Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
If Boeing’s handling of the matter so far is anything to go by, they’ll need to be extremely careful they don’t end up painting themselves into a corner.
Oops!
No, it is not Boeing PR. As more information becomes available, and there is more understanding of what actually happened, those of us who actually get paid to fly can see that these pilots made a lot of mistakes.
The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
Also, with another tariff battle seemingly brewing, it will be very interesting to see whether the size of any penalty levied upon Boeing for the MAX saga is sufficiently small that Airbus could point to it as a ‘state subsidy’ in all but name when arguing its case at the WTO. If anyone doubts the ability of the Washington establishment to influence due process for its favoured firms, look at how Halliburton got away with it over Deepwater Horizon while (foreign-owned) BP got absolutely hammered....
No, it is not Boeing PR. As more information becomes available, and there is more understanding of what actually happened, those of us who actually get paid to fly can see that these pilots made a lot of mistakes.
The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Agree.
Disagree for reasons previously covered. That being said, they were a product of their airline's training and culture.
Agree wholeheartedly.
but this crew did not act stupidly nor incompetently.
The design of MAX in the case of malfunctioning MCAS is terribly intolerant of error.
Join Date: Nov 2018
Location: Vancouver
Posts: 68
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No, it is not Boeing PR. As more information becomes available, and there is more understanding of what actually happened, those of us who actually get paid to fly can see that these pilots made a lot of mistakes.
The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Found in Toronto
Posts: 615
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As we all know now, if the AOA fails, it can cause MCAS to trim nose down when it should not. This was a surprise to the Lion Air Pilots but after that accident Boeing sent a Bulletin to all operators explaining the system and how to deal with it.
Ethiopian Airlines got this bulletin but for some unknown reason the crew of ET302 were not able to deal with the problem.
Boeing has since changed MCAS to use info from both AOA and limited how much nose down trim can be applied. This should make it safer even if the pilots mishandle a failure or emergency.
Last edited by Lost in Saigon; 14th Apr 2019 at 04:28.
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Reading
Age: 41
Posts: 100
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As we all know now, if the AOA fails, it can cause MCAS to trim nose down when it should not. This was a surprise to the Lion Air Pilots but after that accident Boeing sent a Bulletin to all operators explaining the system and how to deal with it.
Ethiopian Airlines got this bulletin but for some unknown reason the crew of ET302 were not able to deal with the problem.
Boeing has since changed MCAS to use info from both AOA and limited how much nose down trim can be applied. This should make it safer even if the pilots mishandle a failure or emergency.
The key words in your post were 'for some unknown reason'. I expect the authorities will want to actually find out what that was before letting the plane fly again. Because they did follow the checklist, and there are points in the FDR which may suggest there is a further problem somewhere in the computers; I believe Boeing has stated they have identified an additional undisclosed problem.
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Reading
Age: 41
Posts: 100
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thank you for providing the proof that pilots were not provided with a way of knowing they have an AoA disagree. Unless they happened to work for American Airines who had the optional extra. And yeh the pilots used electric trim up and then hit the cutout switches. There is a question that may be around the additional problem Boeing is investigating about why they didn't trim up further with the electric trim. It's a question because it happens at the start and the end, and there's no logical reason for the pilots to do that, which suggests there may have been an additional system problem. We shall see.
Join Date: Sep 2013
Location: Melbourne and San Francisco
Age: 75
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From a U.S. Private Pilot: My buddy's youngest is a First Officer on the B737 with Alaska. His only comment was that an emergency "CESSNA" button on the instrument panel to kill all digital input except for primary controls, slats, flaps, brakes and steering would be nice; allowing for good old fashioned piloting skills and, hopefully, a safe manual (Cessna) landing.
Possibly an enormous over-simplification but is that possible?
Tim.
Possibly an enormous over-simplification but is that possible?
Tim.
Join Date: Sep 2011
Location: FL390
Posts: 235
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That’s basically what the stabiliser disconnect switches do on the 737. Pretty much all the controls are string and pulleys.
In any non-normal situation flying the aircraft manually usually comes at the expense of reduced capacity for troubleshooting and decision making. Deliberately increasing workload would be an unusual step to take.
The 737 Max accidents are (IMHO) mainly influenced by design choices that should never have passed certification and trying to slap a sticking plaster on top of those decisions is missing the bigger picture.
In any non-normal situation flying the aircraft manually usually comes at the expense of reduced capacity for troubleshooting and decision making. Deliberately increasing workload would be an unusual step to take.
The 737 Max accidents are (IMHO) mainly influenced by design choices that should never have passed certification and trying to slap a sticking plaster on top of those decisions is missing the bigger picture.
Join Date: Nov 2015
Location: Bay Area, CA
Posts: 65
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No, it is not Boeing PR. As more information becomes available, and there is more understanding of what actually happened, those of us who actually get paid to fly can see that these pilots made a lot of mistakes.
The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
The ET302 pilots did not follow the proper procedures after takeoff when they were faced with an Angle Of Attack disagreement during a day VFR departure. Boeing has taken steps to make the B737 MAX MCAS safer (foolproof?), but there will always be pilots who are their own worst enemies.
FACT: As far as the world knows exactly seven qualified commercial pilots have seen the scenarios that let to the loss of Lion Air 610 and ET302.
FACT: Of those seven pilots four are dead.
FACT: Of those seven pilots, and the three who are not dead, the only individual who correctly connected the dots was not either pilot 5 or 6. It was a jumpseater sitting behind them, who wasn't responsible for anything, who interrupted the mayhem and allowed the flight to continue and land safely.
A failure that results in an absolute 86 percent of its pilots being overwhelmed, that represents 66 percent of flights on which said failure happened ending up in microscopic sized pieces, this is not a failure that can be allowed on a modern transport aircraft.
If eight out of ten pilots who were exposed to a real life stressor are overwhelmed (empirically and though observation in known environments), how exactly is this their fault??
A failure that results in an absolute 66 percent of its pilots (and passengers) being killed simply cannot be blamed on the pilots. Could they have done better?? You bet. But statistics don't lie- and the numbers here show conclusively that MCAS is a killer unless you line up the slots in just the right way.
Perhaps more concerning: ANU trim above 300?? KIAS can cause you to have no trim control at all. I'll take on MCAS any day, but a stuck trim wheel with no altitude to give and... That's just nuts. I've been interviewing friends of mine who fly heavy iron. Not one can describe an airplane they have flown which loses all trim authority above a certain airspeed and tail loading.
You 737 drivers out there: If you are clocking 320KIAS and you try to use the trim- will it work if you are somewhat mis-trimmed nose-down?? 300KIAS?? 310KIAS?? Where and when does your trim tab become teh hammer nailing the lid shut on your coffin?? I am stunned to see here that people are not discussing this more. MCAS is an abomination, but alone it is simple stupidity. An Airplane that has an envelope within the normal operating range wherein trim will no longer not only be detrimental, it will me immovable...Really??
On every airplane you've got a handy indication of stall speed clean and dirty. If there is a speed above which your horizontal trim may not work, would there not be a need for a little line, to like, ummm, say "Hey dummy- if you are above this line you've got squat in terms of horizontal stabilizer trim control!!"
Finally:
Please stop trying to find the person to pin the blame to. This was a human failure, and it has literally thousands of possible inputs that could have effected the outcome. It is in Boeing's interest to minimize the actual events, as well as their underlying causes. But it is up to people like those of you here- to suss out the difference between corporate protective blame and actual culpability. The pilots had seconds to make decisions that would impact hundreds of lives. Boeing had at least eight years to make decisions that would have kept the bastard MCAS from entering into service in the first place. It is improper to equivocate the two, and moreso to blame the guys who only had a few seconds to guess and act correctly, as opposed to those who had years to do it right- and didn't.
Don't get me wrong- I know how proud we are. I simultaneously joined the Caterpillar Club and destroyed an entire airframe in 1996. I knew what had happened, but I knew that until the NTSB report came out NOT blaming pilot error I would never be free. And if it did blame me I would be crushed to the point of uselessness going forward. We are a proud profession, and we will eat our young in a heartbeat if we feel they have failed our standards in some way.
Eating our young here is a disservice to the profession. They went to work, did their best, their best was not good enough and hundreds died.
That should be enough penalty no??
Apologies for the rant-
dce
Join Date: Sep 2007
Location: Derby
Posts: 70
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To be accurate, they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed. This must raise questions about pilot training and the role of pilots in operating aircraft which are becoming more automated.
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Reading
Age: 41
Posts: 100
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To be accurate, they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed. This must raise questions about pilot training and the role of pilots in operating aircraft which are becoming more automated.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Leeds, UK
Posts: 281
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I imagine right now that Boeing HQ are relying on the belief, like some banks, that they are too big to fail. I'm sure they're confident their friends on Capital Hill will manage this fall from grace and cut them all the slack possible on the way back up. Whether this is in the best interests of safety is debatable, The real bogeyman isn't Airbus since they're a known quantity and can co-exist in the world marketplace with Boeing. It's the Chinese who want to dominate everything, and would love to move up the food chain and build and eventually export their own airliners. Look at Huawai v Apple. I'm sure Trump and everybody else are finessing a soft landing, and providing a helping hand up for America's premier manufacturer and exporter.
G
G
Pegase Driver
Join Date: May 1997
Location: Europe
Age: 73
Posts: 3,668
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I've been mostly silent on this thread, despite reading all posts. But that one rang a bell.
FACT: As far as the world knows exactly seven qualified commercial pilots have seen the scenarios that let to the loss of Lion Air 610 and ET302.
FACT: Of those seven pilots four are dead.
FACT: Of those seven pilots, and the three who are not dead, the only individual who correctly connected the dots was not either pilot 5 or 6. It was a jumpseater sitting behind them, who wasn't responsible for anything, who interrupted the mayhem and allowed the flight to continue and land safely.
A failure that results in an absolute 86 percent of its pilots being overwhelmed, that represents 66 percent of flights on which said failure happened ending up in microscopic sized pieces, this is not a failure that can be allowed on a modern transport aircraft.
If eight out of ten pilots who were exposed to a real life stressor are overwhelmed (empirically and though observation in known environments), how exactly is this their fault??
A failure that results in an absolute 66 percent of its pilots (and passengers) being killed simply cannot be blamed on the pilots. Could they have done better?? You bet. But statistics don't lie- and the numbers here show conclusively that MCAS is a killer unless you line up the slots in just the right way.
Perhaps more concerning: ANU trim above 300?? KIAS can cause you to have no trim control at all. I'll take on MCAS any day, but a stuck trim wheel with no altitude to give and... That's just nuts. I've been interviewing friends of mine who fly heavy iron. Not one can describe an airplane they have flown which loses all trim authority above a certain airspeed and tail loading.
You 737 drivers out there: If you are clocking 320KIAS and you try to use the trim- will it work if you are somewhat mis-trimmed nose-down?? 300KIAS?? 310KIAS?? Where and when does your trim tab become teh hammer nailing the lid shut on your coffin?? I am stunned to see here that people are not discussing this more. MCAS is an abomination, but alone it is simple stupidity. An Airplane that has an envelope within the normal operating range wherein trim will no longer not only be detrimental, it will me immovable...Really??
On every airplane you've got a handy indication of stall speed clean and dirty. If there is a speed above which your horizontal trim may not work, would there not be a need for a little line, to like, ummm, say "Hey dummy- if you are above this line you've got squat in terms of horizontal stabilizer trim control!!"
Finally:
Please stop trying to find the person to pin the blame to. This was a human failure, and it has literally thousands of possible inputs that could have effected the outcome. It is in Boeing's interest to minimize the actual events, as well as their underlying causes. But it is up to people like those of you here- to suss out the difference between corporate protective blame and actual culpability. The pilots had seconds to make decisions that would impact hundreds of lives. Boeing had at least eight years to make decisions that would have kept the bastard MCAS from entering into service in the first place. It is improper to equivocate the two, and moreso to blame the guys who only had a few seconds to guess and act correctly, as opposed to those who had years to do it right- and didn't.
Don't get me wrong- I know how proud we are. I simultaneously joined the Caterpillar Club and destroyed an entire airframe in 1996. I knew what had happened, but I knew that until the NTSB report came out NOT blaming pilot error I would never be free. And if it did blame me I would be crushed to the point of uselessness going forward. We are a proud profession, and we will eat our young in a heartbeat if we feel they have failed our standards in some way.
Eating our young here is a disservice to the profession. They went to work, did their best, their best was not good enough and hundreds died.
That should be enough penalty no??
Apologies for the rant-
dce
FACT: As far as the world knows exactly seven qualified commercial pilots have seen the scenarios that let to the loss of Lion Air 610 and ET302.
FACT: Of those seven pilots four are dead.
FACT: Of those seven pilots, and the three who are not dead, the only individual who correctly connected the dots was not either pilot 5 or 6. It was a jumpseater sitting behind them, who wasn't responsible for anything, who interrupted the mayhem and allowed the flight to continue and land safely.
A failure that results in an absolute 86 percent of its pilots being overwhelmed, that represents 66 percent of flights on which said failure happened ending up in microscopic sized pieces, this is not a failure that can be allowed on a modern transport aircraft.
If eight out of ten pilots who were exposed to a real life stressor are overwhelmed (empirically and though observation in known environments), how exactly is this their fault??
A failure that results in an absolute 66 percent of its pilots (and passengers) being killed simply cannot be blamed on the pilots. Could they have done better?? You bet. But statistics don't lie- and the numbers here show conclusively that MCAS is a killer unless you line up the slots in just the right way.
Perhaps more concerning: ANU trim above 300?? KIAS can cause you to have no trim control at all. I'll take on MCAS any day, but a stuck trim wheel with no altitude to give and... That's just nuts. I've been interviewing friends of mine who fly heavy iron. Not one can describe an airplane they have flown which loses all trim authority above a certain airspeed and tail loading.
You 737 drivers out there: If you are clocking 320KIAS and you try to use the trim- will it work if you are somewhat mis-trimmed nose-down?? 300KIAS?? 310KIAS?? Where and when does your trim tab become teh hammer nailing the lid shut on your coffin?? I am stunned to see here that people are not discussing this more. MCAS is an abomination, but alone it is simple stupidity. An Airplane that has an envelope within the normal operating range wherein trim will no longer not only be detrimental, it will me immovable...Really??
On every airplane you've got a handy indication of stall speed clean and dirty. If there is a speed above which your horizontal trim may not work, would there not be a need for a little line, to like, ummm, say "Hey dummy- if you are above this line you've got squat in terms of horizontal stabilizer trim control!!"
Finally:
Please stop trying to find the person to pin the blame to. This was a human failure, and it has literally thousands of possible inputs that could have effected the outcome. It is in Boeing's interest to minimize the actual events, as well as their underlying causes. But it is up to people like those of you here- to suss out the difference between corporate protective blame and actual culpability. The pilots had seconds to make decisions that would impact hundreds of lives. Boeing had at least eight years to make decisions that would have kept the bastard MCAS from entering into service in the first place. It is improper to equivocate the two, and moreso to blame the guys who only had a few seconds to guess and act correctly, as opposed to those who had years to do it right- and didn't.
Don't get me wrong- I know how proud we are. I simultaneously joined the Caterpillar Club and destroyed an entire airframe in 1996. I knew what had happened, but I knew that until the NTSB report came out NOT blaming pilot error I would never be free. And if it did blame me I would be crushed to the point of uselessness going forward. We are a proud profession, and we will eat our young in a heartbeat if we feel they have failed our standards in some way.
Eating our young here is a disservice to the profession. They went to work, did their best, their best was not good enough and hundreds died.
That should be enough penalty no??
Apologies for the rant-
dce
So please , here , unless you work for Boeing and are afraid to loose your job, let's skip the notion that those Ethiopians kids did not follow proper procedures and are somewhat responsible for this accident..
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: UTC +8
Posts: 2,626
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
GlobalNav - "...BS. There's not a crew in the world that doesn't make mistakes, but this crew did not act stupidly nor incompetently...."
So switching on the autopilot with the stick shaker, zooming past 340 VMO with clacker horn tweeting, continuing past 458 kts at low altitude in day VMC is neither stupid nor incompetent? Do tell.
So switching on the autopilot with the stick shaker, zooming past 340 VMO with clacker horn tweeting, continuing past 458 kts at low altitude in day VMC is neither stupid nor incompetent? Do tell.
double-oscar, #4005,
‘… they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed.‘
In addition to stall warning, the crews also had higher stick force (feel shift), airspeed and altitude disagree alerts, ambiguous speed indications; surprise.
Now where in the manual is this combination considered, and belatedly in the FAA AD, how is the description and interaction of these placed in appropriate context.
How should the possibility that the Manufacturer or the Regulator not following their procedures be framed - context, for including a procedure for a situation which was overlooked or not even conceived?
The Lion and Ethiopian crews are the most experienced in our industry in those specific conditions; unfortunately there are unable to relate their experiences for us to learn from. Thus it is everyone’s responsibility to learn from what is known of past events, but not to identify the similarities with (our) current thoughts, or fit understanding to hindsight; instead we all have identify new issue particularly those hidden or already forgotten.
‘… they had a stall warning on lift-off. There is guidance for this in the QRH and the Flight Crew Training Manual which wasn’t followed.‘
In addition to stall warning, the crews also had higher stick force (feel shift), airspeed and altitude disagree alerts, ambiguous speed indications; surprise.
Now where in the manual is this combination considered, and belatedly in the FAA AD, how is the description and interaction of these placed in appropriate context.
How should the possibility that the Manufacturer or the Regulator not following their procedures be framed - context, for including a procedure for a situation which was overlooked or not even conceived?
The Lion and Ethiopian crews are the most experienced in our industry in those specific conditions; unfortunately there are unable to relate their experiences for us to learn from. Thus it is everyone’s responsibility to learn from what is known of past events, but not to identify the similarities with (our) current thoughts, or fit understanding to hindsight; instead we all have identify new issue particularly those hidden or already forgotten.
