US administration blames foreign pilots for 737 Max crashes
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If I want a 737 to climb, from an intermediate altitude, I push up the power. No elevator required. Same for a descent...pull power, down we go. Then elevator can be used to fine tune airspeed. Man, I wish Al Haynes was still around. He'd probably say "don't they teach anyone to FLY any more?"
You know, you really should read the comments that form a discussion before interjecting.
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The classic stab trim runaway is a stuck, or fused switch, which causes the trim to run "continuously", to the limits of the jackscrew in one motion.
I can't have a conversation with someone who keeps repeating the same nonsense. Yes, they didn't let it get that far. That made manually trimming significantly easier for them.
I can't have a conversation with someone who keeps repeating the same nonsense. Yes, they didn't let it get that far. That made manually trimming significantly easier for them.
I would also say that it need not be a fused switch; it could be an intermittent short circuit somewhere in the wiring that would cause the trim motor to run for a period of time before hitting the stops of the jack screw. Intermittent short circuits are not a new concept.
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The point of MCAS was to make the plane easier and more familiar to fly for pilots who were already used to the previous generation of 737. This was a requirement of the certification otherwise additional training was required. If MCAS is going to switch off when there is AOA disagree does this mean the plane will again feel unfamiliar to a pilot and additional training without MCAS will be requirement to deal with this situation. If not, why would there be a requirement for MCAS in the first place?
Is everyone sure that that pushing the nose down is to the only thing that MCAS does or is this the only failure mode found? When the MAX was being developed, experienced pilots found the controls of the aircraft felt unfamiliar: unusually light, and rather different to what they had experienced before. I am not a pilot but it doesn’t fit comfortably with me that all of this is corrected by simply occasionally pushing the nose down ?
Is everyone sure that that pushing the nose down is to the only thing that MCAS does or is this the only failure mode found? When the MAX was being developed, experienced pilots found the controls of the aircraft felt unfamiliar: unusually light, and rather different to what they had experienced before. I am not a pilot but it doesn’t fit comfortably with me that all of this is corrected by simply occasionally pushing the nose down ?
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This issue has nothing to do with any nation pilot superiority in piloting an aircraft. This issue is directly related to the manufacturer who in this instance neglects to inform airlines and pilots of a system that is new and contrary to any Boeing aircraft behavior we longtime pilots have ever endured. I a Boeing pilot for over 30 years have always been confident knowing that once I had disconnected the autopilot and auto throttle, the aircraft was mine, and mine alone.
Please see this matter as it is, do not blame people who have perished in this unfortunate result of the production of this aircraft that has grown way outside of its 1968 envelope.
My take on this, remove the MCAS system altogether and make that public, for every pilot, stewardess and passenger, so they may embark once again on the 737 be that a MAX or not, in confidence and trust in the Boeing Company.
Please see this matter as it is, do not blame people who have perished in this unfortunate result of the production of this aircraft that has grown way outside of its 1968 envelope.
My take on this, remove the MCAS system altogether and make that public, for every pilot, stewardess and passenger, so they may embark once again on the 737 be that a MAX or not, in confidence and trust in the Boeing Company.
Psychophysiological entity
Stopping the trim wheel with your hand will definitely take a couple layers of skin off; using the bottom of one’s shoe works pretty good.
What I would like to see from Boeing, is a pair of wheels that have a similar, albeit a bit heavier, sprung region - which cuts out all power to the H-Stabilizer motor/clutches as soon as you grab the wheel.
Re FLAPS and THRUST:
1. Flaps extended give an AND pitch moment. Retracting the flaps gives an ANU TRIM moment which counters to an extent an unwanted AND input from the MCAS.
2. Thrust gives an ANU trim moment, which counters the unwanted, erroneous and unknown cause MCAS input. Keeping thrust on assists in regaining trim.
3. Increasing speed reduces the AND trim error, and unloads the stabiliser which is necessary once the aircraft is out of trim. Increasing airspeed comes from either permitting the aircraft to pitch nose down due to the erroneous MCAS input ultimately relieving the trim load either by achieving near the actual trim speed, or by impacting the terrain, where your trim problems are suddenly over.
4. Comment made on the momentary pilot trim on the wrong sense does no justice to the crew. If you have no approapriate and expected result from an input, it is not unreasonable to ascertain if the whole system has failed, or if the system is acting in reverse (like that has never happened... even with Airbus FBW LH aileron reversal) To object to a momentary opposite input is unjust and unreasonable.
The crew are the result of the global industry's race to the bottom, not the cause, they are victims of the collective actions of regulators, OEM's and the airlines, who have given us the state we have today. It is offensive for the OEM and the Regulator to make disparaging comments on the pilots while they have been directly responsible for the loss of two jets from their actions. I doubt that it was a deliberate set of actions within the OEM, I certainly hope not...
1. Flaps extended give an AND pitch moment. Retracting the flaps gives an ANU TRIM moment which counters to an extent an unwanted AND input from the MCAS.
2. Thrust gives an ANU trim moment, which counters the unwanted, erroneous and unknown cause MCAS input. Keeping thrust on assists in regaining trim.
3. Increasing speed reduces the AND trim error, and unloads the stabiliser which is necessary once the aircraft is out of trim. Increasing airspeed comes from either permitting the aircraft to pitch nose down due to the erroneous MCAS input ultimately relieving the trim load either by achieving near the actual trim speed, or by impacting the terrain, where your trim problems are suddenly over.
4. Comment made on the momentary pilot trim on the wrong sense does no justice to the crew. If you have no approapriate and expected result from an input, it is not unreasonable to ascertain if the whole system has failed, or if the system is acting in reverse (like that has never happened... even with Airbus FBW LH aileron reversal) To object to a momentary opposite input is unjust and unreasonable.
The crew are the result of the global industry's race to the bottom, not the cause, they are victims of the collective actions of regulators, OEM's and the airlines, who have given us the state we have today. It is offensive for the OEM and the Regulator to make disparaging comments on the pilots while they have been directly responsible for the loss of two jets from their actions. I doubt that it was a deliberate set of actions within the OEM, I certainly hope not...
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The latest reported comments ascribed to Boeing and the FAA are offensive to the majority of customers for the US product that these two entities have responsibility over.
At some point, perhaps the CEO of Boeing should take time out and read the FCTM that his company provided to the crew.
For the record, Boeings own document states that in the case of a severe out of trim condition, that the aircraft should be flown to regain the speed commensurate to the out of trim case, and then the trim forces will be relieved sufficiently to permit the trim system to be reset as desired. It is remarkable that Boeing and the FAA apparently cite keeping power on as a sign of incompetence, when the trim moment form thrust on is nose up, and the out of trim condition requires gaining high speed as soon as possible, which suggests keeping power on as not being such a stupid idea that it would be used to make offensive comment from the people who gave MCAS unannounced, killed 350+ people... frankly, I am embarrassed on their behalf. For the pilot brethren who suggest in the forum herein that keeping power on was stupid, go back and do some simple maths guys before making assertions of incompetence on the dead crews.
Boeing designs a system that has the authority to put in more than 3 times the certified out of trim demonstration requirement FAR 25.255(a), without condescending to tell the apparently deficient foreign devils that fly their magnificent product. It was Boeing and the FAA ODA system that oversaw the MCAS design, and it was Boeing who decided not to bother telling the crews of the system until it was necessary following the first blood spill. Following that, it was Boeing who still did not reinforce the extent that out of trim would give catastrophic problems to a crew in handling, it was up to a newspaper report to show that a competent crew would find the handling nearly impossible when doing a briefed simulation of the event.
Boeing and the FAA are stating, not even insinuating that the crews involved here, and for good measure adding collective guilt to all 'foreign" pilots are of lesser competency than good ol' boys. M'kay, For the record, having spent 40 years flying with US and foreign pilots, in military and airline operations, having flown all Boeings from the 727 to the 787 as well as the 320, 330, and 340, I have to say, there is more commonality than anything else, sorry Mr Trump's band of brothers, the crews from S%$t'ole are not that much different. Is US air travel safer than overseas? Generally, yes, but that says as much about the infrastructure and rules as it does on crew training. Is crew training of a lesser standard overseas? Well, before the CEO of Boeign goes on record on that matter, was he aware that Boeing is or has been the training provider for Ethiopian???? Seems kind of odd to bitch about standards, when the legally responsible party to the standards is.... Boeing. Comments have been made about the AZ214 at San Francisco, where the training organisation was again Boeing, who held contracts for training for KE and AZ for the last 20 odd years in various forms and names of entities, Alteon, Boeing etc.
A B767 just got parked awkwardly in Texas, there was no sudden cry from the S%$t'ole countries concerned with FAA standards... nope, not a word, and nor should there have been.
Over the years I have flown with F15, F16 F22 and A10 pilots, some are great, most are good, some I would not let near a Cessna 150 without supervision. I have flown with Ethiopian pilots, and in fact the absolute best instructor I have ever seen work a simulator was an Ethiopian. Back in the day, the red necks from the usual countries, both sides of the equator would be disparaging with the national pilots and most other foreign pilots, however would fawn over the Ethiopian instructor, he was that good. Two of the best instructors I have had on helicopters were not US, they were Japanese, and I cherish the training they gave me. The next one of note on choppers was a poor little french farm boy from Guadaloupe, and he was and is exceptional. On the Boeing aircraft, without any doubt the best instructors I have ever had didn't come from Seattle, they were oddly almost uniformly Zoroastrians, The most knowledgeable airbus pilot I have ever worked with was a refugee from Iran, and he had a better knowledge base on the aircraft than the TP's that I was also working with at the same time. I don't mind flying with US pilots, I do not however see a great divide between them and the rest of the world, nor in fact do I see much difference between airline operation in audit of European airlines, Asian airlines, North and South American airlines, when conducting partner airline audits. In accident investigation, I have seen people of all skin colour and backgrounds do odd things occasionally with bad results. The US pilot contingent in that group had their share of odd ball events, more or less in keeping with the great unwashed from the S%$t'ole countries that are suggested to be incompetent.
Overall, I am hardly surprised that the OEM and the NAA of the disgrace that is the saga of MCAS are striking out, but they are off base with their assertions. The OEM is in danger of angering their customer base by such comments, and it is not going to add to their bottom line, rather it may well detract. Personally, as a stinking foreigner, albeit with pink skin, I would not buy a Boeing product by choice given the Trump like comments made on the competency of foreign pilots. The foreign airlines have a choice of products to acquire, and having flown more or less all of the offerings, the competition is competent, and comes without the racist bigoted comments of recent reports.
Take out the rhetoric and racism, and fix your plane guys. Suggest that you test your products with the intent of 25.255(a) not just the inadequate words that have so grossly failed us, the pilots and the passengers who pay for the purchase of your product. The aviation world was sharply awoken to the difference between certification standards and the perceived safety that flows from that by the AA587 loss. (it is interesting to note that no bigoted, disparaging comments were made on the pilot of that flight, nor on the pilots of AA965, AA1572, DL191 etc... just sayin'....)
Hofstede discusses the differences between cultures that do have some effect in the operation of a crew, however, this problem was a fundamental flying capability problem, and Boing and the FAA are hardly winning hearts and minds by their comments, coming hot on the heel of the Colgan debacle, Comairs efforts in Kentucky, and the B767 parked in the bayou. The MD11 at RJAA was dispalying a shiny USA flag on the tail...
P.S., the FAA has good people in it, most fighting the system above them, in TAD, FSDOs at and various other acronyms, such as ACO and MIDO's. As a standard, having had professional licenses in 10 different countries, the FAA is not of any particular standout quality in their requirements or process. The FAA happens to be big and that is about the sum of it.
P.P.S. When is a full, honest investigation into the airworthiness of all of the B737NGs built with non compliant structure going to occur? It is hardly the behaviour of a first world nation to sack the QA auditors that brought that to light, that smacks of a 3rd world S%$t'ole type country response in itself.
P.P.P.S. the B767 Captain off the Comorros was a heroic person (ET961). He was being hit over the head with a damn fire axe as he ditched an aircraft without engines against that level of distraction. Sully and Jeff at least were not being accosted when they demonstrated their professionalism on the Hudson.
Bigotry is demeaning to all.
https://www.aerotime.aero/clement.ch...-blames-pilots
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...=.9b2b63241a64
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...7-max-crashes/
At some point, perhaps the CEO of Boeing should take time out and read the FCTM that his company provided to the crew.
For the record, Boeings own document states that in the case of a severe out of trim condition, that the aircraft should be flown to regain the speed commensurate to the out of trim case, and then the trim forces will be relieved sufficiently to permit the trim system to be reset as desired. It is remarkable that Boeing and the FAA apparently cite keeping power on as a sign of incompetence, when the trim moment form thrust on is nose up, and the out of trim condition requires gaining high speed as soon as possible, which suggests keeping power on as not being such a stupid idea that it would be used to make offensive comment from the people who gave MCAS unannounced, killed 350+ people... frankly, I am embarrassed on their behalf. For the pilot brethren who suggest in the forum herein that keeping power on was stupid, go back and do some simple maths guys before making assertions of incompetence on the dead crews.
Boeing designs a system that has the authority to put in more than 3 times the certified out of trim demonstration requirement FAR 25.255(a), without condescending to tell the apparently deficient foreign devils that fly their magnificent product. It was Boeing and the FAA ODA system that oversaw the MCAS design, and it was Boeing who decided not to bother telling the crews of the system until it was necessary following the first blood spill. Following that, it was Boeing who still did not reinforce the extent that out of trim would give catastrophic problems to a crew in handling, it was up to a newspaper report to show that a competent crew would find the handling nearly impossible when doing a briefed simulation of the event.
Boeing and the FAA are stating, not even insinuating that the crews involved here, and for good measure adding collective guilt to all 'foreign" pilots are of lesser competency than good ol' boys. M'kay, For the record, having spent 40 years flying with US and foreign pilots, in military and airline operations, having flown all Boeings from the 727 to the 787 as well as the 320, 330, and 340, I have to say, there is more commonality than anything else, sorry Mr Trump's band of brothers, the crews from S%$t'ole are not that much different. Is US air travel safer than overseas? Generally, yes, but that says as much about the infrastructure and rules as it does on crew training. Is crew training of a lesser standard overseas? Well, before the CEO of Boeign goes on record on that matter, was he aware that Boeing is or has been the training provider for Ethiopian???? Seems kind of odd to bitch about standards, when the legally responsible party to the standards is.... Boeing. Comments have been made about the AZ214 at San Francisco, where the training organisation was again Boeing, who held contracts for training for KE and AZ for the last 20 odd years in various forms and names of entities, Alteon, Boeing etc.
A B767 just got parked awkwardly in Texas, there was no sudden cry from the S%$t'ole countries concerned with FAA standards... nope, not a word, and nor should there have been.
Over the years I have flown with F15, F16 F22 and A10 pilots, some are great, most are good, some I would not let near a Cessna 150 without supervision. I have flown with Ethiopian pilots, and in fact the absolute best instructor I have ever seen work a simulator was an Ethiopian. Back in the day, the red necks from the usual countries, both sides of the equator would be disparaging with the national pilots and most other foreign pilots, however would fawn over the Ethiopian instructor, he was that good. Two of the best instructors I have had on helicopters were not US, they were Japanese, and I cherish the training they gave me. The next one of note on choppers was a poor little french farm boy from Guadaloupe, and he was and is exceptional. On the Boeing aircraft, without any doubt the best instructors I have ever had didn't come from Seattle, they were oddly almost uniformly Zoroastrians, The most knowledgeable airbus pilot I have ever worked with was a refugee from Iran, and he had a better knowledge base on the aircraft than the TP's that I was also working with at the same time. I don't mind flying with US pilots, I do not however see a great divide between them and the rest of the world, nor in fact do I see much difference between airline operation in audit of European airlines, Asian airlines, North and South American airlines, when conducting partner airline audits. In accident investigation, I have seen people of all skin colour and backgrounds do odd things occasionally with bad results. The US pilot contingent in that group had their share of odd ball events, more or less in keeping with the great unwashed from the S%$t'ole countries that are suggested to be incompetent.
Overall, I am hardly surprised that the OEM and the NAA of the disgrace that is the saga of MCAS are striking out, but they are off base with their assertions. The OEM is in danger of angering their customer base by such comments, and it is not going to add to their bottom line, rather it may well detract. Personally, as a stinking foreigner, albeit with pink skin, I would not buy a Boeing product by choice given the Trump like comments made on the competency of foreign pilots. The foreign airlines have a choice of products to acquire, and having flown more or less all of the offerings, the competition is competent, and comes without the racist bigoted comments of recent reports.
Take out the rhetoric and racism, and fix your plane guys. Suggest that you test your products with the intent of 25.255(a) not just the inadequate words that have so grossly failed us, the pilots and the passengers who pay for the purchase of your product. The aviation world was sharply awoken to the difference between certification standards and the perceived safety that flows from that by the AA587 loss. (it is interesting to note that no bigoted, disparaging comments were made on the pilot of that flight, nor on the pilots of AA965, AA1572, DL191 etc... just sayin'....)
Hofstede discusses the differences between cultures that do have some effect in the operation of a crew, however, this problem was a fundamental flying capability problem, and Boing and the FAA are hardly winning hearts and minds by their comments, coming hot on the heel of the Colgan debacle, Comairs efforts in Kentucky, and the B767 parked in the bayou. The MD11 at RJAA was dispalying a shiny USA flag on the tail...
P.S., the FAA has good people in it, most fighting the system above them, in TAD, FSDOs at and various other acronyms, such as ACO and MIDO's. As a standard, having had professional licenses in 10 different countries, the FAA is not of any particular standout quality in their requirements or process. The FAA happens to be big and that is about the sum of it.
P.P.S. When is a full, honest investigation into the airworthiness of all of the B737NGs built with non compliant structure going to occur? It is hardly the behaviour of a first world nation to sack the QA auditors that brought that to light, that smacks of a 3rd world S%$t'ole type country response in itself.
P.P.P.S. the B767 Captain off the Comorros was a heroic person (ET961). He was being hit over the head with a damn fire axe as he ditched an aircraft without engines against that level of distraction. Sully and Jeff at least were not being accosted when they demonstrated their professionalism on the Hudson.
Bigotry is demeaning to all.
https://www.aerotime.aero/clement.ch...-blames-pilots
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...=.9b2b63241a64
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...7-max-crashes/
Forget about who you want to blame- that argument has been hashed over 5,000 posts in the original ETA thread.
Instead read 14CFR section 25.255 "Out of trim characteristics."
If you do you will read about the limits that either the electronic or autopilot trim systems can autonomously input to the point where control is taken/given to/or regained by the pilot. The reason for this certification requirement is simple: If your autopilot fails and trims nose down (or up) until the point where it can no longer maintain control over pitch will you be handed an airplane that you can recover when the AP disconnects, or will you be unable to control the AC?? Basically 25.255 insures that the two (traditional) electronic mechanisms that control the horizontal stab are tested to insure that neither one is likely to fail into a box that leaves the AC unrecoverable. It does this by arbitrarily setting a three second cap on manual inputs and the maximum input that the AP can make before it cannot control the aircraft.
Sounds good yes?? 25.255 insures that any system that can exert control over the horizontal stab is identified, specified, tested and certified to insure that it does not put the airplane outside the envelope at any time. Take the system to the maximum input it can make and see if the pilots can recover it. Great!!
Except, well wait a minute. There is this new system, called MCAS, that has the authority to run the trim all the way to the nose down stops. In nine-second bursts, wait five, rinse and repeat. 30 to 40 seconds is all it will take it to run your horizontal stab not only beyond your ability to recover, but to the max ANU position.
Ahhh, don't worry, you don't need to know about that system!! And rumors to the effect that it is reliant on a single data source are, oops, true!! Who knew??
This is the moral failure that Boeing made, and the bog which they are now in.
1. Boeing engineers KNEW what MCAS did.
2. They KNEW that under current certification regulations MCAS would not be permitted to be designed or implemented as they did as it could not comply.
3. They KNEW that MCAS could not pass numerous certification requirements, so they buried its existence from view to pretty much everyone. (The Three Monkeys approach...)
4. They KNEW that they submitted certification documents seeking .6 (IIRC) of trim per activation, but put into service a system with more than FOUR TIMES the control authority than that Certificated.
4. They KNEW that they created a system which had full and autonomous control authority over pitch and relied on a SINGLE data point. (C'mon, why are we even discussing this. that fact alone- that alone should put Boeing in custodial care or receivership...)
And the FAA stood by and cheered them on as profits went through the roof.
The cynic in me thinks two years from now Boeing will once again be flying the friendly skies uninhibited by such scrutiny, but the optimist in me thinks they might have actually done it this time. Allowed a deregulated environment to run so far off the rails that the Government actually steps back in and reasserts control.
We'll see I guess-
dce
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https://reports.aviation-safety.net/...RELIMINARY.pdf
Assuming the accident Lion Air flight reached almost 0 degrees of trim before impacting water, we can deduce that the trim scales start at 0.0 degrees, it seems that on the trace for the accident flight each major division is one unit, and for the previous flight each minor division represents one unit.
This would mean on both flights the takeoff trim was between 6.5 - 7.0 units, and on the accident flight the trim reached close to 0.0 units before impact. Assuming that is correct, it means the previous Lion Air flight experienced MCAS bringing trim down to about 2.0 units after about 2 minutes of fighting it, then they fought it for about 3 more minutes, then they used the cutout switches for the first time.
Also, we can deduce that the aircraft was in trim at about 5.0 units on the previous flight. This means MCAS took them out of trim by a maximum about 3.0 units at the worst point, to 2.0 units, and that the stabilizer was not more than 1.5 units out of trim when they used the cutout switches. The trim position seems to oscillate between 3.5 and 6.5 units for most of their fight with MCAS, if we exclude the spike where it seems MCAS was able to temporarily bring the trim down to around 2.0 units.
With the same assumptions, when they re-enabled the electric trim later, MCAS was able to bring the trim down to about 3.0 units. Then, after they brought the trim electrically to about 3.5 units, they used the cutout switches again to turn electric trim off for the rest of the flight. After that it seems they used the trim wheels to bring the aircraft back in trim from about 3.5 units to about 5.0 units.
In any case, assumptions aside, it's clear that the previous flight didn't reach 0.0 units of trim at any point, this is how the trace from the previous flight looked:
One thing to consider is that MCAS can be much worse than a classical stabilizer runaway caused by stuck or fused thumb switches. With the flaps up, there are limits to how much the main electric trim can bring the nose down. Depending on the 737 model, the limit is around 4.0 units from full nose down trim.
Also Satcom Guru recently tried to find 737 runaway stabilizer incidents in NTSB's database, and he wasn't able to find any:
https://www.satcom.guru/2019/05/737-...incidents.html
So the 737 runaway stabilizer procedure was rarely if ever tested in real incidents. And in any case, an MCAS runaway can be much worse than a classical runaway. With that in mind, Boeing insistence that the existing stabilizer runway procedure is enough to deal with MCAS misbehaving is questionable.
Last edited by MemberBerry; 19th May 2019 at 07:46. Reason: further details about what may have happened when they re-enabled electric trim
If any system, be it monitoring or actioning, knows that it is doing something it should not ie is trimming when it shouldn't, then it's not beyond the wit of man, or even an engineer, to have a feedback mechanism to stop it doing what it shouldn't. Oh and give a warning that it encountered a problem.
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...and even an engineer might spot a logical inconsistency in that statement!
Funny how people use "western" in a way that includes Australians and New Zealanders, who are as far apart in longitude from other "westerners" as possible.
It's almost as if "western" is being used as a substitute for another word.
And fdr has it exactly right, as opposed to the FTFA-fundies who haven't encountered an MCAS failure, even in a sim, but are utterly certain that they and their "western" buddies would have handled it just fine, without even putting down their coffee cups.
It's almost as if "western" is being used as a substitute for another word.
And fdr has it exactly right, as opposed to the FTFA-fundies who haven't encountered an MCAS failure, even in a sim, but are utterly certain that they and their "western" buddies would have handled it just fine, without even putting down their coffee cups.
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The combination of high speed trim runaway AND elevator force multiplied by 4 is a killer.
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Indeed, the high speed made it worse, MCAS ran 50% faster main electric trim.
In addition to that, MCAS didn't stop at around 4.0 units of trim with the flaps up, like the main electric trim does, and also MCAS couldn't be stopped by pulling on the yoke.
The intermittent nature and the 4x feel force are factors that probably confused the pilots, not to mention the additional physical effort required to fight that.
Counting, there are 5 reasons why a MCAS induced stabilizer runaway is worse than a classical runaway. Or 6 reasons, if we include the fact that the Lion Air pilots didn't even know MCAS existed.
In addition to that, MCAS didn't stop at around 4.0 units of trim with the flaps up, like the main electric trim does, and also MCAS couldn't be stopped by pulling on the yoke.
The intermittent nature and the 4x feel force are factors that probably confused the pilots, not to mention the additional physical effort required to fight that.
Counting, there are 5 reasons why a MCAS induced stabilizer runaway is worse than a classical runaway. Or 6 reasons, if we include the fact that the Lion Air pilots didn't even know MCAS existed.
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The Washington Post is reporting that top US administration officials are blaming the pilots for the two 737 Max crashes. The paper quotes them as saying that "...the problem isn’t that Boeing put a faulty aircraft into the skies, nor that the Federal Aviation Administration’s lax oversight kept it flying. The trouble, they argued, comes from lousy foreign pilots..." https://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...=.14f59e6a0943
Salute!
TNX. For reminding us of that feel increase mentioned back in November, hmmmm
I also wonder is they tested inadvertent MCAS activation while descending to the approach at fairly high “q” and reduced power. Or maybe cruising along near the critical mach . Spoilers up/down. After all STS, feel force and shaker and ...... depend on AoA to work as intended. The interaction of several sftwe mods to the basic design keeps haunting this old systems engineer.
Something rotten in ...... errr, Seattle
Gums sends....
TNX. For reminding us of that feel increase mentioned back in November, hmmmm
I also wonder is they tested inadvertent MCAS activation while descending to the approach at fairly high “q” and reduced power. Or maybe cruising along near the critical mach . Spoilers up/down. After all STS, feel force and shaker and ...... depend on AoA to work as intended. The interaction of several sftwe mods to the basic design keeps haunting this old systems engineer.
Something rotten in ...... errr, Seattle
Gums sends....
Salute!
Hey!, Cay....... did you miss the many assertions by the chairman et al concerning possible lapses in the certification process or one member that was concerned about introducing a new system without telling the users?
WaPo will cherry pick testimony to fit their agenda, as do many so called news media reporters these days and actual technical knowledge does not count.
Gums sends...
Hey!, Cay....... did you miss the many assertions by the chairman et al concerning possible lapses in the certification process or one member that was concerned about introducing a new system without telling the users?
WaPo will cherry pick testimony to fit their agenda, as do many so called news media reporters these days and actual technical knowledge does not count.
Gums sends...
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Accident investigation per Congress!
Having watched a few Congress Comity hearings lately , I find it counterproductive to Aircraft Safety.
It is good they care , but the ignorance and aggressiveness reminds me a bit of High School Debates.
Bread and circus to the people?
It is good they care , but the ignorance and aggressiveness reminds me a bit of High School Debates.
Bread and circus to the people?
[QUOTE=LowObservable;10474893]Funny how people use "western" in a way that includes Australians and New Zealanders, who are as far apart in longitude from other "westerners" as possible.
It's almost as if "western" is being used as a substitute for another word.
Yers.. I guess Oz and NZ are so far East that the only direction is West...
It's almost as if "western" is being used as a substitute for another word.
Yers.. I guess Oz and NZ are so far East that the only direction is West...
Join Date: Sep 2006
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