.) over airplanes
leehamnews.com/2019/03/28/wto-appeals-court-rules-against-boeing-airbus-claims-minimum-15bn-in-harm/
Good evening to everyone.
Well, one thing they (IATA) do is set the rules for air transport of hazardous lithium-ion batteries. I see, from a listing for a power bank on ebay, that there are some Chinese suppliers who openly admit to flaunting these safety regulations.
Quote from the listing:
" 5、 The delivery time of each country's post office is different, the arrival time may be delayed, please be sure to wait patiently
6、Our product capacity is large, if the huge capacity (MAH) is printed on the power bank, it can not be allowed to transported by the aircraft,so our products are not printed capacity information, please understand
7、We ensure that the product 100% is brand-new, but the transport time is long, and the collision in the transport process may cause a small number of product damage, which is unavoidable, if there is damage please contact us in time. "
Quote from the listing:
" 5、 The delivery time of each country's post office is different, the arrival time may be delayed, please be sure to wait patiently
6、Our product capacity is large, if the huge capacity (MAH) is printed on the power bank, it can not be allowed to transported by the aircraft,so our products are not printed capacity information, please understand
7、We ensure that the product 100% is brand-new, but the transport time is long, and the collision in the transport process may cause a small number of product damage, which is unavoidable, if there is damage please contact us in time. "
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: Zurich
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
We do need a separate thread on IATA, it seems. :-) I'm learning more and more and I have more questions, but I do realize I started an off-top. Can we somehow move it to another thread?
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 59
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Zeffy
A very interesting article on what Cpt Bernd von Hosselin had asked ET after the Lion accident.
I find that disturbing.
I hope he gets support to tell and document the truth.
Regards
Cpt B
I find that disturbing.
I hope he gets support to tell and document the truth.
Regards
Cpt B
When I first started in the industry in 1967 IATA was responsible for:
- Clearing house for interline travel
- Tariff setting
- Inflight standards (configuration/meals/alcohol)
As per the tread title - the delay seems to be more Boeing not officially submitting the fix to the FAA.
Why is there the delay?
Boeing say they have fixed it (not that there was ever a problem), is there fear in the test flight stage of not being able to manually move the trim wheel, when it is expected to be movable. Surely most regulators will want evidence of the trim wheel "actual flight" forces to move until it will not move.
Then since MCAS is not a part of this test flight now (had it's one input so locked out) and the MAX is essentially a NG with a trim wheel not able to move.
Nothing quite like doubling the bet - MAX grounding lifted or MAX and NG grounded.
Why is there the delay?
Boeing say they have fixed it (not that there was ever a problem), is there fear in the test flight stage of not being able to manually move the trim wheel, when it is expected to be movable. Surely most regulators will want evidence of the trim wheel "actual flight" forces to move until it will not move.
Then since MCAS is not a part of this test flight now (had it's one input so locked out) and the MAX is essentially a NG with a trim wheel not able to move.
Nothing quite like doubling the bet - MAX grounding lifted or MAX and NG grounded.
Chris2303,
In its early days IATA was concerned too much with ticket pricing and meals standards etc. But now, as well as cting as a clearing house, a large part of IATA's work has been to work alongside ICAO to improve the Standards and Recommended Practices and to promote their application by member states to provide consistent standards for better worldwide ATC, airports and air navigation facilities. https://www.icao.int/safety/safetyma...ges/sarps.aspx
In the early days it was much like a cartel, but since then it has moved with the times, pushing for safer standards, more ATC and airport capacity to reduce delays and greater cost effectiveness. It also conducts safety audits for member airlines. https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/safety...ges/index.aspx
In its early days IATA was concerned too much with ticket pricing and meals standards etc. But now, as well as cting as a clearing house, a large part of IATA's work has been to work alongside ICAO to improve the Standards and Recommended Practices and to promote their application by member states to provide consistent standards for better worldwide ATC, airports and air navigation facilities. https://www.icao.int/safety/safetyma...ges/sarps.aspx
In the early days it was much like a cartel, but since then it has moved with the times, pushing for safer standards, more ATC and airport capacity to reduce delays and greater cost effectiveness. It also conducts safety audits for member airlines. https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/safety...ges/index.aspx
Join Date: Aug 2001
Location: MAN
Posts: 78
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I agree that most people use the terms "safe" and "unsafe"; however, there is no such thing as "safe". "Safety" is a concept of relativity. There will always be risk in every human endeavor, ranging from "slight risk" to "severe risk", and the real world deals with risk management, not attempts to achieve absolute safety ... whatever that is. For example, walking is a relatively safe activity given normal circumstances; yet, walking on the edge of an icy precipice in a snowstorm involves more risk, requiring more caution ... hence "risk management". I could go on and on about this, but I won't.
This is just my opinion; but that opinion is based on 43 years of safety related work and accident investigation.
Cheers,
Grog
This is just my opinion; but that opinion is based on 43 years of safety related work and accident investigation.
Cheers,
Grog
At my age, I have about a 1 in 500000 chance of dying on any given day. Sitting in a commercial airliner for 8 hours protects me from some everyday risks but exposes me to some others (chiefly medical I suspect). Also the radiation exposure slightly increases my risk of developing cancer at some point. The risk from a crash is negligible... less than 1 in 10 million last time I looked.
The risk from crashes has been reduced far below the practical safe level as much for commercial reasons as anything. It is tremendously impressive