MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures

[ST Dog]

Originally Posted by Fly Aiprt

10-15 minutes wrestling with an airplane trying to bunt at low altitude, with alarms blaring and stickshaker activer seems quite a long time indeed.
Are you sure you do not underestimate the problem ?

I'm looking at the 20+ times he did it, 5+ minutes if I read the FDR graphs right. And was above 5000ft through that (ASL I think. What was ground level?)

I think he had a good idea of the problem (AND trim when it shouldn't) and how to counter it. He was doing it. It was only when he handed off to get the manuals that it went to sh*t.

No, I don't know how the rest of the environment would have played here.

But I do think the Capt could have keep it up and then started trying things, eventually getting to cutouts or flaps. Instead he handed off to look in manuals instead of having the F/O do that.


Before anyone jumps, i'm not defending Boeing or blaming pilots. I'm saying it looks like the Captain had it under some control much like the prior crew did. The F/O couldn't maintain that. Don't know why or even imply that he should have been able too. The captain may have been exceptional or just lucky.

Not blaming the F/O either. I drive every day but I don't have the skills a cop/protection detail have for high speed chase/escape. I'm no Grad Prix driver either. They could easily avoid a crash that I couldn't. I don't expect every pilot to have such advanced skills anymore than the average driver is expected to have suck advanced skills.

[etudiant]

The absence of any visible progress in resolving the MAX grounding more than 4 months after it was instituted is disconcerting.
Not only has there been no formal public discussion of the issues, there is not even an agreement as to which issues need to be addressed among the various regulators.
Unless there is tremendous activity well hidden and below the surface, the prospects for an early 2020 reentry into service do not look good. That raises the question of at what point the airlines throw in the towel on this model?

To answer this question, I'd think that France would be the best placed source of insight. Afaik, the MAX engine, the CFM 56, is the largest export earner in the French industry, so the fate of the MAX is of keen interest to France.
Does anyone here have any French connections which could add a little informed perspective on the situation?

[Fly Aiprt]

Originally Posted by ST Dog

And was above 5000ft through that (ASL I think. What was ground level?)

5000 ft isn't high with an airliner doing antics.

Originally Posted by ST Dog

But I do think the Capt could have keep it up and then started trying things, eventually getting to cutouts or flaps. Instead he handed off to look in manuals instead of having the F/O do that.

Have you seen Mentour Pilot's video on trim forces ?
I'm surprised you are saying the Captain could have continued for hundreds of seconds.

One must take fatigue into account - being nervous or physical - this is not a video game.
We don't have control column forces in the preliminary report, but examining the trend of the pitch position curve, we can see the pilot was slowly loosing his fight. (blue curve)

[Peter H]

Originally Posted by infrequentflyer789

For the avoidance of doubt: I don't think moving the stab to augment pitch control forces is wrong in principle, bypassing trim/pitch control safety systems to do it, is. You may consider that part of the implementation rather than the design - in which case we more or less agree. I note that STS, including the "stall-id" function, which trims down close to stall AOA, does NOT bypass the column cutout. So, why did MCAS? That is the point it becomes, to me, wrong in principle. It appears that it was fundamental to its operation that it had to bypass pitch-control safety, in which case MCAS could not exist if it was done right - hence why I said MCAS was wrong.

>FlyAiprt
>Infrequentflyer, great post !
>Indeed what you mention here has been nagging at me for a while.
>The MCAS principle doesn't make sense : can't be overridden with the yoke because they say it must stay active, but can be deactivated with pedestal switches...

It didn't have to be that way.
To add extra pitch control forces MCAS does need to bypass the existing [zero-force?] column cut-out switches used by STS.
However one extra column cut-out switch could be added, which disables MCAS when the column is pulled back forcefully.

[Fly Aiprt]

Originally Posted by etudiant

Afaik, the MAX engine, the CFM 56, is the largest export earner in the French industry, so the fate of the MAX is of keen interest to France.
Does anyone here have any French connections which could add a little informed perspective on the situation?

https://www.safran-group.com/media/s...raded-20190905

The 737 MAX engine is LEAP 1B

Upgraded 2019 revenue and recurring operating income outlook. Based on an assumption of return to service for Boeing 737MAX in Q4, free cash flow to recurring operating income is expected to be in the range 50% to 55%

LEAP program
The ramp-up of LEAP production continues. LEAP deliveries almost doubled in H1 2019 to 861 engines compared with 438 engines in H1 2018. CFM International plans to manufacture around 1,800 LEAP engines in 2019 and will adapt its LEAP-1B delivery plan depending on Boeing's orders.

• LEAP-1A: 44 airlines are operating 454 aircraft powered by LEAP-1A engines totalling over 3.3 million flight hours so far.
• LEAP-1B: 54 airlines were operating 389 aircraft powered by LEAP-1B engines totalling over 1.7 million flight hours until March 13, 2019.

[Grebe]

Originally Posted by etudiant

The absence of any visible progress in resolving the MAX grounding more than 4 months after it was instituted is disconcerting.
Not only has there been no formal public discussion of the issues, there is not even an agreement as to which issues need to be addressed among the various regulators.
Unless there is tremendous activity well hidden and below the surface, the prospects for an early 2020 reentry into service do not look good. That raises the question of at what point the airlines throw in the towel on this model?

To answer this question, I'd think that France would be the best placed source of insight. Afaik, the MAX engine, the CFM 56, is the largest export earner in the French industry, so the fate of the MAX is of keen interest to France.
Does anyone here have any French connections which could add a little informed perspective on the situation?

Here are the most recent EASA issues


Next major milestones Safety assessment of the new design changes proposed by Boeing, including operational procedures
Human factor evaluation and functional tests of the new software
Flight tests on a modified B737 max [one full week - at Boeing Flight Test Center] MCAS operations (nominal behavior)
Flight without MCAS (including high speed turns and stall)
Scenario of stabiliser runaway (uncommanded MCAS activation, manual trim wheel forces)

Approach to stall with autopilot engaged
Crew Training requirements, in particular using Computer Based Training or Simulator Coordination with EASA Member States on Return to Service actions

From EASA Sept report page 16

[AerocatS2A]

Originally Posted by Smythe

I believe that the database showed several pilot reported incidents...without the knowledge of MCAS and confusion on the aircraft nomenclature (737-800 vs 737-8, etc) the reports are a bit generic.

https://www.politico.com/story/2019/...ng-737-1266090

https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/13/u...max/index.html

There is nothing, other than journalistic sensationalism, to suggest those are related to MCAS. I find it difficult to believe you’ve been in these threads for so long and still don’t know this.

there is also this FAA AD:

"This proposed AD was prompted by reports of nuisance stick shaker activation while the airplane accelerated to cruise speed at the top of climb. This proposed AD was also prompted by an investigation of those reports that revealed that the angle of attack (AOA) (also known as angle of airflow) sensor vanes could not prevent the build-up of ice, causing the AOA sensor vanes to become immobilized, which resulted in nuisance stick shaker activation. This proposed AD would require a general visual inspection of the AOA sensors for a part number, and replacement of affected AOA sensors. We are proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

The AD will apply to certain Boeing aircraft, including the 727, 757, 767-300, -300F and 400ER series."

https://simpleflying.com/faa-boeing-aoa-sensor/

No. That does not relate to the MAX. It’s even in the bit you quoted, down the bottom.

[gums]

Salute!

A few points before mods move or cut us off and we return to politics and regulations and such versus the way things flly and changes to our plane that we don't know about.

- I have not seen official text of what happened on the previous Lion flight where many folks claim was saved by a third crewmember. My opinion is we are hearing some urban legend with a touch of reality, but not much considering the AC did not mention turning off the trim switches, not the constant stick shaker.

- I disagree somewhat with one opinion that MCAS should have been based on "q" versus AoA. Apparently, the poorly documented system used mach from the existing computer boxes for "gains". Imagine that sucker activating at 20,000 feet in the holding pattern using the slow speed gains as happened with the two crashes.
The plane has a pitch aero problem, surely. Not unstable, but not the same pitch moments and control deflection/force as the NG model.
The implementation was FUBAR, in my not so humble opinion. And overriding an existing ability to tell HAL to knock it off, just plain sucks.

- Let no one here doubt that I have opinions of the woulda, shoulda, coulda actions of the two crews, but we can all talk about that one stormy night at that neat bar reserved for the brotherhood that flies.

Gums sends...

[Zeffy]

WSJ

https://www.wsj.com/articles/indones...rt-11569185664

Indonesia to Fault 737 MAX Design, U.S. Oversight in Lion Air Crash Report
First formal government finding on crash also likely to detail pilot and maintenance missteps; NTSB preparing separate safety recommendations

By Andy Pasztor and Andrew Tangel
Sept. 22, 2019 4:54 pm ET

Indonesian investigators have determined that design and oversight lapses played a central role in the fatal crash of a Boeing 737 MAX jet in October, according to people familiar with what is expected to be the first formal government finding that the design and U.S. regulatory approval were flawed.

The draft conclusions, these people said, also identify a string of pilot errors and maintenance mistakes as causal factors in the fatal plunge of the Boeing Co. plane into the Java Sea, echoing a preliminary report from Indonesia last year.

Details of the Indonesian report, which haven’t been reported previously, are subject to change and further analysis. Indonesian investigators declined to comment, except to say the final document is likely come out in early November.

A Boeing spokesman said the plane maker continues to work with Indonesian authorities as they complete the report.

U.S. air-crash investigators are preparing to announce a handful of separate safety recommendations, ranging from bolstering the manual flying skills of pilots to enhancing FAA vetting of new aircraft designs.

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board is expected around the end of the month to call for improvements to cockpit training and crew decision making, according to industry and government officials.

The goal is to ensure pilot proficiency when automated systems are malfunctioning or turned off, to help ensure appropriate responses to contradictory cockpit warnings such as those that occurred prior to the MAX crashes, the officials said. The board also is expected to emphasize the importance of setting priorities when executing emergency checklists.

In addition, the NTSB is expected to focus on potential changes to certification of new airliners. The board is poised to recommend re-evaluation of FAA procedures that give the industry authority to sign off on certain safety matters, the officials said. The aim is to make such approvals more transparent, with the goal of greater predictability and more-consistent federal oversight across various types of onboard systems.

Neither the U.S. nor Indonesian recommendations will be binding on the FAA, though the agency already faces escalating congressional and public pressure to change certification procedures. More than half a dozen outside inquiries, including a Justice Department criminal probe and various blue-ribbon advisory panels, are delving into the FAA’s 2017 approval of MCAS. Earlier this month, a Senate appropriations subcommittee backed legislation that would require FAA officials to address recommendations from ongoing investigations and audits.

The FAA has said it welcomes the independent reviews, will carefully consider their results and doesn’t have a firm timetable for allowing MAX jets back in the air. Boeing has said it is collaborating with U.S. and foreign officials to safely return the MAX to service.

Steve Dickson, the FAA’s new head, and top lieutenants are scheduled to meet Monday in Montreal with some four dozen foreign regulators to provide a closed-door update on anticipated fixes to the MAX’s flight-control software and computers.

The FAA is urging a core group of regulators—from Canada, Australia, Brazil and New Zealand—to approve the fixes around November, which would be roughly in tandem with informal U.S. timelines. FAA leaders also are trying to persuade aviation authorities in Europe and other regions to follow by lifting their grounding orders shortly afterward, according to U.S. government and industry officials familiar with the deliberations.

But such coordination efforts are running into significant hurdles. Canadian aviation regulators have signaled to the FAA that they expect to require pilots to undergo simulator training before they can start flying the MAX, something the FAA is unlikely to mandate. It could take until March for Air Canada to phase the bulk of its MAX aircraft into regular schedules, according to a person briefed on the details, months later than projected for U.S. operators.

In Europe, regulators previously said they won’t accept the FAA’s technical verifications of fixes and intend to perform their own certification analyses, possibly adding weeks or months to the timetable.

Meanwhile, FAA officials in recent weeks said that Boeing hasn’t provided all of the requested details laying out the description and safety assessments of the MAX’s redesigned flight-control system.

The latest version of Indonesia’s accident report has been shared with the FAA and NTSB for comment. U.S. officials are expected to visit Indonesia around the end of this month to finalize the document. People familiar with the process said NTSB experts don’t appear to have major disagreements with the draft. Boeing and the FAA, on the other hand, are concerned the final report will unduly emphasize design and FAA certification missteps, some of these people said.

Unlike NTSB reports that identify the primary cause of accidents and then list contributing issues determined to be less significant, Indonesia is following a convention used by many foreign regulators of listing causal factors without ranking them. Instead, the report is expected to list more than 100 elements of the crash chronology, according to a person briefed on the details. Many of those points are likely to refer to missteps by pilots and mechanics initially revealed last year in Indonesia’s preliminary report.

Indonesian authorities now are asking for comments on the draft conclusions dealing with those missteps, as well as findings that investigators have determined constitute engineering shortcomings, including reliance on a sole sensor in the original design of MCAS, according to people familiar with the matter.

—Kim Mackrael and Ben Otto contributed to this article.

[vikingivesterled]

Originally Posted by etudiant

The absence of any visible progress in resolving the MAX grounding more than 4 months after it was instituted is disconcerting.
Not only has there been no formal public discussion of the issues, there is not even an agreement as to which issues need to be addressed among the various regulators.
Unless there is tremendous activity well hidden and below the surface, the prospects for an early 2020 reentry into service do not look good. That raises the question of at what point the airlines throw in the towel on this model?

To achieve control over the situation so one can move on to defining a timeline, Boeing needs to start showing a lot of humility on the issue.
First they need to come up with fixes for everything regulators and forums have questioned so far:
- Yes, fix MCAS with more aoa inputs, more sw controls and maybe less activation, as they have somewhat agreed to.
- Reverse Primary and Backup switches back to the NG of automatic on/off and electruic trim on/off.
- A solution for the manual balance wheel that suits all pilot strenghts, like a geared solution.
- A couple of aerodynamical fins stuck onto the fuselage for the press to take pictures of.
- Some additional protection for rudder cables where they pass the engines.
- Improved documentation and minimum 1 sim session per pilot.
(Feel free to add to (not subtract from) this list of what changes Boeing minimum must do to get a speedy agreement for a return of the plane formerly known as Max to service in a way the public will fly with it.)

Unless they do, this can go on forever since then Boeing is leaving their fate up to regulators in the form of civil servants with no feeling of urgency.
They'll be testing and discussing these issues until they all are 100% sure fixes are not needed, which most likely will be never.
Public Service moves slowly ref the 1 year time limt for final accident reports, or alternatively if not complete, a status update once a year. And the longer they look the more they'll find.
Maybe it will take a new Boeing senior management to eat that much humble pie. This last important step would already be done if Chairman and CEO wasn't one and the same.

[OldnGrounded]

Originally Posted by Zeffy

The goal is to ensure pilot proficiency when automated systems are malfunctioning or turned off, to help ensure appropriate responses to contradictory cockpit warnings such as those that occurred prior to the MAX crashes, the officials said.

If "the officials" actually said that and have adopted it as a goal, there's a serious problem with fallacious logic deeply rooted in the regulatory system.

[etudiant]

Originally Posted by vikingivesterled

... this can go on forever since then Boeing is leaving their fate up to regulators in the form of civil servants with no feeling of urgency.
They'll be testing and discussing these issues until they all are 100% sure fixes are not needed, which most likely will be never.
Public Service moves slowly ref the 1 year time limt for final accident reports, or alternatively if not complete, a status update once a year. And the longer they look the more they'll find.
Maybe it will take a new Boeing senior management to eat that much humble pie. This last important step would already be done if Chairman and CEO wasn't one and the same.

You articulate more effectively the concern that I believe every Boeing shareholder should have.
Boeing management is invisible in this crisis, hiding behind lawyers presumably.
That surrenders the field to the regulators, who have many other priorities than the future of the MAX and of Boeing. It seems close to a dereliction of duty imho.

[fdr]

Originally Posted by ST Dog

I'm looking at the 20+ times he did it, 5+ minutes if I read the FDR graphs right. And was above 5000ft through that (ASL I think. What was ground level?)

I think he had a good idea of the problem (AND trim when it shouldn't) and how to counter it. He was doing it. It was only when he handed off to get the manuals that it went to sh*t.

No, I don't know how the rest of the environment would have played here.

But I do think the Capt could have keep it up and then started trying things, eventually getting to cutouts or flaps. Instead he handed off to look in manuals instead of having the F/O do that.


Before anyone jumps, i'm not defending Boeing or blaming pilots. I'm saying it looks like the Captain had it under some control much like the prior crew did. The F/O couldn't maintain that. Don't know why or even imply that he should have been able too. The captain may have been exceptional or just lucky.

Not blaming the F/O either. I drive every day but I don't have the skills a cop/protection detail have for high speed chase/escape. I'm no Grad Prix driver either. They could easily avoid a crash that I couldn't. I don't expect every pilot to have such advanced skills anymore than the average driver is expected to have suck advanced skills.

The crew were reacting to a fault that presented as a compound series of symptoms, and for a period of time they maintained a level of control of the situation. If we are discussing JT610, then the captain followed global best practice in resource management to attempt to increase his knowledge. The Captain had been dealing with an unknown issue, and had been responding effectively without necessarily having all of the facts or knowing what parts of his actions were effective. As an automated response, it is conceivable that the captain didn't recognise his actions as being abnormal, he was responding to the trim demand of the aircraft. That may appear to be speculative, however, while the captain was flying, the aircraft was under control, shortly after handing over the aircraft control to the FO, trim condition deteriorated in the absence of effective counter inputs, while the captain was in the process of accessing further information.

1. At the time of the handover, the Captain did not fully comprehend what the problem was, he handed over control in order to attempt to rectify that position.
2. The Captain at handover appears to not have been fully aware of his own inputs and that those were anomalous, or would not be continued by the FO.
3. The FO attempted a short period of trim interventions, and then got outside of the loop.

• The crew were trained by the system, and applied or attempted to apply best practices as trained in HF training. On the day it was not effective.
• Had the Captain known what was occurring with the trim, he would have had no need to hand over to the FO hand flying,
• Had the Captain known of the MCAS system, he would have been able to take a moment to bring the aircraft into trim using the pickle switches, and then connect the AP, which would remove the MCAS function from the equation.
• In the background the crew were dealing with a false stall warning, erroneous speed and altitude displays and those alone would make the crew hesitant to attempt to engage the AP.

The OEM altered the function of the MCAS in the certification program taking away one of the two required triggers that would have limited abnormal function.
The OEM didn't comprehend (certainly better not have....) the consequences of the changed primary function of the MCAS system and didn't undertake an effective fault analysis to determine the risk from the change in function.
The lack of comprehension of the OEM as to the consequences of the re functioned MCAS led to a continuation of the position that minimal or no information was needed to be provided to the crew, and that no training was needed for the crew.
MCAS was unknown to the crew
The AOA fault presented as a compound critical fault of instrumentation, IAS/ALT, and flight dynamics, stall warning, operation of an unknown aggressive auto trim function.
Confronted with a compound emergency, the Captain at a time where the aircraft appeared to be under some control, handed over control to the FO who was apparently unaware of the inputs the Captain had been applying to counter the MCAS trim inputs.

For the ET event, the inherent limitations of the manual trim system came to the fore, again, information that was not readily available to the crew was missing.

Post hoc, the handling of the aircraft is difficult, to highly undesirable with this latent defect, when it occurs, and the crews dealing with the problem have full prior knowledge of the issues, and the interventions that are necessary, information that was not available to the accident crews.

With a highly competent crew set, it is possible that a different outcome would have occurred. That is in the lap of the gods to know the truth of, and is speculative, as the facts are simply that the fault never occurred to a crew that would be classified as highly competent, who comprehended the issue to the extent that the aircraft would have been grounded on the spot as non airworthy. Now, the preceding flight to JT610 encountered the problem, and apparently from input from a 3rd pilot became aware of the trim running. The awareness did not get to the point where the crew thereafter removed all of the problems for the continued flight to WIII, they listened to the stall warning for an hour in the cruise. The write up in the logbook doesn't reflect comprehension of the enormity of their accidental discovery of the MCAS behaviour. Hopefully that was reported by some other means internally, but it would be as shocking to find a crew that recognise the import of the issue they have observed and take action to the extent to stop the operation of the aircraft. It took the regulators 6 months to take action... the prior crew had minimal opportunity to intervene. The prior flights composition in the cockpit was non standard, and it is revealing that the cognition of the trim activity came from the observers seat, not the front seats. Whether a highly competent crew of 2 pilots only, without an observer would have resolved the problem successfully as the first crew to encounter the problem remains speculative.

The standards required for the operation of RPT aircraft are established by ICAO SARPS, separately the certification of the aircraft explicitly requires normal levels of strength and competency of the flight crew in dealing with aircraft issues. The system cannot expect constant exceptionalism from all flight crew, it is logically irrational and unobtainable. It doesn't happen with astronauts, doctors, lawyers, and certainly not politicians, so why would crews that are on food stamps in some 3rd world banana republics be expected to meet a standard that is not expected by international SARPS, certification standards, PQS, or any other field of human endeavour. A group assuming they collectively would have always been successful in dealing with such problems due to their [heritage][training standards][haircut] etc is delusional. Confronted with unique problems, a human may well achieve a successful outcome, from applying effective decision making under uncertainty, applying appropriate heuristics, or by good luck. Being damned good or lucky are not requisite standards for operating aircraft.

When preparing for a test flight, a lot of effort goes into ascertaining the potential problems that may arise, and then based on that assessment, defences are established to reduce risk to an acceptable level. In testing, with rigorous risk management protocols, bad things still happen (the Gulfstream 650 crash Roswell, 2011, the A330-300 coupled G/A- engine failure, Toulouse, 1994 come to mind). Blaming a regular flight crew for being caught out by a critical and unknown fault seems to be unreasonable; if test pilots get caught out, how much more exceptional do we expect a line crew to be???

Are we expecting exceptionalism from 300hr CPL's?

Really?

[Bergerie1]

fdr, Thank you for an excellent post.

[PerPurumTonantes]

Originally Posted by OldnGrounded

If "the officials" actually said that and have adopted it as a goal, there's a serious problem with fallacious logic deeply rooted in the regulatory system.

Agreed. "appropriate responses to contradictory indications"

The appropriate response is to design your systems so they don't give contradictory indications.

Given that there will be problems with sensors from time to time, the systems should hand over control to the pilot with "I don't know sir, what do you think?" (or "Alors, je ne sais pas. Merde!" depending on manufacturer). Not hysterical "WE'RE STALLING, WE'RE GOING TOO SLOW" warnings when the nose is pointing at the ground and airspeed increasing. Not warnings that are directly contrary to what is actually happening.

[Turb]

Originally Posted by Zeffy

https://www.wsj.com/articles/indones...rt-11569185664
' The FAA is urging a core group of regulators—from Canada, Australia, Brazil and New Zealand—to approve the fixes around November........FAA leaders also are trying to persuade aviation authorities in Europe and other regions to follow by lifting their grounding orders shortly afterward, according to U.S. government and industry officials familiar with the deliberations. '

One of the big questions asked here has been: "Will there be simultaneous return to flight of the MAX in all jurisdictions?" If that report is accurate then the answer seems to be NO unless the return is delayed well into 2020. It does look as though the FAA is trying to cherry pick the jurisdictions who will be invited to act simultaneously with the FAA. To me this looks like treating safety as if it is a political issue. Either way this is bad for Boeing. Outcome A is that the MAX returns to service in some jurisdictions while others are still keeping it on the ground, with the possible consequences that either insurers or crew or even (possibly) passengers will refuse to play. Outcome B is that the grounding continues until all jurisdictions agree to lift it, and that simply isn't going to happen this year.
The bigger (indeed biggest) question asked here is whether the MAX will ever fly again. I'm assuming that the answer to that is Probably.

[Bend alot]

Canada want a sim training flight.
Australia grounded it before the FAA - the FAA is the preference for many Australian manufactures to get certifications for their aircraft modifications. It is easier and cheaper than using the Australian system. CAsA may well have an ego trip over this.

No idea how NZ or Brazil will play the cards.

[Maninthebar]

Originally Posted by Bend alot

Canada want a sim training flight.
Australia grounded it before the FAA - the FAA is the preference for many Australian manufactures to get certifications for their aircraft modifications. It is easier and cheaper than using the Australian system. CAsA may well have an ego trip over this.

No idea how NZ or Brazil will play the cards.

Don't imagine that the FAA will have pulled these authorities out of a hat
Canada - because the North American airspace is a contained environment in which a large number MAX flights can take pace
Australia + NZ for the same reason
Brazil - that's an interesting one (with lots of internal flights). Worth noting that Brazil seemed, uniquely, to have an inside track on MCAS documentation prior to even the JT incidents.

You would have to think that the FAA will have been in touch with the relevant national authorities prior to the above report, and that their discussions are reasonably advanced.

[MemberBerry]

Not a pilot. In the MAX threads there was a comment from a 737 captain some time ago, regarding a discussion he was having about MCAS with his first officer. He said that during the discussion he discovered that his first officer didn't know you have to extend the handle of trim wheel when operating it manually, and he had to demonstrate how to extend the handle to his first officer.

As Mentour's simulator video has shown, it can be very difficult or even impossible to move the trim wheels due to the aerodynamic forces, even with the handles extended. Not extending the handles probably makes things much harder.

I first thought that the story about that first officer may have been an isolated case, but then I saw a video of a simulator training session in a 737, which included a stabilizer trim runaway, and those pilots didn't extend the trim wheel handles either. So now I'm thinking that this issue may be more widespread.

This is the video I'm talking about, the runaway starts 2:45 minutes into the video:

You Tube

[Fly Aiprt]

Originally Posted by MemberBerry

I saw a video of a simulator training session in a 737, which included a stabilizer trim runaway, and those pilots didn't extend the trim wheel handles either.

According to the video, there was no need for the handles : runaway caught within seconds, limited out of trim, and obviously easy to turn wheels.
Whether this simulation is representative of a real life runaway is speculative.