MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: French Alps
Posts: 326
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Don't get too excited. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee:
https://www.c-span.org/video/?465775...afety&live&vod
https://www.c-span.org/video/?465775...afety&live&vod
https://transportation.house.gov/com...f-the-aircraft
Anybody witnessed the question of Congressman Cohen : "You said you are accountable, those families' relatives are gone, are you getting a cut in pay, are you working for free to correct what's been done wrong, like the Japanese would do ?"
"You're still getting 30 million a year, you're not accountable !"
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 788
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That is true.
My my point is that the MAX FRM says that the control column switches DO function the same as on the NG. Th function of the pedestal cutout switches are more accurately described.
The nomenclature may be confusing to some. I have been operating both for more than 27 years, and have not been confused. The control column cutout switches that Lemme is talking about no longer function as originally designed. The FRM says they do. I quoted the relevant sentence in the MAX FRM above ( and several times over the last year).
Join Date: Sep 2019
Location: Here
Age: 73
Posts: 238
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That is true.
My my point is that the MAX FRM says that the control column switches DO function the same as on the NG. The function of the pedestal cutout switches are more accurately described.
The nomenclature may be confusing to some. I have been operating both for more than 27 years, and have not been confused. The control column cutout switches that Lemme is talking about no longer function as originally designed. The FRM says they do. I quoted the relevant sentence in the MAX FRM above ( and several times over the last year).
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Norway
Age: 57
Posts: 140
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
https://transportation.house.gov/com...f-the-aircraft
Anybody witnessed the question of Congressman Cohen : "You said you are accountable, those families' relatives are gone, are you getting a cut in pay, are you working for free to correct what's been done wrong, like the Japanese would do ?"
"You're still getting 30 million a year, you're not accountable !"
Anybody witnessed the question of Congressman Cohen : "You said you are accountable, those families' relatives are gone, are you getting a cut in pay, are you working for free to correct what's been done wrong, like the Japanese would do ?"
"You're still getting 30 million a year, you're not accountable !"
I've seen a lot of comments here that lead me to believe posters have little knowledge of how safety assessments are done or what the certification process is like..
No, never worked for Boeing though I have some experience with one Boeing aircraft.
Never dealt with management.
Staying within the non-attribution lane I'll just say I'm on the airworthiness authority side of things.
I disagree that "Schedule- Budget- and retraining" were the reason MCAS was classified as Major vs some higher severity.
I think the process, used across the industry, would have ended up at the same severity with other OEs.
Those three may have colored the path taken, by limiting options explored in engineering, and led to looking for a solution that was of a lower severity, but I don't think the process was pencil whipped to reach an outcome of Major.
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: On the Ground
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I flew KC-135s before that, again with the exact same system, so make it 34 years.
Last edited by Takwis; 30th Oct 2019 at 18:46.
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: Washington state
Posts: 209
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Um, perhaps not. They have the emails. Boeing CEO admits design flaw led to crashes
The House Transportation Committee asked about a newly released internal email discussion between Boeing employees in 2015 -- more than a year before the plane's final approval for flight -- raising concerns about that design."Are we vulnerable to single AOA sensor failures with the MCAS implementation," the employee, whose name is redacted in the document, asked, raising the exact scenario blamed for the two crashes.
But committee members raised the prospect the company should have initially made a more stringent design. They pointed to another internal document, dated prior to the crashes, noting that "a slow reaction time" to a MCAS malfunction "found the failure to be catastrophic." In this document, "slow" was defined as longer than 10 seconds.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: San Clemente, CA
Posts: 36
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Safe Landing!
I am afraid the only acceptable way to return the 737 MAX to service is the addition of this "Red Button"! 
Otherwise, I am certain the Boeing management is already looking into filling for BK, making their employees and the US tax payers pay for their F ups!
https://cirrusaircraft.com/totalsafety/#safereturn
Otherwise, I am certain the Boeing management is already looking into filling for BK, making their employees and the US tax payers pay for their F ups!
https://cirrusaircraft.com/totalsafety/#safereturn
Last edited by 787PIC; 30th Oct 2019 at 21:37.
Well if VW had to pay billions in dollars in fines to the USA and who knows how much in Europe and their executives involved in the Dieselgate affair are going to get jail time for a programming scam for anti pollution tests for their cars in which no one died, then I want at a minimum no less for the Boeing executives and other Boeing employees involved in the MAX program that killed all those people in two crashes.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Under the radar, over the rainbow
Posts: 788
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Um, perhaps not. They have the emails. Boeing CEO admits design flaw led to crashes
And Boeing still doesn't seem to be willing or able to get out in front of this.
Join Date: Sep 2019
Location: leftcoast
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Wasn't trying to be snarky. Just wondering. My experience with safety analyses for aircraft systems and ARP4761 and ARP4754A colors my comments.
I've seen a lot of comments here that lead me to believe posters have little knowledge of how safety assessments are done or what the certification process is like..
No, never worked for Boeing though I have some experience with one Boeing aircraft.
Never dealt with management.
Staying within the non-attribution lane I'll just say I'm on the airworthiness authority side of things.
I disagree that "Schedule- Budget- and retraining" were the reason MCAS was classified as Major vs some higher severity.
I think the process, used across the industry, would have ended up at the same severity with other OEs.
Those three may have colored the path taken, by limiting options explored in engineering, and led to looking for a solution that was of a lower severity, but I don't think the process was pencil whipped to reach an outcome of Major.
I've seen a lot of comments here that lead me to believe posters have little knowledge of how safety assessments are done or what the certification process is like..
No, never worked for Boeing though I have some experience with one Boeing aircraft.
Never dealt with management.
Staying within the non-attribution lane I'll just say I'm on the airworthiness authority side of things.
I disagree that "Schedule- Budget- and retraining" were the reason MCAS was classified as Major vs some higher severity.
I think the process, used across the industry, would have ended up at the same severity with other OEs.
Those three may have colored the path taken, by limiting options explored in engineering, and led to looking for a solution that was of a lower severity, but I don't think the process was pencil whipped to reach an outcome of Major.
I'll try to cover in simple- sparse examples just why the " we encourage those with safety concerns to speak up, no retaliation - new reporting guidelines, etc " is no more than business buzzword PR, then ( years ago ) and now - because I personally have lived and worked those kind of items at Boeing. I have munged a bit the dates and identifying items, but the overall issues as described below are real, not hearsay or myth or similar.
1) Time- late 80's-early 90's. CEO at that time was Frank Shrontz. Frank made a major effort to arrange for anyone to contact him about any issue and provided absolute assurances of no retaliation, etc. In casual discussions of several people ( engineers and shop ) I worked with, the most common response to a received- random offer to meet with Frank was turned down- due to fear installed by their local supervisor or manager. I doubt things have since changed, or will change.
2) When a shop or engineering or clerical person was invited (again at random) to attend a paid for breakfast with other random chosen workers and the Program manager with appropriate charge number exclusions- the results varied from Shop supervisor telling such person IF he attended- he would be terminated, to the opposite wherein said person when asked by program manager what was on his/her mind- they literally stood on the table on told said manager exactly what manager should do relative to xyz issue and methods and communication. The result was that said grunt was invited to a special group to help figure out and implement appropriate corrections, suggestions, etc. Said manager commented to me much later his observations. IF when he asked the ' first or second ' person to speak up, AND that person essentially read the manager the ' riot act ' fairly politely, the rest of the meeting went well and he got lots of good feedback. But if no such person spoke up with anything non complementary, not much feedback would ensue for the rest of the meeting.
3) Supervisors and Managers at all levels had/have two distinct traits. One was if there was a problem,they were helped and encouraged to take it as high as felt necessary to get an answer. The other group was of the IF you communicate to any member of management above " me" without MY knowledge or direct approval or permission- you are on my S** list in MY organization.
4) In one specific example on a ' secure ' program where in to get into shop area required special ID, etc the following happened. The program manager rarely visited that area for a variety of good reasons, but had heard of some abusive and unsafe work practices. So late one night in a 'factory' he put on some old wok clothes, and unannounced went thru security check in and wandered thru the factory. stopped to talk to a ' janitor ' with a casual conversation,etc. About one minute later, a shop worker came around a corner, saw the two standing and talking and obviously not ' working '. went up to them, said ' break it up, we just heard the program manager is in the building, and he has been known to fire anyone obviously not working- spread the word ' So much for that evening.
Lastly- I know several current workers and/or recent retirees who will agree things have not really changed thru this year and may have gotten worse.
But the PR-legal buzzwords re ' open door' 'no retaliation' re org changes etc still sell well to the outsiders
+++++ Late edit +++
Mentioned above Frank Shrontz - in the late 80's- early 90's, Boeing hit a rough patch for various reasons- Frank turned down his board approved raise at the shareholders meeting.
Today- mullenberg refused to answer that question- but deferred to whatever the board decided which under the rules- would probalby NOT include a bonus due to prior -current process involving 'profit and earning' lack.
Just re-inforces the culture of 'profit uber alles ' infection. Granted he should stay until MAX is back in service, etc- but he could have easily promised to forgo any bonus, raise, options, etc that may accrue.
So much for his and Boeings ' I'm sorry' meme
Last edited by Grebe; 30th Oct 2019 at 22:59. Reason: late edit re hearing comments
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Within AM radio broadcast range of downtown Chicago
Age: 71
Posts: 842
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The more things change . . .
....not out in front on this (OldnGrounded, re: Boeing crisis response overall)
To start, Grebe's harsh realism about "open door" assurances being buzzwords with little if any practical value rings true. Having practiced primarily management-side employment law for a lot of years, I have seen an increase in a strange combination of a superiority mindset, coupled with a demand for hierarchical passivity by subordinates, as a senior management trait. And in organizational cultures as a whole, as well.
As for the surrealistic uncovering of pieces of the reality of .... well, the several parts of how this happened, the need to match Airbus fast, the need to work out a deal with the Southwest pilots, the need to just add another layer onto the already large stack of amendments to the original certification, the need to focus on production output numbers, and the need to weather the storm after the first deadly crash - this has been like going to the theater for a one-act play with three scenes in the playbill but then there's a fourth, fifth.....I've lost count. (And for the record, by "need" I'm referring only to Boeing managerial attitude.) (And that list no doubt left parts off...ODA, for example. Or the stinking mess lingering around tbe tanker from which our villain, MCAS, hails.)
Matching the theatrics of the revelations is the - to be blunt here - pathetic dodges by the CEO. Maybe he's got a great acting coach. It's only going to rain harder now, no matter how sunshiny his portrayals. By the way, did anybody also happen to notice in the hearing room today the preeminent, revered trial attorney, Robert Clifford? There was almost an element of the tiger calmly, serenely sizing up the about-to-be-devoured. (Other than also practicing law in the Chicago area, I'm not affiliated with or otherwise connected to Mr. Clifford and I'm only offering my own observations here, and not purporting to speak for or on behalf of his firm or otherwise.)
As a teen (16) I traveled on a United 737 to Columbus OH from Chicago in June 1968. The type was barely a year old. It's sad, kind of unspeakably sad, to witness the venerable old workhorse saddled with these disasters. It's almost as if the airplane itself is trying to tell us something....
I know airplanes don't talk; don't send in the men with the nets and white coats.
From IMDb, on the film, No Highway in the Sky:
"Theodore Honey (James Stewart) is a mathematician charged with discovering what caused the crash of a "Reindeer" airliner. As he travels to investigate, he realizes en route that he's flying on the very same type of airplane. Convinced it will suffer a similar accident, he deliberately sabotages it once it lands, and soon finds himself defending his sanity in an English courtroom. Fortunately, a sympathetic actress (Marlene Dietrich) and a stewardess (Glynis Johns) come to his defense."
In the hangar, a Reindeer parked, as its tail falls off crashing onto the hangar floor, Honey realizes what he missed in his calculations.
Ladies and gentlemen, the 737 MAX crisis did not result from just a single calculation error.
To start, Grebe's harsh realism about "open door" assurances being buzzwords with little if any practical value rings true. Having practiced primarily management-side employment law for a lot of years, I have seen an increase in a strange combination of a superiority mindset, coupled with a demand for hierarchical passivity by subordinates, as a senior management trait. And in organizational cultures as a whole, as well.
As for the surrealistic uncovering of pieces of the reality of .... well, the several parts of how this happened, the need to match Airbus fast, the need to work out a deal with the Southwest pilots, the need to just add another layer onto the already large stack of amendments to the original certification, the need to focus on production output numbers, and the need to weather the storm after the first deadly crash - this has been like going to the theater for a one-act play with three scenes in the playbill but then there's a fourth, fifth.....I've lost count. (And for the record, by "need" I'm referring only to Boeing managerial attitude.) (And that list no doubt left parts off...ODA, for example. Or the stinking mess lingering around tbe tanker from which our villain, MCAS, hails.)
Matching the theatrics of the revelations is the - to be blunt here - pathetic dodges by the CEO. Maybe he's got a great acting coach. It's only going to rain harder now, no matter how sunshiny his portrayals. By the way, did anybody also happen to notice in the hearing room today the preeminent, revered trial attorney, Robert Clifford? There was almost an element of the tiger calmly, serenely sizing up the about-to-be-devoured. (Other than also practicing law in the Chicago area, I'm not affiliated with or otherwise connected to Mr. Clifford and I'm only offering my own observations here, and not purporting to speak for or on behalf of his firm or otherwise.)
As a teen (16) I traveled on a United 737 to Columbus OH from Chicago in June 1968. The type was barely a year old. It's sad, kind of unspeakably sad, to witness the venerable old workhorse saddled with these disasters. It's almost as if the airplane itself is trying to tell us something....
I know airplanes don't talk; don't send in the men with the nets and white coats.
From IMDb, on the film, No Highway in the Sky:
"Theodore Honey (James Stewart) is a mathematician charged with discovering what caused the crash of a "Reindeer" airliner. As he travels to investigate, he realizes en route that he's flying on the very same type of airplane. Convinced it will suffer a similar accident, he deliberately sabotages it once it lands, and soon finds himself defending his sanity in an English courtroom. Fortunately, a sympathetic actress (Marlene Dietrich) and a stewardess (Glynis Johns) come to his defense."
In the hangar, a Reindeer parked, as its tail falls off crashing onto the hangar floor, Honey realizes what he missed in his calculations.
Ladies and gentlemen, the 737 MAX crisis did not result from just a single calculation error.
....
From IMDb, on the film, No Highway in the Sky:
"Theodore Honey (James Stewart) is a mathematician charged with discovering what caused the crash of a "Reindeer" airliner. As he travels to investigate, he realizes en route that he's flying on the very same type of airplane. Convinced it will suffer a similar accident, he deliberately sabotages it once it lands, and soon finds himself defending his sanity in an English courtroom. Fortunately, a sympathetic actress (Marlene Dietrich) and a stewardess (Glynis Johns) come to his defense."
In the hangar, a Reindeer parked, as its tail falls off crashing onto the hangar floor, Honey realizes what he missed in his calculations.
Ladies and gentlemen, the 737 MAX crisis did not result from just a single calculation error.
From IMDb, on the film, No Highway in the Sky:
"Theodore Honey (James Stewart) is a mathematician charged with discovering what caused the crash of a "Reindeer" airliner. As he travels to investigate, he realizes en route that he's flying on the very same type of airplane. Convinced it will suffer a similar accident, he deliberately sabotages it once it lands, and soon finds himself defending his sanity in an English courtroom. Fortunately, a sympathetic actress (Marlene Dietrich) and a stewardess (Glynis Johns) come to his defense."
In the hangar, a Reindeer parked, as its tail falls off crashing onto the hangar floor, Honey realizes what he missed in his calculations.
Ladies and gentlemen, the 737 MAX crisis did not result from just a single calculation error.
He was an aeronautical engineer and a pilot, so knew what he was writing about.
Wikipedia on Nevil Shute
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 487
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Seattle Times
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg faces calls to resign in second day of 737 MAX hearings in Congress
...Update, 11:40 a.m.
Rep. Jesus Garcia, D- Illinois, grilled – and mostly blasted – Muilenburg about the financial incentives of his job.
“The way I see it, your relentless focus on stock price and your company’s bottom line may have negatively affected employee performance, would you agree?” Garcia asked him.
“Congressman, I don’t agree with that. Our business model is about safe airplanes,” Muilenburg said.
Garcia wasn’t buying it. Citing internal company surveys and whistleblower reports, he said, “It’s pretty clear there has been a culture of greed and compromising safety at Boeing.”
“Mr. Muilenburg, you did everything to drive profits over safety. You skirted certification requirements or regulators at every corner, and your employees even admit to lying to the FAA. There are basically two ways that this plays out. You either truly didn’t realize that you had an defective plane, which demonstrates gross incompetence and or negligence, or you did know you had a defective plane but still tried to push it to market. In which case, in which case it’s just clear corruption.”
“Either way, Mr. Muilenburg, you’re still the captain of this ship. A culture of negligence, incompetence or corruption starts at the top and it starts with you. You padded your personal finances by putting profits over safety and now 346 people, including 8 Americans, are dead on your watch… I think it’s time that you submitted your resignation, don’t you?”
Muilenburg: “Congressman, I respectfully disagree with your premise on what drives our company.”
Garcia: “Ok, well whether or not you or your colleagues are incriminated in the ongoing criminal investigation, the facts remain: It was either gross negligence, incompetence or corruption. You’re at the top. I think it’s pretty clear to me, to the families of the victims and to the American public that you should resign and do it immediately.”...
Rep. Jesus Garcia, D- Illinois, grilled – and mostly blasted – Muilenburg about the financial incentives of his job.
“The way I see it, your relentless focus on stock price and your company’s bottom line may have negatively affected employee performance, would you agree?” Garcia asked him.
“Congressman, I don’t agree with that. Our business model is about safe airplanes,” Muilenburg said.
Garcia wasn’t buying it. Citing internal company surveys and whistleblower reports, he said, “It’s pretty clear there has been a culture of greed and compromising safety at Boeing.”
“Mr. Muilenburg, you did everything to drive profits over safety. You skirted certification requirements or regulators at every corner, and your employees even admit to lying to the FAA. There are basically two ways that this plays out. You either truly didn’t realize that you had an defective plane, which demonstrates gross incompetence and or negligence, or you did know you had a defective plane but still tried to push it to market. In which case, in which case it’s just clear corruption.”
“Either way, Mr. Muilenburg, you’re still the captain of this ship. A culture of negligence, incompetence or corruption starts at the top and it starts with you. You padded your personal finances by putting profits over safety and now 346 people, including 8 Americans, are dead on your watch… I think it’s time that you submitted your resignation, don’t you?”
Muilenburg: “Congressman, I respectfully disagree with your premise on what drives our company.”
Garcia: “Ok, well whether or not you or your colleagues are incriminated in the ongoing criminal investigation, the facts remain: It was either gross negligence, incompetence or corruption. You’re at the top. I think it’s pretty clear to me, to the families of the victims and to the American public that you should resign and do it immediately.”...
Join Date: Jan 2013
Location: Seattle Area
Posts: 263
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That is true.
My my point is that the MAX FRM says that the control column switches DO function the same as on the NG. The function of the pedestal cutout switches are more accurately described.
The nomenclature may be confusing to some. I have been operating both for more than 27 years, and have not been confused. The control column cutout switches that Lemme is talking about no longer function as originally designed. The FRM says they do. I quoted the relevant sentence in the MAX FRM above ( and several times over the last year).
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: On the Ground
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, that’s apparently how it works, now. That’s still not what the manual says. And it completely defeats the purpose of the control column switches...that pilots can quickly, instinctively, and positively defeat any stupid s*** the airplane tries to do.
And it’s not a new relay, it’s the old stab trim bypass relay, repurposed. It’s now the back door the MCAS comes in through.
And it’s not a new relay, it’s the old stab trim bypass relay, repurposed. It’s now the back door the MCAS comes in through.
Join Date: Sep 2019
Location: leftcoast
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, that’s apparently how it works, now. That’s still not what the manual says. And it completely defeats the purpose of the control column switches...that pilots can quickly, instinctively, and positively defeat any stupid s*** the airplane tries to do.
And it’s not a new relay, it’s the old stab trim bypass relay, repurposed. It’s now the back door the MCAS comes in through.
And it’s not a new relay, it’s the old stab trim bypass relay, repurposed. It’s now the back door the MCAS comes in through.
Wonder how MCAS-1(origonal ) versus MCAS-2(current? ) would handle an AOA sensor getting locked-blocked in the 25 degree nose UP position ? meaning must push on column to correct or try to correct .
How long to recognize, what altitude change ? and how many negative g - whoopeee !
Wonder how MCAS-1(origonal ) versus MCAS-2(current? ) would handle an AOA sensor getting locked-blocked in the 25 degree nose UP position ? meaning must push on column to correct or try to correct .
How long to recognize, what altitude change ? and how many negative g - whoopeee !
How long to recognize, what altitude change ? and how many negative g - whoopeee !
[Tin Hats: Long time back, a Folland Gnat doing a flight along the waterfront of Bournemouth UK had a stabilator jack failure to full nose up, which put the plane into an uncontrolled climb, the IP took over and rolled the aircraft to control airspeed and ended up in a sustained high g turn (well, high for the Gnat) After catching their breath and making many turns, in spite of the additional response time, they determined that there was no corrective action available, and planned an ejection out over beach while heading south over the water. As the handle was pulled on the seat the IP realised he had brought his feet back towards the seat, taking his thighs off the seat pan, and the seat fired in that position, snapping both femurs. The student had a clean ejection, the IP landed on two broken legs, and then got dragged along the beach in the wind until the seaside visitors grabbed his legs. He thought he was taller after the event from the traction.]
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: On the Ground
Posts: 155
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Wonder how MCAS-1(origonal ) versus MCAS-2(current? ) would handle an AOA sensor getting locked-blocked in the 25 degree nose UP position ? meaning must push on column to correct or try to correct .
How long to recognize, what altitude change ? and how many negative g - whoopeee !
How long to recognize, what altitude change ? and how many negative g - whoopeee !