Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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Fate may be the Hunter but Fear is the Killer...
If I have to read "Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude" one more time my head is going to explode like a pimple on a teenage girls nose.
I have no idea why a few very well-invested individuals here are pounding this drum so loudly and consistently, but for the umpteenth time your incredibly abrasive repetition ignores the fact that in order for your hypothesis to work (If airplane is doing something you don't expect, like, etc...) you need a rational fully functioning mind to interpret the data and act the way you want them to act. Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude only works with a human mind that hasn't been incapacitated or significantly diminished.
Someone else has properly offered here that the ET incident may well be traced at it's most basic human factors core to the impairment the pilots experienced due to the previous Lion Air crash. In other words: Their consciousness knew how the last one went down, so their bodies responded accordingly, which left them poorly equipped to actually perform the steps you have been seemingly demanding that they do since shortly after they in fact died.
I shared my own experience in the hope that people would gain some insight into pilot (human) incapacitation and cognitive impairment, but obviously those words were lost in translation. (If you are new to this discussion search on my username for a post roughly a week ago...) I have no idea what particular windmills the small group of devout believers in Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude.
are tilting at, but I can say I wish you would go away and find somewhere else to haunt, or at the very least find some other new expression to convey your "opinion." (Quotes because to me the words express ignorance, but I know they are offered as informed opinion...)
We get it- (we got it a week ago actually) you think the pilots crashed perfectly flyable airplanes. (You've said nearly exactly that...) Let's move on...
Regards-
dce
I have no idea why a few very well-invested individuals here are pounding this drum so loudly and consistently, but for the umpteenth time your incredibly abrasive repetition ignores the fact that in order for your hypothesis to work (If airplane is doing something you don't expect, like, etc...) you need a rational fully functioning mind to interpret the data and act the way you want them to act. Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude only works with a human mind that hasn't been incapacitated or significantly diminished.
Someone else has properly offered here that the ET incident may well be traced at it's most basic human factors core to the impairment the pilots experienced due to the previous Lion Air crash. In other words: Their consciousness knew how the last one went down, so their bodies responded accordingly, which left them poorly equipped to actually perform the steps you have been seemingly demanding that they do since shortly after they in fact died.
I shared my own experience in the hope that people would gain some insight into pilot (human) incapacitation and cognitive impairment, but obviously those words were lost in translation. (If you are new to this discussion search on my username for a post roughly a week ago...) I have no idea what particular windmills the small group of devout believers in Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude.
are tilting at, but I can say I wish you would go away and find somewhere else to haunt, or at the very least find some other new expression to convey your "opinion." (Quotes because to me the words express ignorance, but I know they are offered as informed opinion...)
We get it- (we got it a week ago actually) you think the pilots crashed perfectly flyable airplanes. (You've said nearly exactly that...) Let's move on...
Regards-
dce
Please, let's not personalize this and attack individuals. 737 Driver has invested a lot of time and effort in addressing a lot of issues raised on this thread and for that he deserves everyone's respect whether you agree or disagree with him.
'The crews of the accident aircraft did not meet the expectations of 737 Driver, myself and ...(Boeing)'…....
'The crews of the accident aircraft did not meet the expectations of 737 Driver, myself and ...(Boeing)'…....
That 'them and us' bias creeps in much to regularly in these threads. Accept that not all pilots have your magnificent skills yet they still get hired. That is todays world, but even US pilots crash sometimes.
Surely you have to design to the standard that the lowest skilled that may get posted to the MAX left seat is able to survive without exceptional skills or you just pick your customers.
Oh and there is nothing wrong with agreeing with 737 Driver because he, just like L39 Guy, knows what he's talking about.
I wonder if Ethiopian Airlines youngest Captain, was reluctant to hand over flying to such a low time FO - that had the correct reading instruments.
Then taking on the job to fix the problem/s solo, rather than as a crew. Was the last hole to line up and that overload him?
Was the FO scared to "suggest" things to the Captain due to respect or fear until it was left too late to speak up? There are a couple of pilots on here that come across as people that I would have second thoughts about speaking freely, and think I would pause before speaking.
Then taking on the job to fix the problem/s solo, rather than as a crew. Was the last hole to line up and that overload him?
Was the FO scared to "suggest" things to the Captain due to respect or fear until it was left too late to speak up? There are a couple of pilots on here that come across as people that I would have second thoughts about speaking freely, and think I would pause before speaking.
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Okay, given the flurry of a certain type of comment, I think it would be useful to provide some advice here.
I know some of you have some strongly held positions, and that’s okay. However, some of those positions are based on a theoretical framework, or perhaps something you read somewhere or something someone told you. When those positions stray off into technical matters regarding the 737 or airline operations, please consider the following.
I do not tell my auto mechanic how to fix my car. I do not tell the surgeon how to operate on my body. I do not tell the professional golfer how to perform a tricky shot out of the bunker. I do not do this even if I can tell that the end result was less than optimum. So if you have never actually flown a 737, please do not try to educate me as to how the systems function, how a checklist should be run, or how difficult the aircraft is to operate under certain conditions. It does nothing to add credibility to your position. I have more than 10 years cumulative experience in this aircraft plus another 15+ in other related Boeing products. I have been trained in countless abnormal and emergency situations in that time, and I have experience quite a few real ones in the air. I am quite familiar with the all the psychological and environmental factors that can come into play.
I offer my technical expertise here, in part, so that the commentary doesn’t go off into the weeds on some point that is fundamentally incorrect. In doing so, I may provide information in a simplified fashion to cater to the non-Boeing and non-pilot members of this forum. If you wish to argue the placement and use of switches and controls, whether this step should be done before that step, or whether something can be done in 5 seconds or 5 minutes, please have that discussion with someone else.
The bottom line is that the accident pilots made serious errors and did not meet the expectation of a professional airline flight crew. This statement should be no more controversial than saying that the various engineers and technical staff at Boeing made serious errors in the design of MCAS and did not meet the expectations of their profession. If you wish to label this as “blaming,” there is nothing I can do to stop you. Personally, I’ve seen enough of the culture of blame, and it does little to get to the root of the problem.
You can’t fix a problem until you recognize a problem exists. These accidents, among others, have provided clear evidence that there is a problem with the level of pilot skills in this industry. We can either ignore it, or we can do something about it.
I know some of you have some strongly held positions, and that’s okay. However, some of those positions are based on a theoretical framework, or perhaps something you read somewhere or something someone told you. When those positions stray off into technical matters regarding the 737 or airline operations, please consider the following.
I do not tell my auto mechanic how to fix my car. I do not tell the surgeon how to operate on my body. I do not tell the professional golfer how to perform a tricky shot out of the bunker. I do not do this even if I can tell that the end result was less than optimum. So if you have never actually flown a 737, please do not try to educate me as to how the systems function, how a checklist should be run, or how difficult the aircraft is to operate under certain conditions. It does nothing to add credibility to your position. I have more than 10 years cumulative experience in this aircraft plus another 15+ in other related Boeing products. I have been trained in countless abnormal and emergency situations in that time, and I have experience quite a few real ones in the air. I am quite familiar with the all the psychological and environmental factors that can come into play.
I offer my technical expertise here, in part, so that the commentary doesn’t go off into the weeds on some point that is fundamentally incorrect. In doing so, I may provide information in a simplified fashion to cater to the non-Boeing and non-pilot members of this forum. If you wish to argue the placement and use of switches and controls, whether this step should be done before that step, or whether something can be done in 5 seconds or 5 minutes, please have that discussion with someone else.
The bottom line is that the accident pilots made serious errors and did not meet the expectation of a professional airline flight crew. This statement should be no more controversial than saying that the various engineers and technical staff at Boeing made serious errors in the design of MCAS and did not meet the expectations of their profession. If you wish to label this as “blaming,” there is nothing I can do to stop you. Personally, I’ve seen enough of the culture of blame, and it does little to get to the root of the problem.
You can’t fix a problem until you recognize a problem exists. These accidents, among others, have provided clear evidence that there is a problem with the level of pilot skills in this industry. We can either ignore it, or we can do something about it.
If I have to read "Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude" one more time my head is going to explode like a pimple on a teenage girls nose.
I have no idea why a few very well-invested individuals here are pounding this drum so loudly and consistently, but for the umpteenth time your incredibly abrasive repetition ignores the fact that in order for your hypothesis to work (If airplane is doing something you don't expect, like, etc...) you need a rational fully functioning mind to interpret the data and act the way you want them to act. Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude only works with a human mind that hasn't been incapacitated or significantly diminished.
Someone else has properly offered here that the ET incident may well be traced at it's most basic human factors core to the impairment the pilots experienced due to the previous Lion Air crash. In other words: Their consciousness knew how the last one went down, so their bodies responded accordingly, which left them poorly equipped to actually perform the steps you have been seemingly demanding that they do since shortly after they in fact died.
I shared my own experience in the hope that people would gain some insight into pilot (human) incapacitation and cognitive impairment, but obviously those words were lost in translation. (If you are new to this discussion search on my username for a post roughly a week ago...) I have no idea what particular windmills the small group of devout believers in Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude.
are tilting at, but I can say I wish you would go away and find somewhere else to haunt, or at the very least find some other new expression to convey your "opinion." (Quotes because to me the words express ignorance, but I know they are offered as informed opinion...)
We get it- (we got it a week ago actually) you think the pilots crashed perfectly flyable airplanes. (You've said nearly exactly that...) Let's move on...
Regards-
dce
I have no idea why a few very well-invested individuals here are pounding this drum so loudly and consistently, but for the umpteenth time your incredibly abrasive repetition ignores the fact that in order for your hypothesis to work (If airplane is doing something you don't expect, like, etc...) you need a rational fully functioning mind to interpret the data and act the way you want them to act. Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude only works with a human mind that hasn't been incapacitated or significantly diminished.
Someone else has properly offered here that the ET incident may well be traced at it's most basic human factors core to the impairment the pilots experienced due to the previous Lion Air crash. In other words: Their consciousness knew how the last one went down, so their bodies responded accordingly, which left them poorly equipped to actually perform the steps you have been seemingly demanding that they do since shortly after they in fact died.
I shared my own experience in the hope that people would gain some insight into pilot (human) incapacitation and cognitive impairment, but obviously those words were lost in translation. (If you are new to this discussion search on my username for a post roughly a week ago...) I have no idea what particular windmills the small group of devout believers in Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude.
are tilting at, but I can say I wish you would go away and find somewhere else to haunt, or at the very least find some other new expression to convey your "opinion." (Quotes because to me the words express ignorance, but I know they are offered as informed opinion...)
We get it- (we got it a week ago actually) you think the pilots crashed perfectly flyable airplanes. (You've said nearly exactly that...) Let's move on...
Regards-
dce
Boeing and FAA last documentation prior to ET crash was "indicating" that it could be a good idea NOT to turn off the magic - until the aircraft was trimmed electrically first. Then you turn off the magic.
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If I have to read
Someone else has properly offered here that the ET incident may well be traced at it's most basic human factors core to the impairment the pilots experienced due to the previous Lion Air crash. In other words: Their consciousness knew how the last one went down, so their bodies responded accordingly, which left them poorly equipped to actually perform the steps you have been seemingly demanding that they do since shortly after they in fact died.
Regards-
dce
Someone else has properly offered here that the ET incident may well be traced at it's most basic human factors core to the impairment the pilots experienced due to the previous Lion Air crash. In other words: Their consciousness knew how the last one went down, so their bodies responded accordingly, which left them poorly equipped to actually perform the steps you have been seemingly demanding that they do since shortly after they in fact died.
Regards-
dce
Your above statement indicates to me that you think that all pilots are a bunch of folks who turn to jelly at the first sign of something amiss. I have to respectfully disagree. The extensive training that pilots are supposed to undergo, is to primarily reduce the effects of the "startle factor" and allow the so-called "muscle memory" to take over in the event of an emergency. Of course that is only if the pilots have been trained to fly the airplane instead of wonder: "Why is it doing that?" All too many recent (in the past decade or so) accidents/incidents have involved pilots trouble shooting the computer generated warnings instead of looking out the window and flying the aircraft. I can't necessarily fault pilots for that, because that seems to be what is currently being taught. Pilots need to develop a feel for flying and to understand that it is a very complicated, yet do-able balancing act. I still like 737 Driver's mantra: " Turn off the magic, set the pitch, set the power, trim the aircraft, monitor the performance and move the aircraft to a safe altitude".
Cheers,
Grog
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Wonkazoo:
Your above statement indicates to me that you think that all pilots are a bunch of folks who turn to jelly at the first sign of something amiss. I have to respectfully disagree. The extensive training that pilots are supposed to undergo, is to primarily reduce the effects of the "startle factor" and allow the so-called "muscle memory" to take over in the event of an emergency. Of course that is only if the pilots have been trained to fly the airplane instead of wonder: "Why is it doing that?" All too many recent (in the past decade or so) accidents/incidents have involved pilots trouble shooting the computer generated warnings instead of looking out the window and flying the aircraft. I can't necessarily fault pilots for that, because that seems to be what is currently being taught. Pilots need to develop a feel for flying and to understand that it is a very complicated, yet do-able balancing act. I still like 737 Driver's mantra: " Turn off the magic, set the pitch, set the power, trim the aircraft, monitor the performance and move the aircraft to a safe altitude".
Cheers,
Grog
Your above statement indicates to me that you think that all pilots are a bunch of folks who turn to jelly at the first sign of something amiss. I have to respectfully disagree. The extensive training that pilots are supposed to undergo, is to primarily reduce the effects of the "startle factor" and allow the so-called "muscle memory" to take over in the event of an emergency. Of course that is only if the pilots have been trained to fly the airplane instead of wonder: "Why is it doing that?" All too many recent (in the past decade or so) accidents/incidents have involved pilots trouble shooting the computer generated warnings instead of looking out the window and flying the aircraft. I can't necessarily fault pilots for that, because that seems to be what is currently being taught. Pilots need to develop a feel for flying and to understand that it is a very complicated, yet do-able balancing act. I still like 737 Driver's mantra: " Turn off the magic, set the pitch, set the power, trim the aircraft, monitor the performance and move the aircraft to a safe altitude".
Cheers,
Grog
Your above post indicates to me that not only did you not read my previous post, you have not read any of my other posts either, including the one where I (a 4,400 hour commercial pilot- with the hours earned the hard way) describe a near (as in within a second or two of being dead) death experience as PIC in an airplane. Added to that I once held a zero level (ground) waiver for aerobatic demonstrations so I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that with few exceptions you will not find a more qualified person here on PPRuNe to comment on hand-flying at aerodynamic limits within 300' of the ground. Thus telling me that "Pilots need to develop a feel for flying" is like the dumbest thing I have been told in quite a while.
Please go read- and then you can edit your comment to appropriately reflect what I have written, what my experience is, and you understanding of same.
Warm regards,
dce
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Grog,
Your above post indicates to me that not only did you not read my previous post, you have not read any of my other posts either, including the one where I (a 4,400 hour commercial pilot- with the hours earned the hard way) describe a near (as in within a second or two of being dead) death experience as PIC in an airplane. Added to that I once held a zero level (ground) waiver for aerobatic demonstrations so I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that with few exceptions you will not find a more qualified person here on PPRuNe to comment on hand-flying at aerodynamic limits within 300' of the ground. Thus telling me that "Pilots need to develop a feel for flying" is like the dumbest thing I have been told in quite a while.
Please go read- and then you can edit your comment to appropriately reflect what I have written, what my experience is, and you understanding of same.
Warm regards,
dce
Your above post indicates to me that not only did you not read my previous post, you have not read any of my other posts either, including the one where I (a 4,400 hour commercial pilot- with the hours earned the hard way) describe a near (as in within a second or two of being dead) death experience as PIC in an airplane. Added to that I once held a zero level (ground) waiver for aerobatic demonstrations so I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that with few exceptions you will not find a more qualified person here on PPRuNe to comment on hand-flying at aerodynamic limits within 300' of the ground. Thus telling me that "Pilots need to develop a feel for flying" is like the dumbest thing I have been told in quite a while.
Please go read- and then you can edit your comment to appropriately reflect what I have written, what my experience is, and you understanding of same.
Warm regards,
dce
Are you really saying that an accomplished pilot such as yourself has had no need to develop a feel for flying?
Cheers,
Grog
Some years ago I witnessed a helicopter crash.
The pilot was very experience fixed wing survey pilot most of his time at 247 feet AGL, recently got his helicopter licence and just converted to a very new type turbine helicopter. This day he was just building hours on type, so I did not interrupt him on his pre-flight when I arrived at work.
I watched him take off then start to fly away. Soon I saw a "puff" come from near the rear of the helicopter { brain - did I see that? that seems not normal}.
Some time later I saw the "puff" again {brain - I saw that, it is not normal. ------------------------------------- If I see that again I need to act --------------------------- The tug is just there I will use the radio and TELL him to land}
I did indeed see the third "puff" but I had no chance of using the radio, the "puff" in a fraction of a second was a massive fire covering the entire rear 3/4 of the helicopter.
I froze and watch it crash in a massive fireball - F***K Pat's dead I said as the others looked to that direction, I jumped on the tug and headed to the crash site. Most the way there a army car was heading toward me with Pat in the middle eyes like dinner plates but he acknowledged me, so I turned around and went back to the hangar.
To this day I can not put a time line on any stages of the above events but the flight was around 600 m in length - Pat was seen jumping out of the helicopter before impact by the army guys, so certainly he was in overload at that time. Jumping probably prolonged Pat's life and he gave us the clue to the crash, but the burns won soon after.
I knew that I did see that first "puff" and I knew it was not normal - I was in a safe environment. I took too long to respond - I was listening to my brain.
...................
I have no idea why a few very well-invested individuals here are pounding this drum so loudly and consistently, but for the umpteenth time your incredibly abrasive repetition ignores the fact that in order for your hypothesis to work (If airplane is doing something you don't expect, like, etc...) you need a rational fully functioning mind to interpret the data and act the way you want them to act.....................only works with a human mind that hasn't been incapacitated or significantly diminished.
Someone else has properly offered here that the ET incident may well be traced at it's most basic human factors core to the impairment the pilots experienced....................... I have no idea what particular windmills the small group of devout believers in Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude.
are tilting at, but I can say I wish you would go away...........
Regards-
dce
I have no idea why a few very well-invested individuals here are pounding this drum so loudly and consistently, but for the umpteenth time your incredibly abrasive repetition ignores the fact that in order for your hypothesis to work (If airplane is doing something you don't expect, like, etc...) you need a rational fully functioning mind to interpret the data and act the way you want them to act.....................only works with a human mind that hasn't been incapacitated or significantly diminished.
Someone else has properly offered here that the ET incident may well be traced at it's most basic human factors core to the impairment the pilots experienced....................... I have no idea what particular windmills the small group of devout believers in Turn off the Magic, Set the Pitch, Set the Power, Trim the Aircraft, Monitor the Performance, and Move the Aircraft to a Safe Altitude.
are tilting at, but I can say I wish you would go away...........
Regards-
dce
Everyone expects all pilots to do this but training and testing no longer ensures this basic requirement - witness the crashes and botched go-arounds of recent years. For more years’ than I can remember the (Airbus) SIM briefing is to use the automation to help reduce your workload. (Although to be fair the Airbus automatics are a lot better than the 737’s, and yes I have flown both).
*I would like to think that I would do this with stick shakers and warnings going on but I don’t know for sure. I for one would welcome much more UAS and misbehaving automation practice.
- But then you have changed the mantra. By turning off the magic another form of magic is turned on that then has to be turned off. Not only that, if you thought you had turned off the magic and just needed to fly pitch and power it was affecting pitch more than you ever would.
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Turning off the magic
Beoing's original FCOM
A couple of thoughts.
Firstly, the only bit in bold says that this event occurs "during manual mode only". Perhaps, cognitively, the ET captain zoomed-in on this highlighted bit of text at 400ft climbing-out and tried to duck the issue by engaging A/P (if he had ever actually seen this FCOM). Not a defence, just trying to understand thought process.
Secondly, the FCOM specifically points pilots towards considering not turning off the magic immediately - "electric trim can be used to neutralise control column pitch forces before moving stab trim cutout switches". I'm not a 737 driver but one wonders how much time (MCAS iterations) one would spend trying to balance the forces before switching off. Prior to MCAS, did the NNC include this note?
PS. I tend to agree that leaving thrust at 94% (or whatever it was) would have brought increased complications.
A couple of thoughts.
Firstly, the only bit in bold says that this event occurs "during manual mode only". Perhaps, cognitively, the ET captain zoomed-in on this highlighted bit of text at 400ft climbing-out and tried to duck the issue by engaging A/P (if he had ever actually seen this FCOM). Not a defence, just trying to understand thought process.
Secondly, the FCOM specifically points pilots towards considering not turning off the magic immediately - "electric trim can be used to neutralise control column pitch forces before moving stab trim cutout switches". I'm not a 737 driver but one wonders how much time (MCAS iterations) one would spend trying to balance the forces before switching off. Prior to MCAS, did the NNC include this note?
PS. I tend to agree that leaving thrust at 94% (or whatever it was) would have brought increased complications.
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But then you have changed the mantra. By turning off the magic another form of magic is turned on that then has to be turned off. Not only that, if you thought you had turned off the magic and just needed to fly pitch and power it was affecting pitch more than you ever would.
The cascading series of failures triggered by faulty AOA, is particularly insidious. Once past the initial startle factor, and when MCAS activates, controlling pitch is no longer just flying the aircraft as previously trained. When the computer starts fighting the pilot, the crew have to switch back to diagnostic mode, and this is when sensory overload really sets in.
I appreciate some of the comments made by 737 Driver , but IMO repeating the "mantra" does no justice to a complex and rapidly evolving flight emergency. I am not a pilot, and have little to teach 737 Driver , but must point out that this discussion has been going on for many months, long before (he) became a forum member.
In a recent post I pointed out that the training on the B737 NG simulator that all pilots get, plus the brief computer knowledge about the MAX differences, produce different kinds of memory. Adding the somewhat ambiguous emergency AD, means it is not immediately obvious what the correct procedures are to fly the aircraft, and recall during stressful situations is diminished.
The cascading series of failures triggered by faulty AOA, is particularly insidious. Once past the initial startle factor, and when MCAS activates, controlling pitch is no longer just flying the aircraft as previously trained. When the computer starts fighting the pilot, the crew have to switch back to diagnostic mode, and this is when sensory overload really sets in.
I appreciate some of the comments made by 737 Driver , but IMO repeating the "mantra" does no justice to a complex and rapidly evolving flight emergency. I am not a pilot, and have little to teach 737 Driver , but must point out that this discussion has been going on for many months, long before (he) became a forum member.
The cascading series of failures triggered by faulty AOA, is particularly insidious. Once past the initial startle factor, and when MCAS activates, controlling pitch is no longer just flying the aircraft as previously trained. When the computer starts fighting the pilot, the crew have to switch back to diagnostic mode, and this is when sensory overload really sets in.
I appreciate some of the comments made by 737 Driver , but IMO repeating the "mantra" does no justice to a complex and rapidly evolving flight emergency. I am not a pilot, and have little to teach 737 Driver , but must point out that this discussion has been going on for many months, long before (he) became a forum member.
But now this thread seems over till the final report/s are given - we have waffled on for too long now the power beyond control decides time is up. Who reset the cut out switches that let the machine takeover?
Some very knowledgeable folk posted here, keep up your great work.
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There is a link in the Australian sub-forum: 60 Minutes Boeing Tonight
I am not in Oz, and have not seen the TV program, but assume you are being sarcastic. The promo-link popped in my news-feed earlier today, and looked like rubbish.
Edit: There is a preview online, but it is only available to those with the right IP address: https://www.9now.com.au/60-minutes/2...070glb07twvhug
Edit: https://tvtonight.com.au/2019/05/60-...s-may-5-2.html
Tonight on 60 Minutes Liz Hayes fronts a special investigation into Boeing following recent aviation failures.
“Fatal Flaw”
When aircraft manufacturer Boeing announced its brand-new passenger jet, the 737 MAX, it thought it was onto another winner. Airlines around the world – including Australia – ordered thousands. But Boeing was wrong, and the plane has turned out to be a catastrophic failure. In the last six months two of the jets have crashed and 346 people have been killed. In a special edition of 60 MINUTES, Liz Hayes reconstructs the final horrific moments of both Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302. In startling interviews with 737 pilots, aircraft engineers and a former Boeing insider, Hayes investigates the fatal flaw of the 737 MAX, and questions not only why Boeing designed a plane with the ability to override the control of the pilots, but also why the company didn’t tell the airlines buying the planes it was doing this. Boeing says it can, and will, fix the problem, but Hayes asks whether the damage has already been done. For decades Boeing has relied on the undisputed trust of pilots and millions of passengers flying worldwide. But now, has it all been lost?
Reporter: Liz Hayes
Producer: Gareth Harvey
8:40pm Sunday on Nine.
“Fatal Flaw”
When aircraft manufacturer Boeing announced its brand-new passenger jet, the 737 MAX, it thought it was onto another winner. Airlines around the world – including Australia – ordered thousands. But Boeing was wrong, and the plane has turned out to be a catastrophic failure. In the last six months two of the jets have crashed and 346 people have been killed. In a special edition of 60 MINUTES, Liz Hayes reconstructs the final horrific moments of both Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302. In startling interviews with 737 pilots, aircraft engineers and a former Boeing insider, Hayes investigates the fatal flaw of the 737 MAX, and questions not only why Boeing designed a plane with the ability to override the control of the pilots, but also why the company didn’t tell the airlines buying the planes it was doing this. Boeing says it can, and will, fix the problem, but Hayes asks whether the damage has already been done. For decades Boeing has relied on the undisputed trust of pilots and millions of passengers flying worldwide. But now, has it all been lost?
Reporter: Liz Hayes
Producer: Gareth Harvey
8:40pm Sunday on Nine.
Last edited by GordonR_Cape; 5th May 2019 at 12:44.
Believe it or not Gordon, sarcasm was the furthest thing from my mind.
I didn’t see the promo link, but IMHO the program succinctly went to the heart of just about everything that is wrong with the MCAS fiasco.
And no, I have no affiliation with 60 Minutes, or the Nine Network.
I didn’t see the promo link, but IMHO the program succinctly went to the heart of just about everything that is wrong with the MCAS fiasco.
And no, I have no affiliation with 60 Minutes, or the Nine Network.