Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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737Driver and his cohorts seem intent on diverting attention towards alleged deficiencies in the airmanship of the crews of the two 737 max aircaft that crashed rather than dealing with the real villains of the piece, namely, the FAA and Boeing. I hope that EASA and other foreign regulators hold the FAA's and Boeing's feet to the fire and refuse to lift their grounding of the MAX until a proper SAFE fix has been implemented.
MCAS needs to be removed completely from the 737 Max as it is a far too powerful and dangerous solution to the issue of stick force gradient at high angles of attack. EASA et al should demand that a stick-pusher system should be provided to meet the certification requirements, or else the MAX will not fly passengers in Europe.
Personally, I hold the FAA most culpable for the crashes that have occurred due to MCAS. Whilst aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing, or Airbus, may be tempted to cut corners in pursuit of profit, the regulators are supposed to prevent unsafe commercial aircraft from receiving certification.
MCAS needs to be removed completely from the 737 Max as it is a far too powerful and dangerous solution to the issue of stick force gradient at high angles of attack. EASA et al should demand that a stick-pusher system should be provided to meet the certification requirements, or else the MAX will not fly passengers in Europe.
Personally, I hold the FAA most culpable for the crashes that have occurred due to MCAS. Whilst aircraft manufacturers such as Boeing, or Airbus, may be tempted to cut corners in pursuit of profit, the regulators are supposed to prevent unsafe commercial aircraft from receiving certification.
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Does anyone on this topic know about Boeings system design ? and if so can they please explain to this simple pilot why mcas was designed in the waay it was, If I understand correctly MCAS is a sub-system designsd solely to counteract the lift generated by the engine nacelles at higher than normal AOT. It does this by trimming the stab nose down meaning that if the MCAS system fails due to incorrect AOA info, unless corrected by the PF its heading for disaster.
Why did they not simply alter the elevator feel circuit so that higher force was required to pull back on the stick, sorry column if the AOT was too high and the stick forces were reducing due to the nacelle lift
This could surely have been done so that forward ie nose down column movement was not affected.
This would mean that what ever happened the aircraft would not be left with a nose down trim and would not therefore be trying to fly into the ground.
Why did they not simply alter the elevator feel circuit so that higher force was required to pull back on the stick, sorry column if the AOT was too high and the stick forces were reducing due to the nacelle lift
This could surely have been done so that forward ie nose down column movement was not affected.
This would mean that what ever happened the aircraft would not be left with a nose down trim and would not therefore be trying to fly into the ground.
Basically (if I recall correctly) the elevator feel doesn't operate in a continuously variable fashion relative to AoA. Also the elevator feel system does not have enough authority to maintain the linear stick force called for by certification reqirements. Finally, EFS operates during the stall, stick shaker active, etc. while MCAS (or its effect on stick feel) is needed prior to the stall.
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Speaking for me and just about all of my colleagues of a quite big IT company having its main location in germany: I'll never ever fly a boeing again unless the 737 MAX Issue is resolved including a full analysis *what* went wrong certifying this aircraft.
From an engineers point of view it is quite incredible what has happened in this specific case. May the pilots have partial guilt or not, at least the following facts remain:
* no redundancy for a safety-critical subsystems' sensor
* no sanity-check of input-values of a safety-critical subsystem (e.g. not checking differential of movement, not checking absolute values, not comparing against other available sensors, not checking against absolute - i.e. measureable - orientation against groun(
* no coaching of pilots
* cross-linking of MCAS with assisted trim
In our company boeing is being called as "Boing", which in german means "Crash!". Anyone having to fly who determines to have been booked on a boing 737-MAX (i.e. crash 737-MAX) may refuse to fly, requiring the company to re-book. Do you even grasp what this means?
The longer boeing refuses to admit the obvious, glaring deficits in the MCAS implementation the longer it will permanently lose trust. Whatever 737driver or anyone else says will not rectify this, quite the opposite. Even if it is true to a certain degree.
From an engineers point of view it is quite incredible what has happened in this specific case. May the pilots have partial guilt or not, at least the following facts remain:
* no redundancy for a safety-critical subsystems' sensor
* no sanity-check of input-values of a safety-critical subsystem (e.g. not checking differential of movement, not checking absolute values, not comparing against other available sensors, not checking against absolute - i.e. measureable - orientation against groun(
* no coaching of pilots
* cross-linking of MCAS with assisted trim
In our company boeing is being called as "Boing", which in german means "Crash!". Anyone having to fly who determines to have been booked on a boing 737-MAX (i.e. crash 737-MAX) may refuse to fly, requiring the company to re-book. Do you even grasp what this means?
The longer boeing refuses to admit the obvious, glaring deficits in the MCAS implementation the longer it will permanently lose trust. Whatever 737driver or anyone else says will not rectify this, quite the opposite. Even if it is true to a certain degree.
Salute!
Excuse me, Driver, but your post about all the warning lights you say in last sentence the crew called out “left vane”. And I do not see this right after WoW for several minutes. Sure, many alarms and such went off right away, and looks to me that somewhere along the way they turned off the electric trim. Can post timeline later.
EDIT WITH COCKPIT STUFF:
Takeoff at 5: 38 +/1 a second or two
At 05:39:45, Captain requested flaps up and First-Officer acknowledged. One second later, flap handle moved from 5 to 0 degrees and flaps retraction began.
[that is almost two minutes after WoW)
At 05:39:50, the selected heading started to change from 072 to 197 degrees and at the same time the Captain asked the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading.
[no discussion of AoA vanes yet almost two minutes after WoW]
At 05:39:55, Autopilot disengaged,
At 05:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.
At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.
[The MCAS activates and the real circus begins]
Gums....
Excuse me, Driver, but your post about all the warning lights you say in last sentence the crew called out “left vane”. And I do not see this right after WoW for several minutes. Sure, many alarms and such went off right away, and looks to me that somewhere along the way they turned off the electric trim. Can post timeline later.
EDIT WITH COCKPIT STUFF:
Takeoff at 5: 38 +/1 a second or two
At 05:39:45, Captain requested flaps up and First-Officer acknowledged. One second later, flap handle moved from 5 to 0 degrees and flaps retraction began.
[that is almost two minutes after WoW)
At 05:39:50, the selected heading started to change from 072 to 197 degrees and at the same time the Captain asked the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading.
[no discussion of AoA vanes yet almost two minutes after WoW]
At 05:39:55, Autopilot disengaged,
At 05:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems.
At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly.
[The MCAS activates and the real circus begins]
Gums....
Last edited by gums; 30th Apr 2019 at 22:09.
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Salute!
Excuse me, Driver, but your post about all the warning lights you say in last sentence the crew called out “left vane”. And I do not see this right after WoW for several minutes. Sure, many alarms and such went off right away, and looks to me that somewhere along the way they turned off the electric trim. Can post timeline later.
Gums....
Excuse me, Driver, but your post about all the warning lights you say in last sentence the crew called out “left vane”. And I do not see this right after WoW for several minutes. Sure, many alarms and such went off right away, and looks to me that somewhere along the way they turned off the electric trim. Can post timeline later.
Gums....
My post below has a timeline for when they turned off electric trim including quotes from prelim report.
https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/619272-ethiopian-airliner-down-africa.html#post10459320
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Boeing sells aircraft to airlines. Yes, in this particular case, it seems that something went wrong that should not have gone wrong. It will be fixed, and the company will bleed a lot of cash for it.
I could also announce that I will never buy a Volkswagen again because of the diesel scandal. However, the same thing applies: something went wrong that should not have gone wrong. It will be fixed, and the company will bleed a lot of cash for it.
In fact, when this is fixed, I'll be more than happy to fly the MAX because I'm pretty sure that with all that media attention if anything is going to be fixed properly, it will be MCAS. With a blank check from Boeing's beancounters.
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Mr. Driver has, time and again, acknowledged the glaring "other factors" and has bent over backwards to be fair.
Speaking as an informed passenger, try to see my POV: If there is something wrong with the airplane you're riding, wouldn't you want the very best piloting skills possible sitting up there in the pointy end??? I sure would! I am shocked that there's so much sentiment against "Just fly the damned plane!"
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Stick force reduces as AoA increases under particular flight conditions on, and only on, the 737 MAX. This is not certifiable under FAA rules.
I don't know who originally stated the first part to be the case but it is apparently at the foundation of all that we have talked about and whose chosen "correction" is in whole or in part the cause of the loss of almost 400 lives.
What mentality uses uncommanded movement of the horizontal stab (MCAS) to correct for a decrease in stick force?
Perhaps a mentality that knows that if the 737 MAX were to actually stall under those particular conditions it would be game over?
I don't know who originally stated the first part to be the case but it is apparently at the foundation of all that we have talked about and whose chosen "correction" is in whole or in part the cause of the loss of almost 400 lives.
What mentality uses uncommanded movement of the horizontal stab (MCAS) to correct for a decrease in stick force?
Perhaps a mentality that knows that if the 737 MAX were to actually stall under those particular conditions it would be game over?
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Driver sends.....
Psychophysiological entity
Avionista #4661
We know why it's there, and more or less what it does, but I have to agree with this part of the above post. It's been nagging at me since November.
Why is such a powerful tool used to simply stop the PF heaving back too easily at a high AoA?
Boeing chose not to use conventional stall protection but instead devise a system that changes the aircraft's overall handling at a critical time. For a few moments, they are trying to make the MAX be something it's not. The necessary certifiable handling characteristics are synthesised by moving over 47 feet of flying surface - it's as though the design of the entire aircraft was being momentarily tweaked to cover one issue.
This vast surface is altered to give this synthetic nose down just at a time there's presumably a danger of the wings stalling. If it was capable of a lightning fast return to normal datums, it would just about be acceptable, but any return has to be done by the cranking of that jack. On that dark and stormy night, a last minute change of runway and a moment's inattention. Is that extra weight on the pole going to save the day? If it doesn't, even with a fully serviceable aircraft, it seems to me that the problem of an embarrassing stick shake could be turned into something orders of magnitude worse.
MCAS needs to be removed completely from the 737 Max as it is a far too powerful and dangerous solution to the issue of stick force gradient at high angles of attack.
Why is such a powerful tool used to simply stop the PF heaving back too easily at a high AoA?
Boeing chose not to use conventional stall protection but instead devise a system that changes the aircraft's overall handling at a critical time. For a few moments, they are trying to make the MAX be something it's not. The necessary certifiable handling characteristics are synthesised by moving over 47 feet of flying surface - it's as though the design of the entire aircraft was being momentarily tweaked to cover one issue.
This vast surface is altered to give this synthetic nose down just at a time there's presumably a danger of the wings stalling. If it was capable of a lightning fast return to normal datums, it would just about be acceptable, but any return has to be done by the cranking of that jack. On that dark and stormy night, a last minute change of runway and a moment's inattention. Is that extra weight on the pole going to save the day? If it doesn't, even with a fully serviceable aircraft, it seems to me that the problem of an embarrassing stick shake could be turned into something orders of magnitude worse.
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I don’t think anyone is disagreeing with your observation, and Murph and I attempted to offer an explanation as to why this may have happened. The crew was task saturated, so they didn’t verbalize this annunciation earlier. It doesn’t really seem to have anything to do with any action they did or did not take. Am I missing something here that you are trying to say?
Driver sends.....
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Avionista #4661
We know why it's there, and more or less what it does, but I have to agree with this part of the above post. It's been nagging at me since November.
Why is such a powerful tool used to simply stop the PF heaving back too easily at a high AoA?
Boeing chose not to use conventional stall protection but instead devise a system that changes the aircraft's overall handling at a critical time. For a few moments, they are trying to make the MAX be something it's not. The necessary certifiable handling characteristics are synthesised by moving over 47 feet of flying surface - it's as though the design of the entire aircraft was being momentarily tweaked to cover one issue.
This vast surface is altered to give this synthetic nose down just at a time there's presumably a danger of the wings stalling. If it was capable of a lightning fast return to normal datums, it would just about be acceptable, but any return has to be done by the cranking of that jack. On that dark and stormy night, a last minute change of runway and a moment's inattention. Is that extra weight on the pole going to save the day? If it doesn't, even with a fully serviceable aircraft, it seems to me that the problem of an embarrassing stick shake could be turned into something orders of magnitude worse.
We know why it's there, and more or less what it does, but I have to agree with this part of the above post. It's been nagging at me since November.
Why is such a powerful tool used to simply stop the PF heaving back too easily at a high AoA?
Boeing chose not to use conventional stall protection but instead devise a system that changes the aircraft's overall handling at a critical time. For a few moments, they are trying to make the MAX be something it's not. The necessary certifiable handling characteristics are synthesised by moving over 47 feet of flying surface - it's as though the design of the entire aircraft was being momentarily tweaked to cover one issue.
This vast surface is altered to give this synthetic nose down just at a time there's presumably a danger of the wings stalling. If it was capable of a lightning fast return to normal datums, it would just about be acceptable, but any return has to be done by the cranking of that jack. On that dark and stormy night, a last minute change of runway and a moment's inattention. Is that extra weight on the pole going to save the day? If it doesn't, even with a fully serviceable aircraft, it seems to me that the problem of an embarrassing stick shake could be turned into something orders of magnitude worse.
MCAS is only there to provide the correct elevator feel at high angles of attack to meet the FAA certification requirements. You can still stall the aircraft, the only difference is how the elevator feels. With MCAS the elevator feels like every other aircraft you have flown. Without MCAS the elevator feels light at high angles of attack.
In my opinion, the original MCAS design was really not that big a deal. Boeing and FAA probably decided one Angle of Attack sensor was enough because it still flies just fine without MCAS. It just feels different. If the Angle of Attack sensor fails and MCAS operates incorrectly, you just trim it away with the thumb switches. (Lowering the flaps for landing also deactivates MCAS) If you get tired of playing with the trim switches to keep the nose up, then just turn off the Electric Stab switches and trim manually. No big deal right?
WRONG.... It seems that there are pilots who will have difficulty with this simple concept of FLY THE AIRCRAFT so now Boeing has refined MCAS to make it less likely to confuse these pilots. Now it takes 2 Angle of Attack sensors to agree before MCAS activates, AND it will not apply nose down trim repeatedly. That should make it safe for all pilots. YES?
But, for some reason, people are still not satisfied. It seems these people have a real hate-on for Boeing and the FAA. I think this is all an over reaction to a simple design underestimation that has an easy solution.
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It has been said time and time again: MCAS is not for stall protection.
MCAS is only there to provide the correct elevator feel at high angles of attack to meet the FAA certification requirements. You can still stall the aircraft, the only difference is how the elevator feels. With MCAS the elevator feels like every other aircraft you have flown. Without MCAS the elevator feels light at high angles of attack.
In my opinion, the original MCAS design was really not that big a deal. Boeing and FAA probably decided one Angle of Attack sensor was enough because it still flies just fine without MCAS. It just feels different. If the Angle of Attack sensor fails and MCAS operates incorrectly, you just trim it away with the thumb switches. (Lowering the flaps for landing also deactivates MCAS) If you get tired of playing with the trim switches to keep the nose up, then just turn off the Electric Stab switches and trim manually. No big deal right?
WRONG.... It seems that there are pilots who will have difficulty with this simple concept of FLY THE AIRCRAFT so now Boeing has refined MCAS to make it less likely to confuse these pilots. Now it takes 2 Angle of Attack sensors to agree before MCAS activates, AND it will not apply nose down trim repeatedly. That should make it safe for all pilots. YES?
But, for some reason, people are still not satisfied. It seems these people have a real hate-on for Boeing and the FAA. I think this is all an over reaction to a simple design underestimation that has an easy solution.
MCAS is only there to provide the correct elevator feel at high angles of attack to meet the FAA certification requirements. You can still stall the aircraft, the only difference is how the elevator feels. With MCAS the elevator feels like every other aircraft you have flown. Without MCAS the elevator feels light at high angles of attack.
In my opinion, the original MCAS design was really not that big a deal. Boeing and FAA probably decided one Angle of Attack sensor was enough because it still flies just fine without MCAS. It just feels different. If the Angle of Attack sensor fails and MCAS operates incorrectly, you just trim it away with the thumb switches. (Lowering the flaps for landing also deactivates MCAS) If you get tired of playing with the trim switches to keep the nose up, then just turn off the Electric Stab switches and trim manually. No big deal right?
WRONG.... It seems that there are pilots who will have difficulty with this simple concept of FLY THE AIRCRAFT so now Boeing has refined MCAS to make it less likely to confuse these pilots. Now it takes 2 Angle of Attack sensors to agree before MCAS activates, AND it will not apply nose down trim repeatedly. That should make it safe for all pilots. YES?
But, for some reason, people are still not satisfied. It seems these people have a real hate-on for Boeing and the FAA. I think this is all an over reaction to a simple design underestimation that has an easy solution.
This was not a case of unaware pilots not noticing that the plane was trimming down, or not knowing the basics of how to fly an airplane. The most convincing arguments that I read here for pilot error is that they were too slow to recognize the problem and use the procedure that Boeing specifies (although even that gets fuzzy as Boeing used to specify a more detailed procedure that is now not taught because runaway trim was rare to non-existant before the MAX.)
The variety of "simple concepts" presented as solutions here that would have also crashed the MAX is concerning. My understanding of the current "party line (see Dominic Gates in the Seattle Times) is that the first pilots erred by not turning the electric trim off, and the second pilots erred by turning the electric trim off too soon. My unqualified understanding is that the ideal procedure is to use the electric trim to undo the MCAS input (while not letting go of the switch for a moment) and then (presumably without letting go of the trim button) turning off electric trim to disable MCAS. (I do not believe that is the standard response to a trim runaway which is an argument against the concept that the pilots erred by not applying the trim runaway procedure.)
We cannot forget that two planes from two different respectable airlines with legally qualified pilots crashed in short order, which is not something that happens very often. There is so far no reason to believe that those pilots were any more or less skilled than the thousands of their brethren so if this was just the sad fact that pilots don't know how to fly anymore, we should expect to see major airplane crashes every six months or so. We do not, which is why the plane was grounded despite Boeing's and the FAA's objections.
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Any "poor airmanship" criticism is just because they did not keep on using the thumb switches to keep nose up trim. There may be some underlying issues we don't know about that prevented them from operating the nose up trim. Until we get the full accident report, we don't really know if that is true.
Last edited by Lost in Saigon; 1st May 2019 at 06:25.
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Speaking as an informed passenger, try to see my POV: If there is something wrong with the airplane you're riding, wouldn't you want the very best piloting skills possible sitting up there in the pointy end??? I sure would! I am shocked that there's so much sentiment against "Just fly the damned plane!"
In fact that's what I heard commercial pilots say when asked about the things they do to keep us, the passengers, safe: If they feel that there is anything wrong with the aircraft that could affect the safety of the flight, they will not take off until the issue is taken care of. Period. No ifs and buts.
But in this case, after the Lion Air accident, the pilots trusted Boeing, the FAA and the airlines when they claimed that the MAX is not unsafe, and just continued flying the damned plane. In my opinion that trust has been misplaced.
Anticipating accusations of being hysterical, I feel I need to recap some of the unbelievable things I have read in the last months about how Boeing failed at making safety their primary concern, while the FAA was a watchdog that didn't have teeth sharp enough to prevent it, and also some of the stuff the airlines did that contributed:
- the latest blunder about the AOA disagree warning being disabled "by accident" on the MAX
- recent whistleblower reports about damage to the wiring of the AOA sensors
- the redesign of the cutout switches that prevents disabling automatic trim independently from the manual electric trim
- relying on a single AOA sensor for the MCAS function
- increasing the amount of trim MCAS can apply in one run from 0.6 to 2.5 without re-evaluating its safety
- hiding the existence of the MCAS function and its behavior from the pilots
- a pilot that demanded more training for the MAX being ignored and then punished by his airline when he insisted: https://qz.com/1584233/boeing-737-ma...more-training/
- a pilot that said he didn't feel prepared and had significant issues on his first flight on the MAX: https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/20...37-max/584791/
- making the manual trim wheels smaller to fit the larger displays starting with the NG, and also making them harder to use
- Boeing accepting sub-standard hardware components from its suppliers, then literally hammering them in place or drilling additional holes in the components when they didn't fit properly, see "Problems with Boeing 737 next generation with structural dangers reported SBS dateline Australia":
- airlines refusing to accept aircraft assembled in one of Boeing's factories due to quality issues
- Boeing ignoring employees that reported quality issues in its factories or the factories of their suppliers
- FAA mostly ignoring whistleblowers that did the same.
- Boeing firing the whistleblowers and the people reporting quality issues.
- The battery issues on the Dreamliner (the Al Jazeera investigation):
But with all that going on somehow some people are still extremely surprised about the criticism towards Boeing and the FAA.
The problem goes deep, and just fixing MCAS is not enough. The factors that allowed the issues with MCAS to slip through the cracks, assuming they were not hidden intentionally, also need to be fixed. And based on what I learned so far I think those factors are the under-funding and maybe even corruption within the FAA, and having some unethical people in key positions at Boeing and some of the airlines, that prioritized short term profit over safety.
Speaking as an informed passenger, try to see my POV: If there is something wrong with the airplane you're riding, wouldn't you want the very best piloting skills possible sitting up there in the pointy end??? I sure would! I am shocked that there's so much sentiment against "Just fly the damned plane!"
The assumed use of electric trim depends on understanding the nature of the failure - no direct warning alert. MCAS trim surpasses elect trim - 10 sec to 5 sec, then there is a point where elect trim becomes ineffective, it should be inhibited before then, there is a (coincident) point where manual wheel trim is ineffective (physically impossible to move), so that the residual control force and / or manoeuvre cannot be flown.
If speed of awareness and trim action are important, then the aircraft systems must support these; you cannot expect to cure a poor design by ‘improving’ every pilot, and expecting that enhanced performance every day in every situation.
Water pilot,
We cannot forget that two planes from two different respectable airlines with legally qualified pilots crashed in short order, which is not something that happens very often. There is so far no reason to believe that those pilots were any more or less skilled than the thousands of their brethren so if this was just the sad fact that pilots don't know how to fly anymore, we should expect to see major airplane crashes every six months or so. We do not, which is why the plane was grounded despite Boeing's and the FAA's objections.
Much of this discussion continues to obfuscate some fundamental and indisputable points.
In 2019, the loss of two aircraft to the same cause within less than two years of service entry is anomalous.
Whatever one may think about automation and piloting skills, developments in aircraft technology have paralleled not only a continuous improvement in safety, but an improvement that has been worldwide and near-universal. So far, we have not seen any evidence of an actual decline in piloting standards.
This specific failure - which can barely be called a chain - has a kill probability of 0.667. A surface-to-air missile development team would dream of anything like that.
If there were more incidents of AoA-vane failure triggering MCAS, but with the aircraft being recovered, there would be strong grounds for the FTFA-fundies' argument. As it is, their case is purely speculative.
In 2019, the loss of two aircraft to the same cause within less than two years of service entry is anomalous.
Whatever one may think about automation and piloting skills, developments in aircraft technology have paralleled not only a continuous improvement in safety, but an improvement that has been worldwide and near-universal. So far, we have not seen any evidence of an actual decline in piloting standards.
This specific failure - which can barely be called a chain - has a kill probability of 0.667. A surface-to-air missile development team would dream of anything like that.
If there were more incidents of AoA-vane failure triggering MCAS, but with the aircraft being recovered, there would be strong grounds for the FTFA-fundies' argument. As it is, their case is purely speculative.