Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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If those 2 planes could have been saved by better pilot training is very much an orthogonal discussion.
And those fundamental and indisputable points have been discussed over and over, so why do you have a problem with people discussing pilot training?
We cannot forget that two planes from two different respectable airlines with legally qualified pilots crashed in short order, which is not something that happens very often. There is so far no reason to believe that those pilots were any more or less skilled than the thousands of their brethren so if this was just the sad fact that pilots don't know how to fly anymore,
Water pilot, do yourself (do us all) a favour and look LionAir up on wiki - and tell me if it's accident and incident record - along litany of written off airframes and fatalities - plus bribery at governmental level and flying routes wholesale without licences constitutes a "respectable" airline in your book. Look at the crew + engineering actions and procedures on the days preceeding their accident too...
Also check Indonesia's national historical accident record, which explains why for so long all its airlines were banned from EU airspace, and how recently they were given a reprieve. Doubtless you'll assert that big cats can change their spots. I don't doubt it. What I do doubt is whether they have done so sufficiently.
Of course their latest accident just might be an extremely unfortunate anomaly that a newly reformed company didn't deserve, but with a statistical background like theirs and the evidence from the preceeding flights not many would be taking bets on that I fear.
I can't comment much on Ethiopian, they do seem to have a good record although that statement is often heard qualified, but the non-stop floods of reports over many years of grossly exceeding pilots' flying hours as a matter of routine, failures to honour contracts or provide pay on occasions plus the latest suggestions about failure to publish/incorporate Boeings safety bulletins and lack of systems awareness even after the Lion Air accident make it plain that parts of their operation at least are not up to the sort of standards we expect in N Europe and the US, but I don't think we can judge their overall training quality and standards from the actions of just two pilots though it must raise doubts.
Do not mistake this for racism as doubtless some with auto-offend enabled will do. It most certainly isn't. It's called being honest and realistic. The only bit that isn't proven to be factual yet is the Ethiopian amendment and awareness states, the rest is all hard fact, and even those doubts seem to be pretty much accepted if unproven as yet.
Both nations have historically beeen known for an almost total lack of democratic process, a history of repressive military rule (aka Dictatorship), a highly developed hierarchical society and steep if not near vertical authority gradients in the cockpit. None of these are condusive to the sort of open reporting culture of operations that so many of us here take for granted and it behoves us to take these cultural differences into consideration when we consider what's happened out there.
I've worked in Africa, including Ethiopia and things are simply not done the way we N Europeans expect out there. It shocks one at first but that's just the way it is, just as the way different nations have different driving habits and styles so they do too in Aviation. They also have different ideas on legal matters, so 'legally qualified' may mean one thng to you and something entirely different in a gynae clinic in a fovella in Rio...
This is just another aspect of what's turning into an extremely complex matter which doubtless will become even more so before any resolution is found.
Last edited by meleagertoo; 1st May 2019 at 14:02.
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@meleagertoo
To take a contrarian viewpoint: If an aircraft is not safe to be operated by airlines in countries whose pilots are not top-notch, then it should not be sold to those airlines/countries. Or fix the aircraft, so that it is safe to be operated by less-than-perfect pilots. End of (my version of) the story...
The implication is that training outside the US and other "first world" countries is not up to standard. That may or may not be true, but nobody on this forum has control over all of those countries, and that discussion belongs elsewhere on the forum.
No one is disputing that the current implementation of MCAS was dangerous and led to the 2 accidents.
If those 2 planes could have been saved by better pilot training is very much an orthogonal discussion.
And those fundamental and indisputable points have been discussed over and over, so why do you have a problem with people discussing pilot training?
If those 2 planes could have been saved by better pilot training is very much an orthogonal discussion.
And those fundamental and indisputable points have been discussed over and over, so why do you have a problem with people discussing pilot training?
The implication is that training outside the US and other "first world" countries is not up to standard. That may or may not be true, but nobody on this forum has control over all of those countries, and that discussion belongs elsewhere on the forum.
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I can't comment much on Ethiopian, they do seem to have a good record although that statement is often heard qualified, but the non-stop floods of reports over many years of grossly exceeding pilots' flying hours as a matter of routine, failures to honour contracts or provide pay on occasions plus the latest suggestions about failure to publish/incorporate Boeings safety bulletins and lack of systems awareness even after the Lion Air accident.....
"the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew's mismanagement of the aircraft's speed, altitude, headings and attitude through inconsistent flight control inputs resulting in a loss of control and their failure to abide by CRM principles of mutual support and calling deviations."
Aerodynamic or Mechanical Fix
From Gums
The problem, Bill, et al, is that the plane required an aerodynamic fix for pitch moments approaching the stall AoA.
Hi Gums,
That's not what I have understood the certification problem to be - which was that stick back force did not increase enough at higher AoA to satisfy the requirements. That is not quite the same as a pitch up problem, although it could lead to one, depending on pilot reaction.
If what I understood back there is true - and it came from a very reliable source quite early on on this thread, there can be a few ways to increase stick back force, without going the aerodynamic route.
To my mind, this is preferable than putting large inputs into the stab and has the added advantage that if a fail input into a direct feel-controlling software or linkeage occurs, it is much easier to manage.
Of course if all works normally, the feeling in the design case (high AoA) for the pilot would be a similar one. Of course Boeing wouldn't deliberately put a time bomb in their system . but as we see, one was waiting there.
Greetings, B
PS The quote you used wasn't from me - although I subscribe to a lot of the sentiment in it.
The problem, Bill, et al, is that the plane required an aerodynamic fix for pitch moments approaching the stall AoA.
Hi Gums,
That's not what I have understood the certification problem to be - which was that stick back force did not increase enough at higher AoA to satisfy the requirements. That is not quite the same as a pitch up problem, although it could lead to one, depending on pilot reaction.
If what I understood back there is true - and it came from a very reliable source quite early on on this thread, there can be a few ways to increase stick back force, without going the aerodynamic route.
To my mind, this is preferable than putting large inputs into the stab and has the added advantage that if a fail input into a direct feel-controlling software or linkeage occurs, it is much easier to manage.
Of course if all works normally, the feeling in the design case (high AoA) for the pilot would be a similar one. Of course Boeing wouldn't deliberately put a time bomb in their system . but as we see, one was waiting there.
Greetings, B
PS The quote you used wasn't from me - although I subscribe to a lot of the sentiment in it.
Last edited by bill fly; 1st May 2019 at 11:27.
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From Gums
The problem, Bill, et al, is that the plane required an aerodynamic fix for pitch moments approaching the stall AoA.
Hi Gums,
That's not what I have understood the certification problem to be - which was that stick back force did not increase enough at higher AoA to satisfy the requirements. That is not quite the same as a pitch up problem, although it could lead to one, depending on pilot reaction.
If what I understood back there is true - and it came from a very reliable source quite early on on this thread, there can be a few ways to increase stick back force, without going the aerodynamic route.
To my mind, this is preferable than putting large inputs into the stab and has the added advantage that if a fail input into a direct feel-controlling software or linkeage occurs, it is much easier to manage.
Of course if all works normally, the feeling in the design case (high AoA) for the pilot would be a similar one. Of course Boeing wouldn't deliberately put a time bomb in their system . but as we see, one was waiting there.
Greetings, B
PS The quote you used wasn't from me - although I subscribe to a lot of the sentiment in it.
The problem, Bill, et al, is that the plane required an aerodynamic fix for pitch moments approaching the stall AoA.
Hi Gums,
That's not what I have understood the certification problem to be - which was that stick back force did not increase enough at higher AoA to satisfy the requirements. That is not quite the same as a pitch up problem, although it could lead to one, depending on pilot reaction.
If what I understood back there is true - and it came from a very reliable source quite early on on this thread, there can be a few ways to increase stick back force, without going the aerodynamic route.
To my mind, this is preferable than putting large inputs into the stab and has the added advantage that if a fail input into a direct feel-controlling software or linkeage occurs, it is much easier to manage.
Of course if all works normally, the feeling in the design case (high AoA) for the pilot would be a similar one. Of course Boeing wouldn't deliberately put a time bomb in their system . but as we see, one was waiting there.
Greetings, B
PS The quote you used wasn't from me - although I subscribe to a lot of the sentiment in it.
This reinforces the fact that this is fundamentally a stick feel issue rather than a critical instability that could kick in under extreme but still in certified envelope conditions.
[QUOTE=GordonR_Cape;10460385]@meleagertoo
That contrarian viewpoint, if I may say so, is naiive in the extreme. One can no more withold aircraft sales on those grounds than one could of cars or power tools - They claim to be operating to international standards, if they choose to backslide on that why/how is it Boeing's or Washington's job to judge - ? Wouldn't that be a particularly unpleasant form of self-righteous paternalism? (a phrase I never thought I'd actually use myself!) WE allow them into or airports - we can't then refuse to sell them aircraft, or de we prefer our skies filled with their legacy antique vodka burners dthat haven't seen a spanner in a year and with 28 bald tyres out of 28 instead?
No one but you suggeted that 'training outside the US is not up to standard", (do you include Europe, Canada, Japan, Ozealand in that too?) and discussion of national standards is, I predict, going to become a pivotal matter in this whole affair so I suggest this is exactly the right place to discuss it.
I gather there is a freakish viewpoint out there that Boeing is responsible to fix the aeroplane so even imcompetent pilots can't crash it but that's so grotesquely unrealistic it's simply laughable. How on earth such weird cotton-wool woo-woo ideas ever got into an aviation forum beats me! This is real life for God's sake, not the bloody Guardian's social pages!
Oggers, I refrained from including ET409 - although it may well prove related I don't think it is wise to include what could be a one-off, that's a poor basis for a general conclusion wheras LionAirs's history of disasters is so long the next one might almost be predictable on a time-passed basis. If Ethiopian were to have another similar I might change my tune.
re your valid concerns about the Ethiopian CAA's state of denial let's not judge them until we see the final report. However given that Ethiopia is a single-party socialist state and the government controls every aspect of life including the CAA and by extension the national airline too I'm not expecting to learn much very from it beyond being long on rhetoric and short on critical facts but we'll just have to wait and see. I sincerely hope I'm proved wrong.
This makes it all the more essential that Boeing appear as open and honest as possible.
To take a contrarian viewpoint: If an aircraft is not safe to be operated by airlines in countries whose pilots are not top-notch, then it should not be sold to those airlines/countries. Or fix the aircraft, so that it is safe to be operated by less-than-perfect pilots.
The implication is that training outside the US and other "first world" countries is not up to standard. That may or may not be true, but nobody on this forum has control over all of those countries, and that discussion belongs elsewhere on the forum.
The implication is that training outside the US and other "first world" countries is not up to standard. That may or may not be true, but nobody on this forum has control over all of those countries, and that discussion belongs elsewhere on the forum.
No one but you suggeted that 'training outside the US is not up to standard", (do you include Europe, Canada, Japan, Ozealand in that too?) and discussion of national standards is, I predict, going to become a pivotal matter in this whole affair so I suggest this is exactly the right place to discuss it.
I gather there is a freakish viewpoint out there that Boeing is responsible to fix the aeroplane so even imcompetent pilots can't crash it but that's so grotesquely unrealistic it's simply laughable. How on earth such weird cotton-wool woo-woo ideas ever got into an aviation forum beats me! This is real life for God's sake, not the bloody Guardian's social pages!
Oggers, I refrained from including ET409 - although it may well prove related I don't think it is wise to include what could be a one-off, that's a poor basis for a general conclusion wheras LionAirs's history of disasters is so long the next one might almost be predictable on a time-passed basis. If Ethiopian were to have another similar I might change my tune.
re your valid concerns about the Ethiopian CAA's state of denial let's not judge them until we see the final report. However given that Ethiopia is a single-party socialist state and the government controls every aspect of life including the CAA and by extension the national airline too I'm not expecting to learn much very from it beyond being long on rhetoric and short on critical facts but we'll just have to wait and see. I sincerely hope I'm proved wrong.
This makes it all the more essential that Boeing appear as open and honest as possible.
Last edited by meleagertoo; 1st May 2019 at 14:05.
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It may (or may not) be helpful to remember that the autopilot does not require MCAS help.
This reinforces the fact that this is fundamentally a stick feel issue rather than a critical instability that could kick in under extreme but still in certified envelope conditions.
This reinforces the fact that this is fundamentally a stick feel issue rather than a critical instability that could kick in under extreme but still in certified envelope conditions.
I previously asked the question: How could the autopilot ever get into a high AOA situation? One answer was if the autothrottle is disabled. The implication being that the autopilot could keep increasing the nose up pitch until the stall warning activates, and the crew intervenes. I hope that scenario has been carefully tested?
This also touches on the question of whether the MAX autopilot was specifically programmed for the region of high AOA characteristics covered by MCAS, and whether it was tested under actual flight conditions?
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An interesting point! I can only assume that this has something to do with the autopilot not using AOA as an input like MCAS does, but rather gyro pitch (and other parameters).
I previously asked the question: How could the autopilot ever get into a high AOA situation? One answer was if the autothrottle is disabled. The implication being that the autopilot could keep increasing the nose up pitch until the stall warning activates, and the crew intervenes. I hope that scenario has been carefully tested?
This also touches on the question of whether the MAX autopilot was specifically programmed for the region of high AOA characteristics covered by MCAS, and whether it was tested under actual flight conditions?
I previously asked the question: How could the autopilot ever get into a high AOA situation? One answer was if the autothrottle is disabled. The implication being that the autopilot could keep increasing the nose up pitch until the stall warning activates, and the crew intervenes. I hope that scenario has been carefully tested?
This also touches on the question of whether the MAX autopilot was specifically programmed for the region of high AOA characteristics covered by MCAS, and whether it was tested under actual flight conditions?
The autopilot 'knows' the desired column (and other controls) positions and puts them there, it does not rely on column feel for feedback.
It is manipulating the controls to achieve the desired aircraft state, when pitch is low set column position back until pitch OK at a defined 'gain', how much (not 'how hard) to pull is based on divergence.
This a classic feedback loop, the stick force is not part of the loop.
An imperfect analogy is cruise control in a car, it maintains desired speed directly whereas the driver uses more or less force on the accelerator to maintain speed.
Given the above I would assume (a tricky word in many fields) that no significant changes to autopilot for MAX were required, at most some tweaking of gains.
When I said 'critical' instability i referred to something like reversal of effect past a certain point or similar which would be catastrophic in a feedback loop.
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@meleagertoo
To take a contrarian viewpoint: If an aircraft is not safe to be operated by airlines in countries whose pilots are not top-notch, then it should not be sold to those airlines/countries. Or fix the aircraft, so that it is safe to be operated by less-than-perfect pilots. End of (my version of) the story...
To take a contrarian viewpoint: If an aircraft is not safe to be operated by airlines in countries whose pilots are not top-notch, then it should not be sold to those airlines/countries. Or fix the aircraft, so that it is safe to be operated by less-than-perfect pilots. End of (my version of) the story...
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I previously asked the question: How could the autopilot ever get into a high AOA situation? One answer was if the autothrottle is disabled. The implication being that the autopilot could keep increasing the nose up pitch until the stall warning activates, and the crew intervenes. I hope that scenario has been carefully tested?
Even when the autopilot is in use, at least one of the pilots is expected to actively monitor the aircraft. If the autopilot is struggling, then there will be signs depending on what exactly the problem is. The pilot is then expected to intervene and correct the problem. Until the technology progresses to a point that this active monitoring role is no longer needed, this is not a “design” issue, it is a pilot training issue.
Salute!
I shall stick with my interpretation of the reason MCAS was implemented.
It was to counter a nose up pitch moment.
If all it had to do was stiffen or increase back stick, there would not have been two crashes where the stab trimmed so far down that recovery was a big problem. Oh yeah, then the 5 sec pause and here we go again.
I would love to have Driver or another 737 jock fly the MAX with no MCAS and pull until the stall shaker. Let us know if the stick got lighter and if it was a problem. Real plane, not a sim.
PLease see the other forum where the pitch versus AoA charts are shown/discussed. and somewhere here we have the same chart.
Gotta see the dentist. So later..
...
Gums...
I shall stick with my interpretation of the reason MCAS was implemented.
It was to counter a nose up pitch moment.
If all it had to do was stiffen or increase back stick, there would not have been two crashes where the stab trimmed so far down that recovery was a big problem. Oh yeah, then the 5 sec pause and here we go again.
I would love to have Driver or another 737 jock fly the MAX with no MCAS and pull until the stall shaker. Let us know if the stick got lighter and if it was a problem. Real plane, not a sim.
PLease see the other forum where the pitch versus AoA charts are shown/discussed. and somewhere here we have the same chart.
Gotta see the dentist. So later..
...
Gums...
My version would be: if a pilot cannot fly stick and rudder, pitch and power when all else fails, no aircraft can be considered safe. If a airline or country is unable or unwilling to train their pilots in the basics of flying unassisted, then they should not be operating air transport services.
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Salute!
I shall stick with my interpretation of the reason MCAS was implemented.
It was to counter a nose up pitch moment.
If all it had to do was stiffen or increase back stick, there would not have been two crashes where the stab trimmed so far down that recovery was a big problem. Oh yeah, then the 5 sec pause and here we go again.
I would love to have Driver or another 737 jock fly the MAX with no MCAS and pull until the stall shaker. Let us know if the stick got lighter and if it was a problem. Real plane, not a sim.
PLease see the other forum where the pitch versus AoA charts are shown/discussed. and somewhere here we have the same chart.
Gotta see the dentist. So later..
...
Gums...
I shall stick with my interpretation of the reason MCAS was implemented.
It was to counter a nose up pitch moment.
If all it had to do was stiffen or increase back stick, there would not have been two crashes where the stab trimmed so far down that recovery was a big problem. Oh yeah, then the 5 sec pause and here we go again.
I would love to have Driver or another 737 jock fly the MAX with no MCAS and pull until the stall shaker. Let us know if the stick got lighter and if it was a problem. Real plane, not a sim.
PLease see the other forum where the pitch versus AoA charts are shown/discussed. and somewhere here we have the same chart.
Gotta see the dentist. So later..
...
Gums...
My understanding is that MCAS was implemented ONLY to satisfy FAA Section 25.173
25.173 Static longitudinal stability.
Under the conditions specified in § 25.175, the characteristics of the elevator control forces (including friction) must be as follows:
(a) A pull must be required to obtain and maintain speeds below the specified trim speed, and a push must be required to obtain and maintain speeds above the specified trim speed. This must be shown at any speed that can be obtained except speeds higher than the landing gear or wing flap operating limit speeds or VFC/MFC, whichever is appropriate, or lower than the minimum speed for steady unstalled flight.
(b) The airspeed must return to within 10 percent of the original trim speed for the climb, approach, and landing conditions specified in § 25.175 (a), (c), and (d), and must return to within 7.5 percent of the original trim speed for the cruising condition specified in § 25.175(b), when the control force is slowly released from any speed within the range specified in paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) The average gradient of the stable slope of the stick force versus speed curve may not be less than 1 pound for each 6 knots.
(d) Within the free return speed range specified in paragraph (b) of this section, it is permissible for the airplane, without control forces, to stabilize on speeds above or below the desired trim speeds if exceptional attention on the part of the pilot is not required to return to and maintain the desired trim speed and altitude.
This link provides some good information. 737 MAX Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)
"MCAS is a longitudinal stability enhancement. It is not for stall prevention (although indirectly it helps) or to make the MAX handle like the NG (although it does); it was introduced to counteract the non-linear lift generated by the LEAP-1B engine nacelles at high AoA and give a steady increase in stick force as the stall is approached as required by regulation."
Last edited by Lost in Saigon; 1st May 2019 at 14:33.
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My version would be: if a pilot cannot fly stick and rudder, pitch and power when all else fails, no aircraft can be considered safe. If a airline or country is unable or unwilling to train their pilots in the basics of flying unassisted, then they should not be operating air transport services.
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What does that have to do with this thread? This was not a case of the automatics failing and the pilots not knowing how to fly, it was a case of undesirable interference by the automatics during hand flight. The criteria being debated is how skillful should pilots be at responding to a design flaw and if it is safe for a manufacturer to know of the flaw and assume that pilots would all be that skillful.
What does that have to do with this thread? This was not a case of the automatics failing and the pilots not knowing how to fly, it was a case of undesirable interference by the automatics during hand flight. The criteria being debated is how skillful should pilots be at responding to a design flaw and if it is safe for a manufacturer to know of the flaw and assume that pilots would all be that skillful.
I suspect that the combination of events following the particular malfunction of AOA sensor on MCAS was not foreseen, which I am afraid would be a flaw in the engineering. Regardless, now they know and they ought to do more than tweak the software. This failure mode was twice demonstrated to be catastrophic and the redesign must make it extremely improbable. Will they?
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My version would be: if a pilot cannot fly stick and rudder, pitch and power when all else fails, no aircraft can be considered safe. If a airline or country is unable or unwilling to train their pilots in the basics of flying unassisted, then they should not be operating air transport services.
What does that have to do with this thread? This was not a case of the automatics failing and the pilots not knowing how to fly, it was a case of undesirable interference by the automatics during hand flight. The criteria being debated is how skillful should pilots be at responding to a design flaw and if it is safe for a manufacturer to know of the flaw and assume that pilots would all be that skillful.
In both accidents the pilots were unable to properly deal with a stick shaker at takeoff. Basic airmanship would dictate not raising the flaps when faced with a stick shaker at takeoff. That act lone should have saved the day.
Salute!
I shall stick with my interpretation of the reason MCAS was implemented.
It was to counter a nose up pitch moment.
If all it had to do was stiffen or increase back stick, there would not have been two crashes where the stab trimmed so far down that recovery was a big problem. Oh yeah, then the 5 sec pause and here we go again.
I would love to have Driver or another 737 jock fly the MAX with no MCAS and pull until the stall shaker. Let us know if the stick got lighter and if it was a problem. Real plane, not a sim.
PLease see the other forum where the pitch versus AoA charts are shown/discussed. and somewhere here we have the same chart.
Gotta see the dentist. So later..
...
Gums...
I shall stick with my interpretation of the reason MCAS was implemented.
It was to counter a nose up pitch moment.
If all it had to do was stiffen or increase back stick, there would not have been two crashes where the stab trimmed so far down that recovery was a big problem. Oh yeah, then the 5 sec pause and here we go again.
I would love to have Driver or another 737 jock fly the MAX with no MCAS and pull until the stall shaker. Let us know if the stick got lighter and if it was a problem. Real plane, not a sim.
PLease see the other forum where the pitch versus AoA charts are shown/discussed. and somewhere here we have the same chart.
Gotta see the dentist. So later..
...
Gums...
If there really was a pitch up moment at high AoA/stall that is not an acceptable behaviour and in that case the model would need a stick pusher to keep it from getting there.( § 25.203 Stall characteristics )
Also, if the Max had a pitch up moment, the MCAS downtrimming of the stab could easily be overridden by more elevator( elevator pitch up canceling out the stab downtrim) making sum= status quo. Then the pitch up moment still would be there. If there was a pitch up moment it could only be fixed with a stick pusher.
There is a pitch up moment from the engine nacell’s at high alfa but it is allways less than the pitch down comming from the CG being forward of the centre of pressure center. The nacelles pitch up moment ease the elevator work to pitch up /decrease speed, making the stick force gradient to low.
Gums, you have my respect for many excellent posts and a very good carreer! Thumbs up :-)
Last edited by AAKEE; 1st May 2019 at 15:56. Reason: Iphone spelling...
You and others appear to misunderstand the operation of MCAS trim and control power of the tail.
Once the flap retracted, MCAS started to apply nose down trim, 9 sec on, 5 sec off. There are no additional alerts to indicate that MCAS would generate unwanted trim inputs - no forewarning; thus the only cue was a change in stick force (not looking at the trim wheel). This in part was counteracted by manual trim, which was the crew’s initial and then continuing attempt to manage pitch.
The consensus, but not authoritative view is that pilot electric trim does not override MCAS; thus the summed tail trim movement is nose down at high rate. With increasing tail trim the counteracting electric trim may be progressively ineffective (summed tail forces), similarly the reduced manual trim wheel operation after electric trim is inhibited.
At some point it is likely that the elevator power, stick forces, reach a condition where further pitch control is unavailable. There are no conventional piloting skills which will be able to ‘fly the aircraft’.
Check your assumptions; provide a supporting argument for alternative views.
…, if the Max had a pitch up moment, the MCAS downtrimming of the stab could easily be overridden by more elevator( elevator pitch up canceling out the stab downtrim).
There is a pitch up moment from the engine nacell’s at high alfa but it is allways less than the pitch down comming from the CG being forward of the centre of pressure center. The nacelles pitch up moment ease the elevator work to pitch up /decrease speed, making the stick force gradient to low.
There is a pitch up moment from the engine nacell’s at high alfa but it is allways less than the pitch down comming from the CG being forward of the centre of pressure center. The nacelles pitch up moment ease the elevator work to pitch up /decrease speed, making the stick force gradient to low.
Your appreciation of aerodynamics, controls, cg, etc, differs from mine, and I suspect many other aviators.