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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 25th Mar 2019, 21:15
  #2521 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by yanrair
I can think of quite a few including a 747 at XXX stalling in the holding pattern 7000 feet, and good stall recovery but, very close call with planes below. I will look for others but I think there are many.
Turkish at AMS comes to mind right away
Cheers
Y
Sure, AF447 & China 747 at high altitude, Asiana on short final at SFO, competent aviators NEVER!
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 21:18
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Originally Posted by MemberBerry
I feel there is also discomfort among some others on this forum to accept that even pilots that "know what they are doing" might not have been able to save the Lion Air or the Ethiopian flights.

My discomfort is with the constant claims that a "competent pilot" would have identified and solved the problem immediately, and the insinuations that the crews from those two flights "didn't know what they were doing".

Until we get the final reports from the investigating teams, it's the other way around: WE don't know exactly what those crews were doing.

I'm not saying those pilots didn't make mistakes, it's quite possible they did, after all it was a stressful and confusing situation. It would actually be surprising if they did everything perfectly.

But so far I didn't see any evidence suggesting a training deficit of those pilots, compared to pilots from other airlines. If that's true, it means it is not impossible this could have happened to pilots from US or European airlines. There are even some people that claimed it couldn't have happened to European and US crews, because of their better training. I think we don't have enough evidence, and it's way to early for such claims.
Yes indeed. I have seen such commentary. It is premature and totally unproven. What I have said, I think, is that a runaway STAB whether continuous or intermittent (stop/start but always nose down) is containable - from a purely piloting / mechanical / aerodynamic point of view. If it is noticed it can be stopped. STAB OFF switches.
That is a fact, and it happened the day before. And of course the recent Boeing simulator sessions with line pilots at Seattle showed that they all stopped it. But of course, they knew what to expect, didn't they. But they were 737-max airline pilots and not Boeing test pilots.
Y
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 21:21
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Thanks for that reminder Bob. It is late and I am too tired to start Googling. The point here is that these things happen a lot more than people think and normally, the pilot can manage it.
Y
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 21:26
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Originally Posted by BobM2
Sure, AF447 & China 747 at high altitude, Asiana on short final at SFO, competent aviators NEVER!
I would add Thomsonfly Bournemouth. A company that prides itself on the training and quality of their pilots but this one was very close to a hull loss following a thoroughly mismanaged stall event.
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 22:00
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Accident Investigation Rules

Most people are not aware of the international rules & protocols governing investigations of air transport accidents. The assigned lead investigating agency of a particular accident is the only one who can make public comment on the details of that investigation. In the case of ET302, the lead agency is Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority. Any public comment concerning findings of the investigation must come only from them. Any of the other participants, Ethiopian Airlines, Boeing, FAA, NTSB, BEA, CFM, etc, who violates this rule will be immediately barred from further participation. So if some of the statements made by participants such as FAA or Boeing seem rather vague, that is the reason. A preliminary report is supposed to be issued within 30 days, which was done by Indonesia for the Lion Air crash.
The Ethiopian Airlines CEO was just quoted on TV news as saying a preliminary report should be out either this week or next, so stay tuned.
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 22:02
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Originally Posted by FCeng84
Can anyone with direct knowledge of what the Ethiopian FDR reveals describe specifically how and why then think this accident is similar to the Lion Air accident in a manner that would point to "system design and roll-out strategy" as having played a role?
It is quite possible that MCAS had nothing to do with either accident, but the existence of this poorly designed feature does point to a flawed "system design and roll-out strategy." I have debugged complex systems (both software and electrical) and quite frequently the close review of the system reveals design faults that unfortunately turn out not to have anything much to do with the actual problem that you were tasked to fix. MCAS is glaringly bad, the question that pilots and passengers should ask is "what else don't we know about?" That something else might be the real culprit.

For all we know, something else is going on -- I do not like the reports of data corruption that threw fault codes, attempted to be fixed by "cleaning the connectors." Random data presented to software can expose all sorts of bugs, including in the recording systems that we are using to try to analyze this situation. I worked with a former Boeing programmer (not on avionics) and his code was not exactly fault tolerant with respect to bad network packets; hardware/software engineers seem to have a mindset that precludes the possibility of bad data being presented to their code.
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 22:53
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Originally Posted by Water pilot
It is quite possible that MCAS had nothing to do with either accident, but the existence of this poorly designed feature does point to a flawed "system design and roll-out strategy." I have debugged complex systems (both software and electrical) and quite frequently the close review of the system reveals design faults that unfortunately turn out not to have anything much to do with the actual problem that you were tasked to fix. MCAS is glaringly bad, the question that pilots and passengers should ask is "what else don't we know about?" That something else might be the real culprit.

For all we know, something else is going on -- I do not like the reports of data corruption that threw fault codes, attempted to be fixed by "cleaning the connectors." Random data presented to software can expose all sorts of bugs, including in the recording systems that we are using to try to analyze this situation. I worked with a former Boeing programmer (not on avionics) and his code was not exactly fault tolerant with respect to bad network packets; hardware/software engineers seem to have a mindset that precludes the possibility of bad data being presented to their code.
This is spoken like someone who understands the interaction between hardware and software. It's exactly what I wondered, as well. Sure, maybe it's as simple as altering the sensor inputs, but the input itself, wherever it comes from, has to be trusted all the time. If input is suspect, then output is too, and that's a cause for concern.
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 23:01
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Originally Posted by BobM2
You need to reread the preliminary report on JT610. The left AOA sensor was replaced prior to JT043 on the evening prior to the crash. Despite its malfunction on that flight, it was neither written up nor replaced prior to JT610 the next day.
The MX in CGK didn't suspect the newly replaced vane to be the caused.



The MX from the previous sector in DPS had suspected the CAPT's AOA vane had been the culprit, so he replaced that L Vane. Yet on its next flight, the SAME problem occured again with even more "flavors". Therefore, the MX in CGK surmised the AOA vane wasn't the problem - the problem must've lied elsewhere. He instead flushed the pitot and fixed other stuff which he thought to be correlated with what the CAPT wrote on the AFML.
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 23:12
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Originally Posted by patplan
The MX from the previous sector in DPS had suspected the CAPT's AOA vane had been the culprit, so he replaced that L Vane. Yet on its next flight, the SAME problem occured again with even more "flavors". Therefore, the MX in CGK surmised the AOA vane wasn't the problem - the problem must've lied elsewhere. He instead flushed the pitot and fixed other stuff which he thought to be correlated with what the CAPT wrote on the AFML.
I wouldn't call it the same problem. The problem before was the AoA signal intermittently being missing, causing the loss of air data on the captains side.
After the AoA replacement the problem was a constant offset, i would call that a different error.

Anyway it wasn't two AoA vanes with the constant offset.
It could be that neither AoA vane is at fault and maybe just the installation triggered another problem causing the constant offset.
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Old 25th Mar 2019, 23:27
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Originally Posted by wiedehopf
I wouldn't call it the same problem. The problem before was the AoA signal intermittently being missing, causing the loss of air data on the captains side.
After the AoA replacement the problem was a constant offset, i would call that a different error.

Anyway it wasn't two AoA vanes with the constant offset.
It could be that neither AoA vane is at fault and maybe just the installation triggered another problem causing the constant offset.
To compound the problem even more, the CAPT/FO of JT-043 didn't report the "stick shaker", or the fact that they had to perform the NNC for "runaway stabilizer". The MX had no idea about those "very serious" occurrences. The holes in the cheese started to line up...
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 00:51
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Originally Posted by patplan
To compound the problem even more, the CAPT/FO of JT-043 didn't report the "stick shaker", or the fact that they had to perform the NNC for "runaway stabilizer". The MX had no idea about those "very serious" occurrences. The holes in the cheese started to line up...
The crew of 610 the next morning also had no clue...until they rotated on take-off
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 02:13
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Let’s play what if...

What if the AOA issue w/JT610 turns out to be a maintenance induced fault?

What if ET302 is unrelated to MCAS?

What if the lack of FDR/CVR info from ET302 is solely due to the Ethiopian authorities covering their arse...?

This doesn’t excuse Boeing from the problems with the MCAS implementation, but something is becoming increasingly odd about the lack of info related to ET302. Could someone be trying to make the holes in the cheese line up artificially, since the real answer is one of systematic problems within a country’s aviation authority and whether the crew in question should have been in that cockpit at all?

Idle thoughts maybe?

- GY
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 02:44
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Originally Posted by GarageYears
What if the lack of FDR/CVR info from ET302 is solely due to the Ethiopian authorities covering their arse...?
........
That may or may not be a factor.

But the Ethiopian authorities are under no obligation to say anything for 30 days, certainly not to release data just so arm-chair experts can make their own analysis.
And they as sure as heck are not going to say anything until they themselves are reasoanably sure that what they are about to say is accurate and correct.

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Old 26th Mar 2019, 03:56
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Originally Posted by yanrair
Yes indeed. I have seen such commentary. It is premature and totally unproven. What I have said, I think, is that a runaway STAB whether continuous or intermittent (stop/start but always nose down) is containable - from a purely piloting / mechanical / aerodynamic point of view. If it is noticed it can be stopped. STAB OFF switches.
That is a fact, and it happened the day before. And of course the recent Boeing simulator sessions with line pilots at Seattle showed that they all stopped it. But of course, they knew what to expect, didn't they. But they were 737-max airline pilots and not Boeing test pilots.
Y
Let’s back off competent pilots knowing to cutoff stab trim. Let’s focus on a couple at LionAir that trimmed when their commanded attitude required it. And one who didn’t trim. Why didn’t he trim. Not much real hand flying experience?
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 04:12
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Originally Posted by jimtx


Let’s back off competent pilots knowing to cutoff stab trim. Let’s focus on a couple at LionAir that trimmed when their commanded attitude required it. And one who didn’t trim. Why didn’t he trim. Not much real hand flying experience?
A little background on CAPT and FO, refer to pp.4-5 Preliminary Accident Investigation Report:

1.5.1 Pilot in Command
Age:31 years
Nationality:India
Date of joining company:25 April 2011
License:ATPL
Date of issue:28 July 2016
Aircraft type rating:Boeing 737
Instrument rating validity:31 May 2019
Medical certificate:First Class
Last of medical:5 October 2018
Validity:5 April 2019
Medical limitation:Pilot shall wear corrective lenses
Last line check:19 January 2018
Last proficiency check:7 October 2018

Flying experience
Total hours:6,028 hours 45 minutes
Total on type: 5,176 hours

Last 90 days: 148 hours 15 minutes
Last 30 days: 81 hours 55 minutes
Last 7 days:15 hours 45 minutes
This flight:about 11 minutes



1.5.2 Second in Command
Age:41 years
Nationality:Indonesia
Date of joining company:31 October 2011
License:CPL
Date of issue:15 May 1997
Aircraft type rating:Boeing 737
Instrument rating validity:31 August 2019
Medical certificate:First Class
Last of medical:28 September 2019
Validity:28 March 2019
Medical limitation:Pilot shall possess glasses that correct for near vision
Last line check:4 July 2017
Last proficiency check:25 August 2018

Flying experience
Total hours:5,174 hours 30 minutes
Total on type:4,286 hours

Last 90 days:187 hours 50 minutes
Last 30 days:32 hours 55 minutes
Last 7 days:20 hours 20 minutes
This flight:About 11 minutes
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 04:46
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What if the Ethiopian Airlines CEO is inappropriately involved in the investigation?

Why is this guy giving updates on when a preliminary, or ANY update will be released? What does he know that no-one else seems to know and why?

Update
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 05:10
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Not sure I'd count 'maybe this week or next' as an update.
30 days is up on 9th April anyway.
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 05:14
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Originally Posted by Kremlin
Why is this guy giving updates on when a preliminary, or ANY update will be released? What does he know that no-one else seems to know and why?
I think you're getting a bit paranoid there Kremlin. He might have simply asked the chief investigator "when's your prelim report coming out?" and just relaying the answer. The expected date of the report isn't an "update" IMO.
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 05:27
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Originally Posted by wiedehopf
I wouldn't call it the same problem. The problem before was the AoA signal intermittently being missing, causing the loss of air data on the captains side.
After the AoA replacement the problem was a constant offset, i would call that a different error.

Anyway it wasn't two AoA vanes with the constant offset.
It could be that neither AoA vane is at fault and maybe just the installation triggered another problem causing the constant offset.
Could it be there was some calibration process that was overlooked?
Is the AOA sensor manufactured to output a standard analog voltage output at a given angle of deflection (so, you don't need calibration),
Or does each new installation of AOA sensor installed and then the system is calibrated to interpret the AOA voltage?

Any maintenance engineers here to confirm the steps taken?
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Old 26th Mar 2019, 05:32
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Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
I think you're getting a bit paranoid there Kremlin. He might have simply asked the chief investigator "when's your prelim report coming out?" and just relaying the answer. The expected date of the report isn't an "update" IMO.
The CEO of the airline that had the accident has a massive conflict of interest and shouldn't be allowed to have any part in the publication of a report apart from supplying information to the Investigators. I'm not the first to question this.

How does he know this?

Tewolde
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