Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
L39, no ‘proof’ of low speed awareness, only the reported stick-shake and likely ‘barbers pole’ on the EFIS speed display deduced from the system logic.
The inference from the ‘feel diff pressure’ annunciation was that stick forces would generally increase due to stall warning.
Reference to the FDR, there is an indication of a reduction in pitch after takeoff. There is a significant difference between stall avoidance from an alert of stall warning (stick shake) and the actions required for stall identification, particularly at low altitude immediately after takeoff.
meleagertoo, thank you for a colourful reply.
It is difficult to find any clear point, only cherry picking issues for which none of us have an understanding in relation to what the crew saw or thought.
Generally your approach is that of ‘what was’, opposed to an alternative ‘what could have been’, which could provide the basis of wider understanding and benefit to safety.
The inference from the ‘feel diff pressure’ annunciation was that stick forces would generally increase due to stall warning.
Reference to the FDR, there is an indication of a reduction in pitch after takeoff. There is a significant difference between stall avoidance from an alert of stall warning (stick shake) and the actions required for stall identification, particularly at low altitude immediately after takeoff.
meleagertoo, thank you for a colourful reply.
It is difficult to find any clear point, only cherry picking issues for which none of us have an understanding in relation to what the crew saw or thought.
Generally your approach is that of ‘what was’, opposed to an alternative ‘what could have been’, which could provide the basis of wider understanding and benefit to safety.
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Thus the crew required a step change in their mindset to associate the revised situation with MCAS which ought to have been in the forefront of their mindset , or at least trim problems and then isolate the trim system. Go and re-read that line again! This should all have been complete deja-vue! Inexplicable trim problems four months after the last big accident - how can memories be that short?
Surprise, startle; the original problem understood, now its not ! I don't think they understood much at all I'm afraid.
If a whole bus-load of people in your previously bear-free neighbourhood were eaten by bears a couple of months ago in the scariest event your neighbourhood has ever seen and you were wandering home one night - fat, dumb and happy others might quite reasonably question the appropriateness of your low-key mental state. Is it wise under the circumstances?
Suppose you were a tourist in a country where you had a 'technical' fluency in the language but mainly relied on a 'news for tourists' paper and 'safety guidelines for guests' published by the tour operator in your native language,
You had seen an article in the 'news for tourists" about a a bus-load of people perishing due to the rival tour operator's bus driver making a rookies mistake.
Your tour operator did not update his "safety guidelines for guests' as a result of the prior event.
You then unexpectedly meet a bear despite the safety guidelines stating the biggest animal in the region is a raccoon.
The point is that "everyone knew all about Lion Air' is not a proveable true statement and the AV herald statement re lack of knowledge of update trim procedures bt ET pilots strongly suggests that some did not.
Many posters citing weak piloting skills, human error, are biased by hindsight, with further biases of believing that all pilots will think and behave the same way (or as they do - earned dogmatism effect) or as trained. These views also represent ‘fundamental attribution error’ seeking the nearest - in action, or last person in a chain of events - timeline.
In reality many of these issues reflect the same difficulties that the accident crews experienced; how to make sense of the situation, choosing a course of action, and opportunity to act.
Posts suffer similar deficiencies in ‘airmanship’ and ability to ‘fly the aircraft’; unable to understand the current situation, think critically and review what is currently known. This ‘lack of airmanship’ is a weakness in thinking skills or ability to use them wisely; particularly with the wisdom of hindsight. First ‘fly you mind’, then act - only post comments after well considered thought; where thought should is based on skills training and particularly practice of those thinking skills.
Pursuing the ‘blame game’, embedded in ‘responsibility’, might be a self-satisfying generation of individual understanding, but this offers little opportunity to learn due to premature closure, from those who already have the (their) ‘answer’.
Other people in this forum also seek understanding, using a cautious evaluation and review, involving skills of critical thinking, which similarly are core values in airmanship.
If posters are unable to achieve a suitable level of thinking given the enlightenment of hindsight, and the luxury of time and wealth of additional information, then they should heed the possibility that they could take similar deficiencies of thought - airmanship, situation awareness, assessment, and judgement into their flight decks.
In reality many of these issues reflect the same difficulties that the accident crews experienced; how to make sense of the situation, choosing a course of action, and opportunity to act.
Posts suffer similar deficiencies in ‘airmanship’ and ability to ‘fly the aircraft’; unable to understand the current situation, think critically and review what is currently known. This ‘lack of airmanship’ is a weakness in thinking skills or ability to use them wisely; particularly with the wisdom of hindsight. First ‘fly you mind’, then act - only post comments after well considered thought; where thought should is based on skills training and particularly practice of those thinking skills.
Pursuing the ‘blame game’, embedded in ‘responsibility’, might be a self-satisfying generation of individual understanding, but this offers little opportunity to learn due to premature closure, from those who already have the (their) ‘answer’.
Other people in this forum also seek understanding, using a cautious evaluation and review, involving skills of critical thinking, which similarly are core values in airmanship.
If posters are unable to achieve a suitable level of thinking given the enlightenment of hindsight, and the luxury of time and wealth of additional information, then they should heed the possibility that they could take similar deficiencies of thought - airmanship, situation awareness, assessment, and judgement into their flight decks.
You can see it in politics and in daily life. It leads to repetitive emphasising of dogma and it led to Trump.
You can see it in these discussions.
The tragedy is that some of the items of dogma could be valid, if discussed reasonably but can’t be heard in the torrent.
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L39 Guy and 737 Driver- I owe you both a reply form last night, but it will have to wait for a bit.
In getting caught up with the thread just now a number of continuations of the theme from teh past week popped up, some in support of your stated observation/opinions and some against. Instead of arguing about them ad infinatum I had a vision of explaining how we aren't necessarily as far apart as it may seem, but also how your view as stated is (IMHO) deeply flawed and unforgiving towards four people who are not here to defend themselves.
My path to enlightenment is actually very easy and short.
Assumption: MCAS is a bastard system (some would say a killer) that was created and installed at the last minute and that provides a stupid feel/feedback control with actual control over the entirety of the horizontal stabilizer's range of movement.
Statement 1: Many professional pilots feel strongly that the primary focus for responsibility (note I said primary, not sole) lies with the airmanship (or lack thereof) of the flight crews who perished. In a narrow window of time they failed to correctly (as in solve the puzzle) answer the challenge they had been presented with, the first time never getting there, the second not getting there until the stab was outside of a previously unknown box that would allow it to be manually rolled back into more usable territory. The follow-on to this statement is that both crashes were the fault of the crews for failing the most basic of tasks- to fly the airplane.
Statement 2: Many of us here feel that there is a deep and very real culpability within Boeing and the FAA for creating such a lethal design. In this case (this is all entirely hypothetical, please work with the suggestion rather than the actuality) an engineer was presented with a problem that needed to be solved. She and her team came up with MCAS. The person responsible for choosing the best course of design knew that MCAS would have a profound impact on the horizontal stab, and they chose to shoehorn it in there anyway. The flight-test crews knew of the system at least and failed to properly review it for (what are now) obvious technical and safety shortcomings. Then, in a further admission that they were pushing the envelope everyone involved at Boeing literally hid the existence of the system from the pilots and operators who would fly the airplane. That person(s) also misled the FAA by informing the feds that the maximum authority that MCAS would have was .6 of a degree, when in reality (and they knew this) it was 2.5 degrees at a whack. In a final insult they said "all you need is an hour with this here tablet-thingy and you will know all you need to know to safely command and fly the MAX series of aircraft!!
With those two statements on offer- and the acknowledgement that there is plenty of blame to go around, the question I have is why are you not focusing on Boeing, the corporate culture that created this monster, the profit-driven betrayal of everyone here, and the fact that they are clearly working to pull a rabbit out of the hat in lieu of actually starting over again- which is what any rational society would require them to do. Yes, we know who the four crew members are, so that makes them easy targets, but if the professionals on this forum are willing to eat their own while looking the other way as Boeing goes about its PR campaign then what does that really say about all of us??
Warm regards-
dce
In getting caught up with the thread just now a number of continuations of the theme from teh past week popped up, some in support of your stated observation/opinions and some against. Instead of arguing about them ad infinatum I had a vision of explaining how we aren't necessarily as far apart as it may seem, but also how your view as stated is (IMHO) deeply flawed and unforgiving towards four people who are not here to defend themselves.
My path to enlightenment is actually very easy and short.
Assumption: MCAS is a bastard system (some would say a killer) that was created and installed at the last minute and that provides a stupid feel/feedback control with actual control over the entirety of the horizontal stabilizer's range of movement.
Statement 1: Many professional pilots feel strongly that the primary focus for responsibility (note I said primary, not sole) lies with the airmanship (or lack thereof) of the flight crews who perished. In a narrow window of time they failed to correctly (as in solve the puzzle) answer the challenge they had been presented with, the first time never getting there, the second not getting there until the stab was outside of a previously unknown box that would allow it to be manually rolled back into more usable territory. The follow-on to this statement is that both crashes were the fault of the crews for failing the most basic of tasks- to fly the airplane.
Statement 2: Many of us here feel that there is a deep and very real culpability within Boeing and the FAA for creating such a lethal design. In this case (this is all entirely hypothetical, please work with the suggestion rather than the actuality) an engineer was presented with a problem that needed to be solved. She and her team came up with MCAS. The person responsible for choosing the best course of design knew that MCAS would have a profound impact on the horizontal stab, and they chose to shoehorn it in there anyway. The flight-test crews knew of the system at least and failed to properly review it for (what are now) obvious technical and safety shortcomings. Then, in a further admission that they were pushing the envelope everyone involved at Boeing literally hid the existence of the system from the pilots and operators who would fly the airplane. That person(s) also misled the FAA by informing the feds that the maximum authority that MCAS would have was .6 of a degree, when in reality (and they knew this) it was 2.5 degrees at a whack. In a final insult they said "all you need is an hour with this here tablet-thingy and you will know all you need to know to safely command and fly the MAX series of aircraft!!
With those two statements on offer- and the acknowledgement that there is plenty of blame to go around, the question I have is why are you not focusing on Boeing, the corporate culture that created this monster, the profit-driven betrayal of everyone here, and the fact that they are clearly working to pull a rabbit out of the hat in lieu of actually starting over again- which is what any rational society would require them to do. Yes, we know who the four crew members are, so that makes them easy targets, but if the professionals on this forum are willing to eat their own while looking the other way as Boeing goes about its PR campaign then what does that really say about all of us??
Warm regards-
dce
Unfotunately most people these days want a quick easy solution to life’s complex problems.
You can see it in politics and in daily life. It leads to repetitive emphasising of dogma and it led to Trump.
You can see it in these discussions.
The tragedy is that some of the items of dogma could be valid, if discussed reasonably but can’t be heard in the torrent.
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Seattle Times article
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...37-max-design/
Facing sharp questions, Boeing CEO refuses to admit flaws in 737 MAX design
April 29, 2019 at 10:47 am Updated April 29, 2019 at 1:19 pm
by Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
CHICAGO — In a dramatic and tense news conference, his first since two deadly crashes of 737 MAX airplanes, Boeing Chairman and CEO Dennis Muilenburg faced sharp questioning but refused to admit flaws in the design of the airplane’s systems.
“We have gone back and confirmed again, as we do the safety analysis, the engineering analysis, that we followed exactly the steps in our design and certification processes that consistently produce safe airplanes,” he said. “It was designed per our standards. It was certified per our standards.”
In the case of the MAX, those processes certified as safe a new flight-control system that was triggered on both the Lion Air and Ethiopian crash flights by a single faulty sensor and then engaged repeatedly to push the nose of each airplane down. Boeing is currently flight testing a software redesign of this system — Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
Yet Muilenburg would not concede that there was anything wrong with the original MCAS design, saying only that the system is being “improved” with the software redesign.
He said airplane accidents are typically due to “a chain of events,” and that “it’s not correct to attribute that to any single item.”
He pointed to actions by the pilots on the two flights, who he said did not completely follow the standard procedure when uncommanded tail movements begin to push the jet’s nose down. He added that Boeing’s system safety analysis of MCAS, a technical document prepared by Boeing during certification of the MAX, depends in part on the pilot making the appropriate response in the case of a system failure.
At the brief news conference following Boeing’s annual shareholder meeting at Chicago’s Field Museum, Muilenburg faced one question after another about flaws in MCAS but repeatedly declined to concede that it was badly designed.
His statements hewed closely to the line he followed on an earnings teleconference last Wednesday, when he said the MAX crashes were not due to any “technical slip” by Boeing during the jet’s design or certification.
He took questions for less than 15 minutes. Finally, after parrying a question about whether he had thought about resigning and a last question about blame for MCAS, Muilenburg walked out grim-faced.
As he strode briskly from the room, many reporters had not been called upon. One of those shouted after him: “346 people died. Can you answer some questions?”
Boeing’s proposed software fix for MCAS ensures the system takes input from two sensors, instead of one. It will activate only once, not multiple times, if the sensor reading remains stuck at a high value. And the power of the system will be limited, so that the pilot can always pull back on the control column with enough force to counteract any automatic nose-down movement.
With that fix, Muilenburg said, the MAX when it returns to service will be “one of the safest airplanes ever to fly.”
During the shareholder meeting, a couple of small stockholders asked more gently worded questions about the MAX crashes.
One older man, who identified himself as an engineer, questioned how MCAS was designed to depend on a single unreliable sensor. A young woman questioned whether oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration was sufficiently independent.
Muilenburg’s response to the engineer simply reiterated the statement that Boeing had followed its long-standing procedures in the design and development of the MAX.
On the need for independent oversight, he said Boeing’s airplane development process includes “non-advocate reviews,” when experts who aren’t on the specific program are brought in to evaluate it.
Security was tight at the shareholder meeting, which was attended by the entire Boeing board. Attendees were screened through airport-style metal detectors and explosives-detecting dogs sniffed at all bags.
The event featured shareholder votes on a series of formal proposals, including one to separate Muilenburg’s dual role as chairman and CEO by appointing a separate chairman, another seeking to ensure that executive pay is not boosted by share repurchases, and another to force more disclosure of Boeing’s lobbying activities.
All these external proposals were given short shrift by the board and none came close to passing.
Outside the museum, a small band of relatives of people who died on the Ethiopian Airlines plane protested in the pouring rain. One sign called for the prosecution of Boeing and its executives for manslaughter.
Tarek Milleron, the uncle of 23-year-old Samya Stumo, who was among those killed, said that Boeing’s leadership “should open up on the chain of events that led to these accidents.”
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
April 29, 2019 at 10:47 am Updated April 29, 2019 at 1:19 pm
by Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
CHICAGO — In a dramatic and tense news conference, his first since two deadly crashes of 737 MAX airplanes, Boeing Chairman and CEO Dennis Muilenburg faced sharp questioning but refused to admit flaws in the design of the airplane’s systems.
“We have gone back and confirmed again, as we do the safety analysis, the engineering analysis, that we followed exactly the steps in our design and certification processes that consistently produce safe airplanes,” he said. “It was designed per our standards. It was certified per our standards.”
In the case of the MAX, those processes certified as safe a new flight-control system that was triggered on both the Lion Air and Ethiopian crash flights by a single faulty sensor and then engaged repeatedly to push the nose of each airplane down. Boeing is currently flight testing a software redesign of this system — Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).
Yet Muilenburg would not concede that there was anything wrong with the original MCAS design, saying only that the system is being “improved” with the software redesign.
He said airplane accidents are typically due to “a chain of events,” and that “it’s not correct to attribute that to any single item.”
He pointed to actions by the pilots on the two flights, who he said did not completely follow the standard procedure when uncommanded tail movements begin to push the jet’s nose down. He added that Boeing’s system safety analysis of MCAS, a technical document prepared by Boeing during certification of the MAX, depends in part on the pilot making the appropriate response in the case of a system failure.
At the brief news conference following Boeing’s annual shareholder meeting at Chicago’s Field Museum, Muilenburg faced one question after another about flaws in MCAS but repeatedly declined to concede that it was badly designed.
His statements hewed closely to the line he followed on an earnings teleconference last Wednesday, when he said the MAX crashes were not due to any “technical slip” by Boeing during the jet’s design or certification.
He took questions for less than 15 minutes. Finally, after parrying a question about whether he had thought about resigning and a last question about blame for MCAS, Muilenburg walked out grim-faced.
As he strode briskly from the room, many reporters had not been called upon. One of those shouted after him: “346 people died. Can you answer some questions?”
Boeing’s proposed software fix for MCAS ensures the system takes input from two sensors, instead of one. It will activate only once, not multiple times, if the sensor reading remains stuck at a high value. And the power of the system will be limited, so that the pilot can always pull back on the control column with enough force to counteract any automatic nose-down movement.
With that fix, Muilenburg said, the MAX when it returns to service will be “one of the safest airplanes ever to fly.”
During the shareholder meeting, a couple of small stockholders asked more gently worded questions about the MAX crashes.
One older man, who identified himself as an engineer, questioned how MCAS was designed to depend on a single unreliable sensor. A young woman questioned whether oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration was sufficiently independent.
Muilenburg’s response to the engineer simply reiterated the statement that Boeing had followed its long-standing procedures in the design and development of the MAX.
On the need for independent oversight, he said Boeing’s airplane development process includes “non-advocate reviews,” when experts who aren’t on the specific program are brought in to evaluate it.
Security was tight at the shareholder meeting, which was attended by the entire Boeing board. Attendees were screened through airport-style metal detectors and explosives-detecting dogs sniffed at all bags.
The event featured shareholder votes on a series of formal proposals, including one to separate Muilenburg’s dual role as chairman and CEO by appointing a separate chairman, another seeking to ensure that executive pay is not boosted by share repurchases, and another to force more disclosure of Boeing’s lobbying activities.
All these external proposals were given short shrift by the board and none came close to passing.
Outside the museum, a small band of relatives of people who died on the Ethiopian Airlines plane protested in the pouring rain. One sign called for the prosecution of Boeing and its executives for manslaughter.
Tarek Milleron, the uncle of 23-year-old Samya Stumo, who was among those killed, said that Boeing’s leadership “should open up on the chain of events that led to these accidents.”
Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or [email protected]; on Twitter: @dominicgates.
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With those two statements on offer- and the acknowledgement that there is plenty of blame to go around, the question I have is why are you not focusing on Boeing, the corporate culture that created this monster, the profit-driven betrayal of everyone here, and the fact that they are clearly working to pull a rabbit out of the hat in lieu of actually starting over again- which is what any rational society would require them to do. Yes, we know who the four crew members are, so that makes them easy targets, but if the professionals on this forum are willing to eat their own while looking the other way as Boeing goes about its PR campaign then what does that really say about all of us??
Let me answer a question with a question.
Are you more interesting in bitching or saving lives?
Sorry to put it so bluntly, but really that is what it comes down to. I've already answered this query, but let me state it again. There was a chain of causation in these accidents. That chain consisted of the following:
1. Lapses at Boeing
2. Lapses at the FAA and other certificate authorities
3. At least in the case of Lion Air, lapses in the maintenance/logistics area.
4. Lapses within the airlines in terms of education, training, policies, and culture.
5. Lapses in flight crew member actions
Granted, some may have a different list, but this mine for moment. Now let me ask very pointedly, if the goal is to increase the safety of our operations and prevent future accidents, which item on this list do we, as front line operators, have the most power to effect?
I don't care how insightful or detailed of analysis anyone on this forum could come up with on items 1 thru 3, the chance of it making any difference is essentially zero. It might make you feel better in some respects, but it will not change a thing. Maybe, if the right people are paying attention here, we could have an impact on item 4. However, if the motivation is truly to improve safety and save lives, item 5 is where we ought to spend our time.
As I've said several times already, you can't solve a problem until you recognize a problem exists. I'm sorry if in the course of defining the problem it appears that we are "eating our own," but that is not the intent.
BTW, doesn't it really bug you how Boeing, the FAA, and the airlines try to be all mushy-mouth in saying that they really didn't screw things up? Of course they did!
Why don't they just admit it and get on with fixing their problems?!
That is a very good question indeed.
.
Last edited by 737 Driver; 29th Apr 2019 at 22:27.
The thing is, there would be no need to discuss any of this if it wasn't for these poorly-trained pilots flying one of the thousands of planes ordered. And SLFs decided (so far) that the ticket price covers the risk of flying with less reputable airlines (which again, is probably better for them than not flying at all to get where they want).
As was stated before by a safety engineer, you can address the current situation by more training for a lot of people (increasing costs hence tickets price), and only reducing the risk by a small margin (HF being what is is). Or you can fix the design at a lower cost for everyone (but Boeing), considering that the current average level of airmanship is sufficient. One could say that given the actual safety record of the industry, it is.
As was stated before by a safety engineer, you can address the current situation by more training for a lot of people (increasing costs hence tickets price), and only reducing the risk by a small margin (HF being what is is). Or you can fix the design at a lower cost for everyone (but Boeing), considering that the current average level of airmanship is sufficient. One could say that given the actual safety record of the industry, it is.
Why indeed?
Let me answer a question with a question.
Are you more interesting in bitching or saving lives?
Sorry to put it so bluntly, but really that is what it comes down to. I've already answered this query, but let me state it again. There was a chain of causation in these accidents. That chain consisted of the following:
1. Lapses at Boeing
2. Lapses at the FAA and other certificate authorities
3. At least in the case of Lion Air, lapses in the maintenance/logistics area.
4. Lapses within the airlines in terms of education, training, policies, and culture.
5. Lapses in flight crew member actions
Granted, some may have a different list, but this mine for moment. Now let me ask very pointedly, if the goal is to increase the safety of our operations and prevent future accidents, which item on this list do we, as front line operators, have the most power to effect?
I don't care how insightful or detailed of analysis anyone on this forum could come up with on items 1 thru 3, the chance of it making any difference is essentially zero. It might make you feel better in some respects, but it will not change a thing. Maybe, if the right people are paying attention here, we could have an impact on item 4. However, if the motivation is truly to improve safety and save lives, item 5 is where we ought to spend our time.
As I've said, you can't solve a problem until you recognize a problem exists. I'm sorry if in the course of defining the problem it appears that we are "eating our own," but that is not the intent.
BTW, doesn't it really bug you how Boeing, the FAA, and the airlines try to be all mushy-mouth in saying that they really didn't screw things up? Of course they did!
Why don't they just admit it and get on with fixing their problems?!
That is a very good question indeed.
.
Let me answer a question with a question.
Are you more interesting in bitching or saving lives?
Sorry to put it so bluntly, but really that is what it comes down to. I've already answered this query, but let me state it again. There was a chain of causation in these accidents. That chain consisted of the following:
1. Lapses at Boeing
2. Lapses at the FAA and other certificate authorities
3. At least in the case of Lion Air, lapses in the maintenance/logistics area.
4. Lapses within the airlines in terms of education, training, policies, and culture.
5. Lapses in flight crew member actions
Granted, some may have a different list, but this mine for moment. Now let me ask very pointedly, if the goal is to increase the safety of our operations and prevent future accidents, which item on this list do we, as front line operators, have the most power to effect?
I don't care how insightful or detailed of analysis anyone on this forum could come up with on items 1 thru 3, the chance of it making any difference is essentially zero. It might make you feel better in some respects, but it will not change a thing. Maybe, if the right people are paying attention here, we could have an impact on item 4. However, if the motivation is truly to improve safety and save lives, item 5 is where we ought to spend our time.
As I've said, you can't solve a problem until you recognize a problem exists. I'm sorry if in the course of defining the problem it appears that we are "eating our own," but that is not the intent.
BTW, doesn't it really bug you how Boeing, the FAA, and the airlines try to be all mushy-mouth in saying that they really didn't screw things up? Of course they did!
Why don't they just admit it and get on with fixing their problems?!
That is a very good question indeed.
.
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The thing is, there would be no need to discuss any of this if it wasn't for these poorly-trained pilots flying one of the thousands of planes ordered. And SLFs decided (so far) that the ticket price covers the risk of flying with less reputable airlines (which again, is probably better for them than not flying at all to get where they want).
As was stated before by a safety engineer, you can address the current situation by more training for a lot of people (increasing costs hence tickets price), and only reducing the risk by a small margin (HF being what is is). Or you can fix the design at a lower cost for everyone (but Boeing), considering that the current average level of airmanship is sufficient. One could say that given the actual safety record of the industry, it is.
As was stated before by a safety engineer, you can address the current situation by more training for a lot of people (increasing costs hence tickets price), and only reducing the risk by a small margin (HF being what is is). Or you can fix the design at a lower cost for everyone (but Boeing), considering that the current average level of airmanship is sufficient. One could say that given the actual safety record of the industry, it is.
The reputable airlines have "forced" Boeing to come up with the MAX, without SIM training in order to compete with AB. I found very difficult to accept that the issue of SIM training/MAX is driven by ticket prices, reputable airlines are probably enjoying bigger discounts on planes. Delta/American/United have reported multi billion dollars net profit in 2018. Spending 60 million of that profit would allow to purchase 2 SIM (5 million each), and perform 10000 hours of training on them (5000/hour). I do not think will break the companies, unless you are a bean counter, than we got to my first paragraph....
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One more try
L39 Guy and 737 Driver- I owe you both a reply form last night, but it will have to wait for a bit.
In getting caught up with the thread just now a number of continuations of the theme from teh past week popped up, some in support of your stated observation/opinions and some against. Instead of arguing about them ad infinatum I had a vision of explaining how we aren't necessarily as far apart as it may seem, but also how your view as stated is (IMHO) deeply flawed and unforgiving towards four people who are not here to defend themselves.
My path to enlightenment is actually very easy and short.
Assumption: MCAS is a bastard system (some would say a killer) that was created and installed at the last minute and that provides a stupid feel/feedback control with actual control over the entirety of the horizontal stabilizer's range of movement.
Statement 1: Many professional pilots feel strongly that the primary focus for responsibility (note I said primary, not sole) lies with the airmanship (or lack thereof) of the flight crews who perished. In a narrow window of time they failed to correctly (as in solve the puzzle) answer the challenge they had been presented with, the first time never getting there, the second not getting there until the stab was outside of a previously unknown box that would allow it to be manually rolled back into more usable territory. The follow-on to this statement is that both crashes were the fault of the crews for failing the most basic of tasks- to fly the airplane.
Statement 2: Many of us here feel that there is a deep and very real culpability within Boeing and the FAA for creating such a lethal design. In this case (this is all entirely hypothetical, please work with the suggestion rather than the actuality) an engineer was presented with a problem that needed to be solved. She and her team came up with MCAS. The person responsible for choosing the best course of design knew that MCAS would have a profound impact on the horizontal stab, and they chose to shoehorn it in there anyway. The flight-test crews knew of the system at least and failed to properly review it for (what are now) obvious technical and safety shortcomings. Then, in a further admission that they were pushing the envelope everyone involved at Boeing literally hid the existence of the system from the pilots and operators who would fly the airplane. That person(s) also misled the FAA by informing the feds that the maximum authority that MCAS would have was .6 of a degree, when in reality (and they knew this) it was 2.5 degrees at a whack. In a final insult they said "all you need is an hour with this here tablet-thingy and you will know all you need to know to safely command and fly the MAX series of aircraft!!
With those two statements on offer- and the acknowledgement that there is plenty of blame to go around, the question I have is why are you not focusing on Boeing, the corporate culture that created this monster, the profit-driven betrayal of everyone here, and the fact that they are clearly working to pull a rabbit out of the hat in lieu of actually starting over again- which is what any rational society would require them to do. Yes, we know who the four crew members are, so that makes them easy targets, but if the professionals on this forum are willing to eat their own while looking the other way as Boeing goes about its PR campaign then what does that really say about all of us??
Warm regards-
dce
In getting caught up with the thread just now a number of continuations of the theme from teh past week popped up, some in support of your stated observation/opinions and some against. Instead of arguing about them ad infinatum I had a vision of explaining how we aren't necessarily as far apart as it may seem, but also how your view as stated is (IMHO) deeply flawed and unforgiving towards four people who are not here to defend themselves.
My path to enlightenment is actually very easy and short.
Assumption: MCAS is a bastard system (some would say a killer) that was created and installed at the last minute and that provides a stupid feel/feedback control with actual control over the entirety of the horizontal stabilizer's range of movement.
Statement 1: Many professional pilots feel strongly that the primary focus for responsibility (note I said primary, not sole) lies with the airmanship (or lack thereof) of the flight crews who perished. In a narrow window of time they failed to correctly (as in solve the puzzle) answer the challenge they had been presented with, the first time never getting there, the second not getting there until the stab was outside of a previously unknown box that would allow it to be manually rolled back into more usable territory. The follow-on to this statement is that both crashes were the fault of the crews for failing the most basic of tasks- to fly the airplane.
Statement 2: Many of us here feel that there is a deep and very real culpability within Boeing and the FAA for creating such a lethal design. In this case (this is all entirely hypothetical, please work with the suggestion rather than the actuality) an engineer was presented with a problem that needed to be solved. She and her team came up with MCAS. The person responsible for choosing the best course of design knew that MCAS would have a profound impact on the horizontal stab, and they chose to shoehorn it in there anyway. The flight-test crews knew of the system at least and failed to properly review it for (what are now) obvious technical and safety shortcomings. Then, in a further admission that they were pushing the envelope everyone involved at Boeing literally hid the existence of the system from the pilots and operators who would fly the airplane. That person(s) also misled the FAA by informing the feds that the maximum authority that MCAS would have was .6 of a degree, when in reality (and they knew this) it was 2.5 degrees at a whack. In a final insult they said "all you need is an hour with this here tablet-thingy and you will know all you need to know to safely command and fly the MAX series of aircraft!!
With those two statements on offer- and the acknowledgement that there is plenty of blame to go around, the question I have is why are you not focusing on Boeing, the corporate culture that created this monster, the profit-driven betrayal of everyone here, and the fact that they are clearly working to pull a rabbit out of the hat in lieu of actually starting over again- which is what any rational society would require them to do. Yes, we know who the four crew members are, so that makes them easy targets, but if the professionals on this forum are willing to eat their own while looking the other way as Boeing goes about its PR campaign then what does that really say about all of us??
Warm regards-
dce
The MCAS system obviously should have been designed better but the press makes it seem as if Boeing knew the system created great risks but they went ahead with it anyway in order to make more profit. That thought in itself is so absurd that arguing with anyone who believes it, is basically pointless. If Boeing had thought these accidents were likely to occur they would have designed the system differently.
What does this MCAS monster as you call it actually do? It lowers the nose of the aircraft by changing the position of the horizontal stabilizer. It doesn't make the wings fall off, it doesn't set the plane on fire... it only moves the horizontal stabilizer. There is a switch on the pilots control column which moves the horizontal stabilizer and it overrides MCAS each time. I know you guys do not want to face it, but it really is that simple. Now if someone is reading this, thinking if it was that simple why didn't the pilots just do it? First of all they did. The Lion Air Captain did it at least twenty times. And the Ethiopian Captain did trim out the MCAS induced movement completely the second time it activated. So we could already talk a lot about why they didn't do it the whole time, then lower the flaps for landing (MCAS deactivates) and land. Aside from the fact that they did use the trim switch a little bit at least. please have a look at Asiana flight 214, Emirates 521, or Turkish 1951. These are only a few examples of flights were pilots failed to do the most basic thing: flying the aircraft. There were other causes as well and in the case of Turkish and Asiana the flights were not stabilized at 1000 Feet which means they should have carried out a go around preventing both accidents even before the mistake of not flying the aircraft (speed control) was made.
What these accidents show you is that pilots will crash aircraft even though it would have been very easy not to. In the case of Asiana and Emirates there were not even any system failures. Why these things happen is a completely different issue and the answers are to be found in the human factors involved when people fly aircraft. The Fact is, planes crash because pilots do not carry out the basic steps involved in flying an aircraft.
Now one important point I would like to make to all the posters with their Skygod and hindsight comments: First of all, it isn't about blaming the pilots. It is about stating facts. If I or others state that the crew did not carry out the unreliable airspeed memory items when in fact Boeing requires a crew to so in the situation they were in, then that is stating a fact and has nothing to do with hindsight or blame. Stick shaker only on one side, several caution lights going on, differing airspeed indications create a very confusing situation. For exactly that reason there are memory items in order to deal with that situation and they must be carried out. This procedure is a life saver because in that situation it is nearly impossible to figure out which system is malfunctioning and what is actually going on. For that reason: AP off, AT off, FD both off, flaps extended 10° pitch 80% N1. This will set the airplane on a safe flight path and you will continue to climb away from the ground. Now you have time to figure out the problem. This is what we are trained for. This is our job. Carrying out these procedures in that situation has nothing to do with being a skygod and pointing out that the crew did not do it doesn't make us armchair pilots with hindsight. If there is an engine fire on take off I carry out my memory items, if there is a rapid depressurization I carry out my memory items. Again this is what we are trained for.
If the crew had done this on any of these flights we wouldn't even be talking about MCAS. I am not blaming the crew when I say they did no do this. The crew is always just a product of the training department and the general procedures of the airline they fly for. For example, in the case of the Emirates crash, the crew wanted to fly a go around. They only pushed the take off/go around button but did not actually move the thrust lever forward in order to increase thrust on the engines. These pilots were not idiots. I can completely understand how this could happen. Normally as long as the automatic thrust control is engaged, pushing the TOGA button will increase thrust. However, shortly after touch down the automatic thrust control is automatically disengaged. Emirates is an airline with procedures that will not allow pilots to fly manually with the flight directors off for example. I can understand how a crew that is trained to rely on automation will not think to actually move the thrust levers and will not check if the thrust is increasing, despite procedures to do so. Basic skills are lost if one does not use them regularly.
The 737 MAX is grounded and will continue to be grounded for a long time because people think the airplane is unsafe. Furthermore the press reported the Ethiopian pilots carried out all the required procedures and yet they crashed. Why are people like me writing on this forum? It simply isn't true that the 737 MAX is inherently unsafe even with the "old" MCAS and it isn't true that the crew carried out the required procedures. That is not my opinion. That is a fact (again why they did not do it is another issue). If the established procedures had been carried out the planes would not have crashed. There was not one procedure done wrong but several done wrong. Each one of these procedures would have saved the aircraft. Carrying out the unreliable airspeed memory items is one procedure. If the pilots do not do this they are already entering an area where they are not flying the airplane according to procedure anymore but even in that case, carrying out the stab trim runaway memory items correctly once MCAS engaged (please stop these ridiculous comments that the MCAS activation cannot be recognized as a stab trim runaway) would also have saved the plane. If the pilots decide for whatever reason to not even do that, they still have the option of just trimming out the control forces each time MCAS activates (basic flying skills). Again when I am stating what they should have done according to procedure I am not blaming the pilots but only stating the facts of what Boeing says pilots must do in these situations and what we are trained for in our manuals and in the simulator. These recommended procedures would have saved the plane and please realize that there was a flight that had exactly the same problems and they did land safely (and they did not carry out unreliable airspeed mem items and also did not accurately carry out the stab trim mem items and still they saved the plane proving there are several options and it is not a react quickly or die situation).
Final comment: In my opinion crews that are not trained well and are lacking basic skills of flying the aircraft due to company policies are a far greater threat to aviation safety than any system design. I believe we still have a long way to go until we will design systems that never fail (if ever). So it will continue to be up to the pilots to save the day when systems malfunction. There needs to be a focus on enabling pilots to do so a lot more than focusing on how MCAS can be improved.
Last edited by 737mgm; 30th Apr 2019 at 07:40.
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And my response would be that some people are having trouble seeing that, quite often, these are really two sides of the same coin.
To put it another way, if the accident investigation team determines that one of the primary causes was the poor design of MCAS, would Boeing be blameless?
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SWA claim they thought they had AOA Disagree
"Southwest Airlines says Boeing didn't disclose it had deactivated safety alert on 737 Max jets"
So says Bloomberg, quoting the WSJ. I shan't copy-paste the article here, and I don't believe I can post a link, but the essence is that SWA are stating that their manuals showed the AOA Disagree alert as being a standard feature, not optional, and that they did not know it was optional until after the Lion Air incident. They're also saying that the AOA Disagree alert was standard fit on the NG.
So says Bloomberg, quoting the WSJ. I shan't copy-paste the article here, and I don't believe I can post a link, but the essence is that SWA are stating that their manuals showed the AOA Disagree alert as being a standard feature, not optional, and that they did not know it was optional until after the Lion Air incident. They're also saying that the AOA Disagree alert was standard fit on the NG.
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Trimming out the control forces is an instinctive and unconscious action that 737 Driver has so nicely articulated that is a fundamental skill that pilots with 5 hours of flying time have.
I don't know what it could be (can you break the switches by pressing too hard on them?)
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Have you considered that bitching may save lives? Without extensive "bitching" against Boeing and the FAA from the pilot community, even going as far as being considered "hysterical" by some, the responsible parties at Boeing and the FAA may just conclude that pilots will accept whatever **** system they will come up with and respectively certify, and at some point the public will forget and carry on flying on those flawed machines. How is that a good thing for safety?
I would love nothing more than having all the holes in the layers of cheese patched, including any deficiencies in pilot training. That may require bitching too, not just towards Boeing and the FAA, but also towards the airlines that are extremely reluctant to give the pilots more than a few hours of training, and no simulator training if at all possible.
I think sometimes an attitude along the lines of "I'm mad as Hell and I'm not going to take this anymore" is required to make the responsible parties realize this cannot continue, and fundamental changes must be made. In my opinion that should start with the FAA being given the appropriate budget and independence from political influence to be able to properly regulate both the airlines and the aircraft manufactures, forcing them to "produce" both safe aircrafts and safe pilots respectively.
As a passenger, I will try my best to avoid Boeing aircraft until that actually happens.
I would love nothing more than having all the holes in the layers of cheese patched, including any deficiencies in pilot training. That may require bitching too, not just towards Boeing and the FAA, but also towards the airlines that are extremely reluctant to give the pilots more than a few hours of training, and no simulator training if at all possible.
I think sometimes an attitude along the lines of "I'm mad as Hell and I'm not going to take this anymore" is required to make the responsible parties realize this cannot continue, and fundamental changes must be made. In my opinion that should start with the FAA being given the appropriate budget and independence from political influence to be able to properly regulate both the airlines and the aircraft manufactures, forcing them to "produce" both safe aircrafts and safe pilots respectively.
As a passenger, I will try my best to avoid Boeing aircraft until that actually happens.
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Have you considered that bitching may save lives? Without extensive "bitching" against Boeing and the FAA from the pilot community, even going as far as being considered "hysterical" by some, the responsible parties at Boeing and the FAA may just conclude that pilots will accept whatever **** system they will come up with and respectively certify, and the public at some point will forget and carry on flying on those flawed machines. How is that a good thing for safety?
