MAX’s Return Delayed by FAA Reevaluation of 737 Safety Procedures
Join Date: Mar 2019
Location: French Alps
Posts: 326
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
We discover that previous tests were run on a fixed sim. And the aircraft is manageable when no MCAS interferes, which we already knew.
It seems they did not test what the "new MCAS" does when it kicks in, though.
I'm not sure sure that it holds for the bigger and heavier Max 10, for which there is of course no NG equivalent.
Join Date: Feb 2019
Location: shiny side up
Posts: 431
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
not really larger engines for thrust, but for larger fans. Larger fans equals better fuel economy...
I guess it could be for that "high altitude, hot airport" they claimed they were limited!
I guess it could be for that "high altitude, hot airport" they claimed they were limited!
Psychophysiological entity
My recollection of the push on the 1-11 is of a system that pushed well after the shaker started and the nose drop was quite benign. Well, while safe at 310. I can recall being coached to pull and pull some more to make it happen.
From what I've learned over the last months is that MCAS is a fairly different animal - the prime objective seems to be not letting those last degrees of nose up be achieved with low stick forces. I can see why it is, and then again is not, an anti-stall device. It's more than just semantics.
Ground clearance. Is it even remotely possible the techniques used on the -10 undercarriage could be retro-fitted to the -8? That would buy, what was it, 10" ?
From what I've learned over the last months is that MCAS is a fairly different animal - the prime objective seems to be not letting those last degrees of nose up be achieved with low stick forces. I can see why it is, and then again is not, an anti-stall device. It's more than just semantics.
Ground clearance. Is it even remotely possible the techniques used on the -10 undercarriage could be retro-fitted to the -8? That would buy, what was it, 10" ?
My recollection of the push on the 1-11 is of a system that pushed well after the shaker started and the nose drop was quite benign. Well, while safe at 310. I can recall being coached to pull and pull some more to make it happen.
From what I've learned over the last months is that MCAS is a fairly different animal - the prime objective seems to be not letting those last degrees of nose up be achieved with low stick forces. I can see why it is, and then again is not, an anti-stall device. It's more than just semantics.
Ground clearance. Is it even remotely possible the techniques used on the -10 undercarriage could be retro-fitted to the -8? That would buy, what was it, 10" ?
From what I've learned over the last months is that MCAS is a fairly different animal - the prime objective seems to be not letting those last degrees of nose up be achieved with low stick forces. I can see why it is, and then again is not, an anti-stall device. It's more than just semantics.
Ground clearance. Is it even remotely possible the techniques used on the -10 undercarriage could be retro-fitted to the -8? That would buy, what was it, 10" ?
Smythe, high/hot is a different issue - the airframe can still handle as much thrust at an equivalent IAS, but the engine may not be capable of producing as much thrust in the thinner and/or hotter air (without exceeding a limit - usually EGT - but other issues can come into play). If the engine is effectively derated for the baseline sea level operation, increasing high/hot thrust is relatively easy since the engine already has unused margin.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: the City by the Bay
Posts: 547
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Feb 2018
Location: Canberra
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Boeing turns to high-powered defense attorneys in 737 MAX investigation
The three attorneys leading the defense team are Mark Filip of the law firm Kirkland & Ellis, who served as deputy attorney general under President George W. Bush; Richard Cullen of MaguireWoods, a Virginia-based law and crisis-management firm; and William Burck, co-managing partner of the Washington, D.C., office of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan.
“As such, a primary goal of a white-collar criminal defense lawyer is persuading the government that her client did not commit a crime, in order to avoid an indictment,” Wolfe said. “Generally speaking, once an indictment is returned, it becomes very difficult for defense counsel to persuade the government to dismiss.”
Salute!
The biggest legal cost to Boeng is gonna be the civil actions And U.S. juries are known to make ridiculous awards based on emotion and ignorance versus facts and stats.
A jury recently awarded zillions of bucks to a family that asserted the herbicide Roundup caused them to have non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
The MCAS debacle has a much more clear chain of events than the Roundup herbicide case. The lack of training, the failure to inform crews of the system and how it worked, the "faulty" fault analysis, "there must be fifty ways...."..
Gums sends...
The biggest legal cost to Boeng is gonna be the civil actions And U.S. juries are known to make ridiculous awards based on emotion and ignorance versus facts and stats.
A jury recently awarded zillions of bucks to a family that asserted the herbicide Roundup caused them to have non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
The Oakland, California jury has awarded a couple $2 billion in punitive damages after concluding that sustained exposure to Monsanto Co.'s popular Roundup weed killer led to their cancer diagnoses.
Gums sends...
Last edited by gums; 7th Jun 2019 at 17:34. Reason: typo
Hi, i recognize this is a very delicate question, and of course its something that i would never, ever, wish to happen...but here it goes...in the event of an extreme and super bad worst scenario is there any remote chance that the MAX would never fly again and grounded forever as we know it?
EDIT» PS: Im a plane and boeing lover since as a child and i wish to all the colleagues at Boeing all the best!
EDIT» PS: Im a plane and boeing lover since as a child and i wish to all the colleagues at Boeing all the best!
Last edited by JanetFlight; 7th Jun 2019 at 16:42.
Hi, i recognize this is a very delicate question, and of course its something that i would never, ever, wish to happen...but here it goes...in the event of an extreme and super bad worst scenario is there any remote chance that the MAX would never fly again and grounded forever as we know it?
It is in the interest of all current parties (even including other marques) that a robust set of fixes is found, and in a timely fashion.
BUT
The longer this takes, and the more training might be required the greater the chance that either or both Boeing and customer airlines will decide to cut their losses and find something else,
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 487
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Seattle Times article
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ht-until-2020/
Boeing didn’t plan to fix 737 MAX warning light until 2020
June 7, 2019 at 9:17 am Updated June 7, 2019 at 9:52 am
By Mike Baker
Seattle Times staff reporter
After discovering a problem in 2017 with a cockpit warning light on the 737 MAX, Boeing decided it would defer an update to fix the issue until 2020, congressional officials said Friday.
Even as it continued delivering MAX airplanes to customers, Boeing had kept quiet the details of the problem, which prevented a light from warning pilots when there was disagreement between the plane’s angle-of-attack sensors. Those sensors are now suspected of playing in a role in two MAX crashes.
The company didn’t disclose the issue to the FAA until after a 737 MAX crash in Indonesia last year, something that frustrated FAA leadership. Now, leaders with a transportation committee in the U.S. House said they have obtained information about the initial plan to fix the issue in 2020, although they did not immediately explain the origin of that information. They have sent letters to Boeing, the FAA and supplier United Technologies requesting documents around the problematic alert.
“An important part of the Committee’s investigation is finding out what Boeing knew, when the company knew it and who it informed,” said Rep. Rick Larsen, a Washington state Democrat who leads the aviation subcommittee. “I have questions about the decision to not deem the AOA Disagree alert as safety critical and I am concerned it took Boeing so long to report this defective feature to the FAA and its customers.”
Boeing has said its engineers discovered that the warning light wasn’t functioning in 2017. The company determined that the issue did not adversely impact the safety or operation of the plane.
The warning light, which is standard on the MAX and included in the pilot manuals, is designed to light up if there’s a disagreement between the two sensors on either side of the plane’s nose that measure the jet’s angle of attack — the angle between the oncoming air flow and the airplane’s wing.
At the time of the crashes, the alert worked only on planes flown by airlines that had bought a different indicator added to the main flight-display panel. Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines did not have those packages.
If it had been working, the warning light would have lit up on the fatal flights of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian jets. It’s not clear that it would have made a difference, as Lion Air pilots were unaware of the MAX’s new automated maneuvering system that pushed the plane’s nose down in response to the erroneous angle-of-attack data.
With knowledge of the overall system in the wake of the Lion Air crash, the Ethiopian pilots might have benefited from the information, but a preliminary report suggests they were ultimately able to diagnose the problem. They still weren’t able to maintain control of the plane.
Mike Baker: 206-464-2729 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @ByMikeBaker.
June 7, 2019 at 9:17 am Updated June 7, 2019 at 9:52 am
By Mike Baker
Seattle Times staff reporter
After discovering a problem in 2017 with a cockpit warning light on the 737 MAX, Boeing decided it would defer an update to fix the issue until 2020, congressional officials said Friday.
Even as it continued delivering MAX airplanes to customers, Boeing had kept quiet the details of the problem, which prevented a light from warning pilots when there was disagreement between the plane’s angle-of-attack sensors. Those sensors are now suspected of playing in a role in two MAX crashes.
The company didn’t disclose the issue to the FAA until after a 737 MAX crash in Indonesia last year, something that frustrated FAA leadership. Now, leaders with a transportation committee in the U.S. House said they have obtained information about the initial plan to fix the issue in 2020, although they did not immediately explain the origin of that information. They have sent letters to Boeing, the FAA and supplier United Technologies requesting documents around the problematic alert.
“An important part of the Committee’s investigation is finding out what Boeing knew, when the company knew it and who it informed,” said Rep. Rick Larsen, a Washington state Democrat who leads the aviation subcommittee. “I have questions about the decision to not deem the AOA Disagree alert as safety critical and I am concerned it took Boeing so long to report this defective feature to the FAA and its customers.”
Boeing has said its engineers discovered that the warning light wasn’t functioning in 2017. The company determined that the issue did not adversely impact the safety or operation of the plane.
The warning light, which is standard on the MAX and included in the pilot manuals, is designed to light up if there’s a disagreement between the two sensors on either side of the plane’s nose that measure the jet’s angle of attack — the angle between the oncoming air flow and the airplane’s wing.
At the time of the crashes, the alert worked only on planes flown by airlines that had bought a different indicator added to the main flight-display panel. Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines did not have those packages.
If it had been working, the warning light would have lit up on the fatal flights of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian jets. It’s not clear that it would have made a difference, as Lion Air pilots were unaware of the MAX’s new automated maneuvering system that pushed the plane’s nose down in response to the erroneous angle-of-attack data.
With knowledge of the overall system in the wake of the Lion Air crash, the Ethiopian pilots might have benefited from the information, but a preliminary report suggests they were ultimately able to diagnose the problem. They still weren’t able to maintain control of the plane.
Mike Baker: 206-464-2729 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @ByMikeBaker.
Join Date: Feb 2019
Location: shiny side up
Posts: 431
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The -10 undercarriage doesn't lift the plane by 10", it makes the rotation more user friendly be effectively moving the wheels back and creating more height at rotation.
grounded forever as we know it?
If the MAX stays grounded until the end of this year, which is quite likely, then with current production rates and the number already sitting on the ground, we could be looking at nearly 700 aircraft parked.
Many airlines would be unable to have all their aircraft on the ground at their home base at the same time due to lack of space and rely on the fact that most of the time they will be in the air or turning around at out stations.
The MAXs already in service at the start of the grounding are reasonably well dispersed worldwide, however with the number already produced since they stopped flying and 40-50 more coming out of the factory doors each month, where are Boeing going to store them ?
Many airlines would be unable to have all their aircraft on the ground at their home base at the same time due to lack of space and rely on the fact that most of the time they will be in the air or turning around at out stations.
The MAXs already in service at the start of the grounding are reasonably well dispersed worldwide, however with the number already produced since they stopped flying and 40-50 more coming out of the factory doors each month, where are Boeing going to store them ?
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Castletown
Posts: 241
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If the MAX stays grounded until the end of this year, which is quite likely, then with current production rates and the number already sitting on the ground, we could be looking at nearly 700 aircraft parked.
Many airlines would be unable to have all their aircraft on the ground at their home base at the same time due to lack of space and rely on the fact that most of the time they will be in the air or turning around at out stations.
The MAXs already in service at the start of the grounding are reasonably well dispersed worldwide, however with the number already produced since they stopped flying and 40-50 more coming out of the factory doors each month, where are Boeing going to store them ?
Many airlines would be unable to have all their aircraft on the ground at their home base at the same time due to lack of space and rely on the fact that most of the time they will be in the air or turning around at out stations.
The MAXs already in service at the start of the grounding are reasonably well dispersed worldwide, however with the number already produced since they stopped flying and 40-50 more coming out of the factory doors each month, where are Boeing going to store them ?
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Castletown
Posts: 241
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That's the problem, they, the BC, don't want the close scrutiny to be highlighted, especially when other "matters" will surface in due course.
