Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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Dear Armchair
When you buy a fleet of planes you are given the manuals. They are not exhaustive because no two airlines fly their planes the same way. SOPs can vary greatly. I have trained pilots from other airlines on the same plane and it takes ages to reach them the new SOPs. The manuals don’t tell you so much how to fly as what to do. The airlines and their regulators do the training. Boeing do not train you. Airbus I guess the same. the first ten or so training captains go to Seattle and learn the ropes. They then cascade that down through the airline.
Y
example
Boeing- Select Flap 1
Airline 1- PF CALLS FLAP 1. PM REPEATS “FLAP1.?” PF NOTES CORRECT REPETION OF COMMAND. PM SELECTS FLAP 1, PM NOTES FLAP MOVEMENT. PM CALLS FLAP 1 ONCE F1 IS SET
Airline 2 PF CALLS F1 - PM selects F1
There are several ways to do this and Boeing are not involfved unless your procedures go against their advice
When you buy a fleet of planes you are given the manuals. They are not exhaustive because no two airlines fly their planes the same way. SOPs can vary greatly. I have trained pilots from other airlines on the same plane and it takes ages to reach them the new SOPs. The manuals don’t tell you so much how to fly as what to do. The airlines and their regulators do the training. Boeing do not train you. Airbus I guess the same. the first ten or so training captains go to Seattle and learn the ropes. They then cascade that down through the airline.
Y
example
Boeing- Select Flap 1
Airline 1- PF CALLS FLAP 1. PM REPEATS “FLAP1.?” PF NOTES CORRECT REPETION OF COMMAND. PM SELECTS FLAP 1, PM NOTES FLAP MOVEMENT. PM CALLS FLAP 1 ONCE F1 IS SET
Airline 2 PF CALLS F1 - PM selects F1
There are several ways to do this and Boeing are not involfved unless your procedures go against their advice
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Love Boeing and their jets. But I feel Boeing let the people on those two planes down. In the very worst possible way. Not advising and training on a feature that can (and did) prove deadly and very quickly. Especially if it is thought that airline pilots that are not American are less trained and less able. If that is indeed so or even suspected to be so, then it is the supplier of the aircraft's duty to train them to operate the aircraft in a safe manner. The airplane manufacturer should, indeed must provide (more than) adequate supervision and after sales training ( both flying and maintenance) for the proper use of their product. At least that is what I feel.
If you supply nuclear reactors to a client you (the maker) should be at least morally responsible to provide adequate training in its operation.
You sell hundreds of the latest jets to a client, you should and indeed must provide training in their operation and maintenance to a proper level.
The client should not be allowed to 'wing it' so to speak.
Again my one penny.
If you supply nuclear reactors to a client you (the maker) should be at least morally responsible to provide adequate training in its operation.
You sell hundreds of the latest jets to a client, you should and indeed must provide training in their operation and maintenance to a proper level.
The client should not be allowed to 'wing it' so to speak.
Again my one penny.
- Passengers want cheap(est) fares. Cheaper fares = more passengers = higher load factor = airline profitability (for a given mean fare).
- So, airlines want lowest cost; low(est) leasing rates, low(est) fuel consumption, low(est) maintenance costs, low(est) training costs for new A/C types, lowest wage rates, maximum airframe and crew utilisation, lowest airport charges, etc, etc.
- Aircraft manufacturers want high volume sales for profitability to amortise fixed and development costs, in part to please investors and in part to create sufficient cash flow to allow development of the next model and so will make what they think the market will buy most of...to the minimum standard permitted in service (ie lowest cost). They will offer 'optional extras' at extra cost to the airlines/leasing agents (ie another profit centre).
- Governments and their aviation regulators want maximum safety (in theory). It's not helpful for your voters to suffer the consequences of your mistakes or to see others do so.
Just this simple construct (yes, I know it's more complicated than that), illustrates the tensions in decision-making and taking. Remember, there is no such thing as 'safe' or 'unsafe'. It's all a matter of degree based on thorough, objective, tested risk assessment. Or it should be. But then everyone has an agenda. Everyone.
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ht data. It would appear that issues are far more complicated than it may first appear. At the heart of the issues are the algorithms that process the AoA and computed air speed. The doomed flight had stick shaker on take-off rotation unlike the previous flight (stick shaker started at an altitude about 400ft). The published data does not include all the parameters available.
it has yet to be established if the flight was “Doomed”. Doomed would suggest something like the wings falling off. There MAY have been a solution.
Yanrair
it has yet to be established if the flight was “Doomed”. Doomed would suggest something like the wings falling off. There MAY have been a solution.
Yanrair
Last edited by wheelsright; 27th Mar 2019 at 10:58.
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Dear Armchair
When you buy a fleet of planes you are given the manuals. They are not exhaustive because no two airlines fly their planes the same way. SOPs can vary greatly. I have trained pilots from other airlines on the same plane and it takes ages to reach them the new SOPs. The manuals don’t tell you so much how to fly as what to do. The airlines and their regulators do the training. Boeing do not train you. Airbus I guess the same. the first ten or so training captains go to Seattle and learn the ropes. They then cascade that down through the airline.
Y
example
Boeing- Select Flap 1
Airline 1- PF CALLS FLAP 1. PM REPEATS “FLAP1.?” PF NOTES CORRECT REPETION OF COMMAND. PM SELECTS FLAP 1, PM NOTES FLAP MOVEMENT. PM CALLS FLAP 1 ONCE F1 IS SET
Airline 2 PF CALLS F1 - PM selects F1
There are several ways to do this and Boeing are not involfved unless your procedures go against their advice
When you buy a fleet of planes you are given the manuals. They are not exhaustive because no two airlines fly their planes the same way. SOPs can vary greatly. I have trained pilots from other airlines on the same plane and it takes ages to reach them the new SOPs. The manuals don’t tell you so much how to fly as what to do. The airlines and their regulators do the training. Boeing do not train you. Airbus I guess the same. the first ten or so training captains go to Seattle and learn the ropes. They then cascade that down through the airline.
Y
example
Boeing- Select Flap 1
Airline 1- PF CALLS FLAP 1. PM REPEATS “FLAP1.?” PF NOTES CORRECT REPETION OF COMMAND. PM SELECTS FLAP 1, PM NOTES FLAP MOVEMENT. PM CALLS FLAP 1 ONCE F1 IS SET
Airline 2 PF CALLS F1 - PM selects F1
There are several ways to do this and Boeing are not involfved unless your procedures go against their advice
Last edited by HarryMann; 27th Mar 2019 at 10:00.
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All true. Car manufacturers don't teach you how to drive either. Boeing and Airbus sell their planes and expect competent crew certified by their countries' authorities to fly them. All good, until it is not good enough. It would appear to be in the makers interest to hand hold at least some of their clients longer than others. There is a thought (not without grounds perhaps) that the Indonesian maintenance crew did not correctly identify or rectify the issues with the ill fated plane. But at least the flight crew of the Lion flight could not be blamed for not understanding what was happening. They could perhaps have been blamed for not being trained enough to GUESS or at least theorize the right thing to do especially when minutes or even seconds count. The Captain in hindsight (always 20/20) maybe should not have left his position and handed the controls to his Co pilot while he tried to find out what was happening. Perhaps at that particular juncture they should have been trying to keep the horse from bucking and doing their best to turn right around and land. Or perhaps it was already too late. But at that point in time no pilots knew about MCAS . What happened exactly on the Egyptian flight is not 100pct known as yet.
If I was Boeing I would want to (as part of my sales pitch) provide after sales supervision of the maintenance and observe and provide guidance for any flying issues for a time. Perhaps station some key personnel for a reasonable time. I don't think this is done now but it should be looked into.
Doesn't matter who crashes your product really. It is going to affect you.
p.s. I am not a Boeing fanboy though as I love Airbus products equally. I'm not fond of the sidestick though, where one pilot doesn't "see" what the other is doing.
If I was Boeing I would want to (as part of my sales pitch) provide after sales supervision of the maintenance and observe and provide guidance for any flying issues for a time. Perhaps station some key personnel for a reasonable time. I don't think this is done now but it should be looked into.
Doesn't matter who crashes your product really. It is going to affect you.
p.s. I am not a Boeing fanboy though as I love Airbus products equally. I'm not fond of the sidestick though, where one pilot doesn't "see" what the other is doing.
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Whilst obviously true for the general case, perhaps somewhat disingenuous or simplistic in the case of disseminstion of information ON and training FOR introduction of an aircraft type with MCAS, a new and quite different approach to meeting stability and control requirements
Cheers
Y
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Several people have asked MCAS clarification questions in response to some of my recent posts. Rather than respond to them individually I offer the following as hopeful a fairly comprehensive description of the MCAS system that has been in the 737MAX fleet to date. Note that this does not reflect any of the changes about to be released. Hopefully Boeing will provide clear detail of those soon.
As always, if you still have questions after reading and trying to absorb the following please ask.
1. MCAS was designed to command airplane nose down stabilizer in response to high AOA up to an authority limit of 2.5 degrees for Mach less than 0.4 with lower authority at higher Mach numbers. If the pilot does not make any pitch trim commands, once AOA goes low MCAS will run the stabilizer in the airplane nose up direction back to the location from which it started.
2. MCAS is activated when all of the following are true:
a. Flaps are up
b. Autopilot is not engaged
c. Sensed AOA is above the MCAS activation AOA threshold
3. Once activated, MCAS will not command more than one increment of airplane nose down stabilizer motion until it has been reset. MCAS will be reset by either:
a. Pilot pitch trim command followed by a period of 5 consecutive seconds with no pilot pitch trim command.
- The assumption is made that pilot activation of pitch trim will be closely followed by continued pilot use of pitch trim to return the airplane to a column neutral pitch trim condition. MCAS seeing no further pilot pitch trim for a period of 5 seconds is interpreted as indication that the pilot has achieved column neutral pitch trim.
b. Return (by MCAS) of the stabilizer to its starting position per (1) above.
- Having returned the stabilizer to its pre-MCAS event starting point it is assumed that the airplane is back to a column neutral pitch trim condition.
4. Pilot pitch trim input at any time during the MCAS sequence as described in (1) above will stop MCAS stabilizer motion and end the current MCAS event while immediately moving the stabilizer in the direction of the pilot command.
a. If pilot pitch trim input is issued while MCAS is running the stabilizer airplane nose down, that motion will stop and the stabilizer will immediately move in the direction of the pilot command.
b. If pilot pitch trim input is issued while MCAS is running the stabilizer airplane nose up, that motion will stop and the stabilizer will move in the direction of the pilot command.
c. If pilot pitch trim input is issued after MCAS has completed its airplane nose down motion but prior to MCAS acting to take that motion out (as a result of return to low AOA), the stabilizer will immediately move in the direction of the pilot command.
d. It is assumed that the pilot issuing a pitch trim command is indication that the pilot is taking over the pitch trim task and will return the airplane to a column neutral pitch trim condition.
As a result of 1 through 4 above, given an AOA sensor that is failed so as to give an erroneously high reading (similar to what data appears to indicate occurred during the Lion Air accident flight), the following MCAS related scenarios can occur:
A. MCAS will activate (if flying manually) as soon as the flaps are retracted to up. Note that the stick shaker will have activated as soon as the airplane lifted off the ground regardless of the takeoff flap setting.
B. If the pilot does not make any pitch trim inputs, MCAS will run the stabilizer airplane nose down for one MCAS increment (as much as 2.5 degrees over approximately 10 seconds if Mach is less than 0.4). Without pilot pitch trim input, MCAS will not command further stabilizer motion in either direction. There is plenty of pitch control authority via the elevator using the column to counter the pitch disturbance generated by one MCAS increment of stabilizer motion.
C. If during or after the MCAS stabilizer motion per (A) above the pilot gives a pitch trim command the stabilizer will immediately start moving in the direction of the pilot command.
a. If the pilot pitch trim commands drive that stabilizer back to a column neutral pitch trim condition then the airplane will be back where it started from. In this event, provided sensed AOA is still high, MCAS will activate again once it sees a period of 5 seconds with not pilot pitch trim input. This process will repeat itself with the stabilizer never getting further than one MCAS increment out of trim. It appears that this sequence was repeated 20 or more times by the Lion Air accident flight pilot before he handed control over to his first officer.
b. If the pilot pitch trim commands are activated, but do not drive the stabilizer back to a column neutral pitch trim condition it is possible that successive activation of MCAS triggered by high AOA signal and ineffective pilot pitch trim inputs will lead to the stabilizer moving progressively further in the airplane nose down direction. It appears that this is what took place on the Lion Air accident airplane once the first officer took over control.
As for the reference in media reports this week regarding the crew’s need to intervene within 40 seconds of errant MCAS response to an AOA signal failed high, the following sequence of events would have to occur to so compromise pitch control power in that amount of time:
(a) The flight crew would have to allow a full increment of MCAS airplane nose down stabilizer motion to go in over 10 seconds without interrupting that motion via pilot pitch trim input.
(b) The flight crew would then have to have made a very short pitch trim command that triggered MCAS to reset, but did not re-establish anywhere near a column neutral pitch trim condition.
(c) After a 5 second pause wherein MCAS inferred that no more pilot pitch trim indicated the airplane was back to column neutral pitch trim, the flight crew would have to allow a second full increment of MCAS airplane nose down stabilizer motion to be inserted over another period of 10 seconds. Once again the crew would have to allow this stabilizer motion to go in without interruption via pilot pitch trim command.
(d) Once again, there would have be a repeat of (b) with a short, ineffective pilot pitch trim command.
(e) The final 10 seconds of this proposed 40 second sequence would be allowing another errant MCAS airplane nose down stabilizer motion increment to go in without interruption by pilot pitch trim command.
To summarize, getting in trouble over the course of just 40 seconds requires the crew to not trim when then should and make two very short, ineffective trim inputs following each of the first two MCAS stabilizer motion increments. This represents a worst case scenario.
As always, if you still have questions after reading and trying to absorb the following please ask.
1. MCAS was designed to command airplane nose down stabilizer in response to high AOA up to an authority limit of 2.5 degrees for Mach less than 0.4 with lower authority at higher Mach numbers. If the pilot does not make any pitch trim commands, once AOA goes low MCAS will run the stabilizer in the airplane nose up direction back to the location from which it started.
2. MCAS is activated when all of the following are true:
a. Flaps are up
b. Autopilot is not engaged
c. Sensed AOA is above the MCAS activation AOA threshold
3. Once activated, MCAS will not command more than one increment of airplane nose down stabilizer motion until it has been reset. MCAS will be reset by either:
a. Pilot pitch trim command followed by a period of 5 consecutive seconds with no pilot pitch trim command.
- The assumption is made that pilot activation of pitch trim will be closely followed by continued pilot use of pitch trim to return the airplane to a column neutral pitch trim condition. MCAS seeing no further pilot pitch trim for a period of 5 seconds is interpreted as indication that the pilot has achieved column neutral pitch trim.
b. Return (by MCAS) of the stabilizer to its starting position per (1) above.
- Having returned the stabilizer to its pre-MCAS event starting point it is assumed that the airplane is back to a column neutral pitch trim condition.
4. Pilot pitch trim input at any time during the MCAS sequence as described in (1) above will stop MCAS stabilizer motion and end the current MCAS event while immediately moving the stabilizer in the direction of the pilot command.
a. If pilot pitch trim input is issued while MCAS is running the stabilizer airplane nose down, that motion will stop and the stabilizer will immediately move in the direction of the pilot command.
b. If pilot pitch trim input is issued while MCAS is running the stabilizer airplane nose up, that motion will stop and the stabilizer will move in the direction of the pilot command.
c. If pilot pitch trim input is issued after MCAS has completed its airplane nose down motion but prior to MCAS acting to take that motion out (as a result of return to low AOA), the stabilizer will immediately move in the direction of the pilot command.
d. It is assumed that the pilot issuing a pitch trim command is indication that the pilot is taking over the pitch trim task and will return the airplane to a column neutral pitch trim condition.
As a result of 1 through 4 above, given an AOA sensor that is failed so as to give an erroneously high reading (similar to what data appears to indicate occurred during the Lion Air accident flight), the following MCAS related scenarios can occur:
A. MCAS will activate (if flying manually) as soon as the flaps are retracted to up. Note that the stick shaker will have activated as soon as the airplane lifted off the ground regardless of the takeoff flap setting.
B. If the pilot does not make any pitch trim inputs, MCAS will run the stabilizer airplane nose down for one MCAS increment (as much as 2.5 degrees over approximately 10 seconds if Mach is less than 0.4). Without pilot pitch trim input, MCAS will not command further stabilizer motion in either direction. There is plenty of pitch control authority via the elevator using the column to counter the pitch disturbance generated by one MCAS increment of stabilizer motion.
C. If during or after the MCAS stabilizer motion per (A) above the pilot gives a pitch trim command the stabilizer will immediately start moving in the direction of the pilot command.
a. If the pilot pitch trim commands drive that stabilizer back to a column neutral pitch trim condition then the airplane will be back where it started from. In this event, provided sensed AOA is still high, MCAS will activate again once it sees a period of 5 seconds with not pilot pitch trim input. This process will repeat itself with the stabilizer never getting further than one MCAS increment out of trim. It appears that this sequence was repeated 20 or more times by the Lion Air accident flight pilot before he handed control over to his first officer.
b. If the pilot pitch trim commands are activated, but do not drive the stabilizer back to a column neutral pitch trim condition it is possible that successive activation of MCAS triggered by high AOA signal and ineffective pilot pitch trim inputs will lead to the stabilizer moving progressively further in the airplane nose down direction. It appears that this is what took place on the Lion Air accident airplane once the first officer took over control.
As for the reference in media reports this week regarding the crew’s need to intervene within 40 seconds of errant MCAS response to an AOA signal failed high, the following sequence of events would have to occur to so compromise pitch control power in that amount of time:
(a) The flight crew would have to allow a full increment of MCAS airplane nose down stabilizer motion to go in over 10 seconds without interrupting that motion via pilot pitch trim input.
(b) The flight crew would then have to have made a very short pitch trim command that triggered MCAS to reset, but did not re-establish anywhere near a column neutral pitch trim condition.
(c) After a 5 second pause wherein MCAS inferred that no more pilot pitch trim indicated the airplane was back to column neutral pitch trim, the flight crew would have to allow a second full increment of MCAS airplane nose down stabilizer motion to be inserted over another period of 10 seconds. Once again the crew would have to allow this stabilizer motion to go in without interruption via pilot pitch trim command.
(d) Once again, there would have be a repeat of (b) with a short, ineffective pilot pitch trim command.
(e) The final 10 seconds of this proposed 40 second sequence would be allowing another errant MCAS airplane nose down stabilizer motion increment to go in without interruption by pilot pitch trim command.
To summarize, getting in trouble over the course of just 40 seconds requires the crew to not trim when then should and make two very short, ineffective trim inputs following each of the first two MCAS stabilizer motion increments. This represents a worst case scenario.
The systems are all based on various algorithms. The question is not whether there are algorithms, but whether they are capable of dealing with all possible flight conditions or fault conditions in a way that is helpful. Among these complex interactions between sensors and the controls there are many possibilities for unexpected interactions or interpretations. Does the system work as intended or have some situations been missed? I have some insight into the difficulties of eliminating unexpected conditions in controls engineering; having spent the first part of my life designing control systems in a non-aircraft environment. It is really easy to be lulled into the belief you have thought of everything, only to find there is a major defect in your logic that you have totally missed.
There is growing evidence that trim runaway must be identified at a very early stage to ensure that recovery is possible. The pilots may have to differentiate conflicting information at a time that there is a high workload. It seems likely that the risks are extremely high and have not been adequately mitigated. I look forward to seeing the source code that will have to produced in evidence at some time in the future.
Just to touch on an obvious problem... it is extremely unlikely that full nose down trim would be required in any flight. MCAS has full authority to provide full nose down trim regardless of many other factors (save for the crew disabling it). It would appear to me to be a dangerous degree of authority that should be, at the very least, be immediately obvious and notified to the pilots. Not only is there apparently too much authority but there is also insufficient redundancy and warning. My guess is it is an embarrassing mess, but only detailed investigation will confirm or invalidate that speculation.
All true. Car manufacturers don't teach you how to drive either. Boeing and Airbus sell their planes and expect competent crew certified by their countries' authorities to fly them. All good, until it is not good enough. It would appear to be in the makers interest to hand hold at least some of their clients longer than others. There is a thought (not without grounds perhaps) that the Indonesian maintenance crew did not correctly identify or rectify the issues with the ill fated plane..
As little or nothing was shared with the pilot group about MCAS, it is a bit difficult to believe that nevertheless there was full and complete documentation, procedures, spares availability, etc, about it provided to the engineering side. If anyone can post the Aircraft Maintenance Manual procedures for the Max for a "repeatedly moves stabiliser down" issue, different to "runaway stabiliser", it would be good to see them. Especially the bit about it using alternate AOA probes on alternate flights.
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Senate Commerce Hearing on Airline Safety Mar. 27, 3PM ET on C-SPAN2 8PM
This Senate hearing is at 3 PM Eastern Daylight Time to be broadcast on C-SPAN 2 at 8 PM Eastern Daylight Time (2.5 hours long) and probably will be available online.
Senate Commerce Hearing on Airline Safety
Government officials testify on airline safety after a global recall recall of the Boeing 737 max jets. A Senate Commerce subcommittee holds the hearing.
Program ID: 459047-1
Category: Senate Committee
Format: Senate Committee
Location: Washington, District of Columbia, United States
Will Air: Mar 27, 2019 | 8:00pm EDT | C-SPAN 2
https://www.c-span.org/video/?459047...airline-safety
Senate Commerce Hearing on Airline Safety
Government officials testify on airline safety after a global recall recall of the Boeing 737 max jets. A Senate Commerce subcommittee holds the hearing.
Program ID: 459047-1
Category: Senate Committee
Format: Senate Committee
Location: Washington, District of Columbia, United States
Will Air: Mar 27, 2019 | 8:00pm EDT | C-SPAN 2
https://www.c-span.org/video/?459047...airline-safety
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We have full Stall ID in the case of JT610 by a margin of some 10 degrees. Stall ID on the 737ng triggers: Stick shaker, Feel pressure increase and trim actions very similar to MCAS (though with the Yoke cutout switches active). So given we don't have a clean MCAS case (MCAS should fix the pitch moment curve before stall), what is the MAX logic at Stall ID? Does MCAS replace the 737ng Stall ID trimming and is then the MCAS logic as you described unchanged?
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"Hey, the airplane is trimming repeatedly in a direction I don't like, but we cannot use this procedure here because it says the trim needs to be 'continuous'. Drat!"
The problem is not semantics, although that is an important concept and I don't like people using the word to imply "it is just splitting hairs". It is not. It is about what we mean by words.
The problem is identifying the issue in the first place. Identifying that the trim movements are in fact pathological. Automatic trim inputs are normal and expected on the 737, mostly from the STS, and in situations where high angle of attack values are delivered (valid or not), a lot else is going on that requires your immediate attention, such as stick shaker and IAS disagree. Trimming occasionally to remove stick forces is second nature to any pilot, from light GA singles to large airliners (Airbus FBW autotrim notwithstanding), for a while you wouldn't even think about it. And then there is the problem of perhaps throwing the baby out with the bathwater, i. e. the evaluation of what functions are lost when electric trim is completely disabled. Remember that there is no way to disable MCAS only.
The symptoms are significantly different from runaway trim, which is a trained procedure precisely because the time in which the pilots need to react may be very short for a real runaway, to a large part because manual trim inputs may not stop it. But manual trim inputs do stop MCAS trim inputs. So it is substantially different from a runaway and is much harder to diagnose, and this has nothing whatsoever to do with "just semantics".
Bernd
Last edited by bsieker; 27th Mar 2019 at 15:52. Reason: typos, removed a sentence that might have distracted some people from more pertinent content.
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Boeing Meeting Today
I am on my way for 5 day of 737-800 duty and are not able to post , so can anyone please post any outcome or links to the outcome of the meeting Boeing has invited 200+ customer pilots and admin personnel in Seattle today.
And BTW I am a bit tired of the does and donts of the MCAS .
It is a **** system and the human factor is the clue.
I used to be interested in teck and performance.
Now mostly performance, the HUMAN performance and Limitations!
Looking forward to something constructive from Boeing , FAA ,Canada MOT and EASA.
Regards
Kpt B
And a safe day to You All
And BTW I am a bit tired of the does and donts of the MCAS .
It is a **** system and the human factor is the clue.
I used to be interested in teck and performance.
Now mostly performance, the HUMAN performance and Limitations!
Looking forward to something constructive from Boeing , FAA ,Canada MOT and EASA.
Regards
Kpt B
And a safe day to You All
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[QUOTE=bsieker;10431328]Is that really how you imagine troubleshooting on the flight deck of an airliner to work?
"Hey, the airplane is trimming repeatedly in a direction I don't like, but we cannot use this procedure here because it says the trim needs to be 'continuous'. Drat!"
I don't advocate limiting the forum to pilots, but an attitude of "I'm not a pilot, but I would have identifed the problem and applied the fix immediately" without knowing how things work, is just not
Reply
i am sorry Bsieker. Are you saying that I’m not a pilot?
Y
"Hey, the airplane is trimming repeatedly in a direction I don't like, but we cannot use this procedure here because it says the trim needs to be 'continuous'. Drat!"
I don't advocate limiting the forum to pilots, but an attitude of "I'm not a pilot, but I would have identifed the problem and applied the fix immediately" without knowing how things work, is just not
Reply
i am sorry Bsieker. Are you saying that I’m not a pilot?
Y
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Is that really how you imagine troubleshooting on the flight deck of an airliner to work?
"Hey, the airplane is trimming repeatedly in a direction I don't like, but we cannot use this procedure here because it says the trim needs to be 'continuous'. Drat!"
I don't advocate limiting the forum to pilots, but an attitude of "I'm not a pilot, but I would have identifed the problem and applied the fix immediately" without knowing how things work, is just not
"Hey, the airplane is trimming repeatedly in a direction I don't like, but we cannot use this procedure here because it says the trim needs to be 'continuous'. Drat!"
I don't advocate limiting the forum to pilots, but an attitude of "I'm not a pilot, but I would have identifed the problem and applied the fix immediately" without knowing how things work, is just not
i am sorry Bsieker. Are you saying that I’m not a pilot?
Y
The offending sentence in my original post was perhaps a mistake. Since it added no content, I have removed it.
Bernd
P. S. be careful to retain the closing quote bracket, or the forum software will mess up the formatting.
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Senate Appropriatons hearing notes on 737 MAX
Secretary Chao (during Senate appropriations hearing March 27th) answering the question on why the FAA did not ground the plane faster. She repeatedly points out the fact driven approach of the FAA. No facts known warranted a grounding according to the FAA. That started to change on the Wednesday morning of March 13th when two facts emerged:
[1] new, raw satellite data became available, this first had to be processed before it could be read, this data gave information on the first 3 minutes of the flight, that showed similarities with the Lion flight data,
[2] physical evidence was found at the site that was similar to the Lion crash evidence/information,
[3] not the same importance as point 1 and 2, but the FAA had expected that the black boxes would have been read sooner, …
There was, relatively speaking, a lot of attention for the Ethiopian and Lion accidents in this hearing covering all transportation type funding budgets.
She repeated both the IG audit (detailed factual history of the certification of the 737 MAX 8) and the establishment of a special advisory committee that will adress certification issues. This will be further explained during the later safety related hearing in the Senate.
She also indicated that she shared a number of specific concerns of the various senators (like suggested 'cozy' relations between manufacturers and FAA management), that they would be adressed and investigated, and the Senate kept informed of progress.
One senator was already preparing a Bill aimed at demanding that 'safety related equipment' should be included in the 'basic price of the aircraft'. You could read that as 'should be standard' probably. Another senator, noting he was a pilot himself, considered an AoA indicator to be such a 'standard safety item'. Seems a bit premature but ... That last senator also mentioned that the American public had lost faith in the plane.
So no new issues for pprune readers (except perhaps point [3]). But interesting to see how this is translated at the political level.
FYI - these are my own notes
[1] new, raw satellite data became available, this first had to be processed before it could be read, this data gave information on the first 3 minutes of the flight, that showed similarities with the Lion flight data,
[2] physical evidence was found at the site that was similar to the Lion crash evidence/information,
[3] not the same importance as point 1 and 2, but the FAA had expected that the black boxes would have been read sooner, …
There was, relatively speaking, a lot of attention for the Ethiopian and Lion accidents in this hearing covering all transportation type funding budgets.
She repeated both the IG audit (detailed factual history of the certification of the 737 MAX 8) and the establishment of a special advisory committee that will adress certification issues. This will be further explained during the later safety related hearing in the Senate.
She also indicated that she shared a number of specific concerns of the various senators (like suggested 'cozy' relations between manufacturers and FAA management), that they would be adressed and investigated, and the Senate kept informed of progress.
One senator was already preparing a Bill aimed at demanding that 'safety related equipment' should be included in the 'basic price of the aircraft'. You could read that as 'should be standard' probably. Another senator, noting he was a pilot himself, considered an AoA indicator to be such a 'standard safety item'. Seems a bit premature but ... That last senator also mentioned that the American public had lost faith in the plane.
So no new issues for pprune readers (except perhaps point [3]). But interesting to see how this is translated at the political level.
FYI - these are my own notes
Last edited by A0283; 27th Mar 2019 at 16:45. Reason: Change 737 into 737 MAX 8 ( she was specific )
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The full AMM pages would be interesting if you have them.
Many thanks
Y
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@WBHM
I would say we dont know at the moment.
An example is the AoA indicator discussion (which the pilot senator mentioned). We have this AoA discussion on Pprune too. I would not like to fly without one (based on my background), but quite a few others (including on Pprune) dont consider them necessary for the majority of commercial pilots (which goes quite beyond just for the 'average' pilot). In some other discussions people state that an AoA indicator is only confusing, or 'worse'. As long as there is no formal conclusion on this type of solutions you might not be right to call them a 'safety item'.
I would like to add that the airlines that you mention were formally not the launching customer of the MAX. That was something that really surprised me at the time. You (historically) expect a launch to be with a customer who has more than average and competent (maintenance) engineering staff. When I asked around nobody could really answer my questions on this. Would be interesting to find out if the IG audit or the Special Committee come up with any facts or answers on this.
Quote: Originally Posted by A0283 One senator was already preparing a Bill aimed at demanding that 'safety related equipment' should be included in the 'basic price of the aircraft'. You could read that as 'should be standard' probably.
Quote: Originally Posted by WBHM: I think there were a number of us surprised that such were a chargeable extra ticket item. It would be interesting to ask if the FAA knew it was such, as (surely the prototype but) also the initial production aircraft used in the certification tests all seem to have been for operators who had selected the AOA comparison option.
Quote: Originally Posted by WBHM: I think there were a number of us surprised that such were a chargeable extra ticket item. It would be interesting to ask if the FAA knew it was such, as (surely the prototype but) also the initial production aircraft used in the certification tests all seem to have been for operators who had selected the AOA comparison option.
An example is the AoA indicator discussion (which the pilot senator mentioned). We have this AoA discussion on Pprune too. I would not like to fly without one (based on my background), but quite a few others (including on Pprune) dont consider them necessary for the majority of commercial pilots (which goes quite beyond just for the 'average' pilot). In some other discussions people state that an AoA indicator is only confusing, or 'worse'. As long as there is no formal conclusion on this type of solutions you might not be right to call them a 'safety item'.
I would like to add that the airlines that you mention were formally not the launching customer of the MAX. That was something that really surprised me at the time. You (historically) expect a launch to be with a customer who has more than average and competent (maintenance) engineering staff. When I asked around nobody could really answer my questions on this. Would be interesting to find out if the IG audit or the Special Committee come up with any facts or answers on this.