Boeing Resisted Pilots Calls for Steps On MAX
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We know now with 20/20 hindsight and 348 dead that even the AD methods did not work, because under the ND trimmed condition in a realistic scenario the trim wheel is for manual operation stuck due to air load.
The condition statement for Runaway Stabilizer states "Uncommanded stabilizer trim movement occurs continuously"
My understanding is that in both incidents, the stab trim did not move continuously as per the condition statement, but was reversible by using the control column mounted main electric trim switches and therefore the Runaway Stabilizer memory items, which I believe is the "existing procedure" which pilots are expected to perform does not meet the condition statement.
My understanding is that in both incidents, the stab trim did not move continuously as per the condition statement, but was reversible by using the control column mounted main electric trim switches and therefore the Runaway Stabilizer memory items, which I believe is the "existing procedure" which pilots are expected to perform does not meet the condition statement.
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If I'm not mistaken, even the update to the Stab Trim Runaway wasn't the best example of communication. The last version just suppressed a word (the "continous" was cut off), the whole document didn't put any emphasis on it. Anyone reading it would have to compare with previous version, see that a word was supressed, would have to think "Humm, seems that it doesn't need to be continous anymore". And when the beast showed off slightly above ground, the last crew was expected to think "This shaking is active, it says I'm stalling, yes, surely this is related to the removal of the 'continous' from that checklist, let's do that!".
All threads were closed regarding "lack of new information, let's wait for substatial news". All threads hit a dead end with pages and pages of discussion on it was just necessary to "fly the aircraft", as if nothing else should be learned on why any crew would be doing something while heading to the ground that isn't trying to fly the aircraft...
If these details from newspapers aren't "news", I don't know what else would be. If all those details aren't enough to be considered on why the plane acted in unexpected ways for 3/3 crews, and just 1 one them could survive (and logged the problem with words clearly stating that they didn't consider to be MCAS problem... perhaps because MACS wa unknown until them)... if these details don't impact, at least, on how a crew should proced to recover from the problem... I don't know what else should be discussed.
Anyway, be it a big problem with many factors or be it just a matter that pilots should have done better, I don't think public is reliefed knowing that "you, travelling worldwide, do you know that certified pilots don't know how to deal with an easy problem that they just need to keep flying the plane?".
All threads were closed regarding "lack of new information, let's wait for substatial news". All threads hit a dead end with pages and pages of discussion on it was just necessary to "fly the aircraft", as if nothing else should be learned on why any crew would be doing something while heading to the ground that isn't trying to fly the aircraft...
If these details from newspapers aren't "news", I don't know what else would be. If all those details aren't enough to be considered on why the plane acted in unexpected ways for 3/3 crews, and just 1 one them could survive (and logged the problem with words clearly stating that they didn't consider to be MCAS problem... perhaps because MACS wa unknown until them)... if these details don't impact, at least, on how a crew should proced to recover from the problem... I don't know what else should be discussed.
Anyway, be it a big problem with many factors or be it just a matter that pilots should have done better, I don't think public is reliefed knowing that "you, travelling worldwide, do you know that certified pilots don't know how to deal with an easy problem that they just need to keep flying the plane?".
Last edited by e1229; 15th May 2019 at 16:31. Reason: spelling
Whichever way you look at it Boeing is in deep ****.
The longer this goes on the more and more damming evidence comes to light.
They are going to be sued by everybody.
Boeing are complicit, the FAA are complicit, the US government are complicit, complete cover up at all levels and now they are trying to cover their arses as much as possible.
The longer this goes on the more and more damming evidence comes to light.
They are going to be sued by everybody.
Boeing are complicit, the FAA are complicit, the US government are complicit, complete cover up at all levels and now they are trying to cover their arses as much as possible.
The limits of human performance
So, Boeing can't assume that flight crews are adequately trained? Would that be just in the memory items for runaway trim, or would that also include the other specifics of the type, as well as basic airmanship?
These accidents suggest that these situations were at the limit, or beyond of what can be trained - to ensure reliable action. Thus the inability to react indicates aspects beyond any reasonable expectation of human performance.
The drills start with the need to recognise the situation - time, misdiagnosis, diagnosis, mis-action.
Where is the big red light which indicates ‘trim runaway’; if the aircraft system were able to recognise this then why not disengage trim automatically.
The basis problem is that a weak design relies on human judgement and intervention, in a critically limited time frame, which if not achieved presents a physically impossible task.
Unacceptable !
There is a limit to what can be trained, or be relied on for consistent recall in time for action. Failure to recognise that, manufacturer, regulator, or operator, is just as serious as the design issues.
The human issues are fundamental elements of aviation safety.
In these circumstances the system must be changed so that all operations are within the limited human capability.
These accidents suggest that these situations were at the limit, or beyond of what can be trained - to ensure reliable action. Thus the inability to react indicates aspects beyond any reasonable expectation of human performance.
The drills start with the need to recognise the situation - time, misdiagnosis, diagnosis, mis-action.
Where is the big red light which indicates ‘trim runaway’; if the aircraft system were able to recognise this then why not disengage trim automatically.
The basis problem is that a weak design relies on human judgement and intervention, in a critically limited time frame, which if not achieved presents a physically impossible task.
Unacceptable !
There is a limit to what can be trained, or be relied on for consistent recall in time for action. Failure to recognise that, manufacturer, regulator, or operator, is just as serious as the design issues.
The human issues are fundamental elements of aviation safety.
In these circumstances the system must be changed so that all operations are within the limited human capability.
Reductio ad absurdum...
The FAR subsection dealing with static longitudinal stability was written, I guess, to ensure increasing control forces at high angles of attack so as to be a natural aerodynamic anti-stall characteristic of the airplane.
So Boeing claims that MCAS isn't an anti-stall system because it was developed to counter unsuitable control forces, That I grant you, qualifies as reductio...
Two questions then:
1.does MCAS trigger with a certain alpha value only, or anytime the aircraft has sensed stall ID?
(Stall ID is a Boeing term for how the aircraft determines when its stalled...its determined by either alpha vane or low airspeed)
2. Is the failure of a stall prevention feature defined as a critical failure? Ie, a failure too consequential for Boeing's cobbled together MCAS?
Another bit of Latin: After both accidents Boeing was claiming the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Turns out it wasn't false.
The FAR subsection dealing with static longitudinal stability was written, I guess, to ensure increasing control forces at high angles of attack so as to be a natural aerodynamic anti-stall characteristic of the airplane.
So Boeing claims that MCAS isn't an anti-stall system because it was developed to counter unsuitable control forces, That I grant you, qualifies as reductio...
Two questions then:
1.does MCAS trigger with a certain alpha value only, or anytime the aircraft has sensed stall ID?
(Stall ID is a Boeing term for how the aircraft determines when its stalled...its determined by either alpha vane or low airspeed)
2. Is the failure of a stall prevention feature defined as a critical failure? Ie, a failure too consequential for Boeing's cobbled together MCAS?
Another bit of Latin: After both accidents Boeing was claiming the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Turns out it wasn't false.
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Whichever way you look at it Boeing is in deep ****.
The longer this goes on the more and more damming evidence comes to light.
They are going to be sued by everybody.
Boeing are complicit, the FAA are complicit, the US government are complicit, complete cover up at all levels and now they are trying to cover their arses as much as possible.
The longer this goes on the more and more damming evidence comes to light.
They are going to be sued by everybody.
Boeing are complicit, the FAA are complicit, the US government are complicit, complete cover up at all levels and now they are trying to cover their arses as much as possible.
Regulatory capture.
The normalisation of deviance
I think this aircraft needs a guarded switch,painted yellow/black,`Emergency Stab Trim, and a separate electric power supply to drive the manual trim wheels.. Lift the guard and it cuts out MCAS,and c/w switches,;move switch to NU/ND as appropriate;retrim,get speed under control,put flaps to lowest setting,go home......job done.....
The manual wheels can still be used ,and every pilot should be trained to fly the aircraft using manual trim across the envelope,as you can in most `spam-cans`....If you can`t ,you shouldn`t be there.......
The manual wheels can still be used ,and every pilot should be trained to fly the aircraft using manual trim across the envelope,as you can in most `spam-cans`....If you can`t ,you shouldn`t be there.......
Maybe this has been posted before on one of the many (locked) threads on this matter . Anyway , it bears re-posting . Getting this in before the thread goes the way of the others----Locked.
To be honest , this bulletin should/would have been up there in red letters on any training notice board ; can't say there were no warnings....
To be honest , this bulletin should/would have been up there in red letters on any training notice board ; can't say there were no warnings....
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I don't think the pilots involved had forgotten how to trim..
On the NG, it went from Stab Elec and/ or AP....on the MAX, either switch discos the entire electric stab system.
There is little need for the MCAS to prevent pitch up stall...BUT what it does do is when there is an AoA disco, as on the crash, it kicks in.
So far, it appears that MCAS initiates on AoA disagree or disco...so.
So, lets say they dont fix the switch config (pri/alt)...the Ac has an AoA disco and MCAS kicks in, you cancel that by flipping the stab trim switch.
NOW...all ELEC and AP functions of stab trim are dead and you are in manual stab trim mode...
no elec or AP capabilities...
On TO, enroute or ARR, now you have manual trim with defective AoA readings.....
How many pilots out there can deal with a TO with manual trim...
Enroute with manual trim...
and ARR with manual trim?
FMD, this is not something I want to have to deal with...
...
Because now the rear stabiliser was being repurposed to add a few pounds of back pressure to the control column.
to be honest , this bulletin should/would have been up there in red letters on any training notice board ;
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WSJ Opinion
https://www.wsj.com/articles/flight-...b1d10cb08f8eca
OPINION | LETTERS
Flight Systems Have Become Too Complicated
There are airline pilots that are not capable of recognizing and mitigating certain system failures.
May 15, 2019 401 p.m. ET
Regarding Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.’s column “GM and Boeing Show How Safety Miscues Happen” (Business World, May 11): Most media reports portray Boeing as incompetent and inappropriately close with the Federal Aviation Administration. As Mr. Jenkins notes, any attempt by Boeing to defend its design is met with derision and contempt. This exaggerated portrayal increases the risk that the public will never recognize the real problem: Many current airline pilots are simply not up to the standard necessary to operate current systems. With that in mind, the airline industry—not just Boeing—needs to lower expectations related to pilot competency in designing systems and dealing with failures.
The fiasco around MCAS—Boeing’s twice-failed maneuvering control system—is a good example of that, and we can expect more accidents if action is not taken to revise the current safety methodology to minimize or eliminate reliance on pilots to recognize failures and respond correctly. The Lion Air crew that flew the same airplane the day prior to the accident also encountered the MCAS-induced antistall system, and simply disengaged the system and completed the flight.
The software changes that are now being implemented by Boeing eliminate the need for the crew to recognize and correctly respond to a failure of an angle-of-attack sensor. This is done in recognition that there are airline pilots that are not capable of recognizing and mitigating certain system failures. It is a shame that it took two accidents with many fatalities to understand this, but it is not fair or reasonable to assert that Boeing and the FAA should have known the exact point when systems would become too complex for certain pilots. That said, Boeing was remiss in disabling the AOA “Disagree” message, which would have given pilots a clear prompt to override a system failure. Yet given that the trim wheel was spinning madly and the stick shaker was activated, it is doubtful that a small, yellow advisory message would have made a difference.
Roger H. Hoh
Society of Experimental Test Pilots Grass Valley, Calif.
Flight Systems Have Become Too Complicated
There are airline pilots that are not capable of recognizing and mitigating certain system failures.
May 15, 2019 401 p.m. ET
Regarding Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.’s column “GM and Boeing Show How Safety Miscues Happen” (Business World, May 11): Most media reports portray Boeing as incompetent and inappropriately close with the Federal Aviation Administration. As Mr. Jenkins notes, any attempt by Boeing to defend its design is met with derision and contempt. This exaggerated portrayal increases the risk that the public will never recognize the real problem: Many current airline pilots are simply not up to the standard necessary to operate current systems. With that in mind, the airline industry—not just Boeing—needs to lower expectations related to pilot competency in designing systems and dealing with failures.
The fiasco around MCAS—Boeing’s twice-failed maneuvering control system—is a good example of that, and we can expect more accidents if action is not taken to revise the current safety methodology to minimize or eliminate reliance on pilots to recognize failures and respond correctly. The Lion Air crew that flew the same airplane the day prior to the accident also encountered the MCAS-induced antistall system, and simply disengaged the system and completed the flight.
The software changes that are now being implemented by Boeing eliminate the need for the crew to recognize and correctly respond to a failure of an angle-of-attack sensor. This is done in recognition that there are airline pilots that are not capable of recognizing and mitigating certain system failures. It is a shame that it took two accidents with many fatalities to understand this, but it is not fair or reasonable to assert that Boeing and the FAA should have known the exact point when systems would become too complex for certain pilots. That said, Boeing was remiss in disabling the AOA “Disagree” message, which would have given pilots a clear prompt to override a system failure. Yet given that the trim wheel was spinning madly and the stick shaker was activated, it is doubtful that a small, yellow advisory message would have made a difference.
Roger H. Hoh
Society of Experimental Test Pilots Grass Valley, Calif.
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Seattle Times article
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...-faa-approval/
Boeing says its software fix for the 737 MAX is ready, awaits FAA approval
May 16, 2019 at 1:27 pm Updated May 16, 2019 at 2:23 pm
Dominic Gates By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
Boeing said Thursday it has completed development of the software fix for the 737 MAX flight-control system that malfunctioned on the two flights that crashed in Indonesia and Ethiopia and has finished simulator and flight tests of the new system.
After the first crash, of a Lion Air jet, Boeing told U.S. pilots at the end of November that it could have the software fix ready in about six weeks. More than 14 weeks later, with Boeing still working on the software fix, the Ethiopian Airlines jet crashed when the same system malfunctioned.
In all, it’s take Boeing four times longer to develop the software fix than it projected back then.
Boeing now awaits approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which must fly a certification flight and also review all the manufacturer’s documentation on the changes made to the flight-control system before the MAX can be recertified and cleared to reenter commercial service.
The news comes ahead of a crucial meeting next week of civil aviation authority officials from around the world, convened by the FAA in Washington, D.C., to try to arrive at an international consensus on what’s needed before the MAX is allowed to fly passengers again.
The manufacturer said it has flown flight tests with the updated software for more than 360 hours on 207 flights.
Boeing said the FAA has asked for additional information before it will conduct a certification flight, including details on how pilots interact with the airplane controls and displays in different flight scenarios. The company is now providing that information.
Boeing Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg in a statement cited “clear and steady progress” toward updating the MAX so that it will “be one of the safest airplanes ever to fly.”
“We have completed all of the engineering test flights for the software update and are preparing for the final certification flight,” said Muilenburg. “We’re committed to providing the FAA and global regulators all the information they need, and to getting it right.”
On Nov. 27, a month after the Lion Air crash and a day before the preliminary report into that crash was released, Boeing vice president Mike Sinnett briefed American Airlines pilots in a meeting in Dallas and told them Boeing was working on “software that would significantly reduce the probability of it happening again.”
According to an audio recording of the meeting that was provided by the Allied Pilots Association (APA), the airline’s pilot union, when the American pilots pressed Sinnett for faster action, he laid out a six-week timeline to develop the fix, followed by a 90-day period for the FAA to review and mandate its implementation
“Our typical software revision process is about six months to a year. We’re talking 6 weeks,” Sinnett told the APA pilots. “We’re talking about moving relatively quickly.”
That meeting was 24 weeks ago.
With Boeing almost finished with its part, the next step will depend on the FAA.
An FAA spokesman said Thursday the agency will “clear the aircraft for return to flight only after we’re satisfied that the safety concerns have been addressed.”
Boeing has separately developed enhanced training and educational materials that are now being reviewed with the FAA, global regulators and airline customers to support the jet’s return to service. The company said it will hold a series of regional customer conferences around the world to inform customers of the new training requirements.
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
May 16, 2019 at 1:27 pm Updated May 16, 2019 at 2:23 pm
Dominic Gates By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
Boeing said Thursday it has completed development of the software fix for the 737 MAX flight-control system that malfunctioned on the two flights that crashed in Indonesia and Ethiopia and has finished simulator and flight tests of the new system.
After the first crash, of a Lion Air jet, Boeing told U.S. pilots at the end of November that it could have the software fix ready in about six weeks. More than 14 weeks later, with Boeing still working on the software fix, the Ethiopian Airlines jet crashed when the same system malfunctioned.
In all, it’s take Boeing four times longer to develop the software fix than it projected back then.
Boeing now awaits approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which must fly a certification flight and also review all the manufacturer’s documentation on the changes made to the flight-control system before the MAX can be recertified and cleared to reenter commercial service.
The news comes ahead of a crucial meeting next week of civil aviation authority officials from around the world, convened by the FAA in Washington, D.C., to try to arrive at an international consensus on what’s needed before the MAX is allowed to fly passengers again.
The manufacturer said it has flown flight tests with the updated software for more than 360 hours on 207 flights.
Boeing said the FAA has asked for additional information before it will conduct a certification flight, including details on how pilots interact with the airplane controls and displays in different flight scenarios. The company is now providing that information.
Boeing Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Dennis Muilenburg in a statement cited “clear and steady progress” toward updating the MAX so that it will “be one of the safest airplanes ever to fly.”
“We have completed all of the engineering test flights for the software update and are preparing for the final certification flight,” said Muilenburg. “We’re committed to providing the FAA and global regulators all the information they need, and to getting it right.”
On Nov. 27, a month after the Lion Air crash and a day before the preliminary report into that crash was released, Boeing vice president Mike Sinnett briefed American Airlines pilots in a meeting in Dallas and told them Boeing was working on “software that would significantly reduce the probability of it happening again.”
According to an audio recording of the meeting that was provided by the Allied Pilots Association (APA), the airline’s pilot union, when the American pilots pressed Sinnett for faster action, he laid out a six-week timeline to develop the fix, followed by a 90-day period for the FAA to review and mandate its implementation
“Our typical software revision process is about six months to a year. We’re talking 6 weeks,” Sinnett told the APA pilots. “We’re talking about moving relatively quickly.”
That meeting was 24 weeks ago.
With Boeing almost finished with its part, the next step will depend on the FAA.
An FAA spokesman said Thursday the agency will “clear the aircraft for return to flight only after we’re satisfied that the safety concerns have been addressed.”
Boeing has separately developed enhanced training and educational materials that are now being reviewed with the FAA, global regulators and airline customers to support the jet’s return to service. The company said it will hold a series of regional customer conferences around the world to inform customers of the new training requirements.
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
Flight Systems Have Become Too Complicated
‘There are airline pilots that are not capable of recognizing and mitigating certain system failures.’
(WSJ #48)
There are also designers, regulators, and managers who are not capable of recognizing and mitigating certain system failures.
Everyone has their limits; the difficulty - the safety challenge, is to recognise this before the limit is reached.
Additional training is not a solution for complicated systems; it may even make the recognition of certain failures more difficult.
‘Countermeasures are based on the assumption that though we cannot change the human condition, we can change the conditions under which humans work.’
James Reason
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/art...70/pdf/768.pdf
James Reason's 12 Principles of Error Management - Aerossurance
(WSJ #48)
There are also designers, regulators, and managers who are not capable of recognizing and mitigating certain system failures.
Everyone has their limits; the difficulty - the safety challenge, is to recognise this before the limit is reached.
Additional training is not a solution for complicated systems; it may even make the recognition of certain failures more difficult.
‘Countermeasures are based on the assumption that though we cannot change the human condition, we can change the conditions under which humans work.’
James Reason
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/art...70/pdf/768.pdf
James Reason's 12 Principles of Error Management - Aerossurance
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Hopefully the FAA won't just look at the software fix in isolation. Other questions about whether the aircraft is fit to fly include
1) Can pilots correct an out of trim situation at high speed
2) How did the missing AOA disagree light get through testing; are there other weaknesses
3) Boeing certified MCAS based on 0.3 travel but it could do 2.5 units. How did this occur, and have other self-certified items also changed since the paperwork was submitted
4) Why was MCAS code not written to level 1 spec. What else controls flight surfaces and is not Level 1?
5) Given two pilots did not recognise MCAS/trim issues, one crew after being told about MCAS, what human factors are involved in alerts/nnc's etc
6) Has the new bus interconnect for the flight computers being tested?
Really the failure of the design and engineering in MCAS is more like the canary in the mine...
G
1) Can pilots correct an out of trim situation at high speed
2) How did the missing AOA disagree light get through testing; are there other weaknesses
3) Boeing certified MCAS based on 0.3 travel but it could do 2.5 units. How did this occur, and have other self-certified items also changed since the paperwork was submitted
4) Why was MCAS code not written to level 1 spec. What else controls flight surfaces and is not Level 1?
5) Given two pilots did not recognise MCAS/trim issues, one crew after being told about MCAS, what human factors are involved in alerts/nnc's etc
6) Has the new bus interconnect for the flight computers being tested?
Really the failure of the design and engineering in MCAS is more like the canary in the mine...
G
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Reuters reports that Boeing still has to provide B737 MAX pilot training material to the FAA, in addition to the MCAS software update: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKCN1SM2HB