Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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I would avoid making assumptions about the skills of the crews. In Europe it's easy to do too - we hear incompetent sounding fat cigar chewing fools who don't know that you can have a flight level of 90, but we try to remember that judging ability by nationality or assumed education is very, very wrong.
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In quiet cockpit, vmc, no distractions, no turbulence, hands on controls: 3 seconds. 1: a/c is just "doing its thing". 2: thats weird. 3: wtf? Hit elec trim.
But. With stick shaker distraction: add time. With any other alarm, add more time. Add IMC, double it. If you're concentrating on another task: Add time. With noise that masks clacks: more time. Add "I have control" there's another half second. Add fatigue: more time.
MCAS is a slow-motion catastrophic control surface failure, taking 12 seconds. (For those who haven't followed all 228 pages of this thread, see this post detailing why MCAS is so insidious and lethal to a pilot.) You're treating it like an engine fail on takeoff. It has more in common with wonkazoo's snapped rudder cable. An engine fail on takeoff you'd pretty much expect to see at some point in your career. Before Lion Air and ET, no-one would be expecting to see trim runaway. This surprise factor again adds time.
They ran out of time.
Every time you say 'just fly the plane' or 'basic airmanship' or 'get another career' you're completely ignoring human factors. This is as dangerous as not knowing how to fly the aircraft. And this is why you're getting such a deservedly robust response from others on here.
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I did not read the discussion for a weak and I find it partly very useless.
As an (automotive) safety engineer, I categorize the 'controllability' of an event in simple (>99%), normal (>90%) or difficult (<90%) according to ISO26262.
And yes, difficult and uncontrollable are the same.
So as long as less than 90% of the pilots here are saying 'piece of cake', it's the same as uncontrollable.
The reason is very easy: If you design a system, you can estimate an order of magnitude of the error probability. Sensor redundancy doubles the number fields on your lottery ticket, so would you bother about the exact probability, third digit? Probably not if you're going from one in a million to one in a trillion (lost flights / winning tickets...).
What's better? Rely on the estimate that 70% of professional pilots can handle the event with training instead of 40% or just make it one in a million years instead of 2 times in 4 months by a simple plain stupid sensor compare of existing sensors?
Together with other estimates (exposure, severity), where MCAS has both won the jackpot (highly probable situation with fatal outcome), this looks like a highly critical system to me.
As an engineer, this tells you that you really need redundancy. There is always a remaining probability (like lot's of goose at low attitude as common cause for a dive in the Hudson...) where the pilot may have a chance of not being part of the 'remaining accepted risk of flying' by our society. But how often did it happen? Based on how many planes in the air? Would anyone blame the captain if this would have gone wrong?
Recently I read the report and told another safety engineer that the FBW system prevented a stall while the pilot pulled the stick and would have caused it. The first question I got was: Did he count on this function? Like with ESP: you do not longer consider blocking tires, just press hard... The automation assists you even in critical situations, that's state of the art (instead of 37 turns on a handwheel).
The obvious underestimation of this MCAS function is one thing, but no engineer would DEACTIVATE an existing diagnostic function while at the same time ADDING a safety critical system to the (no longer) diagnosed input.
Especially with the explanation that this one true warning may cause side effects while the pilot gets ****loads of false ones (stickshaker...). But media reports indicate that this is the case.
This would scream at you at so many stages of the design process that it would be almost impossible to overlook. Except there is something wrong with your process..
In addition, if this turns out to be a defective cabling as whistleblowers describe, it would make things even far worse:
-> Cabling diagnostics are the first thing an engineer does on EVERY cable he can find. It's easy to implement and cuts the error probability a lot.
-> Range check is the second one and a no-brainer... (which pilot did ever encounter a real/plausible AoA of 75° from below? Free-fall at 0 speed, flying in reverse gear or over an active volcano?)
-> If this was due to a foreign object close to the cabling, this opens up another big question mark: Production quality?
So if this turns out to be a management decision (or management decisions involved), good night Boeing... The 'training penalty' definitely counts as a motivation to do so.
Not because of MCAS but because it would put all decisions regarding safety of the last years into question since they could also be infected by financial aspects (including the FAA).
In my opinion everything points in this direction, since this thing is too big to be overseen within the safety engineering process.
But please, point the discussion in the direction of duct tape in the cockpit in case the pilot has to tape the wings back in place like every real pilot would do...
You couldn't do Boeing a bigger favour than this. Fighting the value of the third digit while there are several digits missing and maybe enough holes in the cheese for other surprises.
PS: Yesterday I had a turnament on ballroom dancing, first one after a long break. I trained for years and guess what: I learned that I need to dance the choreography I trained for months once directly before the turnament because with all the adrenaline in my blood I simply could not remember it / access my long term memory. It's like a tunnel, lost, gone for a moment... Ballroom competition dancing is considered one of the sports with the highest stress hormon levels (competitive sports + thinking + uncontrollable factors like your partner) and I finally realized what that means and does to you...
Having his life immediately threatened is probably far better than this, and the pilots had the full load ('sportive-elevator-pulling' + thinking + a mad MCAS). Nothing prepares you for this, no simulator, simply nothing... It may be comparable to doing a math test after your first bungee jump with fear of heights after a fast run... Simply do the math... sure...
As an (automotive) safety engineer, I categorize the 'controllability' of an event in simple (>99%), normal (>90%) or difficult (<90%) according to ISO26262.
And yes, difficult and uncontrollable are the same.
So as long as less than 90% of the pilots here are saying 'piece of cake', it's the same as uncontrollable.
The reason is very easy: If you design a system, you can estimate an order of magnitude of the error probability. Sensor redundancy doubles the number fields on your lottery ticket, so would you bother about the exact probability, third digit? Probably not if you're going from one in a million to one in a trillion (lost flights / winning tickets...).
What's better? Rely on the estimate that 70% of professional pilots can handle the event with training instead of 40% or just make it one in a million years instead of 2 times in 4 months by a simple plain stupid sensor compare of existing sensors?
Together with other estimates (exposure, severity), where MCAS has both won the jackpot (highly probable situation with fatal outcome), this looks like a highly critical system to me.
As an engineer, this tells you that you really need redundancy. There is always a remaining probability (like lot's of goose at low attitude as common cause for a dive in the Hudson...) where the pilot may have a chance of not being part of the 'remaining accepted risk of flying' by our society. But how often did it happen? Based on how many planes in the air? Would anyone blame the captain if this would have gone wrong?
Recently I read the report and told another safety engineer that the FBW system prevented a stall while the pilot pulled the stick and would have caused it. The first question I got was: Did he count on this function? Like with ESP: you do not longer consider blocking tires, just press hard... The automation assists you even in critical situations, that's state of the art (instead of 37 turns on a handwheel).
The obvious underestimation of this MCAS function is one thing, but no engineer would DEACTIVATE an existing diagnostic function while at the same time ADDING a safety critical system to the (no longer) diagnosed input.
Especially with the explanation that this one true warning may cause side effects while the pilot gets ****loads of false ones (stickshaker...). But media reports indicate that this is the case.
This would scream at you at so many stages of the design process that it would be almost impossible to overlook. Except there is something wrong with your process..
In addition, if this turns out to be a defective cabling as whistleblowers describe, it would make things even far worse:
-> Cabling diagnostics are the first thing an engineer does on EVERY cable he can find. It's easy to implement and cuts the error probability a lot.
-> Range check is the second one and a no-brainer... (which pilot did ever encounter a real/plausible AoA of 75° from below? Free-fall at 0 speed, flying in reverse gear or over an active volcano?)
-> If this was due to a foreign object close to the cabling, this opens up another big question mark: Production quality?
So if this turns out to be a management decision (or management decisions involved), good night Boeing... The 'training penalty' definitely counts as a motivation to do so.
Not because of MCAS but because it would put all decisions regarding safety of the last years into question since they could also be infected by financial aspects (including the FAA).
In my opinion everything points in this direction, since this thing is too big to be overseen within the safety engineering process.
But please, point the discussion in the direction of duct tape in the cockpit in case the pilot has to tape the wings back in place like every real pilot would do...
You couldn't do Boeing a bigger favour than this. Fighting the value of the third digit while there are several digits missing and maybe enough holes in the cheese for other surprises.
PS: Yesterday I had a turnament on ballroom dancing, first one after a long break. I trained for years and guess what: I learned that I need to dance the choreography I trained for months once directly before the turnament because with all the adrenaline in my blood I simply could not remember it / access my long term memory. It's like a tunnel, lost, gone for a moment... Ballroom competition dancing is considered one of the sports with the highest stress hormon levels (competitive sports + thinking + uncontrollable factors like your partner) and I finally realized what that means and does to you...
Having his life immediately threatened is probably far better than this, and the pilots had the full load ('sportive-elevator-pulling' + thinking + a mad MCAS). Nothing prepares you for this, no simulator, simply nothing... It may be comparable to doing a math test after your first bungee jump with fear of heights after a fast run... Simply do the math... sure...
Last edited by TryingToLearn; 29th Apr 2019 at 00:40.
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In quiet cockpit, vmc, no distractions, no turbulence, hands on controls: 3 seconds. 1: a/c is just "doing its thing". 2: thats weird. 3: wtf? Hit elec trim.
But. With stick shaker distraction: add time. With any other alarm, add more time. Add IMC, double it. If you're concentrating on another task: Add time. With noise that masks clacks: more time. Add "I have control" there's another half second. Add fatigue: more time.
MCAS is a slow-motion catastrophic control surface failure, taking 12 seconds. (For those who haven't followed all 228 pages of this thread, see this post detailing why MCAS is so insidious and lethal to a pilot.) You're treating it like an engine fail on takeoff. It has more in common with wonkazoo's snapped rudder cable. An engine fail on takeoff you'd pretty much expect to see at some point in your career. Before Lion Air and ET, no-one would be expecting to see trim runaway. This surprise factor again adds time.
They ran out of time.
Every time you say 'just fly the plane' or 'basic airmanship' or 'get another career' you're completely ignoring human factors. This is as dangerous as not knowing how to fly the aircraft. And this is why you're getting such a deservedly robust response from others on here.
In quiet cockpit, vmc, no distractions, no turbulence, hands on controls: 3 seconds. 1: a/c is just "doing its thing". 2: thats weird. 3: wtf? Hit elec trim.
But. With stick shaker distraction: add time. With any other alarm, add more time. Add IMC, double it. If you're concentrating on another task: Add time. With noise that masks clacks: more time. Add "I have control" there's another half second. Add fatigue: more time.
MCAS is a slow-motion catastrophic control surface failure, taking 12 seconds. (For those who haven't followed all 228 pages of this thread, see this post detailing why MCAS is so insidious and lethal to a pilot.) You're treating it like an engine fail on takeoff. It has more in common with wonkazoo's snapped rudder cable. An engine fail on takeoff you'd pretty much expect to see at some point in your career. Before Lion Air and ET, no-one would be expecting to see trim runaway. This surprise factor again adds time.
They ran out of time.
Every time you say 'just fly the plane' or 'basic airmanship' or 'get another career' you're completely ignoring human factors. This is as dangerous as not knowing how to fly the aircraft. And this is why you're getting such a deservedly robust response from others on here.
A significant part of the training of a professional pilot is how to handle things when things are going wrong. There is not a one of us who hasn't been in a sim when lights were flashing, alarms were blaring, systems were malfunctioning and the plane was trying to do something that it wasn't supposed to do. Is there some specified level of distraction at which we are excused from doing our job? If there is, I haven't heard of it.
And what is that job? At a minimum, when all is going to hell and you are really not sure what else to do - FLY THE AIRCRAFT. Turn off the magic, set the pitch, set the power, monitor the performance, trim the aircraft, move to a safe altitude. Do that until your head clears and you can sort out what else needs to be done. This action should be as reflexive as executing your takeoff reject procedures - if you have to think about it, you're too late.
Being able to respond correctly under pressure and distraction is one of those things professional pilots are supposed to train for and expected to do. There is no "pause" button we can hit to stop the motion. We need to have the ability to shake off the distractions and FLY THE AIRCRAFT, first, last, and always. Yes, there is some level of turmoil that will overcome the best of us, but the events surrounding these accidents come no where near that threshold.
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Turn off the magic, :: The only (documented) way to do this was using the trim cutouts, which they did do.
set the pitch, :: the were pulling the whole time with little change in displayed pitch, some oscillations after trim cutout.
set the power, :: Crew left it at takeoff, speed reached and settled at near/just over VMO after trim cutout.
monitor the performance, :: don'n know enogh to comment, other than noticing speed, but they may have not have had confidence in instruments.
trim the aircraft, :: One has to believe they were trying once cutout, may have wasted some time if only right switch was selected in mistaken belief that manual electric would still be available as on NG. Unfortunalty no detail in prelim report.
move to a safe altitude. . :: require pitch control, although they were gradually climbing until the end.
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Not ignoring the human element at all. Yes, the Captain was sufficiently distracted that he failed to take the most basic steps to fly his aircraft. There are all sorts of reasons why this can happen, but my point is that it should not have happened.
A significant part of the training of a professional pilot is how to handle things when things are going wrong. There is not a one of us who hasn't been in a sim when lights were flashing, alarms were blaring, systems were malfunctioning and the plane was trying to do something that it wasn't supposed to do. Is there some specified level of distraction at which we are excused from doing our job? If there is, I haven't heard of it.
And what is that job? At a minimum, when all is going to hell and you are really not sure what else to do - FLY THE AIRCRAFT. Turn off the magic, set the pitch, set the power, monitor the performance, trim the aircraft, move to a safe altitude. Do that until your head clears and you can sort out what else needs to be done. This action should be as reflexive as executing your takeoff reject procedures - if you have to think about it, you're too late.
Being able to respond correctly under pressure and distraction is one of those things professional pilots are supposed to train for and expected to do. There is no "pause" button we can hit to stop the motion. We need to have the ability to shake off the distractions and FLY THE AIRCRAFT, first, last, and always. Yes, there is some level of turmoil that will overcome the best of us, but the events surrounding these accidents come no where near that threshold.
A significant part of the training of a professional pilot is how to handle things when things are going wrong. There is not a one of us who hasn't been in a sim when lights were flashing, alarms were blaring, systems were malfunctioning and the plane was trying to do something that it wasn't supposed to do. Is there some specified level of distraction at which we are excused from doing our job? If there is, I haven't heard of it.
And what is that job? At a minimum, when all is going to hell and you are really not sure what else to do - FLY THE AIRCRAFT. Turn off the magic, set the pitch, set the power, monitor the performance, trim the aircraft, move to a safe altitude. Do that until your head clears and you can sort out what else needs to be done. This action should be as reflexive as executing your takeoff reject procedures - if you have to think about it, you're too late.
Being able to respond correctly under pressure and distraction is one of those things professional pilots are supposed to train for and expected to do. There is no "pause" button we can hit to stop the motion. We need to have the ability to shake off the distractions and FLY THE AIRCRAFT, first, last, and always. Yes, there is some level of turmoil that will overcome the best of us, but the events surrounding these accidents come no where near that threshold.
"There is not a one of us who hasn't been in a sim when lights were flashing, alarms were blaring, systems were malfunctioning and the plane was trying to do something that it wasn't supposed to do. Is there some specified level of distraction at which we are excused from doing our job? If there is, I haven't heard of it."
While you were sitting there in the sim your body's adrenal system is sitting quietly, secure in the knowledge that the furthest you will fall is the ten feet down the entry stairs when you exit your session. I don't care how many alarms you are facing in a simulation- it is, by definition, a simulation. On the other hand, coming face to face in an instant with the knowledge and reality that your life is about to end and it may or may not be in your control to alter that course will cause your adrenal system to kick into high gear, almost certainly to an extent you have never experienced before. Having experienced this myself and in a literal life or death moment I can attest to the fact that the reaction of your body is going to cause things to happen that you basically can't even imagine. So first things first: There is no way to test for how an individual will react in such a circumstance, just like there is no way to simulate such an occurrence. Stop fantasizing about the day you will heroically react perfectly and save the day. You won't, and if you do save the day it will be in spite of your own body's reactions, not because of them.
"Being able to respond correctly under pressure and distraction is one of those things professional pilots are supposed to train for and expected to do."
Sorry, but that is so much macho BS, and it undercuts and underlies everything you have written. Once again: Could the pilots have done better?? Yes. But placing yourself in their position and declaring loudly and repeatedly that you would have done great had you been there and all they had to do was fly the airplane is simply gross ignorance writ large. Each crew had a cascading series of complex failures, at the end of which a little hidden genie would politely but insistently spool the trim forward until the airplane was in an unrecoverable state. Lest we forget- the ET crew did cuotout the trim, they just didn't do it quickly enough to prevent yet another hidden factor from coming into play.
Finally: "We need to have the ability to shake off the distractions and FLY THE AIRCRAFT, first, last, and always."
From an obviously intelligent guy/gal that is the most ignorant piece of horse$hit I've seen offered here. You (Yes, I mean 737 Driver in this instance) are no more able to "shake off" the effects of your adrenal system than I am able to become an African American female. It is insulting and denigrates our noble profession to continue to offer the "hero pilot" trope as the answer to everything human that goes sideways in a cockpit. It's because of ignorance like this that concussions remain an overly significant issue in sports, with kids fighting to play on despite being at severe risk, because "that's what the tough guys do. They shake it off and keep playing."
If you cannot or don't want to accept these realities that's fine, and for sure I'm going to stop trying now to explain them to you as I am fairly sure people must be tiring of this game. At the same time I do hope sometime soon you are able to grasp the things you cannot see now, in a way that will make you a better pilot, to the benefit of your passengers and crew. As well that you will stop making the tiresome argument that you could have done it just fine and the crews obviously should have been able to as well if they had simply followed your advice and FLOWN THE AIRPLANE!!
Warm regards,
dce
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Sorry, fell into pilot speak. Let me translate.
By "magic", I am referring to the automation. Turn of the Flight Directors, disengage the autopilot and autothrottles. BTW, these are the first steps to the Airspeed Unreliable memory items.
If the crew had used the UAS procedures, 10 degrees pitch would have been the appropriate target. Pitch control was effective until the runaway event. The reason the Captain had trouble with pitch control was because 1) he did not actively trim against MCAS, and 2) they cutoff the electric stab trim only after the aircraft was severely out of trim.
Yes, we are aware. There was no attempt to change the power setting after liftoff. "Set the power" does not mean "Leave the power where it is." It means "SET THE POWER," as in put your hands physically on the power levers and set an appropriate power setting. UAS procedures call for 80% N1, but frankly anything between 80 and 90% would have probably been fine for their conditions as long as they also maintained the proper pitch attitude.
In the domain of instrument flying, there are "control" instruments and "performance" instruments. The basic control instruments are the attitude indicator and the primary power setting instrument (N1 on the 737). The performance instruments are things like airspeed, vertical velocity, altitude, heading. You manipulate the aircraft to establish certain parameters on the control instruments, and then you cross-check the performance instruments to see if the aircraft is reacting as you wish. If the aircraft's performance is not to your satisfaction, then you readjust on the control instruments and re-check the performance instruments. For example, if you wish to climb and the aircraft is not climbing, you increase the pitch and/or power and then you go back and see if you are now climbing (while also keeping an eye on the airspeed).
It also means that if you are OVERSPEEDING THE CRAP OUT OF THE AIRFRAME, you need to do something about that, too.
Hence the mantra, set the pitch (control), set the power (control), monitor the performance.
This statement really is a bit of a reach.
The "trim the aircraft" part came way, way before the point that they flew themselves into a corner. Yes, you can put this aircraft into a state that even Buck Rogers couldn't extract it. There was no reason to let MCAS trim as far as it did. The yoke trim switch trumps MCAS every single time. Failure to trim, pure and simple.
Pitch control would have been available to the Captain if he had simply used the power of his left thumb to trim the aircraft. He did not. The rest is history.
Sorry, fell into pilot speak. Let me translate.
set the pitch, :: the were pulling the whole time with little change in displayed pitch, some oscillations after trim cutout.
set the power, :: Crew left it at takeoff, speed reached and settled at near/just over VMO after trim cutout.
monitor the performance, :: don't know enough to comment, other than noticing speed,
It also means that if you are OVERSPEEDING THE CRAP OUT OF THE AIRFRAME, you need to do something about that, too.
Hence the mantra, set the pitch (control), set the power (control), monitor the performance.
but they may have not have had confidence in instruments.
trim the aircraft, :: One has to believe they were trying once cutout, may have wasted some time if only right switch was selected in mistaken belief that manual electric would still be available as on NG.
move to a safe altitude. . :: require pitch control, although they were gradually climbing until the end.
Last edited by 737 Driver; 29th Apr 2019 at 04:07.
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If you cannot or don't want to accept these realities that's fine, and for sure I'm going to stop trying now to explain them to you as I am fairly sure people must be tiring of this game. At the same time I do hope sometime soon you are able to grasp the things you cannot see now, in a way that will make you a better pilot, to the benefit of your passengers and crew. As well that you will stop making the tiresome argument that you could have done it just fine and the crews obviously should have been able to as well if they had simply followed your advice and FLOWN THE AIRPLANE!!
Warm regards,
dce
Warm regards,
dce
Excuse me if I choose not to live in that world.
Salute!
Thanks, Wonk...... well put views and axioms for the pilots and wannabe pilots here.
I am sure that more than one pilot reading all this crapola would have "survived" the scenarios we are examining. But not all. I will go so far as to assert that the Lion Air preceding flight crew had not a clue about MCAS and "lucked out" after getting tired of screwing with the uncommanded trim. The actual notes we saw in our Lion Air thread ( before 737 joined the forums) even stated, "STS running in reverse". That doesn;t sound like someone who knew about MCAS. Especially since the stick shaker was activated and the pilot prolly associated that with a high AoA - you know, a stall warning.
I also like one contributing pilot here that claimed the best thing to do initially when something weird happens is to wind the clock. I am sure the old farts remember that sucker right in front on the intstrument panel. Pressing the "stopwatch function" was the last thing you did before releasing the brakes, huh?
Oh well, maybe Boeing will eventually decide to correct the plane's basic aero characteristics and not add a kludge on top of another. Too many old wiring diagrams and connections, ya think?. So time to do a clean sheet design for all the electronics and try vortex generators, nacelle slots, or something to keep most of the model's production tooling but correct the aero.
Gums sends...
Thanks, Wonk...... well put views and axioms for the pilots and wannabe pilots here.
I am sure that more than one pilot reading all this crapola would have "survived" the scenarios we are examining. But not all. I will go so far as to assert that the Lion Air preceding flight crew had not a clue about MCAS and "lucked out" after getting tired of screwing with the uncommanded trim. The actual notes we saw in our Lion Air thread ( before 737 joined the forums) even stated, "STS running in reverse". That doesn;t sound like someone who knew about MCAS. Especially since the stick shaker was activated and the pilot prolly associated that with a high AoA - you know, a stall warning.
I also like one contributing pilot here that claimed the best thing to do initially when something weird happens is to wind the clock. I am sure the old farts remember that sucker right in front on the intstrument panel. Pressing the "stopwatch function" was the last thing you did before releasing the brakes, huh?
Oh well, maybe Boeing will eventually decide to correct the plane's basic aero characteristics and not add a kludge on top of another. Too many old wiring diagrams and connections, ya think?. So time to do a clean sheet design for all the electronics and try vortex generators, nacelle slots, or something to keep most of the model's production tooling but correct the aero.
Gums sends...
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Okay Wonkazoo, you win. I humbly concede. I guess we will all have to accept that any pilot can freeze up at any moment, people will die, and there's nothing to be done. There's no way to train, no way to learn, no way to improve, no way to avoid certain death for some uncertain number of people. The best we can hope for is that someday someone will invent the perfect aircraft and thus be able to remove the imperfect pilot from the equation altogether.
Excuse me if I choose not to live in that world.
Excuse me if I choose not to live in that world.
It is a positive thing however that we are totally confident that we can deal with such situations effectively even though that might not turn out to be the case if we are unlucky.
In the light of this I think it is very wrong we criticise pilots for making mistakes under stress, yes learn from those mistakes definitely but dont ever think youd never ever make them yourself.
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Okay Wonkazoo, you win. I humbly concede. I guess we will all have to accept that any pilot can freeze up at any moment, people will die, and there's nothing to be done. There's no way to train, no way to learn, no way to improve, no way to avoid certain death for some uncertain number of people. The best we can hope for is that someday someone will invent the perfect aircraft and thus be able to remove the imperfect pilot from the equation altogether.
Excuse me if I choose not to live in that world.
Excuse me if I choose not to live in that world.
Sadly it isn't about winning or losing, its about enlightenment and using knowledge to alter future outcomes. (As opposed to continuing ancient tropes while simultaneously ignoring and exculpating the individual(s) who were really at fault for setting the cheese in motion in the first place.) If you put a hundredth of the energy into picking apart the engineering staff, legal staff, management staff etc at Boeing, and the certification process as overseen (ahem) by the FAA I would be more impressed, not to mention you might have a positive impact on the actual root causes for the entire chain of events.
And the next 737 model you climb into might end up being properly engineered and certified as a result, which I would think would be a happy outcome for you given your profession.
Warm regards,
dce
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However I am seriously wondering what's going on here and thought it worth pointing out to the population at large.
Regards,
dce
Regards,
dce
What is going on is I took an interest in these events since I do happen to operate this aircraft, and I came here among other places looking for information. Feel free to go back and look at my earliest posts. Yes, I like a good debate, but I have also tried to pass along relevant information regarding the 737 systems since there were obviously some non-pilots and non-Boeing folks wandering off into the weeds. Along the way, however, I also noticed a definite trend here of throwing bricks across the fence without much in the way of serious introspection. Let's just say I have a thing about intellectual consistency.
I've made no bones about where I think the problems lie, and I've noticed that no one seems to contradict me when I aim my displeasure at Boeing, or the FAA, or the airlines, or anyone but a fellow pilot. Why is that?
Are pilots that infallible? Do we have no room for improvement? Can we not honestly admit our errors and seek to do better? It's perfectly okay to say Boeing fracked up, but we dare not consider that a fellow aviator did as well? I just don't see the logic in that.
You can't fix a problem until you admit a problem exists. Continuing to pretend that there weren't serious lapses in airmanship, that there is nothing that can be done to prevent such future lapses, will do nothing to save future lives. As I've said many times, we aren't going to fix Boeing's issues, or the FAA's, and probably not the airline's (though we have a wee bit more leverage there). We can make a go at addressing ours. Assuming you think that saving lives is a worthy pursuit, of course.
Your choice.
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Yes, I know I come across strong (I would say passionate), and my words may fall harsh on some ears. Call it an attempt to shake some folks out a sense of complacency. Fate may be the Hunter, but we don't have to be a passive prey.
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Sadly both my dad's copy and the first I stumbled on to twenty years ago are in boxes right now so I have to work off memory. But this line, paraphrased though it is will still resonate: "The default is pilot error, because no investigator is going to admit that the best they could come up with is that God unzipped his fly and urinated on the pillar of science..."
This forum is the place for passion, unlike your office, where (I think we both agree) calm reason must rule the day. Even if, as I argue, both calm and reason might occasionally be lost...
Cheers-
dce
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Wonkazoo,
I have enjoyed your contribution to this discussion, particularly your first post, but I think you are offside with this post. 737 Driver is doing an exceptional job of articulating what a lot of us professional pilots both on this forum and elsewhere think about this whole MAX affair: MCAS needs to be tweaked (although fundamentally there is nothing wrong with a single sensor device that prevents a stall but intervening in the flight controls like numerous other aircraft), the industry (manufacturers, airlines, CAA's, pilot unions) needs to have a serious look in the mirror as they have been whistling past the graveyard way too long with poor training and over reliance upon automation, etc.
In the final analysis, however, the professional pilot who knows how to fly an aircraft with all of the auto stuff turned off and with bells and whistles blaring has to be able to gain and maintain control of the aircraft. If any of the MCAS accident crews had done that we would not be having this discussion; in the Lion Air incident the day before the fatal one, the crew did, in fact, do the UAS drill (unlike the crashed aircraft cases) and that gave them time to assess the situation and the aircraft control to trim the aircraft, although it is unforgivable that a jump-seating, B737 rated pilot from a different airline had to tell them to turn the stab trim off - that tells me lots about Lion Air's training that 0 of 4 pilots could recognized a stab trim runaway.
Unlike your harrowing experience with the broken control cable for which there is no published, let alone simulator trained procedure, there are procedures for the MCAS event. First, the UAS which is a pretty simple emergency even with bells and whistles blaring - auto stuff off, 10 degree pitch, 80% power. Neither of the fatal aircraft crews did that; the recovered aircraft crew did. Is it a coincidence that the crew that did the drill survive and the others that didn't did not? That should tell everyone something. And remember, the stab trim problem did not manifest itself until after the flaps were raised minutes later.
A stab trim runaway too is a published procedure for not just the B737 but any aircraft with electric trim - fly the aircraft, trim as necessary and if that does not work turn off the electric trim and revert to the backup trim (mechanical in the case of the B737, electric in the case of many other aircraft including the B767, B777 and B787). I haven't flown the B737 for 15 years but having done lots of hand flying with it (it had a very basic Sperry autopilot) one learned how to trim including using continuous trim particularly during flap selections; judging by the lack of continuous trimming by the pilots (but intermittent bursts instead according to the FDR printouts), this tells me that they lack the basic hand flying skills likely because they have spent most of their lives as Children of the Magenta Line, i.e. autopilot cripples. This ties in with my earlier comment on this post as well as one a week or two ago that the industry has to do a rethink of the notion of not hand flying and allowing those hands and feet skills to atrophy. I am sure that you would agree that in your harrowing experience it was your hands and feet skills that saved your bacon not an autopilot.
I am not going to repeat the rest of the analysis as that has been beaten to death on this forum but I, as a 36 year/26,000 hour professional airline pilot who also taught flying for many years, wholeheartedly agree with 737 Driver. If it is of any value, when me and my flying buddies discuss this over coffee we have 100% agreement that this is an entirely manageable situation - we are all ex B737 drivers too. As unpleasant as it is to criticize someone who is no longer on this planet and is unable to defend themselves, these accidents scream "pilot error" for not fulfilling their role as the last line of defense in the Swiss Cheese model.
While you question 737 Driver's credentials, I would be interested in the credentials of those who keep arguing with him - what, if any, flying experience do they have? How much professional flying experience? How much B737 time? If the consensus of my coffee buddies is any gauge, I would think that the majority of professional pilots would agree with myself and 737 Driver that one has to fly the aircraft first then deal with the emergency, particularly since nothing is on fire nor are any pieces falling off the jet. And dealing with emergencies with bells and whistles going off is part of the job for which one has to be trained to overcome in order to focus on flying the aircraft, solving the problem and getting the aircraft back on the ground.
In the final analysis, however, the professional pilot who knows how to fly an aircraft with all of the auto stuff turned off and with bells and whistles blaring has to be able to gain and maintain control of the aircraft. If any of the MCAS accident crews had done that we would not be having this discussion; in the Lion Air incident the day before the fatal one, the crew did, in fact, do the UAS drill (unlike the crashed aircraft cases) and that gave them time to assess the situation and the aircraft control to trim the aircraft, although it is unforgivable that a jump-seating, B737 rated pilot from a different airline had to tell them to turn the stab trim off - that tells me lots about Lion Air's training that 0 of 4 pilots could recognized a stab trim runaway.
Unlike your harrowing experience with the broken control cable for which there is no published, let alone simulator trained procedure, there are procedures for the MCAS event. First, the UAS which is a pretty simple emergency even with bells and whistles blaring - auto stuff off, 10 degree pitch, 80% power. Neither of the fatal aircraft crews did that; the recovered aircraft crew did. Is it a coincidence that the crew that did the drill survive and the others that didn't did not? That should tell everyone something. And remember, the stab trim problem did not manifest itself until after the flaps were raised minutes later.
A stab trim runaway too is a published procedure for not just the B737 but any aircraft with electric trim - fly the aircraft, trim as necessary and if that does not work turn off the electric trim and revert to the backup trim (mechanical in the case of the B737, electric in the case of many other aircraft including the B767, B777 and B787). I haven't flown the B737 for 15 years but having done lots of hand flying with it (it had a very basic Sperry autopilot) one learned how to trim including using continuous trim particularly during flap selections; judging by the lack of continuous trimming by the pilots (but intermittent bursts instead according to the FDR printouts), this tells me that they lack the basic hand flying skills likely because they have spent most of their lives as Children of the Magenta Line, i.e. autopilot cripples. This ties in with my earlier comment on this post as well as one a week or two ago that the industry has to do a rethink of the notion of not hand flying and allowing those hands and feet skills to atrophy. I am sure that you would agree that in your harrowing experience it was your hands and feet skills that saved your bacon not an autopilot.
I am not going to repeat the rest of the analysis as that has been beaten to death on this forum but I, as a 36 year/26,000 hour professional airline pilot who also taught flying for many years, wholeheartedly agree with 737 Driver. If it is of any value, when me and my flying buddies discuss this over coffee we have 100% agreement that this is an entirely manageable situation - we are all ex B737 drivers too. As unpleasant as it is to criticize someone who is no longer on this planet and is unable to defend themselves, these accidents scream "pilot error" for not fulfilling their role as the last line of defense in the Swiss Cheese model.
While you question 737 Driver's credentials, I would be interested in the credentials of those who keep arguing with him - what, if any, flying experience do they have? How much professional flying experience? How much B737 time? If the consensus of my coffee buddies is any gauge, I would think that the majority of professional pilots would agree with myself and 737 Driver that one has to fly the aircraft first then deal with the emergency, particularly since nothing is on fire nor are any pieces falling off the jet. And dealing with emergencies with bells and whistles going off is part of the job for which one has to be trained to overcome in order to focus on flying the aircraft, solving the problem and getting the aircraft back on the ground.
Last edited by L39 Guy; 29th Apr 2019 at 04:37. Reason: First sentence struck out following retraction however the balance of the post is relevant.
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Full Circle
Having been playfully reminded of uncle Ernie I went online to try to find the quote I posted above. I failed, but there are a few more which I did find, and which are wise beyond their years.
Regarding the hidden MCAS:
The emergencies you train for almost never happen. It's the one you can't train for that kills you.
And referencing many of my posts above, and why the pilots need to be cut a ton of slack:
Fear is the afterbirth of reason and calculation. It takes time to recuperate from fear...
Finally this:
Electronics were rascals, and they lay awake nights trying to find some way to screw you during the day. You could not reason with them. They had a brain and intestines, but no heart.
A good ending to this night for me. I need to go find the box with Fate is the Hunter- it's been more than a few years and I miss it dearly...
dce
Regarding the hidden MCAS:
The emergencies you train for almost never happen. It's the one you can't train for that kills you.
And referencing many of my posts above, and why the pilots need to be cut a ton of slack:
Fear is the afterbirth of reason and calculation. It takes time to recuperate from fear...
Finally this:
Electronics were rascals, and they lay awake nights trying to find some way to screw you during the day. You could not reason with them. They had a brain and intestines, but no heart.
A good ending to this night for me. I need to go find the box with Fate is the Hunter- it's been more than a few years and I miss it dearly...
dce
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Hahahahaha!!!
Sadly both my dad's copy and the first I stumbled on to twenty years ago are in boxes right now so I have to work off memory. But this line, paraphrased though it is will still resonate: "The default is pilot error, because no investigator is going to admit that the best they could come up with is that God unzipped his fly and urinated on the pillar of science..."
This forum is the place for passion, unlike your office, where (I think we both agree) calm reason must rule the day. Even if, as I argue, both calm and reason might occasionally be lost...
Cheers-
dce
Sadly both my dad's copy and the first I stumbled on to twenty years ago are in boxes right now so I have to work off memory. But this line, paraphrased though it is will still resonate: "The default is pilot error, because no investigator is going to admit that the best they could come up with is that God unzipped his fly and urinated on the pillar of science..."
This forum is the place for passion, unlike your office, where (I think we both agree) calm reason must rule the day. Even if, as I argue, both calm and reason might occasionally be lost...
Cheers-
dce
Goodnight.