Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 59
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
****!
Just a few observations.
I have read a few hundred Accident reports and this one is one of the scariest!
Why did this Cpt select AP on, with stickshaker going?
Why did he retract flaps when he knew there was a 50/50 chance the MCAS would go off.
Why did he not set a reasonable pwr setting so as to not accelerate out of control?
Must have been confusing for him?
As for Boeing Max
It will never fly again without serious modifications!
Cpt B
I have read a few hundred Accident reports and this one is one of the scariest!
Why did this Cpt select AP on, with stickshaker going?
Why did he retract flaps when he knew there was a 50/50 chance the MCAS would go off.
Why did he not set a reasonable pwr setting so as to not accelerate out of control?
Must have been confusing for him?
As for Boeing Max
It will never fly again without serious modifications!
Cpt B
Join Date: Mar 2015
Location: Washington state
Posts: 209
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Shortly after Takeoff the Captain who was pilot flying had stick shaker on his side only. Why not transfer control to the first officer at this point or at least a little while later?
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Apple Maggot Quarantine Area
Age: 47
Posts: 99
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As has been previously discussed - the measured AOA and the measured static pressure is used to compute an AOA-corrected static pressure. Airspeed is then calculated based on the difference between the dynamic pressure measured at the Pitot tube and the AOA-corrected static pressure. If you loose AOA, you loose AOA-corrected static pressure, and anything that uses it in it's calculation becomes unreliable.
Join Date: Apr 2015
Location: Europe
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Another very important reason is that I am probably going to gain much greater situational awareness if I become the pilot monitoring as I can concentrate on getting a grip on the situation instead of concentrating on flying the airplane.
Join Date: Apr 2014
Location: Europe
Posts: 26
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Investigators on Thursday confirmed there was a third, off-duty pilot in the cockpit that evening. That was not mentioned in the preliminary report because they had not interviewed the pilot at that stage as they worked to get the report out fast, Utomo said.
Reuters on Wednesday reported it was a captain at Lion Air’s full-service sister carrier Batik Air who solved the flight control problems, according to two sources.
KNKT said the pilot was qualified on the 737 MAX 8 but did not say what airline he worked for or what role he played in assisting the crew.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 preliminary report:
Boeing: 737 MAX Update
Boeing: 737 MAX Update
Join Date: Apr 2017
Location: England
Posts: 75
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Additional software problem detected in Boeing 737 Max flight control system, officials say
BREAKING: A Boeing-led review of a stall-prevention system suspected in the deadly crashes of two of the company’s new 737 Max jetliners has detected an additional software problem that the FAA has ordered fixed before the planes are cleared to fly again, the company acknowledged Thursday. Boeing called the additional problem, which is unrelated to the stall-prevention system,“relatively minor.” Two officials familiar with the FAA investigation said the issue is nonetheless classified as critical to flight safety. Boeing said it expects to have a solution ready “in the coming weeks.”
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 59
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Let one thing be clear, we now have facts.
The crew was extremely inexperienced :
The FO had grand total 361hrs of wich 207 the last 3 months.
The captain was 29 years. Had an impressive career!
Had 8122hrs total
July 23 2010 he graduated
FO 737-800 31 jan 2011
Then FO 757/767 777 and 787.
BUT!
And here comes the problem: In 26 Okt 2017 he made Cpt 737-800 , SO less then 1.5 years Command.
There is a total of 1477hrs 738 and 103hrs Max.
Of which a lot is FO time!!
So, a low timer indeed!
This is a warning on so many levels!
The crew was extremely inexperienced :
The FO had grand total 361hrs of wich 207 the last 3 months.
The captain was 29 years. Had an impressive career!
Had 8122hrs total
July 23 2010 he graduated
FO 737-800 31 jan 2011
Then FO 757/767 777 and 787.
BUT!
And here comes the problem: In 26 Okt 2017 he made Cpt 737-800 , SO less then 1.5 years Command.
There is a total of 1477hrs 738 and 103hrs Max.
Of which a lot is FO time!!
So, a low timer indeed!
This is a warning on so many levels!
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Europe
Age: 54
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just a few observations.
I have read a few hundred Accident reports and this one is one of the scariest!
Why did this Cpt select AP on, with stickshaker going?
Why did he retract flaps when he knew there was a 50/50 chance the MCAS would go off.
Why did he not set a reasonable pwr setting so as to not accelerate out of control?
Must have been confusing for him?
As for Boeing Max
It will never fly again without serious modifications!
Cpt B
I have read a few hundred Accident reports and this one is one of the scariest!
Why did this Cpt select AP on, with stickshaker going?
Why did he retract flaps when he knew there was a 50/50 chance the MCAS would go off.
Why did he not set a reasonable pwr setting so as to not accelerate out of control?
Must have been confusing for him?
As for Boeing Max
It will never fly again without serious modifications!
Cpt B
That's the only explanation to the AP Warning they got there.
It appears they
- restored the stab trim cutout switches
- made two quick manual ANU inputs
- hit the autopilot engange button, hoping the autopilot would solve the situation for them
Join Date: Aug 2015
Location: London, UK
Posts: 7
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It appears he tried to engage the left autopilot a fourth time, near the end at 05:43:30.
That's the only explanation to the AP Warning they got there.
It appears they
That's the only explanation to the AP Warning they got there.
It appears they
- restored the stab trim cutout switches
- made two quick manual ANU imputs
- hit the autopilot engange button, hoping the autopilot would solve the situation for them
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Surrounded by aluminum, and the great outdoors
Posts: 3,780
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
so now the spin begins, "they followed all the rules and it still crashed"...well, not quite, how did the elec/auto stab trim find itself functioning again, or did it turn itself back on?
Join Date: Oct 2018
Location: New york
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Because Boeing stated MCAS inoperative with flaps extended. If crew extended flaps before reengaging electric stabilizer they could have prevented MCAS from operating. That would have allowed them to easily trim plane electrically. With known MCAS issue retracting flaps at 1000 agl seems too soon to me. At that altitude MCAS engagement more difficult to control.
I'm still baffled by the speed they reached. Having control issues I'd think one would instinctively try to maintain some reasonable power level. It is almost if they flew TOGA till the ground...
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Melbourne
Posts: 39
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
''About four minutes into the flight, the pilots gave up on the manual stabilizer wheel and switched the electric power to the tail back on, then used the thumb switches on the control column to pitch the nose back up.
But just five seconds later, MCAS kicked in again and once more pushed the nose sharply down.
Just 35 seconds later, six minutes after take-off, the plane rolled over before plowing into the earth in a “high energy impact” at a speed of approximately 575 miles per hour."
Checkmate - they were damned if they did (use trim cutout switches) and damned if they didn't. Seems that at the point they shut of the system the AND trim was more than the elevators could overcome and with ever increasing speed in the dive manual trim was not an option. what would you do? try flying inverted (as with the air Alaska accident )? May explain the last minute roll .
What a mess.
But just five seconds later, MCAS kicked in again and once more pushed the nose sharply down.
Just 35 seconds later, six minutes after take-off, the plane rolled over before plowing into the earth in a “high energy impact” at a speed of approximately 575 miles per hour."
Checkmate - they were damned if they did (use trim cutout switches) and damned if they didn't. Seems that at the point they shut of the system the AND trim was more than the elevators could overcome and with ever increasing speed in the dive manual trim was not an option. what would you do? try flying inverted (as with the air Alaska accident )? May explain the last minute roll .
What a mess.
So why has the CEO/President of Boeing, tonight, said that he now own responsibility for what happened in that cockpit as a result of the MCAS debacle thrown up by the preliminary report?
He went on to state that Boeing had a 'fix' which will/is being implemented as he speaks.
Do you honestly believe a man of this stature is going to make a carefully crafted statement such as this - without advice.
Boeing is in for some serious pain for years to come, over this. Law suits have already been lined up.
The pilots 'appear' to have been cleared of any malpractice, it seems to me.......
He went on to state that Boeing had a 'fix' which will/is being implemented as he speaks.
Do you honestly believe a man of this stature is going to make a carefully crafted statement such as this - without advice.
Boeing is in for some serious pain for years to come, over this. Law suits have already been lined up.
The pilots 'appear' to have been cleared of any malpractice, it seems to me.......
Join Date: Jan 2016
Location: Uk
Posts: 74
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
to add a non-pilot (burn him, burn him, but sometimes the ignorant can ask relevant questions..) question to the mix.
Could the reason that on both fatal flights that we saw unexpectedly brief presses to the "trim up" pickle switch be :
because that the pilot would have expected that his pressing of the switch to cause the immediate cacophony of noise of the trim wheels spinning , and maybe they didn't due to aerodynamic loads currently on them due to the lack of authority of the electric motor due to increasing speed so they quickly released the switch ("It's not working") . This would have been then followed up by MCAS throwing in it's "i'm OK to go again jack" logic of another bucketload of nose down. And the same side effect of increasing speed could cause the inability to wind back manually leading to the desperate measure of turning the electronic back on.
I guess the question is - is there a combination of speed and nose down trim that can mean that neither the electronic trim nor the hand wind trim can counteract it. And of course if you re-enable the electronic trim to try, having manual trim try and failed, then MCAS gives you an extra dose of "nose hard down"...
Could the reason that on both fatal flights that we saw unexpectedly brief presses to the "trim up" pickle switch be :
because that the pilot would have expected that his pressing of the switch to cause the immediate cacophony of noise of the trim wheels spinning , and maybe they didn't due to aerodynamic loads currently on them due to the lack of authority of the electric motor due to increasing speed so they quickly released the switch ("It's not working") . This would have been then followed up by MCAS throwing in it's "i'm OK to go again jack" logic of another bucketload of nose down. And the same side effect of increasing speed could cause the inability to wind back manually leading to the desperate measure of turning the electronic back on.
I guess the question is - is there a combination of speed and nose down trim that can mean that neither the electronic trim nor the hand wind trim can counteract it. And of course if you re-enable the electronic trim to try, having manual trim try and failed, then MCAS gives you an extra dose of "nose hard down"...
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 59
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Rananim
Fair summary.
But it is not criminal to be one level above Your Competency Level.
It IS criminal to make such a **** aircraft and certify and sell it like Boeing does!
But it is not criminal to be one level above Your Competency Level.
It IS criminal to make such a **** aircraft and certify and sell it like Boeing does!
Join Date: May 2010
Location: Boston
Age: 73
Posts: 443
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That said do disagree with statements on manual trim, pretty strong evidence that at the speed and trim they were in it would be physically very hard or impossible to trim manually without unloading maneuvers that the did not have the altitude for and/or knowledge/training of.