Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

[Cows getting bigger]

737 Driver, TEM incorporates the whole system, not just pilots being faced with issues. So, in this case one could view MCAS trim runaway as the threat with AOA failures, inadequate training, crew responses etc as errors.

Without going over the apportionment argument again (that’s one for the lawyers), MCAS brought a new TEM ‘flow’ that was not properly thought through. The slightly worrying thing is a similar flow could apply to any trim runaway; in hindsight the number of layers in place may be too few or, more likely, some of the layers have rather large holes.

TEM works, as long as everyone involved recognises the importance their role in the system. Some thousands of posts back I postulated that the overall risk may have been (inadvertently) ‘shuffled’ too far in the direction of the crews.

[Takwis]

Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight

3: Some as yet to be revealed flaw that interferes with pilot trim inputs; one possibility is biomechanical factors related to actuation switches after prolonged pulling.
This is unlikely but could explain the final seconds of both accidents.

Last time I was in the sim, doing stalls and falls, I had an unusual attitude recovery from somewhat inverted (120 degrees), nose low. There were several other stalls leading up to this, so the stick shaker had been going quite a bit. On this one, while trying to roll, push, get the speedbrakes out, and trim, my thumb slipped off the trim switch two or three times. I can easily see how hard it would be to pull with some force on the yoke, and keep your thumb on the trim, after a long period of stickshaker activation.

[737 Driver]

Originally Posted by Cows getting bigger

737 Driver, TEM incorporates the whole system, not just pilots being faced with issues. So, in this case one could view MCAS trim runaway as the threat with AOA failures, inadequate training, crew responses etc as errors.

You are correct. The TEM model can be applied to the entire chain including what went wrong during the design process. This model is so flexible that it is often used outside of aviation as well. However, as I have previously mentioned, my main interest is what can done at the flight crew level, so that is where my focus is.

[Smythe]

driver,

the flow of if/then logic in the system is lost with legacy and lack of a comprehensive logic flow chart.

As an example, the accident in DXB, when the pilots pressed TOGA, but then the ac bounced on the runway. The pilots had no idea of the logic switch in the system, and what was disabled with weight on wheels. The mantra, press TOGA, pull back...within 10 seconds the ac impacted the rwy.

The legacy commands, the if/thens, are lost in the FMS programming. Only on incidents, does the legacy and the myriad of if/then scenarios emerge.

MCAS was a poorly applied band-aid to a much larger problem. At least 3 different crews found the holes in the model, 2 of which, cant speak to the issues.

[meleagertoo]

What, exactly, is the use of an "A of A DISAGREE" with no A of A indication to back it up? I can't see it tells you anything useful at all, in fact it merely adds an unquantifiable and unanswerable question into the mix. Had it been fitted it would have required a QRH action to go with it. What could tgat possibly tell you to do about it?
Add another A of A sensor and a triage system and it becomes another matter of course, but it seems unnecessarily harsh to criticise Boeing for not incorporating procedures that can only confuse and not help.

[PJ2]

Originally Posted by wonkazoo

The Boeing whistleblower who is working with the FBI confirmed that making the MCAS flight control system reliant on only one sensor was a deliberate decision to avoid the need for expensive Level D or flight simulator training.

“MCAS was designed using data from only one of the sensors because we knew the FAA would not have certified a two-sensor system without Level D Training…”

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qytf...ature=youtu.be at 35:30

Boeing is dead, at least the Boeing we all knew and loved. It’s sadly time to accept that reality.

Was this video done in a B737MAX simulator? If so, who's simulator, and if not, we need to know how an NG simulator re-produces MCAS behaviour such that the demonstration is a valid one.

[737 Driver]

Originally Posted by PJ2

Was this video done in a B737MAX simulator? If so, who's simulator, and if not, we need to know how an NG simulator re-produces MCAS behaviour such that the demonstration is a valid one.

It is an NG simulator. You could fake it by throwing in a bad AOA/stick shaker/unreliable airspeed and then introduce a runaway stab after flap retraction. Not what I would call "valid" but "illustrative."

[wonkazoo]

Originally Posted by PJ2

Was this video done in a B737MAX simulator? If so, who's simulator, and if not, we need to know how an NG simulator re-produces MCAS behaviour such that the demonstration is a valid one.

The simulation is meaningless and it is on an NG sim. The quote is purportedly from a Boeing whistleblower who is working with the FBI. IF from an accurate source it is not meaningless, it is instead a stunning indictment that Boeing put profit ahead of safety and knew it when they did.

Forget the demonstration- that was so much theater. Look at what the Boeing employee said- that is the important bit, which is why I posted it.

Regards,
dce

[Marian Blacharski]

Originally Posted by wonkazoo

Reading the back and forth on the conundrum of “Pilots completely at fault for being stupid” as set against “Pilots completely not at fault because Boeing designed a $hit system,” and I’ve decided to take a stand. Apologies in advance as this is long, but trust me- it is worth it.

Of all of you out there who have posted here- whether with a desire to blame the pilots entirely or the opposite, how many of you have actually experienced an imminent, binary and life-threatening emergency in your airplane?? One that is so explicit you will either get it right or you will die?? And you have maybe 30 seconds to make that choice.

My guess is the list of aviators who can answer honestly that they have been at that threshold of death is very very small.

I am on that list. And I survived, despite making bad choices along the way.

I share this story because I want people to understand once and for all that while it is fine to offer that the pilots could have done better (they totally could have) the root cause of the MAX crashes was one of design, and human failures only built on that edifice to achieve the final outcome.

I also share this story because I want to try to explain to everyone here, in terms we can all understand, what it is really like when your known world explodes and you have to improvise in order to survive.

In June of 1996 I was in a very high performance unlimited category biplane named the Goshawk. (N345RM) I had departed Livermore CA several minutes earlier and was headed to a legal practice box adjacent to the Tracy airport. While over the Altamont hills at an indicated altitude of 4000MSL I began warming up by pulling to a 45 degree upline and doing snap rolls to the right. I did this once or twice. On the third attempt, once again at approximately 4000+MSL I initiated the snap roll to the right and hit hard left rudder as the wings returned to level to stop the autorotation. When I did this the left rudder pedal/bar shot away from my foot instead of providing actual resistance. The left rudder cable had snapped.

The airplane (which was by design dynamically unstable) paused its rotation for a moment and then began again violently to the right, probably at about 360 degrees per second. And here’s where the chair-jockeys don’t get it. I probably went two or three full revolutions before my mind could accept what I already knew had happened. I immediately pulled power, but the aircraft was already entering a nose-down spin- at a rotational rate of at least 360 degrees per second.

The ROD of a spinning aerobatic biplane is pretty steep, probably on the 1500-2000FPM range. I checked my altimeter, saw I was descending through 4,000 feet and decided to try to recover the airplane before bailing out. AND HERE IS THE IMPORTANT POINT: BECAUSE I REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS COMPLETELY EFFED I would nearly die. My mind knew before then, as it knows now, that if you put a Pitts-like airplane into an autorotational state the only thing that is going to get it out is opposite yaw. With no rudder THERE CANNOT BE ANY OPPOSITE YAW!! I had thousands of hours in similar aircraft, I was an unlimited category competition aerobatic pilot and instructor, and yet when faced with the obvious I could not process it quickly enough, despite having the evidence staring me squarely in the eye, to react quickly enough to prevent me from nearly dying.

So I frittered away precious moments trying to use opposite yaw via ailerons, shots of engine thrust, hell I might have even prayed, I don’t know. What I know now is I could have done better. What I also know now, and somehow managed to forget then, was that I was over the Altamont. When I saw 4000’MSL and thought “OK, I’ve got time to play with this” the reality was I was over a hill- that was 2134’ high. Tracy- just 20 miles away and where I was headed sits at 193’ MSL.

In my mind, because I was stupid overwhelmed, or just unable to process everything being thrown at me I had maybe 3500-4000’ to play with. So I could spend 30 seconds fighting the airplane to try to recover it before I had to bail.

In reality I had less than 2000’ before I would be dead.

I spent probably ½ to ¾ of the real time I had to get out of the airplane in it- fighting to try to save it, and I did this by deliberately ignoring what I already knew (I had lost rudder control completely) what I should have known (I was over the Altamont) and what I should have accepted (I had to go- the Goshawk was not going to survive this, the only real question was would I??)

I obviously did reach the (already foregone but stubbornly ignored by me) conclusion that the airplane was unrecoverable and decided to bail out- which is an interesting concept in a stable spinning airplane. I undid my harnesses as I had practiced, and I fought my way out of the airplane- pinned against the left side of the cockpit coaming by the rotational g-forces before eventually getting enough of my upper body into the slipstream that I was basically yanked out of the airplane. I was falling in a fetal position, thought about waiting to pull the ripcord, said eff-it and pulled, and after the shocking introduction to my first and (so far) only canopy opening was struck by the sound of the airplane smacking into the ground just a second or two later. Future calculation efforts would show that my chute opened between 134 and 200 feet above the ground, which at that rate of descent equaled a couple of seconds at best.

Surviving that incident has given me some small window of insight into what happens when your comfy world devolves in seconds into one where you know you are about to die.

The biggest lesson, and the greatest ego-killer was simple: I didn’t respond nearly as I would have hoped I would. It took me countless seconds to register the fact of the failure. I knew as soon as the pedal fired away from my foot what had happened. But my mind simply refused to accept that reality for some short period of time. The second error was equally simple: I thought I was the hero pilot (Neil Williams etc…) who would bring my crippled plane back to the airport, thereby saving the day. That thought nearly cost me my life, as I wasted precious seconds performing an absolutely useless dance of fancy “airmanship” that did nothing but allow my airplane to bring me closer and closer to the ground with every moment.

And now to the main point of this entirely too-long post: For those of you who suppose you will see everything clearly and “FTFA” when your own fatal opportunity presents itself please hear me when I say this: YOU WILL NOT!! The question that will determine your survival is how quickly will you move past that initial shock and be able to function properly again. In my case it was a single (albeit fatal) failure. I was extremely well trained, averse to panic-driven responses, and well-able to handle the emergency I had been presented with. Yet I wasted probably a full minute in an airplane I had no business being in any longer.

In the 737 crashes it was a cascade of failures. My own- very rare life experience tells me that those pilots had little chance given the stressors they were working under, as would the rest of you. These are not the words of someone who doesn’t know what it’s like. I’ve been there. I lived. So please trust me when I tell you that your vaunted talents will wither to nothing if someday you are in this unfortunate position. At best you will be semi-functional, at worst you will be functionally useless.

What you will not be, in any context, is a hero who defies these realities.

Final note: This isn’t about placing blame on anyone. Boeing designed an airplane with a crap system that had random and unmonitored control over the single most important control surface of the aircraft. The FAA paved the way for certification of the airplane, and once in the hands of pilots that airplane not once, but twice flew itself into the ground. (The pilots didn’t- it was MCAS that did, and that’s an important fact to take note of…) You can blame the pilots all you want, but it was the airplane itself that had a failure mode that required the pilots to be perfect or die. Boeing had years to create a functioning system that would not put the pilots in this position and they failed to create one. So the two (six really) pilots were left to defend themselves against an airplane that was trying to kill them. Four failed in that endeavor, and they have my utmost respect and gratitude.

Only those who have walked the path and survived can understand the fine line between winning and dying- which is why I have posted this ridiculously long post tonight.

Sorry for the sermon, just tired of reading the constant back and forth about who we should blame.

Link to the Final on my incident: Well despite being a member for years I haven't reached the vaunted 10-post threshold for posting URLs. Search "NTSB June 17, 1996 N345RM" for the final report.

Regards,
dce

Dear DCE, the only thing I disagree with is that Your "story" was too long. Not at all, it could not be shorter, though You are a talented writer.
//M

[737 Driver]

Threat and Error Management

Part 2

Continuing the Threat and Error Management (TEM) discussion....

Necessary preamble.... Yes, there were many other factors leading to this accident, many of which were outside the control of the crew. The TEM model can be applied to those pieces of the puzzle, but my interest is in what can be learned and applied at the professional flight crew level. What are the takeaways so that pilots can avoid a similar situation in the future?

Using the TEM model to analyze the Ethiopian accident, we can look at the factors that were directly bearing on the crew. We can start by asking "What were the threats?"

Threats can be external or internal (inside or outside the crew's direct control). External threats are things such as weather, terrain, language barriers, external pressure to meet schedule, etc). Internal threats could include such things as fatigue, distraction, and crew experience. Threats can also be known and unknown (but not necessarily unknowable). A known threat might be an inoperative aircraft system that has been placarded. Unknown threats which could still be anticipated would include such things as possible aircraft malfunctions during the flight, a pop-up TCAS alert, or a sudden call by tower to execute a go-around from low altitude. Once identified, the next step is to attempt to mitigate the threat using the tools available to the flight crew.

For ET302, environmental threats might include field conditions (high altitude) and high terrain in the general area. Specific detail on the crew pairing and schedule has not been released, but we can probably categorized a low-time First Officer as a potential threat. If the crew had not flown together much, lack of familiarity with each other could have been a threat. Insufficient rest could have created a fatigue issue. It has been suggested that there may have been a steep authority gradient gradient at Ethiopian which would have discouraged a First Officer from correcting a Captain. If so, this would be a threat, but perhaps an unappreciated one if this authority gradient was deeply embedded in the airline culture. The primary unknown threat was the pending AOA malfunction. Another possible unknown threat was a lack of specific systems knowledge as it related to MCAS and the subsequent trim problem.

For each of the identified (known) threats, what could have the crew done to mitigate them? Primarily, by actually identifying the threats and briefing any appropriate procedures - forewarned is forearmed. For example, one thing I do whenever I fly with a new First Officer is that I explicitly state that anyone on the flight deck can make an error and it was the job of the other pilot to correct those errors. I want my FO's to feel free to speak up. Slowing down and methodically using checklists and flows is another good mitigation strategy. In the more extreme cases, simply refusing to depart until the situation has been satisfactorily changed for the better may be the most appropriate mitigation strategy.

The next question in this analysis is, "What were the errors?"

Errors are caused by human actions or inaction that increase the likelihood of an adverse event. The difference between an error and a threat is that an error can, with careful attention, be quickly identified and crew members can find prompt solutions to the error. This is sometimes known as "trapping" the error. The impact of an error can, therefore, be quickly reduced if properly managed. If not managed correctly, an untrapped error can lead to an undesired aircraft state or create a new threat (known or unknown). Examples of errors include procedural errors, perception errors, miscommunications, and violations of SOP's (intentional or unintentional).

The crew errors seem to fall in the following categories: perception errors (not picking up on obvious cues), procedural errors, CRM errors, and basic airmanship errors. Most of these have been extensively discussed, so I won't repeat them here.

The next question is what were the barriers that should have enabled the crew to trap any error before they led to an undesired aircraft state?

Traditional aviation barriers include policies and procedures, checklists, CRM, knowledge and aircraft handling skills, as well as external resources (ATC, maintenance, etc).

As we look at this accident through the TEM lens, I think there are two very important questions:

Why did the existing barriers fail?

What happens when a barrier actually becomes a threat?

[L39 Guy]

Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight

It has pretty well been established on this thread that pilot electric trim will work in all conditions (does not stall under load) and interrupts MCAS if active as shown by ET trace at ~05:40:27. This pilot trim input was possibly then interrupted by cutout switches.

Other than 'deer in headlights' loosing it I see a few possible factors:

1: Pilot accustomed to short blips not comprehending amount truly needed, this fits Lion Air when the FO was ineffective at the end when PIC handed over control while the Captain was mostly successful.

2: Trimming by column feel not position: May seem that AC is closer to trimmed than it is. In other words if you have been pulling really hard then just slightly hard may feel like close to trimmed, I am sure the pilot did not want to over trim given all the alarms.
This might explain ET first retrim at 05:4-:15. Unfortunately we don't have the column force graph, just position.

3: Some as yet to be revealed flaw that interferes with pilot trim inputs; one possibility is biomechanical factors related to actuation switches after prolonged pulling.
This is unlikely but could explain the final seconds of both accidents.

Hopefully the final reports will fully address this question.

Another factor is that given the dependence on automation these pilots may have never trimmed this aircraft or any others in their airline career.

Consider that if the airline policy was to use the autopilot to the max (sorry about the pun), their entire career of flying a Boeing product would be to takeoff, climb to 400 ft then engage the autopilot. For this short bit of flying there is no requirement to trim if the stabilizer trim was set properly. During any changes in speed or configuration the autopilot would automatically trim the aircraft. The aircraft would stay on autopilot until short final (1000 AGL or less), the autopilot would be disconnected and, assuming that no configuration or speed changes occur, the aircraft would not have to be manually trimmed.

In speaking with friends flying outside of “the western world” this is exactly what happens. In fact, if the flight data analysis (which, in some cases is analyzed after every flight at some carriers) shows manual flying, the Captain gets queried about why. If it happens too often they get docked pay.

To those of us that insist on doing some hand flying of our jets, this might seem preposterous however that is what is going on in many parts of the world.

I would be interested in hearing if others are under this practice or have colleagues that are.

[Lost in Saigon]

Originally Posted by L39 Guy

Another factor is that given the dependence on automation these pilots may have never trimmed this aircraft or any others in their airline career.

Consider that if the airline policy was to use the autopilot to the max (sorry about the pun), their entire career of flying a Boeing product would be to takeoff, climb to 400 ft then engage the autopilot. For this short bit of flying there is no requirement to trim if the stabilizer trim was set properly. During any changes in speed or configuration the autopilot would automatically trim the aircraft. The aircraft would stay on autopilot until short final (1000 AGL or less), the autopilot would be disconnected and, assuming that no configuration or speed changes occur, the aircraft would not have to be manually trimmed.

In speaking with friends flying outside of “the western world” this is exactly what happens. In fact, if the flight data analysis (which, in some cases is analyzed after every flight at some carriers) shows manual flying, the Captain gets queried about why. If it happens too often they get docked pay.

To those of us that insist on doing some hand flying of our jets, this might seem preposterous however that is what is going on in many parts of the world.

I would be interested in hearing if others are under this practice or have colleagues that are.

As airline pilots our recurrent training often emphasizes or incorporates items that were the causes of recent airline accidents or incidents:

I can just see it now.... My next session is going have some spot training involving hand flying while operating the electric trim switches up and down .

[shmerik]

Not a pilot - software engineer that started my career at a small company that produced hardware-in-the-loop testing and certification solutions for major aerospace and defense organizations. I experienced first-hand the sort of pressures and poor communications/management between entities that leads to audits/test results/certifications be pushed through too fast and in incomplete forms and to be honest it made me wonder if we wouldn't start to see failures like this tragedy unfold in the near future.

From the information available my gut feeling tells me that the systems design on the MAX was intentional, not an instance of well-meaning engineers making a mistake. There's the change of the rate of trim applied made late in the testing stages (from 0.6 units to 2.5 units per time period?) and the seeming lack of any sort of sanity checks in the MCAS system that just seems impossible to miss. There are very basic things that can be done in software even beyond bringing in more sensors to fall back on such as checking the values that come before (is it ever possible for AOA to jump over from 14 to 75 degrees in under a second?). This is something that should have been glaringly obvious to all involved in the process and if there was genuinely no bad intentions on Boeing's part then what this suggests is serious organizational rot. In either case I would hesitate to put confidence in other aspects of the design if this system is such a mess.

I've yet to see a satisfactory explanation behind the changes to the trim cutout switches. Sure, I've read that they are always used at the same time but how does that justify neutering the behavior but leaving the two switches except for different labels? In what world does it make sense to get rid of the ability to cutout the plane's automation (STS, MCAS, probably others that I'm not familiar with) while still allowing the pilot to enter trim commands using the stab motor? What does this improve upon the original design of the switches? A change like this involves multiple engineering departments in order to implement and everything is documented and cross checked along the way. I'm very curious as to what the justification is here.

And the mysterious short blips of trim shortly before MCAS dealt it's final blow... From following along in this thread and others I've come to the knowledge that trimming away pressure in the control column is one of the most basic aspects of flying that there is. The failures to get completely back into trim and then the final blips suggest to me that something else is wrong. From what I see other pilots saying it sounds like the equivalent of someone in the path of an oncoming semi-truck applying very slight turns of the steering wheel to get out of the way (sorry for the clumsy metaphor). If airline training has taken such a deep dive in quality over the years as to lead to pilots that don't have supposed basic airmanship skills, doesn't this imply that we should expect to see a steep increase in the amount of pilot errors leading to accidents?

So far they have been confined to two hulls of the same make and model within the first years of it entering into flight...

If you read all of that then thanks for taking the time to consider the viewpoint of someone from outside the profession. I've become somewhat obsessed with this MAX fiasco because just like it highlights the importance of airmanship to some pilots here, to me it highlights the importance of systems design and good engineering practices in the software and technology world. It is cheap and easy to alter products by manipulating lines of code but we must keep in mind that the impact that it has on the word is just as real as that of the other more "material" engineering professions.

[737 Driver]

Originally Posted by Lost in Saigon

As airline pilots our recurrent training often emphasizes or incorporates items that were the causes of recent airline accidents or incidents:

I can just see it now.... My next session is going have some spot training involving hand flying while operating the electric trim switches up and down .

Yep, always training for the last accident, kind of like generals fighting the last war.....

[safetypee]

wheelsright,

‘But do you think that it is possible to use electric trim to counteract MCAS before using the cut-out switches?’

Overall, and biased by the accident outcome, I doubt that nose up trim would have been effective, particularly when considering time of recognition, realisation, and action.

Continued debate considers if trim would / was enabled to override MCAS.
Then, the erroneous rate / power of MCAS design would out perform trim by 9 sec down to 3 sec up.
Also, there is debate and interpretation if trim is restricted due to design (EASA questions) and further if the aerodynamic forces restrict nose up motion - tail / elevator interaction.
Then the above must consider the pilots perception of the situation, the need for trim and the extent of trim required in very stressful, surprising, and demanding conditions.

All that must be confined to history. Whatever is changed in the MCAS operation it must not be able to mis trim the aircraft to extreme.

As for judgement of crew performance, consider https://www.pacdeff.com/pdfs/Errors%...n%20Making.pdf
Crews either fail to understand the situation, HF - thus choose the incorrect procedure
Or with correct understanding, the incorrect procedure is chosen - HF (or procedure is not available - documentation, training, novel failures)

[L39 Guy]

Originally Posted by Zeffy

https://youtu.be/QytfYyHmxtc

Compelling interviews with Chris Brady ( The Boeing 737 Technical Site ), Dennis Tajer, Peter Lemme, David Learmount and Dominic Gates.
43 minutes...

That simulator sequence at the beginning was interesting to see. If that wasn't a stab trim runaway I don’t know what is. Uncommanded pitching of the nose (down in this case) and spinning of the trim wheel. someone hand flying that aircraft couldn’t miss that or mistake that as not being a textbook stab trim runaway.

Interesting too that arm strength with continuous trim recovers that aircraft. That would be an opportune time to hit the stab trim cutout switches.

[MurphyWasRight]

Originally Posted by safetypee

wheelsright,

‘But do you think that it is possible to use electric trim to counteract MCAS before using the cut-out switches?’

Overall, and biased by the accident outcome, I doubt that nose up trim would have been effective, particularly when considering time of recognition, realisation, and action.

Continued debate considers if trim would / was enabled to override MCAS.
Then, the erroneous rate / power of MCAS design would out perform trim by 9 sec down to 3 sec up.

One last time: Please look at the ET traces from 05:40:00 (first MCAS) to 05:40:45.
This shows MCAS trimming down, an inadequate pilot retrim followed by another MCAS trim 5 seconds later, this second MCAS trim was interrupted after 6 seconds by pilot trim.
This pilot trim continues until trim cutout. Had they waited 10 more seconds while continuing to apply trim the AC would likely be in trim.
Each of these trim inputs clearly show on the pitch trim trace.

All of the above is exactly as described by original MCAS 'disclosure'.

Not sure where the '3 sec up' in your post comes from, the second pilot trim in above is 8 or 9 seconds (hard to read exactly from graph).

They did re-enable electric trim at end, likely a desperate measure, unfortunately they did not provide sustained trim inputs but did re-trigger MCAS one last time.
The trim position trace at 05:43:15 show a slight upward bump after the 2 'blip' showing the electric trim working against the aero loads.
The trim inputs would not show on the trace if still cutout due to cutout switch wiring.

[wheelsright]

Originally Posted by MurphyWasRight

One last time: Please look at the ET traces from 05:40:00 (first MCAS) to 05:40:45.
This shows MCAS trimming down, an inadequate pilot retrim followed by another MCAS trim 5 seconds later, this second MCAS trim was interrupted after 6 seconds by pilot trim.
This pilot trim continues until trim cutout. Had they waited 10 more seconds while continuing to apply trim the AC would likely be in trim.
Each of these trim inputs clearly show on the pitch trim trace.

All of the above is exactly as described by original MCAS 'disclosure'.

Not sure where the '3 sec up' in your post comes from, the second pilot trim in above is 8 or 9 seconds (hard to read exactly from graph).

They did re-enable electric trim at end, likely a desperate measure, unfortunately they did not provide sustained trim inputs but did re-trigger MCAS one last time.
The trim position trace at 05:43:15 show a slight upward bump after the 2 'blip' showing the electric trim working against the aero loads.
The trim inputs would not show on the trace if still cutout due to cutout switch wiring.

"One last time" the FDR trace does not track thumb switch trim inputs. Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty what the pilots were doing. The assumption is that Boeing advice is correct but it is not absolutely certain. Unless you can authoritatively show that MCAS has no authority during thumb switch input in all circumstances then you are speculating.

[MurphyWasRight]

Originally Posted by wheelsright

"One last time" the FDR trace does not track thumb switch trim inputs. Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty what the pilots were doing. The assumption is that Boeing advice is correct but it is not absolutely certain. Unless you can authoritatively show that MCAS has no authority during thumb switch input in all circumstances then you are speculating.

Ok I will bite:
Unless you can authoritatively show the FDR trace does not track thumb switch trim inputs a reasonable interpretation of the traces is that it does. I have not seen anything that shows otherwise.

As to whether the switches tracked the pilots thumb and or intentions is possibly an open question, especially the blips at the end.

Don't know about "all circumstances" but the trace at 05:40:27 shows the manual trim stopping MCAS before the full 9 or seconds it would have run.

The schematic that was posted also shows manual electric trim overriding automatic,the 'trim motor' is shown as a block so can't 'prove' this.

In any case not clear where this is going, in ET case MCAS is clearly disabled by pilot trim (for 5 seconds) and cutout, had they succeeded with manual trim we would not be having this discussion.

No need for elaborate undisclosed actions, the stated behavior explains what is seen.
Occam's razor might be constructively considered here.

[Loose rivets]

Still concentrating on the Human Factor - the miserable consuming confusion while under stress.

Recently I said.

" there's a chance some pre-knowledge of the Lion Air accident had a negative effect on the ET skipper's actions. Firstly a greater shock factor - due to realising a very specific and serious danger was confronting him . . ."

However, Lord Farringdon put it far better, and in commoner's language.

If the ET Captain had never heard of MCAS, he probably would have carried out the UAS and landed safely. Basically, his mere knowledge of MCAS but lack of full understanding of it may have scared the c##p out of him.

Hopefully by now the ET captain may well have linked the duff AoA with an airspeed error and stick-shake, but not the failure of the AP to stay locked on for more than thirty seconds. He was probably processing that while the wheel spun for 9 seconds.

I recall leaving the classrooms after Type conversions with a reasonable knowledge of system interactions . . . at best. Usually, the light-bulb would come on after 300 to 500 hours and a lot of work. How one system affected another was the most difficult part of any type conversion for me, and in the modern world, I'd imagine the MAX is an order of magnitude more involved. I have to concede 737 Driver's 'Fly and then press on with the drills', rather than analyse too deeply is vital. It's simply too complex these days.

.

.