Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
Join Date: Mar 2013
Location: France
Age: 39
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hello all.
i just checked one of the previous aircraft I used to fly, equipped with a stick pusher system, this is what I found :
The push force felt at the control column is approximately 80 lbs, which is adequate for stall
correction, but can still be overpowered by the pilot in the event the system cannot be
disabled.
NOTE: The number 1 and number 2 computer must both agree to push before the stick
pusher can be activated.
The stick pusher will activate when all of the following conditions are met:
#1 STALL SYST FAIL, #2 STALL SYST FAIL and PUSHER SYST FAIL caution lights are
OFF.
The airplane is airborne.
The airplane altitude is greater than 400 feet AGL.
The airspeed is less than 200 -
4 KEAS.
The stick shakers have been activated by both systems.
The only thing I have difficulty to understand is why Boeing in the first place didn't connect the MCAS system to both AOA, exactly as stick pusher was in my previous aircraft.
now, not writing as long post about it, but the mcas issue is not only a design problems ... We can clearly see a tendency in the world of pilot to loose confidences in manual and basic flying skill in the modern aviation world. I would like to believe authority will not only react to fix the MCAS and that it, it is applicable to all the aviation world and instead of have more and more automation because pilot are more and more crap, we should maybe put back the pilot in the center of the loop and ask / help / train them to have their skill up to the task.
i just checked one of the previous aircraft I used to fly, equipped with a stick pusher system, this is what I found :
The push force felt at the control column is approximately 80 lbs, which is adequate for stall
correction, but can still be overpowered by the pilot in the event the system cannot be
disabled.
NOTE: The number 1 and number 2 computer must both agree to push before the stick
pusher can be activated.
The stick pusher will activate when all of the following conditions are met:
#1 STALL SYST FAIL, #2 STALL SYST FAIL and PUSHER SYST FAIL caution lights are
OFF.
The airplane is airborne.
The airplane altitude is greater than 400 feet AGL.
The airspeed is less than 200 -
4 KEAS.
The stick shakers have been activated by both systems.
The only thing I have difficulty to understand is why Boeing in the first place didn't connect the MCAS system to both AOA, exactly as stick pusher was in my previous aircraft.
now, not writing as long post about it, but the mcas issue is not only a design problems ... We can clearly see a tendency in the world of pilot to loose confidences in manual and basic flying skill in the modern aviation world. I would like to believe authority will not only react to fix the MCAS and that it, it is applicable to all the aviation world and instead of have more and more automation because pilot are more and more crap, we should maybe put back the pilot in the center of the loop and ask / help / train them to have their skill up to the task.
Getting a bit bored of multiple posts slagging off these pilots.
We get it. You think they were sub-standard. You would have used your greater "airmanship" to keep the basic parameters in line and therefore the aircraft flying.
Your lack of appreciation of human factors in a real scenario with real line pilots in the real world is what you should address. After-the-event-heroism is ever so easy.
My suggestion is to slice the event up into small time slices. In each slice - look at the information presented, the probable solution, the required actions and the workload. Then in the next slice, base your model on a modification of the previous slice - increasing or decreasing the factors, and extrapolating the data flows. So if it starts with a stall indication, then keep the "it's a stall" flowing, until (given the workload estimate) the information is sufficient to demonstrate to the pilots that it's not a stall. Doing this, you will discover that the pilot with reduced workload will process new information earlier.
In my model, the captain wanted to get the thing cleaned up, then reduce the workload, then work out what was wrong. They cleaned up - he used the a/p to reduce the workload, and as they were starting to diagnose the aircraft bit them. His workload reduced his SA (along with the stick shaker) to a critical point. The pilot failed due to excess workload, not due to lack of "airmanship".
We get it. You think they were sub-standard. You would have used your greater "airmanship" to keep the basic parameters in line and therefore the aircraft flying.
Your lack of appreciation of human factors in a real scenario with real line pilots in the real world is what you should address. After-the-event-heroism is ever so easy.
My suggestion is to slice the event up into small time slices. In each slice - look at the information presented, the probable solution, the required actions and the workload. Then in the next slice, base your model on a modification of the previous slice - increasing or decreasing the factors, and extrapolating the data flows. So if it starts with a stall indication, then keep the "it's a stall" flowing, until (given the workload estimate) the information is sufficient to demonstrate to the pilots that it's not a stall. Doing this, you will discover that the pilot with reduced workload will process new information earlier.
In my model, the captain wanted to get the thing cleaned up, then reduce the workload, then work out what was wrong. They cleaned up - he used the a/p to reduce the workload, and as they were starting to diagnose the aircraft bit them. His workload reduced his SA (along with the stick shaker) to a critical point. The pilot failed due to excess workload, not due to lack of "airmanship".
This is about:
Systems knowledge
Recognition
Recovery
Systems knowledge
A document/ipad/manual will give the systems knowledge.
Recognition
If the new software were to have an aural alert "MCAS" whenever it triggered, then this would make recognition easy. Because if you are in a phase of flight that is normal, and the machine cries "MCAS", then you know it's a fault and quickly flick the switches. This part would not require sim training.
If the new software does not alert you, then recognition has been demonstrated by two crews as difficult, and therefore this would require sim training. Maybe 3 or 4 scenarios based on different phases of flight and different erroneous inputs.
Recovery
The recovery may require sim training regardless of the above. If you're in a benign state and MCAS activates (and you recognise) then recovery is not hard, and has been previously trained. But what if you are in an expeditious descent (say, 330 knots) and MCAS triggers? You flick the switches. But now you are probably in a slight overspeed, pointing the wrong way, holding against the trim and are faced with hand-trimming. I would suggest that I would like to practice that in the sim, and I'd like the crew of the Max I am in the back of to have also practised that - before I get on board.
So however you look at it, sim training is required. Probably just 1 hour per crew, but 1 hour none the less.
Anything less, I'm not going.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Paris
Age: 74
Posts: 275
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The design of the 737 Max MCAS with two AoA sensors present and only one input used is *wierd*
Edmund
Perfect answer!
Just no mention of it in the fix.
As you are vocal and seems a very competent 737 pilot (certainly seems that way by your posts)
Can you detail how the/you cockpit would have responded after take off of the ET flight with you as Captain and with the 2-300 hr FO - who's job was who's when and why ?
Just no mention of it in the fix.
As you are vocal and seems a very competent 737 pilot (certainly seems that way by your posts)
Can you detail how the/you cockpit would have responded after take off of the ET flight with you as Captain and with the 2-300 hr FO - who's job was who's when and why ?
Vee one, Rotate! Stickshaker sounds on rotation. Master Caution and other assorted warnings.
You immediately hit TOGA and check pitch attitude. Almost immediatey see from the aircraft's performance that it is climbing normally and feels normal. You're already somewhat sceptical about the stall-warning. You Tell PNF to crosscheck airspeeds.He does so and his and the SBY agree. You now know the warning is false. "Gear UP" "You have control, FLY the aeroplane Bloggs! climb maintain 10,000ft (at Addis), level at 200Kts do not retract flaps, my RT". Scan panel and assay the warnings. Looks like unreliable airspeed is the first to deal with. Memory items - Assure yourself the aircraft is indeed flying normally. Monitor the FO, tell him to reduce power if necessary, you don't need 5000fpm at this point. Once comfortable-ish locate of the stickshaker cb and pull it. (it was drilled into us at my 737 conversion that you need to be able to find that one quickly just to reduce stress levels once it is deteremined to be false).
Pan/Mayday call for radar circuit to land 15 mile finals to give us time.
I really don't think I'd retract flap in that situation. I don't know what's caused the stickshaker and associated stall warnings but I do know the airframe seems to be flying as normal. I'd like to think I had the wit not to disturb anything that might affect that and leave flap where it is. I'm going to need it in a few minutes time for landing, why retract? It's just addng another potential unknown into the mix and I'd simply rather avoid that altogether. Accuse me of being wise after the event if you like, but my first thought on reading the sequence of events was "why did they move the flaps?"
Let's assume I did raise the flaps and MCAS set off on it's tricks. By now the stickshaker has been shut up and we can think. We level at 10,000 clean and speed 250. Bloggs says the bloody trim keeps running forward and he has to keep motoring it back. This is weird. What the heck's going on? You watch it for a couple of cycles and it seems the automatic trim is doing things that are unasked for and unwanted. How is this difficult to contain - even if your company hadn't told you about LionAir, Boeing's STC and you were such a hermit you didn't read the news or discuss tech in the crewroom?
"Bloggs, we're going to revert to manual trim, tell me when you're in trim and I'll select the cutout switches. (I might even take control for a minute or two to see what he is experiencing.)
There isn't much of an existential threat in any of this, is there? Apart from a little sphyncter exercise in the first ten seconds after rotation once the stickshaker is silenced this can all be done in a conversational tone of voice, which is how I prefer to manage malfunctions.
Bloggs flies the circuit. Capt runs checks, briefs landing, talks to No1 and pax, takes control and lands normally if perhaps a bit overweight.
UNLESS - the big unless - you don't stop the stickshaker beating your brains to mush and you don't forget to fly the aeroplane (so runaway airspeed doesn't happen). I think this step is critical in creating an environment where logical thought can once again occur. No overspeed, trim still operable even if you did select cutoff switches before getting it somewhere cloise to normal.
That done, you land. No one dies. No hysterical outbursts in the media shrieking about Boeing's corporate greed and murderous incompetence, or the wicked complicity with the FAA and crooked approval standards. MCAS gets fixed relatively quietly - probably still with a fleet grounding - and all returns to normal. Most importantly, the airframe is intact and they can see what ent wrong right away.
Boeing perhaps adds a stickshaker cutoff switch to the panel somewhere...to aid those whose instructor wasn't as punctilious as mine. Thank you Al.
Having flown extensively with 200hr cadets fresh to the line in a major UK airline I'd not be much concerned about my colleague's (in)experience. Of course I can't comment on those from other training environments. In my experience he is probably as good as you at flying the aeroplane accurately, probably has at least as good if not better tech and systems knowledge so use him as a voice-activated autopilot as Mr Boeing expects you to do. At my conversion course we were told that Boeing's design philosophy was that the aeroplane was designed to be operated by a competent Professional pilot and an (insert name of continent) PPL. It does that as advertised. Ultimately a sucessful outcome hinges on that, and that alone. If other nations employ different standards of crew training and operating standards then this premise becomes faulty (through no fault of Boeing's) and all bets are off.
All the above only relevant If you stick to the correct procedures and employ a tad of (swearword alert) A!*m@n***p.
You are certianly in a different pickle if your company hasn't troubled to pass on the latest Boeing safety advice or promulgated lessons learned from the previous accident, but then why wouldn't any pilot on the same type take the trouble to find out himself - as if you could avoid learning all about it in the media - so how could they not have had an inkling that this was all deja-vu? I know Ethiopia is a bit insular but for heaven's sake!
A proper Western investigation into Ethiopian's operating and training standards would make interesting readng but that's not going to happen. We'll be lucky to get an unmolseted CVR which would tell us what really went on. I fear the final report may not tell us much useful at all.
Last edited by meleagertoo; 27th Apr 2019 at 15:17.
I find it fascinating to watch highly qualified and experienced folks take nearly opposite views of the crews’ and Boeing’s respective contributions to the accidents.
I wonder if folks might get closer to consensus if the judged the crews based on what did happen, and Boeing on what could have happened. As SLF, I have to accept that the chaos in the cockpit would have been beyond anything I’m capable of imagining. But I’m still skeptical that a crew trapped in a tug-of-war with the control column shouldn’t have worked out that they should apply nose-up trim – and keep applying it until things got better or it became completely obvious that it wasn’t working.
At the same time, I’m assuming that the AOA probe failure could have happened in IMC. At least I haven’t seen anyone explain why it couldn’t. It seems perfectly reasonable that a crew faced with a stick shaker for no obvious reason and a display showing the horizon rising above the flight path for no obvious reason might hesitate before making major nose-up control and pitch inputs. And it sounds like it could have become too late pretty quickly.
Am I missing something?
I wonder if folks might get closer to consensus if the judged the crews based on what did happen, and Boeing on what could have happened. As SLF, I have to accept that the chaos in the cockpit would have been beyond anything I’m capable of imagining. But I’m still skeptical that a crew trapped in a tug-of-war with the control column shouldn’t have worked out that they should apply nose-up trim – and keep applying it until things got better or it became completely obvious that it wasn’t working.
At the same time, I’m assuming that the AOA probe failure could have happened in IMC. At least I haven’t seen anyone explain why it couldn’t. It seems perfectly reasonable that a crew faced with a stick shaker for no obvious reason and a display showing the horizon rising above the flight path for no obvious reason might hesitate before making major nose-up control and pitch inputs. And it sounds like it could have become too late pretty quickly.
Am I missing something?
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Derby
Posts: 70
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Getting a bit bored of multiple posts slagging off these pilots.
We get it. You think they were sub-standard. You would have used your greater "airmanship" to keep the basic parameters in line and therefore the aircraft flying.
Your lack of appreciation of human factors in a real scenario with real line pilots in the real world is what you should address. After-the-event-heroism is ever so easy.
My suggestion is to slice the event up into small time slices. In each slice - look at the information presented, the probable solution, the required actions and the workload. Then in the next slice, base your model on a modification of the previous slice - increasing or decreasing the factors, and extrapolating the data flows. So if it starts with a stall indication, then keep the "it's a stall" flowing, until (given the workload estimate) the information is sufficient to demonstrate to the pilots that it's not a stall. Doing this, you will discover that the pilot with reduced workload will process new information earlier.
In my model, the captain wanted to get the thing cleaned up, then reduce the workload, then work out what was wrong. They cleaned up - he used the a/p to reduce the workload, and as they were starting to diagnose the aircraft bit them. His workload reduced his SA (along with the stick shaker) to a critical point. The pilot failed due to excess workload, not due to lack of "airmanship".
We get it. You think they were sub-standard. You would have used your greater "airmanship" to keep the basic parameters in line and therefore the aircraft flying.
Your lack of appreciation of human factors in a real scenario with real line pilots in the real world is what you should address. After-the-event-heroism is ever so easy.
My suggestion is to slice the event up into small time slices. In each slice - look at the information presented, the probable solution, the required actions and the workload. Then in the next slice, base your model on a modification of the previous slice - increasing or decreasing the factors, and extrapolating the data flows. So if it starts with a stall indication, then keep the "it's a stall" flowing, until (given the workload estimate) the information is sufficient to demonstrate to the pilots that it's not a stall. Doing this, you will discover that the pilot with reduced workload will process new information earlier.
In my model, the captain wanted to get the thing cleaned up, then reduce the workload, then work out what was wrong. They cleaned up - he used the a/p to reduce the workload, and as they were starting to diagnose the aircraft bit them. His workload reduced his SA (along with the stick shaker) to a critical point. The pilot failed due to excess workload, not due to lack of "airmanship".
But your model is not what is contained in the QRH for the Boeing 737. There are actions for a stick shaker on lift-off and neither involve engaging the auto-pilot or retracting the flaps. One would hope any pilot flying the aircraft would be familiar with this. Certainly in EASA countries, jet upset and stall recovery has been one of the hot topics and recurrent training for the past few years has certainly included elements to improve pilot recognition and recovery from such events. To focus on MCAS is wrong, there is much more to these accidents than that and 737driver is right, pilot training is one of them.
Psychophysiological entity
wonkazoo #4412
I thought, a very good post with an up to date overview of the situation in general.
737Driver #4438
Over the years since the 447, I've become seriously concerned about the lack of aerodynamic feel the Children of the Magenta line seem to display. I was instructed to take the BAC 1-11 to the push every other base check and remember with astonishing clarity how that aircraft felt. Hand flying to and from the cruise was taken for granted. No sims then.
A British Eagle training captain took a fellow FO and me to STN for some Viscount familiarization. One of the fun things was going over the end of the runway at 1,500' (yes, on QFE) and landing off that. We'd both been on it a year by then and it was just a fun thing to do. I can not imagine being restricted to simulated flight to get to know a type. I can not imagine being in the RHS never having really pulled the aircraft about. Mind you, we flew a lot of empty sectors back then which did not please the bean counters.
On the loss of vision thread, someone piped up and said, that's what the bloke in the RHS is for. Just go somewhere and land. Yeh, right. Good luck with the weather.
I'd have no problem stepping onto a MAX with 737Driver at the helm. But, he is pre-sprung to react to the smaller anomalies, but I'm still concerned by that 'noise' on the thumb switch trace, instead of a clear sustained ANU command. As mentioned, I'm still concerned about another 'ghost in the machine' computer anomaly.
I'd still step onto a flight was several of the experienced bods on this thread, but I wouldn't discount the chance of the craft delivering a WTF! moment.
I thought, a very good post with an up to date overview of the situation in general.
737Driver #4438
By the numbers then: Stick shaker. WTF?! Check my power (increase as necessary), check my attitude, check my configuration. Is it flying or is it wallowing? ( my bold ) If it is wallowing, keep the nose down and accelerate.
A British Eagle training captain took a fellow FO and me to STN for some Viscount familiarization. One of the fun things was going over the end of the runway at 1,500' (yes, on QFE) and landing off that. We'd both been on it a year by then and it was just a fun thing to do. I can not imagine being restricted to simulated flight to get to know a type. I can not imagine being in the RHS never having really pulled the aircraft about. Mind you, we flew a lot of empty sectors back then which did not please the bean counters.
On the loss of vision thread, someone piped up and said, that's what the bloke in the RHS is for. Just go somewhere and land. Yeh, right. Good luck with the weather.
I'd have no problem stepping onto a MAX with 737Driver at the helm. But, he is pre-sprung to react to the smaller anomalies, but I'm still concerned by that 'noise' on the thumb switch trace, instead of a clear sustained ANU command. As mentioned, I'm still concerned about another 'ghost in the machine' computer anomaly.
I'd still step onto a flight was several of the experienced bods on this thread, but I wouldn't discount the chance of the craft delivering a WTF! moment.
Join Date: Feb 2019
Location: shiny side up
Posts: 431
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I would like to see a brand new FMS, not version 14 with all the legacy bs hiding in the background.
A good flow chart of the connectivity and flowpath with the if/then clearly shown. Now there is not only the if/then, but the legacy but if, but if, but if, then.
B 737 driver....In regards to the MCAS and AP, there seems to be some differences noted.
From Pilot reports:
Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to "up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK DONT SINK!"
I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb.
Another report:
After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.
Concur, but, as we have all noticed, the ac these days are getting pretty slippery, not to mention a lot more thrust.. its not as easy...been a bit surprised on some short finals.
A good flow chart of the connectivity and flowpath with the if/then clearly shown. Now there is not only the if/then, but the legacy but if, but if, but if, then.
B 737 driver....In regards to the MCAS and AP, there seems to be some differences noted.
From Pilot reports:
Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to "up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK DONT SINK!"
I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb.
Another report:
After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.
Over the years since the 447, I've become seriously concerned about the lack of aerodynamic feel the Children of the Magenta line seem to display.
Join Date: Dec 2015
Location: Cape Town, ZA
Age: 62
Posts: 424
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I find it fascinating to watch highly qualified and experienced folks take nearly opposite views of the crews and Boeings respective contributions to the accidents.
I wonder if folks might get closer to consensus if the judged the crews based on what did happen, and Boeing on what could have happened. As SLF, I have to accept that the chaos in the cockpit would have been beyond anything Im capable of imagining. But Im still skeptical that a crew trapped in a tug-of-war with the control column shouldnt have worked out that they should apply nose-up trim and keep applying it until things got better or it became completely obvious that it wasnt working.
At the same time, Im assuming that the AOA probe failure could have happened in IMC. At least I havent seen anyone explain why it couldnt. It seems perfectly reasonable that a crew faced with a stick shaker for no obvious reason and a display showing the horizon rising above the flight path for no obvious reason might hesitate before making major nose-up control and pitch inputs. And it sounds like it could have become too late pretty quickly.
Am I missing something?
I wonder if folks might get closer to consensus if the judged the crews based on what did happen, and Boeing on what could have happened. As SLF, I have to accept that the chaos in the cockpit would have been beyond anything Im capable of imagining. But Im still skeptical that a crew trapped in a tug-of-war with the control column shouldnt have worked out that they should apply nose-up trim and keep applying it until things got better or it became completely obvious that it wasnt working.
At the same time, Im assuming that the AOA probe failure could have happened in IMC. At least I havent seen anyone explain why it couldnt. It seems perfectly reasonable that a crew faced with a stick shaker for no obvious reason and a display showing the horizon rising above the flight path for no obvious reason might hesitate before making major nose-up control and pitch inputs. And it sounds like it could have become too late pretty quickly.
Am I missing something?
You comment raises a broader issue: With hindsight we know that both aircraft were flyable, with the right sequence of control inputs. At the time the pilots could not have known this for sure, and may have wasted energy on many mental scenarios, most of which did not lead to the small number of escape steps. They did not know for certain if there was any kind of mechanical malfunction (parts of the horizontal stabiliser or elevator fell off, control systems jammed), computer gone rogue (we know the cutoff switches are supposed to work, but are you really sure). In addition they might conceivably avoid doing things that might make the situation worse, or provoke the computer systems into more nose-down trim?
As several personal anecdotes have reminded us, when things go seriously wrong, rational thought sometimes goes right out the window. My understanding is that passenger jet pilots do not wake up in the morning expecting to face imminent death. The training process does not emphasise this kind of life or death situation, and the selection process does not specifically weed out those that would fail to meet test-pilot or astronaut standards.
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
B 737 driver....In regards to the MCAS and AP, there seems to be some differences noted.
From Pilot reports:
Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to "up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK DONT SINK!"
I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb.
Another report:
After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.
From Pilot reports:
Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to "up" and above clean "MASI up speed" with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called "DESCENDING" followed by almost an immediate: "DONT SINK DONT SINK!"
I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb.
Another report:
After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set "UP" speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the "A" autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called "descending" just prior to the GPWS sounding "don't sink, don't sink." The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.
This does not appear to be a MCAS issue, since the A/P was engaged. It is more likely an autopilot issue. Not knowing the detail of how the crew had the A/P set up or the maintenance history, I couldn't really comment beyond that. I've seen A/P doing wonky things before on engagement which is why I keep my thumb near the disengage button when turning the ship over to HAL.
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I say again, Fly The Aircraft!
We get it. You think they were sub-standard. You would have used your greater "airmanship" to keep the basic parameters in line and therefore the aircraft flying. Your lack of appreciation of human factors in a real scenario with real line pilots in the real world is what you should address.
I definitely appreciate the human factors issue. The crew performance is one HUGE human factors issue. And that issue is this: What were the factors impacting these crews (experience? training? environment? stress?) that kept them from applying basic airmanship skills to stabilize the aircraft so they could then successfully deal with the malfunction?
In my model, the captain wanted to get the thing cleaned up, then reduce the workload, then work out what was wrong. They cleaned up - he used the a/p to reduce the workload, and as they were starting to diagnose the aircraft bit them. His workload reduced his SA (along with the stick shaker) to a critical point. The pilot failed due to excess workload, not due to lack of "airmanship".
In comparison the "model" I have repeated flogged, a model that has been around for probably a century of aviation, a model that has saved many an aircraft when followed and doomed quite a few when not, would have at a minimum allowed this crew to stabilize the aircraft and get it to a safe altitude. Whether they would then have correctly resolved a subsequent problem with MCAS is impossible to say, but they would have been dealing with it from a stabilized platform at a much higher altitude.
Last edited by 737 Driver; 27th Apr 2019 at 16:46.
Join Date: Oct 2011
Location: Lower Skunk Cabbageland, WA
Age: 74
Posts: 354
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
737 Driver:
What you say (and keep on saying) makes manifest sense. Basic competency is an absolute requirement for this gig.
Don't let the bastards get you down!
What you say (and keep on saying) makes manifest sense. Basic competency is an absolute requirement for this gig.
Don't let the bastards get you down!
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Hotel Gypsy
Posts: 2,821
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Trying to add a bit of balance here, there are clearly polarised views regarding Boeing vs. a few pilots. Surely professional aviators, certainly those operating a $100M aircraft, realise that they are a layer in the system? What would you prefer, no changes to the technical side and continued reliance on pilot skills/airmanship, or perhaps a more comprehensive review and upgrade of the entire system (note, pilots are part of the system)? To bang-on about a lack of basic airmanship sort of misses the point and reminds me of the 1980s Air Force I joined. Things have moved on. If it were my train set(s), I would:
Start designing the 737 replacement
Bin the MCAS 'kludge' and put in a system that is far more comprehensive and capable.
Ensure people are trained properly (a joint manufacturer, regulator and operator responsibility)
Communicate.
We all have positives to offer here and that should be a good thing about aviation. Unfortunately, money drives the world; the open & honest environment we require will always be influenced by the bean-counters and lawyers.
Start designing the 737 replacement
Bin the MCAS 'kludge' and put in a system that is far more comprehensive and capable.
Ensure people are trained properly (a joint manufacturer, regulator and operator responsibility)
Communicate.
We all have positives to offer here and that should be a good thing about aviation. Unfortunately, money drives the world; the open & honest environment we require will always be influenced by the bean-counters and lawyers.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Paris
Age: 74
Posts: 275
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Trying to add a bit of balance here, there are clearly polarised views regarding Boeing vs. a few pilots. Surely professional aviators, certainly those operating a $100M aircraft, realise that they are a layer in the system? What would you prefer, no changes to the technical side and continued reliance on pilot skills/airmanship, or perhaps a more comprehensive review and upgrade of the entire system (note, pilots are part of the system)? To bang-on about a lack of basic airmanship sort of misses the point and reminds me of the 1980s Air Force I joined. Things have moved on. If it were my train set(s), I would:
Start designing the 737 replacement
Bin the MCAS 'kludge' and put in a system that is far more comprehensive and capable.
Ensure people are trained properly (a joint manufacturer, regulator and operator responsibility)
Communicate.
We all have positives to offer here and that should be a good thing about aviation. Unfortunately, money drives the world; the open & honest environment we require will always be influenced by the bean-counters and lawyers.
Start designing the 737 replacement
Bin the MCAS 'kludge' and put in a system that is far more comprehensive and capable.
Ensure people are trained properly (a joint manufacturer, regulator and operator responsibility)
Communicate.
We all have positives to offer here and that should be a good thing about aviation. Unfortunately, money drives the world; the open & honest environment we require will always be influenced by the bean-counters and lawyers.
In an ideal world, the regulator and the manufacturer, FAA and Boeing would have sat down for a discussion of how to solve the issue MCAS addresses, stated requirements, a proposed solution, and a validation path to ensure the adequacy of the solution. Because MCAS is ABOUT EXTENDING AN EXISTING TYPE CERTIFICATE.
In the corrupt world which has set in, the FAA said nudge nudge wink wink "just make a fig leaf to cover that patch", Boeing designed a fig leaf, flight tested it and found it inadequate, quickly modded it and shipped it. No dialogue and honest verification took place.
Now the FAA, and thus the US government is involved in covering up the process inadequacy "in the name of competing with Airbus".
What a joke. Don't congressmen and women have families who fly on US-made airframes?
Edmund
So as this thread continues towards the five-grand mark, how many of these posts have been a version of "well, if this had happened to me and my F/O, we'd have done this, that and those other things and everyone would have been fine because FLY THE AIRPLANE and BASIC AIRMANSHIP and we're not children of the magenta line, we're hairy-armed master aviators."
But let's get this straight. It never happened to you.
There are three pilots alive to whom this failure (AoA failure arms MCAS, which kicks in as flaps retract) actually happened. Four others are dead along with their passengers, The failure caused two fatal accidents less than two years after service introduction. Compare this to anything in the past 25 years of aviation and tell me that's not unusual, that the AoA/MCAS sequence is something that should be handled with normal training.
Bull
!
But let's get this straight. It never happened to you.
There are three pilots alive to whom this failure (AoA failure arms MCAS, which kicks in as flaps retract) actually happened. Four others are dead along with their passengers, The failure caused two fatal accidents less than two years after service introduction. Compare this to anything in the past 25 years of aviation and tell me that's not unusual, that the AoA/MCAS sequence is something that should be handled with normal training.
Bull
!
Join Date: Oct 2011
Location: Lower Skunk Cabbageland, WA
Age: 74
Posts: 354
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
But the guy you're railing against, the one who keeps on saying, "Fly the airplane," DOES acknowledge the design problem generated by Boeing, in every post, while criticizing the pilots. That IS a balanced view.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Tennessee, USA
Age: 71
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I just saw this on The Aviation Herald:
On Apr 27th 2019 it became known, that four independent whistleblowers, current and former Boeing employees, had called the FAA hotline for whistleblowers regarding aviation safety concerns on Apr 5th 2019. The concerns reported were wiring damage to the AoA related wiring as result of foreign object damage as well as concerns with the TRIM CUTOUT switches. The FAA believes these reports may open completely new investigative angles into the causes of the two crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
On Apr 27th 2019 it became known, that four independent whistleblowers, current and former Boeing employees, had called the FAA hotline for whistleblowers regarding aviation safety concerns on Apr 5th 2019. The concerns reported were wiring damage to the AoA related wiring as result of foreign object damage as well as concerns with the TRIM CUTOUT switches. The FAA believes these reports may open completely new investigative angles into the causes of the two crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
Join Date: Aug 2017
Location: London
Posts: 94
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
By the numbers then: Stick shaker. WTF?! Check my power (increase as necessary), check my attitude, check my configuration. Is it flying or is it wallowing? If it is wallowing, keep the nose down and accelerate. If its flying, probably a false indication, continue the climb, call for the gear. Cross check instruments. I've got my hands full, so ask my FO to read off what he sees on all three airspeeds. At 400 feet check my roll mode, have FO ask for straight ahead if appropriate and declare emergency. If by now I've determined we have unreliable airspeed, memory items except I'm going to keep takeoff power and 15 degrees pitch until 1000' where I set 10 degrees and 80% N1.
There are two problems with it. The pilot seems to have done rather a lot by 400ft. And leaving flaps down seems a bit too convenient. If you just add a bit of delay in pulling the stick shaker CBs, and you happen to clean up (which would be perfectly good airmanship), then the MCAS genie is out of the bottle and you're in test pilot mode.
Reality is more complex, time is more flexible, cognitive skills are worse than the scripts that we write after the event.
A competent pilot showing good airmanship would most likely have activated mcas pre lion air, and quite possibly post. Once in the mcas trap I'd say it's 50/50 they'd get out of it at low altitude. See my previous post for why. So your constant assertions of 'just fly the plane' don't really cut it.
Again I think everyone agrees with you that there needs to be more emphasis on hand flying skills throughout the whole industry and that 200h is ludicrous for a FO.
Last edited by PerPurumTonantes; 27th Apr 2019 at 22:03.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: Canada
Posts: 24
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
One thing is certain, the persons who are the main drivers of these accidents had a lot more time to consider the outcome of their actions than the pilots. They have a CPA, MBA and/or JD. They received large salaries and bonuses. They live in the suburbs of Chicago, and will be receiving far less scrutiny than the engineers and pilots. They will cost out the lives lost vs. the cost of doing things properly. Their profession will insulate them from their true share of the culpability. In the end a very few will get a golden handshake and pursue other interests. Lets take a minute to remember them.
Last edited by dozing4dollars; 27th Apr 2019 at 19:56.