737 max returning to service ?
Simulators are indeed few and far between, but on the other hand there are +400 frames standing idle on the ground, why not bring them to use? Sure, it costs a hell of a lot more than using a sim, but, using them will reduce the time needed to get all crews trained.
So, how about we have Boeing trainers train the airline TRI/TREs in the real aircraft, and then have the TRI/TREs train the TCs in their grounded fleet, who in turn may train the line pilots, either in real aircraft or in simulators as available.
Such an approach would also have a large and positive effect on regaining public/airline/pilot trust. But such pragmatism is of course far less appealing to your average bean counting CEO than a 1-hour iPad session.
So, how about we have Boeing trainers train the airline TRI/TREs in the real aircraft, and then have the TRI/TREs train the TCs in their grounded fleet, who in turn may train the line pilots, either in real aircraft or in simulators as available.
Such an approach would also have a large and positive effect on regaining public/airline/pilot trust. But such pragmatism is of course far less appealing to your average bean counting CEO than a 1-hour iPad session.
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The purpose of the MCAS system was to tame the MAX's very bad approach to a stall. As the angle of attack increases, the very forward and very large engine cowlings catch the wind stream and aggravate a pitch up. To put it crudely, the MAX's are ready and willing to do back flips. I am a private pilot that has done sail planes, aerobatics, hang gliding, parachuting. If I was faced with an aircraft that had this kind of dynamic instability - or very marginal dynamic stability, I would be treating that machine as a rather scary creature.
As an engineer that has been involved in the development of several mission-critical and life-critical systems (though none have been aviation related), I would certainly invite the cockpit crews to explore the MAXs pitch up characteristics with and without MCAS. In the same way that student pilots practice minimum controllable to learn how the plane responds in that domain, I would suggest numerous MAX simulator runs where the limit of controllability is approached and sometimes exceeded. And, of course, several simulator runs where each MCAS failure mode can be explored - exercising very prompt and delayed responses.
I certainly appreciate the dollar factor, but in a situation like this, the question is not what constitutes adequate pilot training. The question is what constitutes really great pilot training.
As an engineer that has been involved in the development of several mission-critical and life-critical systems (though none have been aviation related), I would certainly invite the cockpit crews to explore the MAXs pitch up characteristics with and without MCAS. In the same way that student pilots practice minimum controllable to learn how the plane responds in that domain, I would suggest numerous MAX simulator runs where the limit of controllability is approached and sometimes exceeded. And, of course, several simulator runs where each MCAS failure mode can be explored - exercising very prompt and delayed responses.
I certainly appreciate the dollar factor, but in a situation like this, the question is not what constitutes adequate pilot training. The question is what constitutes really great pilot training.
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An interesting make-up of some big hitters from the safety world.
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-et...-idUKKCN1RY1F7
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-et...-idUKKCN1RY1F7
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An interesting make-up of some big hitters from the safety world.
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-et...-idUKKCN1RY1F7
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-et...-idUKKCN1RY1F7
She also named Kenneth Hylander, chief safety officer at Amtrak
2017 Amtrak derailment over I-5 in Washington State crushes cars, kills three.
Well, that is certainly comforting. Amtrak is well known for their safety culture.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined Tuesday the April 3, 2016, derailment of Amtrak train 89 near Chester, Pennsylvania was caused by deficient safety management across many levels of Amtrak and the resultant lack of a clear, consistent and accepted vision for safety.
Last edited by Water pilot; 29th Apr 2019 at 13:50. Reason: to be fair
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Boeing not proposing required simulator time for 737 Max pilots
Boeing not proposing required simulator time for 737 Max pilots
- 29 April, 2019
- SOURCE: Flight Dashboard
- BY: Jon Hemmerdinger
- Boston
Boeing does not believe pilots should be required to complete training in a flight simulator prior to flying the 737 Max once regulators lift the aircraft’s grounding.
The company’s chief executive Dennis Muilenburg confirms Boeing instead is developing computer-based training, though it intends to offer flight simulator time as an option later to some airlines’ pilots.
“We believe that the right training right now is computer-based training,” Muilenburg said during the company’s annual general meeting on 29 April.
He made the comment when asked if the company was developing simulator training as part of its work to bring the 737 Max back to service.
Boeing will, “where it makes sense”, provide airlines with the option to augment computer-based training with flight simulator training, he adds.
Muilenburg describes flight simulator training as a “downstream” option available “where it makes sense” and based on airlines’ “individual needs”. “We will be providing enhanced training and supplemental materials to our airline… customers,” he says.
His comments follow news last week that Boeing has been sharing the computer-based training session with US pilots.
The training reviews the 737 Max’s flight control software, including the speed trim system and manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), which has been implicated as a factor contributing to two recent 737 Max crashes, sources say.
That training would be available on laptop or table computers and takes about 15min to complete, sources have said.
Some pilots have said 15min of MCAS training is plenty, noting their familiarity with the 737 Max’s systems. Sources have also noted the complex logistics of running thousands of pilots through the few 737 Max simulators available, saying some airlines might need the better part a year to complete the process.
Two recent 737 Max crashes raised questions about MCAS – which Boeing is now updating – and about pilot training and the actions of the pilots in the cockpits of the two crashed jets.
Investigations into both crashes remain ongoing.
Boeing and Muilenburg have largely steered away from discussion of the role pilots may have played.
But recently Muilenburg has eased into more discussion of training, saying last week that Boeing will provide different types of training for different customers.
“Longer term, we're also deploying training packages and additional educational materials,” Muilenburg said during the company’s first quarter earnings call on 24 April. “I would call those above-and-beyond educational materials that are tailored for our various customers around the world. So, that'll be a longer-term effort where we work with them on training, education.”
The company’s chief executive Dennis Muilenburg confirms Boeing instead is developing computer-based training, though it intends to offer flight simulator time as an option later to some airlines’ pilots.
“We believe that the right training right now is computer-based training,” Muilenburg said during the company’s annual general meeting on 29 April.
He made the comment when asked if the company was developing simulator training as part of its work to bring the 737 Max back to service.
Boeing will, “where it makes sense”, provide airlines with the option to augment computer-based training with flight simulator training, he adds.
Muilenburg describes flight simulator training as a “downstream” option available “where it makes sense” and based on airlines’ “individual needs”. “We will be providing enhanced training and supplemental materials to our airline… customers,” he says.
His comments follow news last week that Boeing has been sharing the computer-based training session with US pilots.
The training reviews the 737 Max’s flight control software, including the speed trim system and manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), which has been implicated as a factor contributing to two recent 737 Max crashes, sources say.
That training would be available on laptop or table computers and takes about 15min to complete, sources have said.
Some pilots have said 15min of MCAS training is plenty, noting their familiarity with the 737 Max’s systems. Sources have also noted the complex logistics of running thousands of pilots through the few 737 Max simulators available, saying some airlines might need the better part a year to complete the process.
Two recent 737 Max crashes raised questions about MCAS – which Boeing is now updating – and about pilot training and the actions of the pilots in the cockpits of the two crashed jets.
Investigations into both crashes remain ongoing.
Boeing and Muilenburg have largely steered away from discussion of the role pilots may have played.
But recently Muilenburg has eased into more discussion of training, saying last week that Boeing will provide different types of training for different customers.
“Longer term, we're also deploying training packages and additional educational materials,” Muilenburg said during the company’s first quarter earnings call on 24 April. “I would call those above-and-beyond educational materials that are tailored for our various customers around the world. So, that'll be a longer-term effort where we work with them on training, education.”
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Boeing not proposing required simulator time for 737 Max pilots
- 29 April, 2019
- SOURCE: Flight Dashboard
- BY: Jon Hemmerdinger
- Boston
Boeing does not believe pilots should be required to complete training in a flight simulator prior to flying the 737 Max once regulators lift the aircraft’s grounding.
ec - just as a reminder, Boeing introduced MCAS (in part or in whole) to allow the MAX to fly and "feel" enough like previous 73s that it would not require crews to go through special training in transitioning to the MAX.
And that was a selling point to customers, not just the regulators.
Word on the street is, Boeing gave, e.g. SWA, a $1-million-per-aircraft "performance guarantee" that no sim time would be required to transition from NG to MAX. Just "iPad ground school."
And that was a selling point to customers, not just the regulators.
Word on the street is, Boeing gave, e.g. SWA, a $1-million-per-aircraft "performance guarantee" that no sim time would be required to transition from NG to MAX. Just "iPad ground school."
There are rumours afloat, that the contracted Boeing signed with SW had a clause saying Boeing would pay SW 1 million USD for every aircraft delivered, if sim training was necessary to convert from NG to Max. That's 280 million good reasons why a bean counter and lawyer driven company would come up with an idea such as MCAS.
I think you misunderstood me. Somebody was saying:"just fly slightly faster than the stall speed and everything will be okay". I wanted him to answer where he would get a reliable source for airspeed from, with an AOA failure (and I think most of us agree the two crashed MAXes had AOA issues), at no point did I suggest AOA failure is more or less likely than a pitot issue. On the aircraft I fly I have seen min clean as low as 180 and as high as 245 depending on weight, pretty hard to guess the stall speed accurately enough.
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I strongly feel that this should be the most essential training item for any unreliable , or uncertain airspeed issue combined with revert to gyro attitude display
This is basic stuff that has somehow been obscured by the "magenta line"
The "flight manager" should disappear and be replaced by gyro attitude display in any case of sensor disagree or does not compute situation
Sailvi767,
Speed: - Except that AoA malfunction also affects speed, ‘speed disagree’; so which speed is correct. Thus the need for a third system cross check, but two different cues - stick shake and low speed awareness strongly suggest the lower (erroneous) speed is correct - mental conflict.
Higher workload / confusion immediately after liftoff; which might not aid safety.
phylosocopter,
Pitch power settings are a valuable guide, but as you note these are situationaly dependent.
Current drills differentiate ‘dynamic’ situations, such as takeoff, and ‘static’ situations for continued flight; thus crews have to identify, differentiate, and recall the appropriate procedure. In complex operations there will be more considerations.
The ‘obscuring’ Magenta Line view contributes to the difficulties of judgement. The phase does not relate to the dependence on automation, but knowledge of when to change the course of action; hence the underlying Magenta Line message was ‘Click Click’ (see video) - switch off automation, change plans, but nowhere does this consider how and when pilots would detect this point.
Magenta Line is a widely used catch phase, but one where few people understand the deep meaning and requirement to first understand the situation.
Speed: - Except that AoA malfunction also affects speed, ‘speed disagree’; so which speed is correct. Thus the need for a third system cross check, but two different cues - stick shake and low speed awareness strongly suggest the lower (erroneous) speed is correct - mental conflict.
Higher workload / confusion immediately after liftoff; which might not aid safety.
phylosocopter,
Pitch power settings are a valuable guide, but as you note these are situationaly dependent.
Current drills differentiate ‘dynamic’ situations, such as takeoff, and ‘static’ situations for continued flight; thus crews have to identify, differentiate, and recall the appropriate procedure. In complex operations there will be more considerations.
The ‘obscuring’ Magenta Line view contributes to the difficulties of judgement. The phase does not relate to the dependence on automation, but knowledge of when to change the course of action; hence the underlying Magenta Line message was ‘Click Click’ (see video) - switch off automation, change plans, but nowhere does this consider how and when pilots would detect this point.
Magenta Line is a widely used catch phase, but one where few people understand the deep meaning and requirement to first understand the situation.
Yes, the MAX has a somewhat tarnished reputation now, well helped by a sensationalist media that smelled blood in the water (literally). Boeing did some really awful decisions about the MAX, like not telling anyone about MCAS, as well as trying to save a few dollars on not hooking up the second AOA sensor so they could compare values.
I do understand where this comes from. A quote from the Al Jazeera program “Broken dreams” pointed out that Boeing used to be this innovative company that was passionate about aviation. Today it is run by accountants that don’t give a rats a** about aviation, safety, planes, passengers or pilots. Their biggest fear is to actually have to invest in a new aircraft program. This is also why you see them beating all their dead horses, and resurrecting designs from the 1950’s that would never pass certification today.
That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.
Yes the investigation is in progress, and the conclusion is probably years away, but the solid information so far from documents, FDRs and CVRs gives me a somewhat clear indication that neither the QRH, FCOM, FCTM or other publications guidelines was followed correctly in either case. IMO there is no need for additional training to operate the MAX now, the requirement was to accomplish the initial training correctly, and that obviously did not happen with all operators.
I do understand where this comes from. A quote from the Al Jazeera program “Broken dreams” pointed out that Boeing used to be this innovative company that was passionate about aviation. Today it is run by accountants that don’t give a rats a** about aviation, safety, planes, passengers or pilots. Their biggest fear is to actually have to invest in a new aircraft program. This is also why you see them beating all their dead horses, and resurrecting designs from the 1950’s that would never pass certification today.
That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.
Yes the investigation is in progress, and the conclusion is probably years away, but the solid information so far from documents, FDRs and CVRs gives me a somewhat clear indication that neither the QRH, FCOM, FCTM or other publications guidelines was followed correctly in either case. IMO there is no need for additional training to operate the MAX now, the requirement was to accomplish the initial training correctly, and that obviously did not happen with all operators.
All very good, but the fact remains that the Max is a modern aircraft which has been reverse engineered as a facsimile of an old aircraft and as such lacks a fit for purpose Crew Alerting System as one would find on all other modern aircraft.
Airline can just indicate it is no longer willing to fly the Max and looking to flog or return to Boeing.
Boeing could go to court but then would find itself having to defend everything that happened, the defendant able to continually file discovery motions to find what Boeing have or haven't been doing. Get that in a public court with wall to wall press coverage and they are finished. One single shortcut and airlines would have to desert them as Pax refuse to fly.
This is about confidence in the future, a single airline deserting them and handing back aircraft is a huge no confidence vote, other airlines will wonder "What do they know" with pax also asking the question.
Boeing is on the hook and no amount of press briefings and claims it is "Now" safe will make a difference. We know that Boeing costs in Q1 are $1 billion, they cannot forecast rest of year which gives you an idea of how bad it is. My initial view in another thread was $2 billion in compensation and cost, think that figure is light and likely to be closer to $10 billion and above. Customers will not order or hold off.
It is not just going to hit them just this year but the cost will be next year and likely the year after. Deepwater Horizon cost in excess of $61 billion to BP and less people died.
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Virgin Australia said in a statement that it was deferring delivery of its first batch of planes from November 2019 to July 2021.
"Safety is always the number one priority for Virgin Australia. As we have previously stated, we will not introduce any new aircraft to the fleet unless we are completely satisfied with its safety," Virgin Chief Executive Paul Scurrah said Tuesday April 30th .
"Safety is always the number one priority for Virgin Australia. As we have previously stated, we will not introduce any new aircraft to the fleet unless we are completely satisfied with its safety," Virgin Chief Executive Paul Scurrah said Tuesday April 30th .
Yes, the MAX has a somewhat tarnished reputation now, well helped by a sensationalist media that smelled blood in the water (literally). Boeing did some really awful decisions about the MAX, like not telling anyone about MCAS, as well as trying to save a few dollars on not hooking up the second AOA sensor so they could compare values.
That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.
.
That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.
.
Yes, the MAX has a somewhat tarnished reputation now, well helped by a sensationalist media that smelled blood in the water (literally). Boeing did some really awful decisions about the MAX, like not telling anyone about MCAS, as well as trying to save a few dollars on not hooking up the second AOA sensor so they could compare values.
I do understand where this comes from. A quote from the Al Jazeera program “Broken dreams” pointed out that Boeing used to be this innovative company that was passionate about aviation. Today it is run by accountants that don’t give a rats a** about aviation, safety, planes, passengers or pilots. Their biggest fear is to actually have to invest in a new aircraft program. This is also why you see them beating all their dead horses, and resurrecting designs from the 1950’s that would never pass certification today.
That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.
Yes the investigation is in progress, and the conclusion is probably years away, but the solid information so far from documents, FDRs and CVRs gives me a somewhat clear indication that neither the QRH, FCOM, FCTM or other publications guidelines was followed correctly in either case. IMO there is no need for additional training to operate the MAX now, the requirement was to accomplish the initial training correctly, and that obviously did not happen with all operators.
I do understand where this comes from. A quote from the Al Jazeera program “Broken dreams” pointed out that Boeing used to be this innovative company that was passionate about aviation. Today it is run by accountants that don’t give a rats a** about aviation, safety, planes, passengers or pilots. Their biggest fear is to actually have to invest in a new aircraft program. This is also why you see them beating all their dead horses, and resurrecting designs from the 1950’s that would never pass certification today.
That being said, I love the MAX. I would have no reservation to keep flying it after several hundred hours on it, even after the pathetic worldwide panic that spread like wildfire on March 12 despite having no new information on the table.
Yes the investigation is in progress, and the conclusion is probably years away, but the solid information so far from documents, FDRs and CVRs gives me a somewhat clear indication that neither the QRH, FCOM, FCTM or other publications guidelines was followed correctly in either case. IMO there is no need for additional training to operate the MAX now, the requirement was to accomplish the initial training correctly, and that obviously did not happen with all operators.
Have you trained for that? - is it a light or rapid change? - or just it wants to go vertical in an instant?
I guess you can not answer as you have never been there - but why change from the reported 0.6 degrees to a required 2.5 degrees?
That to me as an engineer, is the transition is/will not be slow when the cowls start to create lift. (MCAS runs the high speed trim)
The only reason airlines are backing the MAX is that they need to get their fleet back in the air and keep them flying, they are dependent on them and can't simply switch. It's like being stuck in a bad marriage, walking out is easier said than done. Airlines that already have a significant percentage of their fleet in the MAX or have a major future commitment to the type must be getting desperate for a solution. Imagine the effect on a major B737 operator such as Southwest Airlines if the MAX is permanently grounded and they're faced with waiting years for an all new Boeing narrowbody or switching to Airbus with a years long waiting list.