Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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Again, no. The aircraft is not, by any stretch of the imagination, "unstable", let alone "inherently unstable" (in what way is that different from "unstable"). It just does not provide enough adverse stick force to satisfy a very specific certification requirement.
Poor design of the engine/wing configuration 'fixed' (so far not successfully) with software... the other fix, to turn off the AP, really? That to me is unstable design.
4 units per second would be a feat to behold.
Salute!
After the Lion crash, and many affirmations of the MCAS rationale, I see this comment today
Ahem....... Guess the test pilot here flew the MAX at high AoA to help evaluate the FAR requirements for control force approaching the stall. Maybe not read all the posts bout the new engines and their mounting adding nose up pitch moments. If not, then maybe the test hops in the previous models did not include evaluating the STS with the trim motor turned off. You know, the thing that helps meet FAR requirements for speed stability when flying "trimmed". The tricky test point is that one up high to ensure that HAL tweaks the elevator without you doing anything when approaching a certain mach threshold. That's a good one, cause you might get aileron reversal and some flutter that really strains your control surfaes and wing.
But no problem, As another pilot here has stated over and over - " any competent crew/pilot could handle that".
And then I continue the quote;
Well, sir, IT HAS CHANGED!!!!! And that has been the crux of most discussion on our various threads since early November. So DOUBT IT !!! Sheesh, .............................beam me up.
-----------------------------------------
I am trying to follow the ROE for our forum, but it's getting hard. I do not mean to diminish the length and breadth of experience that many pilots here have contributed to the discussion. But somethimes I get a little testy.
My fear is that some lurking here will think that we lost two planes and 300 passengers because incompetent crews did not simply turn off two switches within seconds of raising flaps at normal altitude and speed with the stall warning system telling them they were stalling and their airspeed was FUBAR.
The primary contributing factor to loss of control in the Lion crash and likely the Ethiopian one ,is gonna be the MCAS and its implementatio without fairly documenting it for the crews and not considering its activation at a corner of the envelope it was not intended for.
Gums...
After the Lion crash, and many affirmations of the MCAS rationale, I see this comment today
I don't get your comment "not certified". A 737 can fly with no computers or indeed no pretty much anything working, and this is demanded on the FAA test flights which I have conducted to make sure it works.
But no problem, As another pilot here has stated over and over - " any competent crew/pilot could handle that".
And then I continue the quote;
If this has changed on the MAX then that is something to ponder most seriously. But I doubt it.
-----------------------------------------
I am trying to follow the ROE for our forum, but it's getting hard. I do not mean to diminish the length and breadth of experience that many pilots here have contributed to the discussion. But somethimes I get a little testy.
My fear is that some lurking here will think that we lost two planes and 300 passengers because incompetent crews did not simply turn off two switches within seconds of raising flaps at normal altitude and speed with the stall warning system telling them they were stalling and their airspeed was FUBAR.
The primary contributing factor to loss of control in the Lion crash and likely the Ethiopian one ,is gonna be the MCAS and its implementatio without fairly documenting it for the crews and not considering its activation at a corner of the envelope it was not intended for.
Gums...
Gender Faculty Specialist
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When it gets to a certain angle of attack, the engines, given the size and the forward/upward mounting, provide an unexpected amount of lift. This is the reason MCAS was developed, to push the nose down.
Poor design of the engine/wing configuration 'fixed' (so far not successfully) with software... the other fix, to turn off the AP, really? That to me is unstable design.
Exactly, and likely at full speed!
Poor design of the engine/wing configuration 'fixed' (so far not successfully) with software... the other fix, to turn off the AP, really? That to me is unstable design.
Exactly, and likely at full speed!
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March 21, 2019 / 8:34 AM / Updated an hour ago
Boeing to add extra safety alarm in 737 MAX jets: FT
(Reuters) - Boeing Co will install an extra safety alarm in the cockpits of all its 737 MAX aircraft after intense criticism in the wake of two fatal crashes, the Financial Times reported on Thursday.
Boeing did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Shares of the company were down about 1 percent at $372.49 in morning trade
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Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Company Sold Only as Extras
From the above article:
The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy. Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded.
“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”
“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”
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March 21, 2019 / 8:34 AM / Updated an hour ago
Boeing to add extra safety alarm in 737 MAX jets: FT
(Reuters) - Boeing Co will install an extra safety alarm in the cockpits of all its 737 MAX aircraft after intense criticism in the wake of two fatal crashes, the Financial Times reported on Thursday.
Boeing did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Shares of the company were down about 1 percent at $372.49 in morning trade
Yea, so that's going to work, so at point of rotation, we get a vane split, and MCAS will still do its stuff while the crew are fumbling for the checklist.
But hey, we're Boeing and we've given you guys a little light.
From what others before have described, its still a sub-system reliant on its on-side sensor only, with no automatic cut out if the off-side sensor is in disagreement.
Ttfn
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[QUOTE=Tunkurman;10425639]Have you seen this 737 runaway stabilizer training on YouTube? OMG when that stab wheel is running there is not much time to react. Very scary. Look at the first officer trainee's reaction when the warning signals turn on and the plane dips. After seeing this I am so sad to see that these easy to access STAB TRIM switches could have saved both planes.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co
Thanks Tunkurman. Sort of proves what I have been saying all along. Notice that within 12 seconds the stabiliser is disabled by STAB OFF switches. The runaway STAB drill which is a memory checklist says
Condition "STAB TRIM RUNS CONTINUOUSLY" but if you note in this video, if is off after 12 seconds and before the plane can even begin to become unstable. The guys did not even spill their coffee and the remainder of the flight was very calm.
The word "CONTINUOUSLY" has always meant to me and I am sure thousands of 737 pilots to mean running in a manner not expected because in normal use it just moves in small increments either up or down. The moment it runs for more than a few seconds, that is a runaway.
If we are to start analysing every word in the Boeing QRH for its hidden meaning then the whole thing becomes a farce. During training we are shown that a stabiliser running is a very dangerous situation that needs instant memory action. It is this training that instills the knowledge of how to react - not a single word in a checklist.
There is a difference in the Lion Air in that there may have been stick shaker activity as well but multiple failures are a fact of life when flying and then QRH makes this very clear. "This document does not cover multiple failures.........." which must be dealt with by airmanship. No document could ever cover multiple failures.
Yanrair.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co
Thanks Tunkurman. Sort of proves what I have been saying all along. Notice that within 12 seconds the stabiliser is disabled by STAB OFF switches. The runaway STAB drill which is a memory checklist says
Condition "STAB TRIM RUNS CONTINUOUSLY" but if you note in this video, if is off after 12 seconds and before the plane can even begin to become unstable. The guys did not even spill their coffee and the remainder of the flight was very calm.
The word "CONTINUOUSLY" has always meant to me and I am sure thousands of 737 pilots to mean running in a manner not expected because in normal use it just moves in small increments either up or down. The moment it runs for more than a few seconds, that is a runaway.
If we are to start analysing every word in the Boeing QRH for its hidden meaning then the whole thing becomes a farce. During training we are shown that a stabiliser running is a very dangerous situation that needs instant memory action. It is this training that instills the knowledge of how to react - not a single word in a checklist.
There is a difference in the Lion Air in that there may have been stick shaker activity as well but multiple failures are a fact of life when flying and then QRH makes this very clear. "This document does not cover multiple failures.........." which must be dealt with by airmanship. No document could ever cover multiple failures.
Yanrair.
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BOEING QRH ADVICE ON NON NORMAL CHECKLISTS
Non–Normal Checklist Operation
Non–normal checklists start with steps to correct the situation. If needed, information for planning the rest of the flight is included. When special items are needed to configure the airplane for landing, the items are included in the Deferred Items section of the checklist. Flight patterns for some non–normal situations are located in the Maneuvers chapter and show the sequence of configuration changes.
While every attempt is made to supply needed non–normal checklists, it is not possible to develop checklists for all conceivable situations. In some smoke, fire or fumes situations, the flight crew may need to move between the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist and the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist. In some multiple failure situations, the flight crew may need to combine the elements of more than one checklist. In all situations, the captain must assess the situation and use good judgment to determine the safest course of action.
Non–Normal Checklist Operation
Non–normal checklists start with steps to correct the situation. If needed, information for planning the rest of the flight is included. When special items are needed to configure the airplane for landing, the items are included in the Deferred Items section of the checklist. Flight patterns for some non–normal situations are located in the Maneuvers chapter and show the sequence of configuration changes.
While every attempt is made to supply needed non–normal checklists, it is not possible to develop checklists for all conceivable situations. In some smoke, fire or fumes situations, the flight crew may need to move between the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist and the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist. In some multiple failure situations, the flight crew may need to combine the elements of more than one checklist. In all situations, the captain must assess the situation and use good judgment to determine the safest course of action.
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yanrair, you're really not getting it. By your line of argument, everything should be flying again in the morning, no changes and life moves on - "Nothing to see here". So, when the next crew creates another smoking hole are we just going to roll-out 'airmanship' again or are we going to do the SENSIBLE thing and identify/remove/mitigate the risk?
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[QUOTE=yanrair;10425972]
So to sum up. In the same situation with a Stab Trim repeatedly trimming nose down, you would NOT switch off the Stab Trim at the cut out switches because the NNC says 'continuous' and this is 'repeated' - really?
Have you seen this 737 runaway stabilizer training on YouTube? OMG when that stab wheel is running there is not much time to react. Very scary. Look at the first officer trainee's reaction when the warning signals turn on and the plane dips. After seeing this I am so sad to see that these easy to access STAB TRIM switches could have saved both planes.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co
Thanks Tunkurman. Sort of proves what I have been saying all along. Notice that within 12 seconds the stabiliser is disabled by STAB OFF switches. The runaway STAB drill which is a memory checklist says
Condition "STAB TRIM RUNS CONTINUOUSLY" but if you note in this video, if is off after 12 seconds and before the plane can even begin to become unstable. The guys did not even spill their coffee and the remainder of the flight was very calm.
The word "CONTINUOUSLY" has always meant to me and I am sure thousands of 737 pilots to mean running in a manner not expected because in normal use it just moves in small increments either up or down. The moment it runs for more than a few seconds, that is a runaway.
If we are to start analysing every word in the Boeing QRH for its hidden meaning then the whole thing becomes a farce. During training we are shown that a stabiliser running is a very dangerous situation that needs instant memory action. It is this training that instills the knowledge of how to react - not a single word in a checklist.
There is a difference in the Lion Air in that there may have been stick shaker activity as well but multiple failures are a fact of life when flying and then QRH makes this very clear. "This document does not cover multiple failures.........." which must be dealt with by airmanship. No document could ever cover multiple failures.
Yanrair.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co
Thanks Tunkurman. Sort of proves what I have been saying all along. Notice that within 12 seconds the stabiliser is disabled by STAB OFF switches. The runaway STAB drill which is a memory checklist says
Condition "STAB TRIM RUNS CONTINUOUSLY" but if you note in this video, if is off after 12 seconds and before the plane can even begin to become unstable. The guys did not even spill their coffee and the remainder of the flight was very calm.
The word "CONTINUOUSLY" has always meant to me and I am sure thousands of 737 pilots to mean running in a manner not expected because in normal use it just moves in small increments either up or down. The moment it runs for more than a few seconds, that is a runaway.
If we are to start analysing every word in the Boeing QRH for its hidden meaning then the whole thing becomes a farce. During training we are shown that a stabiliser running is a very dangerous situation that needs instant memory action. It is this training that instills the knowledge of how to react - not a single word in a checklist.
There is a difference in the Lion Air in that there may have been stick shaker activity as well but multiple failures are a fact of life when flying and then QRH makes this very clear. "This document does not cover multiple failures.........." which must be dealt with by airmanship. No document could ever cover multiple failures.
Yanrair.
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Yea, so that's going to work, so at point of rotation, we get a vane split, and MCAS will still do its stuff while the crew are fumbling for the checklist.
But hey, we're Boeing and we've given you guys a little light.
From what others before have described, its still a sub-system reliant on its on-side sensor only, with no automatic cut out if the off-side sensor is in disagreement.
Ttfn
But hey, we're Boeing and we've given you guys a little light.
From what others before have described, its still a sub-system reliant on its on-side sensor only, with no automatic cut out if the off-side sensor is in disagreement.
Ttfn
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That's like BMW (other manufacturers are available) saying your car is the safest in class, you have 10 airbags installed but its £1000 to connect them up and use them. Surely the negative publicity and 300 people that have lost their lives should be more than enough to convince them to fit them.
I think, we have gone far to far down the road of automation & the idea that the computer knows better than the Flight Crew.
As helpful as automatics & computerised technology etc are in aviation & other modes of transport, often the decision making & more importantly, the ability to carry out any subsequent action, is taken away from the Flight Crew.
The buck stops with the Pilots, give them the final authority & ability to `fly the aeroplane.
As helpful as automatics & computerised technology etc are in aviation & other modes of transport, often the decision making & more importantly, the ability to carry out any subsequent action, is taken away from the Flight Crew.
The buck stops with the Pilots, give them the final authority & ability to `fly the aeroplane.
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Salute!
My fear is that some lurking here will think that we lost two planes and 300 passengers because incompetent crews did not simply turn off two switches within seconds of raising flaps at normal altitude and speed with the stall warning system telling them they were stalling and their airspeed was FUBAR.
Gums...
My fear is that some lurking here will think that we lost two planes and 300 passengers because incompetent crews did not simply turn off two switches within seconds of raising flaps at normal altitude and speed with the stall warning system telling them they were stalling and their airspeed was FUBAR.
Gums...
Last edited by BobM2; 21st Mar 2019 at 22:05.
The fundamental problem is the location of the engines relative to the wings, not MCAS.
And the ethics of a once great company that thought a band aid (MCAS) on an open wound was OK.
And a regulator that abrogated it’s responsibility.
it will take more than a software patch and a little light to convince me the Max is safe.
What other design features did they self certify that should have been stillborn?
And the ethics of a once great company that thought a band aid (MCAS) on an open wound was OK.
And a regulator that abrogated it’s responsibility.
it will take more than a software patch and a little light to convince me the Max is safe.
What other design features did they self certify that should have been stillborn?
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March 21, 2019 / 8:34 AM / Updated an hour ago
Boeing to add extra safety alarm in 737 MAX jets: FT
(Reuters) - Boeing Co will install an extra safety alarm in the cockpits of all its 737 MAX aircraft after intense criticism in the wake of two fatal crashes, the Financial Times reported on Thursday.
Boeing did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Shares of the company were down about 1 percent at $372.49 in morning trade