Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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Airflow is horizontal only in level flight ! not in climb or descent 
If by horizontal you mean at AoA ~ 0 degrees, that is very, very incorrect
If by horizontal you mean at AoA ~ 0 degrees, that is very, very incorrect
In my context, "horizontal" is relative. Much the same as indicated airspeed and the jetsteam and of course, groundspeed.
It is of course, mounted to the fuselage, so there is already the inherent offset to the angle of attack of the wings vs the fuselage.
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It would have been really interesting to know what the stability margin actually is at high AoA. If the full 2,5 deg stabilizer travel really is needed to give the Max a sufficient positive stability/stick force gradient when going from about 10 deg AoA up to about 14 deg AoA, it would seem that a large part of the positive stability in this region is lost without MCAS?
The airspeed must return to within 10 percent of the original trim speed for the climb, approach, and landing conditions specified in § 25.175 (a), (c), and (d), and must return to within 7.5 percent of the original trim speed for the cruising condition specified in § 25.175(b), when the control force is slowly released from any speed
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also, I would be surprised if with, when MCAS has been activated for what it is intended to do (increase stability), having moved the stabilizer 2.5° from its previous position, it lets the plane return by itself at the previous trimmed speed as it should by this rule :
Much like any modern aircraft you would lose several protections systems and perhaps be presented some bad data. Pilots would then be required to apply some knowledge and fly the aircraft.
It’s off topic, but I don’t think that’s the reason for the nose up pitch trim at 400RA.
I think the reason is to allow the aircraft to pitch up gently rather than crashing onto the runway in the event of a autoland flare failure (given that it is only dual autopilot) if there is no pilot input after autopilot dropout during the flare.
And it’s not a massive trim input, it’s a small trim input easily handled by a pilot.
The reason for mentioning it was to illustrate the way Boeing is willing to mess with trim to achieve certification.
By the way a No flare situation doesn’t allow you to let the aircraft somehow land - that’s a go around.
And as for the input being easily handled, it causes one more distracting problem as mentioned in my post, in a subsequent manual single engined go around.
The auto land itself was very sketchy too - nothing like the smooth MD-80 performance - which was achieved without heavy handed trim inputs.
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Thanks. "It depends" sounds right!
Then again, the vane could be sticky, e.g. dirt in the bearings, and give correct readings one moment and incorrect ones the next.
Then again, the vane could be sticky, e.g. dirt in the bearings, and give correct readings one moment and incorrect ones the next.
Finite state automaton. Very standard software engineering concept. There's a large read across to the Airbus modes of operation....
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also, I would be surprised if with, when MCAS has been activated for what it is intended to do (increase stability), having moved the stabilizer 2.5° from its previous position, it lets the plane return by itself at the previous trimmed speed as it should by this rule :
what it is intended to do (increase stability)
It does not make the aircraft more stable.
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Possible reason for faulty data in AOA system?
NYT 3/23/19 "Go,go,go" article, quoted in post #2338 cites a Boeing technician assembling the Max:
Generally, such observations would not seem to boost confidence in the Max. More specifically, it would be interesting to know if any of these omissions in the MAX assembly designs which "could lead to a faulty connection" involve circuitry carrying the AOA sensor data.
" A technician who assembles wiring on the Max said that in the first months of development, rushed designers were delivering sloppy blueprints to him. He was told that the instructions for the wiring would be cleaned up later in the process, he said.
His internal assembly designs for the Max, he said, still include omissions today, like not specifying which tools to use to install a certain wire, a situation that could lead to a faulty connection. Normally such blueprints include intricate instructions."
His internal assembly designs for the Max, he said, still include omissions today, like not specifying which tools to use to install a certain wire, a situation that could lead to a faulty connection. Normally such blueprints include intricate instructions."
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I stopped reading this thread a long time ago, but can someone explain a point to an old, retired 737 driver? All 737s pitch up with the application of power; it's a consequence of the design. This one will pitch up more than most; again a consequence of the design. If the crew are made aware of this, is it really beyond the power of the human mind to be ready and correct the pitch? In other words, no need for this system at all.
I agree with you. 5 years ago post Amsterdam I think with Turkish Airlines 737 stall and hull loss on the approach - the stall procedure was changed from the usual
FULL POWER PITCH DOWN RECOVER - since you were a 737 jockey and even back to the Wright Brothers.
to
PITCH DOWN / POWER AS REQUIRED / RECOVER.
We spent a year of more retraining all pilots to do this new recovery . Reason - to ensure that the engine pitch up moment with newer more powerful engines was not going to prevent the nose down break stall which is the heart of the recovery procedure. The only thing I can think of that might be different on the MAX is that the natural down pitch which all designers seek and regulators look for might be too weak. And they thought it needed augmentation. Now I don't know from what I have gleaned from this forum if this is an aerodynamic issue or simply the bigger engines causing an upward pitching moment - the last thing you want in a stall. I suspect the former. The latter can be fixed by not applying too much power too soon as per current 737-800.
So the logic behind MCAS, how it works, and so forth are still not fully understood - at least not by me. I await the outcome of the investigations as we all should with interest and an open mind.
Cheers
Yanrair
It does look as if a system designed to simply improve the handling in a stall and assist the pilot may have malfunctioned and applied multiple recoveries due to a stuck AOA SENSOR. But we don't know that yet do we?
All I have tried to say in this short piece how real stalls on real 737/757/767/747 airplanes and simulators, stalling routines that I have flown and observed many times - this is how it was done. And stall recovery was a really easy manoeuvre which worked every time.
There has been no mention of an AOA failure prior to its replacement on the evening prior to the crash. It was apparently replaced as trouble-shooting in response to repeated write-ups of Capt unreliable airspeed & altitude. This did not correct the unreliable airspeed & altitude, but rather introduced an additional failure on the last two flights.
Satcom Guru (selected quotes)
"Prior to JT043, the AoA on the Captain (left) side had issues and was replaced. First, AOA signal fail was fixed by reset of the ADIRU. ADIRU is a combination of the Air Data Computer and the Inertial Reference Unit."
"On the next flight, AOA signal out of range is displayed and again ADIRU is saying AOA Signal Fail."
"The issues encountered in ET302 AoA vane must be taken into account with these two vanes apparently on Lion Air that malfunctioned. Is it a problem with the vanes or is it a problem in the data processing? What needs to be fixed? Was this just a string of bad luck and coincidence?"
Satcom Guru's post refers:
https://www.satcom.guru/2019/03/taki...aiting-on.html
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Way back at the beginning of this thread I asked the following question of someone QUALIFIED to give me a definitive answer, maybe it was too early to be asking the question so now I'll post it again and please only respond if you ARE qualified to answer, that's to say have experience with the 737 MAX systems in the real world.
We have no ideas beyond some possibly educated guess-work as to what happened here but I do have a question that can be answered by someone with the relevant experience. As a 10,000 + hr career pilot I'm not exactly a newbie but have not had any experience with the latest sophisticated systems being introduced on modern aircraft.
Q. Is there something preventing pilots of these aircraft from simply hitting an autopilot 'disconnect' button, and then getting on with flying manually ? Not suggesting that this is relevant to this accident.
So, what I'm asking is, does modern technology prevent/resist/over-ride a pilot from flying an aircraft in the most basic sense once the autopilot system has been disconnected ? And I say again: I'm not suggesting that this is relevant to this particular accident.
We have no ideas beyond some possibly educated guess-work as to what happened here but I do have a question that can be answered by someone with the relevant experience. As a 10,000 + hr career pilot I'm not exactly a newbie but have not had any experience with the latest sophisticated systems being introduced on modern aircraft.
Q. Is there something preventing pilots of these aircraft from simply hitting an autopilot 'disconnect' button, and then getting on with flying manually ? Not suggesting that this is relevant to this accident.
So, what I'm asking is, does modern technology prevent/resist/over-ride a pilot from flying an aircraft in the most basic sense once the autopilot system has been disconnected ? And I say again: I'm not suggesting that this is relevant to this particular accident.
As for Ethiopian - they issued a statement that all their pilots were aware of the Lion Air crash and the corrective action recommended by Boeing; So that remains a mystery I believe unless anyone else has anything new on that point please?
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MungoP, #2491
Q. Is there something preventing pilots of these aircraft from simply hitting an autopilot 'disconnect' button, and then getting on with flying manually ?
A. Being able to understand the situation which requires alternative action.
Thus for this accident (not autopilot related), how and when might the crew have identified the situation, linking control difficulties with trim - and the drill; given that the preceding situation (flaps down) which appeared to be related to erroneous airspeed / air data - stick shake, low speed awareness, ‘ASI and Alt disagree’ cautions.
An opposing view, seen throughout this thread, is the powerful effect of hindsight bias, and other human behaviours such as finding patterns where there are none, selecting data which confirms one’s existing thoughts.
The tendency is to ask ‘why didn't they’; yet the answer applies equally to the many people in design, regulation, training, and operations over several months, and to a crew who had to identify cause and solution in a few minutes of flight, without supporting information, relevant knowledge or experience.
Technology does not prevent us from flying, in most cases it helps; the difficulty is with our thinking about technology - designer or regular, and ourselves.
Q. Is there something preventing pilots of these aircraft from simply hitting an autopilot 'disconnect' button, and then getting on with flying manually ?
A. Being able to understand the situation which requires alternative action.
Thus for this accident (not autopilot related), how and when might the crew have identified the situation, linking control difficulties with trim - and the drill; given that the preceding situation (flaps down) which appeared to be related to erroneous airspeed / air data - stick shake, low speed awareness, ‘ASI and Alt disagree’ cautions.
An opposing view, seen throughout this thread, is the powerful effect of hindsight bias, and other human behaviours such as finding patterns where there are none, selecting data which confirms one’s existing thoughts.
The tendency is to ask ‘why didn't they’; yet the answer applies equally to the many people in design, regulation, training, and operations over several months, and to a crew who had to identify cause and solution in a few minutes of flight, without supporting information, relevant knowledge or experience.
Technology does not prevent us from flying, in most cases it helps; the difficulty is with our thinking about technology - designer or regular, and ourselves.
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This depends on what you call stability. If stability is the tendency to pitch back down in response to having pitched up, MCAS can be viewed as increasing pitch stability
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Isn't the intention of the MCAS is to increase the feel the to the pilot on elevators as the AoA is increased as required by the FARs.
In certain conditions, with the engines mounted so far forward and upward on the wing, the engine nacelles at certain angles of attack, create lift, pitching the nose up to stall.
MCAS automatically brings the node back down.
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No, MCAS overides controls and creates it own downward pitch when the pitch up gets close to stall.
In certain conditions, with the engines mounted so far forward and upward on the wing, the engine nacelles at certain angles of attack, create lift, pitching the nose up to stall.
MCAS automatically brings the node back down.
In certain conditions, with the engines mounted so far forward and upward on the wing, the engine nacelles at certain angles of attack, create lift, pitching the nose up to stall.
MCAS automatically brings the node back down.
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/24/b...imulators.html
https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2019/03/24/p...max/index.html
At the 737 Max Factory, Pilots Simulate New Boeing Software
By David Gelles
March 24, 2019
Pilots from several airlines met with Boeing executives in Renton, Wash., on Saturday to discuss proposed changes to the 737 Max, two of which have crashed in recent months.
The meeting on Saturday, with about a dozen pilots and trainers, was part of Boeing’s effort to manage the crisis set off by the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 in October and the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 under similar circumstances this month. Boeing and people briefed on the meeting confirmed it.
In addition to reviewing proposed modifications to new anti-stall software and cockpit displays, pilots from five airlines strapped into flight simulators to see how they would have handled the situation that is believed to have brought down Lion Air Flight 610 in Indonesia, according to two people briefed on the meeting.
In each case, the pilots using the simulators were able to land the plane safely.
Saturday’s session included representatives from American Airlines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines — the three American carriers that fly the Max — as well as from two non-U.S. airlines, Copa Airlines and Fly Dubai. The group did not include representatives from Ethiopian Airlines, Lion Air or the large Chinese carriers that fly the 737 Max.
On Wednesday in Renton, where the 737 Max is assembled, Boeing will host a group of 200 pilots and officials from almost all the carriers that currently fly the Max or have ordered the jets. As on Saturday, Boeing plans to describe the proposed changes to the software, and review what new training procedures may be needed before airlines can once again fly the Max, which is grounded worldwide.
“This is part of our ongoing effort to share more details about our plan for supporting the safe return of the 737 Max to commercial service,” Boeing said in a statement. “We had a productive session this past Saturday and plan to reach all current and many future Max operators and their home regulators.”
While Boeing continues to work on a software fix, American Airlines said it would extend its cancellations through April 24. American canceled nearly 90 of its roughly 6,700 flights a day because of the Max grounding.
International authorities and domestic regulators including the Federal Aviation Administration will have to sign off before the Max can fly again.
On Saturday, pilots from the five airlines simulated flights with the software as it was originally written, as well as with the proposed updates.
A leading theory is that the Lion Air flight crashed because the anti-stall software received erroneous data, forcing the plane into a nose-dive. The Ethiopian Airlines flight also crashed after an erratic takeoff.
In simulations using the current software, pilots were able to disable the anti-stall software using existing procedures, and land the airplane safely.
The simulations using the updated software required less intervention by the pilots.
The software, known as MCAS, is designed to push the nose of the plane down if it detects the plane pointing up at a dangerous angle that might induce a stall. To determine when it is needed, the software takes data from two so-called angle of attack sensors on the side of the plane, which measure whether the fuselage is pointing up or down.
But when it was originally designed, the software only responded to data from one sensor at a time.
Preliminary plans for a proposed update will change the software in several substantial ways, according to the people familiar with the meeting. It will take data from both angle of attack sensors, instead of just one.
If the difference between the two sensors is more than 5 degrees, the software will be disabled.
Instead of allowing the software to push the nose down multiple times, it will limit the number of instances it can attempt to push the nose down, and limit the duration of that intervention to 10 seconds.
On Sunday, Boeing also issued a statement on the equipment used to measure and display the plane’s angle of attack.
The New York Times reported on Thursday, that two of these indicators were sold as options.
Boeing previously charged extra for two features in the cockpit: the angle of attack indicator, which showed pilots the readings from the angle of attack sensors; and the disagree light, which notified pilots if the readings from the two sensors were at odds with one another.
Boeing will now make the disagree light standard in all new 737 Max planes, and will provide the indicator free of charge for customers who want it.
“All primary flight information required to safely and efficiently operate the 737 Max is included on the baseline primary flight display,” Boeing said. “All 737 Max airplanes display this data in a way that is consistent with pilot training and the fundamental instrument scan pattern that pilots are trained to use.”
The F.A.A. does not currently require pilots to to train on simulators that replicate all the features of the Max, and may not change that stance. But it is possible that even if the F.A.A. does not requires simulator training, other international regulators may do so.
“We’ve been working diligently and in close cooperation with the F.A.A. on the software update,” Boeing said in its statement. “We are taking a comprehensive and careful approach to design, develop and test the software that will ultimately lead to certification.”
By David Gelles
March 24, 2019
Pilots from several airlines met with Boeing executives in Renton, Wash., on Saturday to discuss proposed changes to the 737 Max, two of which have crashed in recent months.
The meeting on Saturday, with about a dozen pilots and trainers, was part of Boeing’s effort to manage the crisis set off by the crash of Lion Air Flight 610 in October and the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 under similar circumstances this month. Boeing and people briefed on the meeting confirmed it.
In addition to reviewing proposed modifications to new anti-stall software and cockpit displays, pilots from five airlines strapped into flight simulators to see how they would have handled the situation that is believed to have brought down Lion Air Flight 610 in Indonesia, according to two people briefed on the meeting.
In each case, the pilots using the simulators were able to land the plane safely.
Saturday’s session included representatives from American Airlines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines — the three American carriers that fly the Max — as well as from two non-U.S. airlines, Copa Airlines and Fly Dubai. The group did not include representatives from Ethiopian Airlines, Lion Air or the large Chinese carriers that fly the 737 Max.
On Wednesday in Renton, where the 737 Max is assembled, Boeing will host a group of 200 pilots and officials from almost all the carriers that currently fly the Max or have ordered the jets. As on Saturday, Boeing plans to describe the proposed changes to the software, and review what new training procedures may be needed before airlines can once again fly the Max, which is grounded worldwide.
“This is part of our ongoing effort to share more details about our plan for supporting the safe return of the 737 Max to commercial service,” Boeing said in a statement. “We had a productive session this past Saturday and plan to reach all current and many future Max operators and their home regulators.”
While Boeing continues to work on a software fix, American Airlines said it would extend its cancellations through April 24. American canceled nearly 90 of its roughly 6,700 flights a day because of the Max grounding.
International authorities and domestic regulators including the Federal Aviation Administration will have to sign off before the Max can fly again.
On Saturday, pilots from the five airlines simulated flights with the software as it was originally written, as well as with the proposed updates.
A leading theory is that the Lion Air flight crashed because the anti-stall software received erroneous data, forcing the plane into a nose-dive. The Ethiopian Airlines flight also crashed after an erratic takeoff.
In simulations using the current software, pilots were able to disable the anti-stall software using existing procedures, and land the airplane safely.
The simulations using the updated software required less intervention by the pilots.
The software, known as MCAS, is designed to push the nose of the plane down if it detects the plane pointing up at a dangerous angle that might induce a stall. To determine when it is needed, the software takes data from two so-called angle of attack sensors on the side of the plane, which measure whether the fuselage is pointing up or down.
But when it was originally designed, the software only responded to data from one sensor at a time.
Preliminary plans for a proposed update will change the software in several substantial ways, according to the people familiar with the meeting. It will take data from both angle of attack sensors, instead of just one.
If the difference between the two sensors is more than 5 degrees, the software will be disabled.
Instead of allowing the software to push the nose down multiple times, it will limit the number of instances it can attempt to push the nose down, and limit the duration of that intervention to 10 seconds.
On Sunday, Boeing also issued a statement on the equipment used to measure and display the plane’s angle of attack.
The New York Times reported on Thursday, that two of these indicators were sold as options.
Boeing previously charged extra for two features in the cockpit: the angle of attack indicator, which showed pilots the readings from the angle of attack sensors; and the disagree light, which notified pilots if the readings from the two sensors were at odds with one another.
Boeing will now make the disagree light standard in all new 737 Max planes, and will provide the indicator free of charge for customers who want it.
“All primary flight information required to safely and efficiently operate the 737 Max is included on the baseline primary flight display,” Boeing said. “All 737 Max airplanes display this data in a way that is consistent with pilot training and the fundamental instrument scan pattern that pilots are trained to use.”
The F.A.A. does not currently require pilots to to train on simulators that replicate all the features of the Max, and may not change that stance. But it is possible that even if the F.A.A. does not requires simulator training, other international regulators may do so.
“We’ve been working diligently and in close cooperation with the F.A.A. on the software update,” Boeing said in its statement. “We are taking a comprehensive and careful approach to design, develop and test the software that will ultimately lead to certification.”
Boeing testing software changes to 737 MAX planes
By David Shortell, Evan Perez and Gregory Wallace, CNN
Updated 10:17 PM EDT, Sun March 24, 2019
Seattle (CNN) Pilots from the three American carriers that fly Boeing 737 MAX planes tested software changes developed by Boeing to a key stabilization system on Saturday, a person briefed on the tests said.
The changes are intended to decrease the chances of triggering the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, which is believed to have played a role in the Lion Air crash in October.
The Federal Aviation Administration has said there are similarities between that crash and a second 737 MAX crash earlier this month in Ethiopia.
Pilots and training officials from Southwest Airlines, American Airlines and United Airlines met with Boeing officials Saturday to review the software changes in the Seattle area, where the model is assembled, according to multiple airline sources.
At the gathering, pilots from the three American carriers, plus two smaller non-US airlines, ran simulated flights designed to mimic the situation that brought down the Lion Air flight in Indonesia last year, using the current and updated software, according to the person briefed on the session.
Each pilot using the flight simulator landed the plane safely, the person said.
In the simulations with the current MCAS software, the test pilots used existing procedures to disable the system, while test flights using the new software required less intervention from the pilots, the person said.
Saturday's test flights were first reported by the New York Times.
The updated software designed by Boeing uses input from two sensors on the nose of the plane, instead of one, and is designed to not trigger the MCAS system repeatedly, which is believed to have pitched the Lion Air plane's nose down so sharply that the pilots' attempts to regain control were futile.
In a statement Sunday, Boeing called the meeting a "productive session" and said that they had invited more than 200 pilots and technicians, as well as regulators, to an informational session at the company's production facility in Renton, Washington, on Wednesday.
"This is part of our ongoing effort to share more details about our plan for supporting the safe return of the 737 MAX to commercial service," Boeing said.
"We had a productive session this past Saturday and plan to reach all current and many future MAX operators and their home regulators. At the same time, we continue to work closely with our customers and regulators on software and training updates for the 737 MAX," Boeing said.
The FAA, which is part of this effort to test the new software, declined to comment.
One source familiar with the tests said the FAA is expected to receive the software early in the week.
But the FAA is not expected to allow the dozens of 737 MAX planes it grounded back into the air until it learns more about the causes of the Ethiopian Air crash, the source said.
Data from the flight data and cockpit voice recorders is being analyzed in Ethiopia.
US air carriers would like to see the plane return to the sky. American, which has 24 MAX aircraft in its fleet, and Southwest, which has 34, agree with union statements that their pilots are trained well enough to deal with the incidents that the Lion Air pilots encountered.
American alone is canceling dozens of flights a day as a result of the grounding of the MAX aircraft.
On Sunday, the airline said in a statement that the cancellations would continue through April 24, resulting in 90 flights grounded every day.
By David Shortell, Evan Perez and Gregory Wallace, CNN
Updated 10:17 PM EDT, Sun March 24, 2019
Seattle (CNN) Pilots from the three American carriers that fly Boeing 737 MAX planes tested software changes developed by Boeing to a key stabilization system on Saturday, a person briefed on the tests said.
The changes are intended to decrease the chances of triggering the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, which is believed to have played a role in the Lion Air crash in October.
The Federal Aviation Administration has said there are similarities between that crash and a second 737 MAX crash earlier this month in Ethiopia.
Pilots and training officials from Southwest Airlines, American Airlines and United Airlines met with Boeing officials Saturday to review the software changes in the Seattle area, where the model is assembled, according to multiple airline sources.
At the gathering, pilots from the three American carriers, plus two smaller non-US airlines, ran simulated flights designed to mimic the situation that brought down the Lion Air flight in Indonesia last year, using the current and updated software, according to the person briefed on the session.
Each pilot using the flight simulator landed the plane safely, the person said.
In the simulations with the current MCAS software, the test pilots used existing procedures to disable the system, while test flights using the new software required less intervention from the pilots, the person said.
Saturday's test flights were first reported by the New York Times.
The updated software designed by Boeing uses input from two sensors on the nose of the plane, instead of one, and is designed to not trigger the MCAS system repeatedly, which is believed to have pitched the Lion Air plane's nose down so sharply that the pilots' attempts to regain control were futile.
In a statement Sunday, Boeing called the meeting a "productive session" and said that they had invited more than 200 pilots and technicians, as well as regulators, to an informational session at the company's production facility in Renton, Washington, on Wednesday.
"This is part of our ongoing effort to share more details about our plan for supporting the safe return of the 737 MAX to commercial service," Boeing said.
"We had a productive session this past Saturday and plan to reach all current and many future MAX operators and their home regulators. At the same time, we continue to work closely with our customers and regulators on software and training updates for the 737 MAX," Boeing said.
The FAA, which is part of this effort to test the new software, declined to comment.
One source familiar with the tests said the FAA is expected to receive the software early in the week.
But the FAA is not expected to allow the dozens of 737 MAX planes it grounded back into the air until it learns more about the causes of the Ethiopian Air crash, the source said.
Data from the flight data and cockpit voice recorders is being analyzed in Ethiopia.
US air carriers would like to see the plane return to the sky. American, which has 24 MAX aircraft in its fleet, and Southwest, which has 34, agree with union statements that their pilots are trained well enough to deal with the incidents that the Lion Air pilots encountered.
American alone is canceling dozens of flights a day as a result of the grounding of the MAX aircraft.
On Sunday, the airline said in a statement that the cancellations would continue through April 24, resulting in 90 flights grounded every day.
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Lena.Kiev
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work.I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?
Edit: My apologies for missing that detail in the article.
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work.
Edit: My apologies for missing that detail in the article.
Last edited by GordonR_Cape; 25th Mar 2019 at 12:08.
Lena.Kiev
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work. I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?
Boeing showed a few pilots how a functioning MCAS operates, and how the trim cutouts work. I assume they did not show AOA disagree, stick shaker and stall warning at the same time? Does anyone feel reassured by this demonstration, given all the issues discussed in this thread?