Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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Why if one has a significant problem such as may have been the case why allow the aircraft to accelerate to 382kts?
Wouldn't an experienced crew at least reduce thrust to maintain around 210-250kts and a safe altitude attempting to get things under control?
Wouldn't an experienced crew at least reduce thrust to maintain around 210-250kts and a safe altitude attempting to get things under control?
I don't think there will be a proper engineering fix for this.
What we are going to get is a patch, stuck on MCAS, which is itself a patch.
Boeing care about a few hundred deaths in countries other than America, only in as much as they affect its ability to make money.
The Max is a classic example of a design stretched far beyond the original concept, for reasons of expediency and profitability only.
A 'proper' fix would be to redesign the undercarriage and then relocate the engines, but of course that would require a complete re-design, and even though it's what they themselves would have preferred to have done from the start, it's too late now.
A software patch is what we are likely to get.
What we are going to get is a patch, stuck on MCAS, which is itself a patch.
Boeing care about a few hundred deaths in countries other than America, only in as much as they affect its ability to make money.
The Max is a classic example of a design stretched far beyond the original concept, for reasons of expediency and profitability only.
A 'proper' fix would be to redesign the undercarriage and then relocate the engines, but of course that would require a complete re-design, and even though it's what they themselves would have preferred to have done from the start, it's too late now.
A software patch is what we are likely to get.
Last edited by Nomad2; 18th Mar 2019 at 06:29.
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Fighting with an aircraft just several hundreds / thousands feet above the ground at full speed and doing everything it can to return to the ground asap maybe?
FDR should explain all that, I hope.
I don't think there will be a proper engineering fix for this.
What we are going to get is a patch, stuck on MCAS, which is itself a patch.
Boeing care about a few hundred deaths in countries other than America, only in as much as they affect its ability to make money.
The Max is a classic example of a design stretched far beyond the original concept, for reasons of expediency and profitability only.
A 'proper' fix would be to redesign the undercarriage and then relocate the engines, but of course that would require a complete re-design, and even though it's what they themselves would have preferred to have done from the start, it's too late now.
A software patch is what we are likely to get.
What we are going to get is a patch, stuck on MCAS, which is itself a patch.
Boeing care about a few hundred deaths in countries other than America, only in as much as they affect its ability to make money.
The Max is a classic example of a design stretched far beyond the original concept, for reasons of expediency and profitability only.
A 'proper' fix would be to redesign the undercarriage and then relocate the engines, but of course that would require a complete re-design, and even though it's what they themselves would have preferred to have done from the start, it's too late now.
A software patch is what we are likely to get.
The altitude spike where the aircraft dips below the runway surface(!) accompanied by a single, instantaneous 2000+ fpm ROC value is clearly an artifact (unless Newton got it all wrong), probably coinciding with rotation.
There is a similar, spurious altitude spike towards the RH edge of the plot, which you have wisely ignored - that one is easier to account for because a distance-vs-time plot shows the aircraft flying backwards at that point (i.e. it's a timestamp anomaly rather than bad ADS-B data).
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I don't think there will be a proper engineering fix for this.
What we are going to get is a patch, stuck on MCAS, which is itself a patch.
Boeing care about a few hundred deaths in countries other than America, only in as much as they affect its ability to make money.
The Max is a classic example of a design stretched far beyond the original concept, for reasons of expediency and profitability only.
A 'proper' fix would be to redesign the undercarriage and then relocate the engines, but of course that would require a complete re-design, and even though it's what they themselves would have preferred to have done from the start, it's too late now.
A software patch is what we are likely to get.
What we are going to get is a patch, stuck on MCAS, which is itself a patch.
Boeing care about a few hundred deaths in countries other than America, only in as much as they affect its ability to make money.
The Max is a classic example of a design stretched far beyond the original concept, for reasons of expediency and profitability only.
A 'proper' fix would be to redesign the undercarriage and then relocate the engines, but of course that would require a complete re-design, and even though it's what they themselves would have preferred to have done from the start, it's too late now.
A software patch is what we are likely to get.
That the MCAS relied on a single AOA is that single point. Now potentially a causal factor in two fatal accidents does not bode well for a soft solution.
The world has watched the silence of Boeing, the duplicitous silence of the FAA can readily be construed as regulatory capture.
Anything less than a full and frank commitment to resolve the root problem, not with legal inspired weasel words but action may not see all countries regulatory authorities so quick to play circus elephants and follow a clearly compromised FAA.
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Croppy, in what was either an inspired piece of programming or else pure coincidence, a couple of days ago in Melbourne AUS the program Air Crash Investigation dealing with the crash of a Brazilian Fokker 100 was shown. To remind you, this happened when, shortly after take-off, the right reverser buckets began cycling, and finally deployed permanently. The crews lack of understanding of what was happening resulted in the aircraft diving into the ground. The initial cause was, as I recall, the failure of a ground-sensing micro. The back up safety system installed by Fokker automatically retarded the thrust lever, but the FO over-rode that using brute force, thus creating a situation of full forward thrust on the left, and full reverse on the right. The point of raising this incident is to highlight the fact that Fokker decided not to either inform, nor train crews in the system, apparently on the grounds that the probability of failure was extremely low. NTSB became involved and severely criticised the manufacturer's authority in this area, and also the FAA failure to mandate training. It wasn't clear to me whether the FAA even knew about this particular system. I don't think NTSB is currently involved with the MAX investigations, but nevertheless are aware of historic and similar failures of the regulatory authority. It should be clear to people that self-regulation will always lead to cost cutting and ultimately accidents. Spoiler - I am a retired regulator.
I'm not a pilot (well, only ex-PPL), but I am an engineer, working in safety-critical infrastructure. These two accidents are going to shake this industry. I know they have not yet been linked, but the gun is smoking.
Three massive issues stand out for me.
1. What has gone wrong at Boeing, that could allow a system to intervene, unknown to the flightdeck, but which had no redundancy on a vital input? Any systems analysis of this solution should have picked up this critical flaw...if it didn't, then the analysis (or analysors) was patently in error.
2. What has gone wrong at Boeing, that allowed a system to be designed, which used trim as a primary flight control? Correct me here if I'm wrong, but is trim not there to alleviate control forces once a flightpath has been established? Any system where trim is used in a primary manner is completely counterintuitive to flight crew. (maybe my understanding is wrong here, so happy to be corrected)
3. What has gone wrong at the FAA, that no-one caught this system? It seems they tried to devolve responsibility back to Boeing, but the FAA cannot do that...they are on the hook for this regulatory failure.
Corporate and regulatory culture is the problem here, and it stinks. I've always assumed Boeing were good guys, with a track record second to none. But something has gone wrong. And the FAA? I just find the whole thing staggering.
Pity the poor flightcrew...left with an airplane that had systems they didn't know about, without the necessary redundancy, and which was doing things they couldn't hope to assimilate at a crtical juncture in the flight.
The safest form of transport is facing a lot of questions just now.
Three massive issues stand out for me.
1. What has gone wrong at Boeing, that could allow a system to intervene, unknown to the flightdeck, but which had no redundancy on a vital input? Any systems analysis of this solution should have picked up this critical flaw...if it didn't, then the analysis (or analysors) was patently in error.
2. What has gone wrong at Boeing, that allowed a system to be designed, which used trim as a primary flight control? Correct me here if I'm wrong, but is trim not there to alleviate control forces once a flightpath has been established? Any system where trim is used in a primary manner is completely counterintuitive to flight crew. (maybe my understanding is wrong here, so happy to be corrected)
3. What has gone wrong at the FAA, that no-one caught this system? It seems they tried to devolve responsibility back to Boeing, but the FAA cannot do that...they are on the hook for this regulatory failure.
Corporate and regulatory culture is the problem here, and it stinks. I've always assumed Boeing were good guys, with a track record second to none. But something has gone wrong. And the FAA? I just find the whole thing staggering.
Pity the poor flightcrew...left with an airplane that had systems they didn't know about, without the necessary redundancy, and which was doing things they couldn't hope to assimilate at a crtical juncture in the flight.
The safest form of transport is facing a lot of questions just now.
With regard to some of the apologists:
Excuses? Everybody’s got one!
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As a career engineer, AOA vanes scare the living daylights out of me! Small, delicate gadgets, easily damaged by ground staff, dependent on small bearings to work. They should NEVER be relied on in isolation and I reckon the risk of two being similarly dysfunctional at the same time cannot be discounted. If two are relied on for safety they should be constantly monitored and checked in software for correct orientation whenever possible.
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The Seattle Times article says FAA has briefed lawmakers that the software fix will:
- use input from both AoA vanes
- limit travel
- limit retriggering
Sorry if this has been covered before: how do the MAX of SWA and AA differ? Do they just have an AoA display or do they actually have an extra vane, and their MCAS is already configured to use that extra input?
- use input from both AoA vanes
- limit travel
- limit retriggering
Sorry if this has been covered before: how do the MAX of SWA and AA differ? Do they just have an AoA display or do they actually have an extra vane, and their MCAS is already configured to use that extra input?
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I see Boeing have quietly rolled out a new B777 as well.
Did they fast track/fiddle that certification as well?
https://edition.cnn.com/travel/artic...now/index.html
Did they fast track/fiddle that certification as well?
https://edition.cnn.com/travel/artic...now/index.html
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SEATTLE/WASHINGTON - Employees of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration warned as early as seven years ago that Boeing Co. had too much sway over safety approvals of new aircraft, prompting an investigation by Department of Transportation auditors who confirmed the agency hadn’t done enough to “hold Boeing accountable.”
The 2012 investigation also found that discord over Boeing’s treatment had created a “negative work environment” among FAA employees who approve new and modified aircraft designs, with many of them saying they’d faced retaliation for speaking up. Their concerns predated the 737 Max development.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20.../#.XI9lbSgzaUk
The 2012 investigation also found that discord over Boeing’s treatment had created a “negative work environment” among FAA employees who approve new and modified aircraft designs, with many of them saying they’d faced retaliation for speaking up. Their concerns predated the 737 Max development.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20.../#.XI9lbSgzaUk
Why is the aircraft at "fullspeed" hundreds of feet off the ground?.
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The Boeing quote (from today`s Times) "The FAA concluded that the MCAS on the 737Max met all certification and regulatory requirements" and reliance on information from a single AOA vane are both extremely concerning.
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I see Boeing have quietly rolled out a new B777 as well.
Did they fast track/fiddle that certification as well?
https://edition.cnn.com/travel/artic...now/index.html
Did they fast track/fiddle that certification as well?
https://edition.cnn.com/travel/artic...now/index.html
Bernd
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One of the problems with a safety system is that when you find an omission/error/oversight/process concern you (should) start to wonder what else has gone wrong or been missed. if I were the FAA, I would be taking a big sample of other sign-offs and having a really good look at them. This MCAS affair has cast doubt on the integrity of a Organisation's Management System; that's going to take a lot to address and far more than a software tweak.