Sheremetyevo Superjet 100 in flames
The emergency exits in the SSJ-100 SVO incident were woefully inadequate as they are on most narrow body aircraft. The aviation incident was completely survivable. The static killing and maiming by fire and smoke was medieval. Burn through clearly is the killer and it has nothing to do with flying other than the fact that coming back to terra firma too easily dumps you in such a terrible situation. The speed of onset of danger in with an ignited fuel spill means you must be able to get out of the cigar tubes sat in those flames immediately, and it is of course is impossible if you can only use the two front exits and you are in the back. Why do we still tolerate this risk?
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The emergency exits in the SSJ-100 SVO incident were woefully inadequate as they are on most narrow body aircraft. The aviation incident was completely survivable.
If you look at the video, people come out at an absolutely low rate, much lower than you would expect. If they would come out one every second (which is what you can see on many other occasions), they would have easily evacuated the full load of people.
With respect to the bounce, would the aircraft have auto-spoilers in (what they called) "direct mode" ?
If you are used to auto spoilers, how much would it increase the chance of a bounce if they would not deploy as you are expecting ?
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The acceptable lightning voltage transients that must be accounted for (and tested) are different for carbon composite - the 787 had to meet (IIRC) 2/3rd higher induced voltage transients than for a conventional aluminum airframe. The size or type of electronic device is immaterial - it needs to be tested and demonstrate it can withstand the appropriate lightning transients - this applies to every critical and essential system on the aircraft. Otherwise it shouldn't be on the aircraft.
So my original point stands - If a lightning strike caused multiple systems to fail, making the aircraft dangerously difficult to fly and land, it's critically important that we know why. Because it either means the requirements are wrong, the testing was wrong, or the implementation was wrong. If was the implementation, it points to a problem with Sukhoi and the Superjet. If it was the way it was tested, we need to refine the testing standards (and make sure they are complied with). If it's the requirements, we have a big problem that could potentially impact thousands of aircraft and the industry as a whole.
Honest question, does the Superjet use significant carbon composite structure? I thought it was fairly conventional aluminum construction.
So my original point stands - If a lightning strike caused multiple systems to fail, making the aircraft dangerously difficult to fly and land, it's critically important that we know why. Because it either means the requirements are wrong, the testing was wrong, or the implementation was wrong. If was the implementation, it points to a problem with Sukhoi and the Superjet. If it was the way it was tested, we need to refine the testing standards (and make sure they are complied with). If it's the requirements, we have a big problem that could potentially impact thousands of aircraft and the industry as a whole.
Honest question, does the Superjet use significant carbon composite structure? I thought it was fairly conventional aluminum construction.
Lightning test levels will be adjusted in the future and this accident may contribute to the data set used to determine the new levels.
These are my opinions an my not reflect those of my employer.
Last edited by Thruster763; 7th May 2019 at 17:28.
You've got that the wrong way round.
The place near Siberia tends to fill up with good people - people who question authority, attempt to hold it to account, the thinkers, the questioners, the imaginative. It's those poor buggers that end up there. The fat git that grabbed his bag, his hat and his coat before leaving the aircraft to burn will probably defend his actions to the authorities successfully (with rubles) and vanish in to the mist of the aftermath never to be heard of again. Excuse my world-weary cynicism.
You've got that the wrong way round.
The place near Siberia tends to fill up with good people - people who question authority, attempt to hold it to account, the thinkers, the questioners, the imaginative. It's those poor buggers that end up there. The fat git that grabbed his bag, his hat and his coat before leaving the aircraft to burn will probably defend his actions to the authorities successfully (with rubles) and vanish in to the mist of the aftermath never to be heard of again. Excuse my world-weary cynicism.
The place near Siberia tends to fill up with good people - people who question authority, attempt to hold it to account, the thinkers, the questioners, the imaginative. It's those poor buggers that end up there. The fat git that grabbed his bag, his hat and his coat before leaving the aircraft to burn will probably defend his actions to the authorities successfully (with rubles) and vanish in to the mist of the aftermath never to be heard of again. Excuse my world-weary cynicism.
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Don't get me wrong, there is a big difference between the moral and legal side of things. You're on a burning airplane and only one person can get out. Will you jump to safety or will you let a little girl make the jump? Sure, most people will sacrifice themselves to save the little girl and have a high school named after them, but can you really criminally convict someone who chose to live themselves?
I think the only realistic solution would be for airlines to switch to "rolling cart overhead bins" placed on the jetway where passengers would place large carry on items. These would reappear at destination jetway shortly after landing. Already done to some extent for small regional jets.
I will make a feeble attempt to hijack this thread and return to the OT:
Kommersant has a fairly long and detailed article on the state of the investigation, alegedly from insider sources: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3962418#id1743216
While too long to translate and re-post, the key contents:
Investigation is focusing on the actons of the pilots, in particular:
- their decision to fly into a zone of increment weather
- their decision to return immediately (the airplane was perfectly flyable in direct law, burning off fuel would have been an option to avoid an overweight landing)
- the approach and touchdown (30kph too fast, first touchdown 1000m beyond threshold, improper recovery technique after first bounce)
It appears that crew did manage to communicate on 121.5, but reception was very poor with constant interruptions.
It also appears likely that those seated in the rear of the plane suffered injuries during the final hard touchdown which would have prevented them from being able to evacuate without assistance.
In addition, the investigation is looking at the ARFF response. Alarm was only raised when the aircraft caught fire on the runway, and corresponding response times were adequate. However the question remains why the alarm was not raised earlier, knowing that an emergency was in progress. (Apparently this could have been a case of bureucratc legacy of soviet times, only seven high ranking airport oficials have the authority to order an alert stage, not the tower controler himself ).
Pretty much the same issues that were raised already on this forum.
Kommersant has a fairly long and detailed article on the state of the investigation, alegedly from insider sources: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3962418#id1743216
While too long to translate and re-post, the key contents:
Investigation is focusing on the actons of the pilots, in particular:
- their decision to fly into a zone of increment weather
- their decision to return immediately (the airplane was perfectly flyable in direct law, burning off fuel would have been an option to avoid an overweight landing)
- the approach and touchdown (30kph too fast, first touchdown 1000m beyond threshold, improper recovery technique after first bounce)
It appears that crew did manage to communicate on 121.5, but reception was very poor with constant interruptions.
It also appears likely that those seated in the rear of the plane suffered injuries during the final hard touchdown which would have prevented them from being able to evacuate without assistance.
In addition, the investigation is looking at the ARFF response. Alarm was only raised when the aircraft caught fire on the runway, and corresponding response times were adequate. However the question remains why the alarm was not raised earlier, knowing that an emergency was in progress. (Apparently this could have been a case of bureucratc legacy of soviet times, only seven high ranking airport oficials have the authority to order an alert stage, not the tower controler himself ).
Pretty much the same issues that were raised already on this forum.
I will make a feeble attempt to hijack this thread and return to the OT:
Kommersant has a fairly long and detailed article on the state of the investigation, alegedly from insider sources: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3962418#id1743216
While too long to translate and re-post, the key contents:
Investigation is focusing on the actons of the pilots, in particular:
- their decision to fly into a zone of increment weather
- their decision to return immediately (the airplane was perfectly flyable in direct law, burning off fuel would have been an option to avoid an overweight landing)
- the approach and touchdown (30kph too fast, first touchdown 1000m beyond threshold, improper recovery technique after first bounce)
It appears that crew did manage to communicate on 121.5, but reception was very poor with constant interruptions.
It also appears likely that those seated in the rear of the plane suffered injuries during the final hard touchdown which would have prevented them from being able to evacuate without assistance.
In addition, the investigation is looking at the ARFF response. Alarm was only raised when the aircraft caught fire on the runway, and corresponding response times were adequate. However the question remains why the alarm was not raised earlier, knowing that an emergency was in progress. (Apparently this could have been a case of bureucratc legacy of soviet times, only seven high ranking airport oficials have the authority to order an alert stage, not the tower controler himself ).
Pretty much the same issues that were raised already on this forum.
Kommersant has a fairly long and detailed article on the state of the investigation, alegedly from insider sources: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3962418#id1743216
While too long to translate and re-post, the key contents:
Investigation is focusing on the actons of the pilots, in particular:
- their decision to fly into a zone of increment weather
- their decision to return immediately (the airplane was perfectly flyable in direct law, burning off fuel would have been an option to avoid an overweight landing)
- the approach and touchdown (30kph too fast, first touchdown 1000m beyond threshold, improper recovery technique after first bounce)
It appears that crew did manage to communicate on 121.5, but reception was very poor with constant interruptions.
It also appears likely that those seated in the rear of the plane suffered injuries during the final hard touchdown which would have prevented them from being able to evacuate without assistance.
In addition, the investigation is looking at the ARFF response. Alarm was only raised when the aircraft caught fire on the runway, and corresponding response times were adequate. However the question remains why the alarm was not raised earlier, knowing that an emergency was in progress. (Apparently this could have been a case of bureucratc legacy of soviet times, only seven high ranking airport oficials have the authority to order an alert stage, not the tower controler himself ).
Pretty much the same issues that were raised already on this forum.
"Overweight landing"?
Hooh, 1 ton, 2 tons? WTF?
"the airplane was perfectly flyable in direct law"
How do they know?
"first touchdown 1000m"
So what, regarding 3.700m?
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I will make a feeble attempt to hijack this thread and return to the OT:
Kommersant has a fairly long and detailed article on the state of the investigation, alegedly from insider sources: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3962418#id1743216
While too long to translate and re-post, the key contents:
Investigation is focusing on the actons of the pilots, in particular:
- their decision to fly into a zone of increment weather
- their decision to return immediately (the airplane was perfectly flyable in direct law, burning off fuel would have been an option to avoid an overweight landing)
- the approach and touchdown (30kph too fast, first touchdown 1000m beyond threshold, improper recovery technique after first bounce)
It appears that crew did manage to communicate on 121.5, but reception was very poor with constant interruptions.
It also appears likely that those seated in the rear of the plane suffered injuries during the final hard touchdown which would have prevented them from being able to evacuate without assistance.
In addition, the investigation is looking at the ARFF response. Alarm was only raised when the aircraft caught fire on the runway, and corresponding response times were adequate. However the question remains why the alarm was not raised earlier, knowing that an emergency was in progress. (Apparently this could have been a case of bureucratc legacy of soviet times, only seven high ranking airport oficials have the authority to order an alert stage, not the tower controler himself ).
Pretty much the same issues that were raised already on this forum.
Kommersant has a fairly long and detailed article on the state of the investigation, alegedly from insider sources: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3962418#id1743216
While too long to translate and re-post, the key contents:
Investigation is focusing on the actons of the pilots, in particular:
- their decision to fly into a zone of increment weather
- their decision to return immediately (the airplane was perfectly flyable in direct law, burning off fuel would have been an option to avoid an overweight landing)
- the approach and touchdown (30kph too fast, first touchdown 1000m beyond threshold, improper recovery technique after first bounce)
It appears that crew did manage to communicate on 121.5, but reception was very poor with constant interruptions.
It also appears likely that those seated in the rear of the plane suffered injuries during the final hard touchdown which would have prevented them from being able to evacuate without assistance.
In addition, the investigation is looking at the ARFF response. Alarm was only raised when the aircraft caught fire on the runway, and corresponding response times were adequate. However the question remains why the alarm was not raised earlier, knowing that an emergency was in progress. (Apparently this could have been a case of bureucratc legacy of soviet times, only seven high ranking airport oficials have the authority to order an alert stage, not the tower controler himself ).
Pretty much the same issues that were raised already on this forum.
Is there any investigation into why a lightning strike could have crippled a modern aircraft design?
I don't expect an answer, but in the long run, this may turn out to highlight broader issues than the actions of the pilots.
Google translate does a reasonable job. Seems they are in denial mode already:
Igor Vinogradov, vice-president of Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Company, told Kommersant that during SSJ tests it was checked for lightning strikes. According to their results, it was found that lightning does not lead to fires on the aircraft and the loss of its control. Another source of “Kommersant” in the company noted that during the operation of the SSJ 100, lightning hit them 13 times, but none of these incidents affected the operation of the [car] in the air.
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Is there any investigation into why a lightning strike could have crippled a modern aircraft design?
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Thanks for the report. My question:
Is there any investigation into why a lightning strike could have crippled a modern aircraft design?
I don't expect an answer, but in the long run, this may turn out to highlight broader issues than the actions of the pilots.
Google translate does a reasonable job. Seems they are in denial mode already:
Is there any investigation into why a lightning strike could have crippled a modern aircraft design?
I don't expect an answer, but in the long run, this may turn out to highlight broader issues than the actions of the pilots.
Google translate does a reasonable job. Seems they are in denial mode already:
I do hope for these pilots that there was more to the aircraft malfunctions than has been initially reported.
In a futile attempt to stop all the carry-on-heroes ( And by posting, I have become part of the problem).
Locking the bins will cause even more delay, because people will stand there burning trying to get their carry-on.
Prosecuting people will do nothing because who will remember jurisprudence while trying to get of an aircraft that is on fire.
I honestly think the only realistic scenario for certification would be to simulate an emergency evacuation, tell the pax to take their carry-on with them, and still see if they can meet the 90 sec rules.
Locking the bins will cause even more delay, because people will stand there burning trying to get their carry-on.
Prosecuting people will do nothing because who will remember jurisprudence while trying to get of an aircraft that is on fire.
I honestly think the only realistic scenario for certification would be to simulate an emergency evacuation, tell the pax to take their carry-on with them, and still see if they can meet the 90 sec rules.
Rule 101 of fire crews responding to a vehicular accident is to put a fire out rather than extract a patient.
The firemen interviewed in the previously linked documentary makes the point that they can’t get in whilst passengers are still coming out.
A significant proportion of passengers die due to toxic gas and smoke inhalation.
We know just two breaths of this lethal **** can render you unconscious. (In house fires it’s not uncommon to find bodies between bed and bedroom door)
The studies of aircraft fire survivability do not examine in much detail if more lives can be saved by a snatch team entering the cabin whilst the fire is still active.
What is the typical time before fire crews enter the cabin?
How many and for how long are unconscious passengers surviving, whilst fire appliances are spraying foam on the flames?
Access by firemen to the door with a deployed slide is problematic but can be solved.
Specialised turnout suits with compact BA can be tailored to provide more freedom of movement and protection.
I’m referring to pushing unconscious passengers from a lethal smoke filled cabin down the slide.
Maybe just two minutes of work under extreme conditions.
There is usually enough passengers and cabin crew to begin 1st aid on the survivors.
Improved scale of respiratory support on the tarmac would be required to complete the picture.
As a former volunteer fireman and with experience at an international airport in a filming role, I’m aware of the costs, the physics involved and that safeguarding lives of firemen is the priority.
Worthy of further study?
mjb
The firemen interviewed in the previously linked documentary makes the point that they can’t get in whilst passengers are still coming out.
A significant proportion of passengers die due to toxic gas and smoke inhalation.
We know just two breaths of this lethal **** can render you unconscious. (In house fires it’s not uncommon to find bodies between bed and bedroom door)
The studies of aircraft fire survivability do not examine in much detail if more lives can be saved by a snatch team entering the cabin whilst the fire is still active.
What is the typical time before fire crews enter the cabin?
How many and for how long are unconscious passengers surviving, whilst fire appliances are spraying foam on the flames?
Access by firemen to the door with a deployed slide is problematic but can be solved.
Specialised turnout suits with compact BA can be tailored to provide more freedom of movement and protection.
I’m referring to pushing unconscious passengers from a lethal smoke filled cabin down the slide.
Maybe just two minutes of work under extreme conditions.
There is usually enough passengers and cabin crew to begin 1st aid on the survivors.
Improved scale of respiratory support on the tarmac would be required to complete the picture.
As a former volunteer fireman and with experience at an international airport in a filming role, I’m aware of the costs, the physics involved and that safeguarding lives of firemen is the priority.
Worthy of further study?
mjb
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Arffs major foam tenders have underbody sprays if needed to deal with burning fuel on approach, the smaller truck derived arffs appliances generally don't, depends on specification. Looking at the videos it was a substantial external fire at the rear, aluminium melts at a relatively low temperature, anyone who has experienced a jet A1 fire will appreciate how hot it is. The aim is to create surviveable conditions for the pax to get out, there was a point where the fire was pushed by a monitor towards R1, fortunately it didn't comprimise the chute. Had the arffs been at standby positions, would more have survived, we'll never know.
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@ mickjoebill, unlike structural firefighters, arffs response times are 3 minutes from time of call, get kit on and drive to incident, breathing apparatus if required donned, if internal, MUST report to entry control, this all takes time, risk assesment carried out, external fire controlled/ extinguished before commiting a crew internal.
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I know nothing about this aircraft of its systems. I am just curious if the reported malfunction might have resulted in the crew having to do a zero flap land and/or no ground spoilers? I can't tell from the videos. That might provide some of the reason for the bounced landing (should have gone around anyway). Something like this can happen with the 737, and it makes for a touchy landing, particularly if you are fast.
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The question is: why do airlines encourage PAX to bring as much crap as possible into the cabin. "To generate revenue" can't be the answer, as quite a bit of the hand luggage then goes into the hold, for free, at the gate. I'm guessing it's so they can advertise cheaper "hand luggage only" flights, but does that really have such an impact on sales/revenue that you have to do it? Not very long ago the luggage allowance was 2 hold bags free of charge, and I seem to remember there was much less crap in the cabin, hand luggage was sort of hand bag / small rucksack sized.
period!