Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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There are two lines of thinking here: it was a poor aircraft and they were poor pilots. Let me explore both, using the "why" system:
1. The aircraft had hidden killer behaviour because it was a financial requirement to have a common TR because the regulator allowed this because the regulator is weak.
2. The crew performed poorly because they were inadequately trained because it was a common TR which was allowed because the regulator is weak.
If we boil this down, it doesn't really matter whether you subscribe to pilot error or Boeing error or both.
1. The aircraft had hidden killer behaviour because it was a financial requirement to have a common TR because the regulator allowed this because the regulator is weak.
2. The crew performed poorly because they were inadequately trained because it was a common TR which was allowed because the regulator is weak.
If we boil this down, it doesn't really matter whether you subscribe to pilot error or Boeing error or both.
Lol!
I would suggest then that every party bar one wants better regulators:
Manufacturers, so the pilots are well trained and don't destroy their aircraft.
Pilots, so the manufacturers make safe aircraft.
Passengers, for both the above reasons.
The only party who wants poor regulators is the airlines - and that's for greed reasons.
I would suggest then that every party bar one wants better regulators:
Manufacturers, so the pilots are well trained and don't destroy their aircraft.
Pilots, so the manufacturers make safe aircraft.
Passengers, for both the above reasons.
The only party who wants poor regulators is the airlines - and that's for greed reasons.
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Originally Posted by 737 Driver 
retract the flaps) when it was not appropriate (particularly retracting the flaps given what was known about MCAS).
retract the flaps) when it was not appropriate (particularly retracting the flaps given what was known about MCAS).
Had the auto pilot stayed engaged another couple of minutes we might not be having this discussion.
Btw: I am not faulting the auto pilot (probably the only thing that is mostly innocent) or agree with decision to engage it given stick shaker etc.
I only disagree with 737 Driver over his assertion that flying the aircraft in those circumstance was always achievable. I maintain that for many crews it would have been unachievable, owing to the combined human factor issues that saturate the environment, inhibiting the execution of normal flying skills. In my experience of major failures in real life, getting over the hill is harder than you think. Much harder. And very low hour FOs are very, very useful. Controversial, I know (especially to US pilots), but that's what I discovered for real.
meleagertoo
No, of course I don't.
Who ramped this up to "LEGAL", this isn't a court of law. Or are you changing the rules midstream?
No kangaroo court - back to hysterical overstatement again! The evidence for pilot's actions? The preliminary reports and the data traces are all we have to go on but they're enough to tell a great deal. Or do you hold them discredited due to some hitherto unsuggested collusion or corruption?
I'm surprised you even need to ask that question...
Who ramped this up to "LEGAL", this isn't a court of law. Or are you changing the rules midstream?
No kangaroo court - back to hysterical overstatement again! The evidence for pilot's actions? The preliminary reports and the data traces are all we have to go on but they're enough to tell a great deal. Or do you hold them discredited due to some hitherto unsuggested collusion or corruption?
I'm surprised you even need to ask that question...
My original question to you was trying to point out the contradiction between your "Despite the amount of unequivocal evidence of misdeeds by the pilots" and your wish for evidence to be present evidence and discuss it rationally. My reading of the posts on this thread by qualified pilot does lead me to conclude that everyone is of that opinion and I merely suggesting that before making such a statement you should provide evidence of such.
Finally, as for your "hysterical overstatement" remark, you might like to go back and re-read your post where phrase such statements abound "hysteria ramps up and wild totally unsubstantiated accusations of bodgery etc etc", "shrill and baseless …. nothing short of scurrilous etc etc". You might also like to check out other posts on this thread (eg FAA getting comments on their whistleblower phoneline) which suggest that these unsubstantiated accusations are less than unsubstantiated.
Sorry that I had to take up your time explaining this again.
wonkazoo, I have sent you a PM
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Analysing all of this in a short period of time, would have required exceptional knowledge, and in the absence of an AOA value or AOA disagree display, an understanding of the links between the sensors and the flight systems may have been beyond the scope of the crew.
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Just to clarify something which was discussed previously: Enabling the autopilot would certainly inhibit MCAS. However this is only true if there were no other factors in play. In the accident scenarios the problems cascaded, and AOA disagree triggered unreliable airspeed, which limited the possibility that the autopilot could be used to inhibit MCAS.
Analysing all of this in a short period of time, would have required exceptional knowledge, and in the absence of an AOA value or AOA disagree display, an understanding of the links between the sensors and the flight systems may have been beyond the scope of the crew.
Analysing all of this in a short period of time, would have required exceptional knowledge, and in the absence of an AOA value or AOA disagree display, an understanding of the links between the sensors and the flight systems may have been beyond the scope of the crew.
Flap retraction led to 2 things in short order:
1: Autopilot dropped off.
2:Mcas added it's first ND input.
So the pilot was dealing with 2 things at once.
2: Mcas added it's first ND input.
3. Stick shaker still going off and fault not resolved.
4. Unreliable airspeed.
5. ATC blah blah
Overload.
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Am I right in thinking that - even with the 'fix' - there will be no clear indication to the pilot that MCAS has kicked in? If the difference between AOA sensors is less than 5.5 degrees, does this mean that even the little mustard 'AOA-disagree' alert won't show, but MCAS will fire if other conditions are met?
I guess this means that pilots will have to infer that MCAS is live from the uncommanded AND, having quickly checked whether the other conditions apply (flaps, autopilot)?
I can't see that this does much to advance the pilot's ability to diagnose the problem. Why can't some space be found for a flashing red 'MCAS active' alert to show exactly what's happening?
I guess this means that pilots will have to infer that MCAS is live from the uncommanded AND, having quickly checked whether the other conditions apply (flaps, autopilot)?
I can't see that this does much to advance the pilot's ability to diagnose the problem. Why can't some space be found for a flashing red 'MCAS active' alert to show exactly what's happening?
No space needed if a voice says "MCAS MCAS" as it's trimming.
If you're not in the high AoA regime (ie it's faulty) then that would be a great time to flick the switches.
No hardware mods required.
If you're not in the high AoA regime (ie it's faulty) then that would be a great time to flick the switches.
No hardware mods required.
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737 Driver isnt going away...and thats lucky for us.What he says is undeniably true.
These accidents are not just about MCAS.
I think we need to focus on UAS.Boeing article below discusses it best.The uncertainty
when faced with conflicting or spurious data can be unsettling.The alarms can make it
a real test of focus over distraction.If trained in UAS,the startle factor is surmountable,
recovery is always assured.If not,things can go south pretty quick.
Training,experience,airmanship is everything.Nothing else matters.Nothing.
Erroneous Flight Instrument Information - Text Only
These accidents are not just about MCAS.
I think we need to focus on UAS.Boeing article below discusses it best.The uncertainty
when faced with conflicting or spurious data can be unsettling.The alarms can make it
a real test of focus over distraction.If trained in UAS,the startle factor is surmountable,
recovery is always assured.If not,things can go south pretty quick.
Training,experience,airmanship is everything.Nothing else matters.Nothing.
Erroneous Flight Instrument Information - Text Only
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). My thoughts are this: the manufacturer determines what the allowable range is and my job is to stay with that range. That being said, after a certain amount of time with any aircraft, one should have a decent idea of what a "normal" trim setting should be. But once again, I don't know any pilot who flies around and sets the trim by looking at the index. You set it by feel. The index isn't even the most useful visual tool to clue you into a runaway trim. That honor goes to the trim wheel. It takes about 15 rotations to make one degree of movement, and it has a bright white stripe that flashes at you as the wheel is spinning. Hard to miss if you are looking at it.
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I think the point is the Max has a nose heavy empty weight and that the take off trim band ( Green) has been moved aft to compensate!
The question is did Boeing have to move/ expand the rest of the envelope to avoid restrictions on the loading of the aircraft making a not so fantastic economic choice?
The question is did Boeing have to move/ expand the rest of the envelope to avoid restrictions on the loading of the aircraft making a not so fantastic economic choice?
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Am I right in thinking that - even with the 'fix' - there will be no clear indication to the pilot that MCAS has kicked in? [SNIP]
I guess this means that pilots will have to infer that MCAS is live from the uncommanded AND, having quickly checked whether the other conditions apply (flaps, autopilot)?
I can't see that this does much to advance the pilot's ability to diagnose the problem. Why can't some space be found for a flashing red 'MCAS active' alert to show exactly what's happening?
I guess this means that pilots will have to infer that MCAS is live from the uncommanded AND, having quickly checked whether the other conditions apply (flaps, autopilot)?
I can't see that this does much to advance the pilot's ability to diagnose the problem. Why can't some space be found for a flashing red 'MCAS active' alert to show exactly what's happening?
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According to the WSJ, and taken up by CNBC, it now seems the AoA disagree functionality in the Max airframes belonging to SWA was DISABLED, and some FAA officials contemplated grounding the plane.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/28/boei...d-off-wsj.html
Edmund
Southwest Airline’s statement:
Upon delivery (prior to the Lion Air event), the AOA Disagree lights were depicted to us by Boeing as operable on all MAX aircraft, regardless of the selection of optional AOA Indicators on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The manual documentation presented by Boeing at Southwest’s MAX entry into service indicated the AOA Disagree Light functioned on the aircraft, similar to the Lights on our NG series. After the Lion Air event, Boeing notified us that the AOA Disagree Lights were inoperable without the optional AOA Indicators on the MAX aircraft. At that time, Southwest installed the AOA Indicators on the PFD, resulting in the activation of the AOA Disagree lights - both items now serve as an additional crosscheck on all MAX aircraft.
Federal Aviation Administration safety inspectors and supervisors were also unaware of the change, according to government and industry officials that spoke to The Wall Street Journal.
Upon delivery (prior to the Lion Air event), the AOA Disagree lights were depicted to us by Boeing as operable on all MAX aircraft, regardless of the selection of optional AOA Indicators on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The manual documentation presented by Boeing at Southwest’s MAX entry into service indicated the AOA Disagree Light functioned on the aircraft, similar to the Lights on our NG series. After the Lion Air event, Boeing notified us that the AOA Disagree Lights were inoperable without the optional AOA Indicators on the MAX aircraft. At that time, Southwest installed the AOA Indicators on the PFD, resulting in the activation of the AOA Disagree lights - both items now serve as an additional crosscheck on all MAX aircraft.
Federal Aviation Administration safety inspectors and supervisors were also unaware of the change, according to government and industry officials that spoke to The Wall Street Journal.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/28/boei...d-off-wsj.html
Edmund
Last edited by edmundronald; 28th Apr 2019 at 23:18.
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The report does state that the FO called trim runaway so he was not totally inert.
There is a saying in medicine that rare conditions are most likely to be diagnosed by bright interns or very experienced doctors. The intern does not have the experience to reject improble diagnoses while the very experienced are more likely to pick up on the "something does not fit" observations. From your description one would have to say the Captain was in the moderately (at best) experienced category.
There is a saying in medicine that rare conditions are most likely to be diagnosed by bright interns or very experienced doctors. The intern does not have the experience to reject improble diagnoses while the very experienced are more likely to pick up on the "something does not fit" observations. From your description one would have to say the Captain was in the moderately (at best) experienced category.
To be fair, it is entirely possible that more was being in said in the cockpit than what has been released in the transcript, though I would think any relevant comments would have been included. What strikes me most about the CVR transcript is not so much what is being said, but what is not.
There is obviously something wrong with the aircraft. The Captain is struggling to maintain control. I see little if any cross-talk about airspeeds, altitudes, power settings, etc. I see no discussion regarding non-normals. Other than the stab trim cutout call, I do not see the First Officer prompting the Captain in any meaningful way.
I do see a lot of (mostly unnecessary) communicating with and about ATC. Ever hear the phrase, "Aviate, navigate, communicate"? If you don't have the first item under control, then you don't have much business moving onto the third.
Part of every briefing I give at the beginning of a trip with a new FO (or one I have not flown with recently) is this statement: "Each and every leg of this trip I am absolutely guaranteed to screw up at least one thing. Please note that I say at least, and not only, one thing. Your job is to catch my mistakes, and my job is to catch yours."
I fly, I am human, humans err, therefore I err when I fly. QED. This is the foundational message of the crew concept. A good First Officer is more than a co-worker who flies the aircraft according to the airline's scripts and follows the direction of the Captain. A good First Officer not only knows their aircraft and procedures, but he/she is also assertive enough to speak up when the Captain is going off into the weeds. At every point that the Captain was doing something that was either inadvisable or ineffective, a good First Officer should have spoken up. In extreme cases of Captain befuddlement, a First Officer should say loudly and firmly "My Aircraft!" and do what needs to be done to save the ship. None of these things happened.
I haven't been too hard on the FO, because I don't really expect much from a 360-hour, three-month pilot. It is my personal opinion that this gentleman was simply put in a situation beyond his capacity to function effectively. Some people have suggested that I shouldn't be so biased against a low-time pilot. Well, if that's truly the case, then they probably won't like what I have to say about the FO's performance either.
Last edited by 737 Driver; 28th Apr 2019 at 23:54.
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I think the point is the Max has a nose heavy empty weight and that the take off trim band ( Green) has been moved aft to compensate! The question is did Boeing have to move/ expand the rest of the envelope to avoid restrictions on the loading of the aircraft making a not so fantastic economic choice?
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Just noticed this on AV herald, if true it is shocking and may explain some of the crews confusion/actions. My bolding, strongly suggest reading the whole article at:
Crash: Ethiopian B38M near Bishoftu on Mar 10th 2019, impacted terrain after departure
I may have missed this if it was posted earlier, it is hard to keep up given the volume of posts.
Crash: Ethiopian B38M near Bishoftu on Mar 10th 2019, impacted terrain after departure
Coverage released on Apr 16th:
On Apr 11th 2019 The Aviation Herald received a full copy of the Flight Operations Manual (FOM), Revision 18B released on Nov 30th 2018, which is currently being used by Ethiopian Airlines (verified in April 2019 to be current). Although Boeing had issued an operator's bulletin on Nov 6th 2018, which was put into Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2018-23-51 dated Nov 7th 2018 requiring the stab trim runaway procedure to be incorporated into the FOM ahead of the sign off of this version of the FOM (the entire document is on file but not available for publishing), there is no trace of such an addition in the entire 699 pages of the FOM.
...
...
It turned out, that only very cursory knowledge about the stab trim runaway procedure exists amongst the flight crew of Ethiopian Airlines even 5 months after the EAD was distributed.
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...
On Apr 11th 2019 The Aviation Herald received a full copy of the Flight Operations Manual (FOM), Revision 18B released on Nov 30th 2018, which is currently being used by Ethiopian Airlines (verified in April 2019 to be current). Although Boeing had issued an operator's bulletin on Nov 6th 2018, which was put into Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2018-23-51 dated Nov 7th 2018 requiring the stab trim runaway procedure to be incorporated into the FOM ahead of the sign off of this version of the FOM (the entire document is on file but not available for publishing), there is no trace of such an addition in the entire 699 pages of the FOM.
...
...
It turned out, that only very cursory knowledge about the stab trim runaway procedure exists amongst the flight crew of Ethiopian Airlines even 5 months after the EAD was distributed.
...
...