Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
Join Date: Feb 2010
Location: Thailand
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
OSLO (Reuters) - Norwegian Air will temporarily ground its Boeing 737 MAX 8 passenger jets at the advice of European regulators, it said on Tuesday.
“Following the decision by the relevant aviation regulatory bodies to temporarily suspend operations of Boeing 737 MAX, Norwegian will not operate any flights with this aircraft type until further notice,” the company said in a statement.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKBN1QT1U5
“Following the decision by the relevant aviation regulatory bodies to temporarily suspend operations of Boeing 737 MAX, Norwegian will not operate any flights with this aircraft type until further notice,” the company said in a statement.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-e...-idUSKBN1QT1U5
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
THOUGHTS ON A POSSIBLE FIX
On the subject of a 'software fix', as well as possibly feeding data from both AoA sensors to the microprocessor concurrently rather than consecutively, would adding another precondition to MCAS operation affect certification?
What I am suggesting is a >minimum altitude to be achieved before operation of the system.
The stabiliser is a very powerful control surface and having a system which can repeatedly trim the nose down at an altitude where time to recover is limited has the potential to cause more harm than it can prevent. A system which can require both pilots to simultaneously apply greater than normal elevator control added to the need for either the system to be disabled (one hand off the control column to operate two guarded switches or selection of flaps), opposing the MCAS trim by repeated manual trim control, or all three is quite frankly an ergonomic mess!
Despite the 'it wouldn't happen in a Western/white airline' nonsense we keep hearing, as many people on here have said, MCAS operates normally most of the time and even the best forewarned crew would (and should) not immediately respond to every upset as though it was an MCAS problem. Even a very quick and efficient diagnosis of the problem could still take the same length of time as it takes for the automatics to put your aircraft in a potentially fatal nose down trim. This is not primarily a training issue, it is a systems issue which Boeing now seems to be accepting despite the 'making a very safe aircraft even safer' statement.
This is a general observation, regardless of the cause of this particular incident. As mentioned above, the best time to have an AoA sensor failure is just after take off (even at night) when there are still some visual references to help you decide whether to believe either what your instruments are telling you or what you are seeing outside the cockpit.
So if we don't get a rethink of the whole system, would putting a minimum altitude requirement for its operation pass existing certification or is MCAS protection required for all phases of clean flight? As MCAS is intended to provide protection in low energy situations a great deal of thought would need to be given to how the minimum operating altitude would be determined.
On the subject of a 'software fix', as well as possibly feeding data from both AoA sensors to the microprocessor concurrently rather than consecutively, would adding another precondition to MCAS operation affect certification?
What I am suggesting is a >minimum altitude to be achieved before operation of the system.
The stabiliser is a very powerful control surface and having a system which can repeatedly trim the nose down at an altitude where time to recover is limited has the potential to cause more harm than it can prevent. A system which can require both pilots to simultaneously apply greater than normal elevator control added to the need for either the system to be disabled (one hand off the control column to operate two guarded switches or selection of flaps), opposing the MCAS trim by repeated manual trim control, or all three is quite frankly an ergonomic mess!
Despite the 'it wouldn't happen in a Western/white airline' nonsense we keep hearing, as many people on here have said, MCAS operates normally most of the time and even the best forewarned crew would (and should) not immediately respond to every upset as though it was an MCAS problem. Even a very quick and efficient diagnosis of the problem could still take the same length of time as it takes for the automatics to put your aircraft in a potentially fatal nose down trim. This is not primarily a training issue, it is a systems issue which Boeing now seems to be accepting despite the 'making a very safe aircraft even safer' statement.
This is a general observation, regardless of the cause of this particular incident. As mentioned above, the best time to have an AoA sensor failure is just after take off (even at night) when there are still some visual references to help you decide whether to believe either what your instruments are telling you or what you are seeing outside the cockpit.
So if we don't get a rethink of the whole system, would putting a minimum altitude requirement for its operation pass existing certification or is MCAS protection required for all phases of clean flight? As MCAS is intended to provide protection in low energy situations a great deal of thought would need to be given to how the minimum operating altitude would be determined.
Join Date: Apr 2014
Location: NY
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What surprises me most, since the Lion Air crash, is how very very very far Boeing and the FAA are behind in this. Historically Boeing has often been ahead of events (having the benefit of validated information of course). Viewed from the outside this is a watershed in Boeing culture. In the coming years we will find out if this has anything to do with the move to Chicago, or that they have just been surprised and startled by social media speed.
Join Date: May 2005
Location: Milton Keynes
Posts: 1,070
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Posting a bit too much but
If it were the AAIB they would put out a preliminary as soon as possible I think to try to clarify - as we saw with the recent heli crash in Leicester, with an almost concurrent AD. Can we expect the same from an Ethiopian inquiry?
If it were the AAIB they would put out a preliminary as soon as possible I think to try to clarify - as we saw with the recent heli crash in Leicester, with an almost concurrent AD. Can we expect the same from an Ethiopian inquiry?
Join Date: Oct 2017
Location: Vienna
Posts: 143
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The correct approach is to ground the craft until faults are identified, the idea that the craft should continue flying until we discover the fault is backwards and seems to be a common line of thought nowadays amongst people who like to think that they are scientific but do not understand data analysis.
If profits come first, continuation of operation might be the only option. E.g.: we continue, ET crash was not mcas related -> best possible profit outcome. All others are just loss minimisation.
Just saying.
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: btw SAMAR and TOSPA
Posts: 566
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FAA EASA
Be it MCAS in this case or not, the MCAS certification of the MAX series smells. To certify a system that directly controls primary flight surfaces AND that is reliant on a single sensor (AOA), is against written and unwritten rules in aircraft design, engineering and certification. If we were not living in times of massive commercial global rivalry (US, Europe, China) I would have expected the FAA and subsequently EASA coming under enormous public and political pressure how they ever had accepted the MCAS certification proposal by Boeing. But it had become a political and commercial case where no country wants to damage its industry and protects its agencies. This is too sad as it damages the culture of aviation safety in lieu of local interests.
It's really strange that the relevant certifying authorities like FAA and EASA are so far behind the operators and many nations this time and seem to come to different conclusions. Has this ever happened before on this level?
Join Date: Feb 2019
Location: MOW
Posts: 34
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
THOUGHTS ON A POSSIBLE FIX
On the subject of a 'software fix', as well as possibly feeding data from both AoA sensors to the microprocessor concurrently rather than consecutively, would adding another precondition to MCAS operation affect certification?
What I am suggesting is a >minimum altitude to be achieved before operation of the system.
The stabiliser is a very powerful control surface and having a system which can repeatedly trim the nose down at an altitude where time to recover is limited has the potential to cause more harm than it can prevent. A system which can require both pilots to simultaneously apply greater than normal elevator control added to the need for either the system to be disabled (one hand off the control column to operate two guarded switches or selection of flaps), opposing the MCAS trim by repeated manual trim control, or all three is quite frankly an ergonomic mess!
Despite the 'it wouldn't happen in a Western/white airline' nonsense we keep hearing, as many people on here have said, MCAS operates normally most of the time and even the best forewarned crew would (and should) not immediately respond to every upset as though it was an MCAS problem. Even a very quick and efficient diagnosis of the problem could still take the same length of time as it takes for the automatics to put your aircraft in a potentially fatal nose down trim. This is not primarily a training issue, it is a systems issue which Boeing now seems to be accepting despite the 'making a very safe aircraft even safer' statement.
This is a general observation, regardless of the cause of this particular incident. As mentioned above, the best time to have an AoA sensor failure is just after take off (even at night) when there are still some visual references to help you decide whether to believe either what your instruments are telling you or what you are seeing outside the cockpit.
So if we don't get a rethink of the whole system, would putting a minimum altitude requirement for its operation pass existing certification or is MCAS protection required for all phases of clean flight? As MCAS is intended to provide protection in low energy situations a great deal of thought would need to be given to how the minimum operating altitude would be determined.
On the subject of a 'software fix', as well as possibly feeding data from both AoA sensors to the microprocessor concurrently rather than consecutively, would adding another precondition to MCAS operation affect certification?
What I am suggesting is a >minimum altitude to be achieved before operation of the system.
The stabiliser is a very powerful control surface and having a system which can repeatedly trim the nose down at an altitude where time to recover is limited has the potential to cause more harm than it can prevent. A system which can require both pilots to simultaneously apply greater than normal elevator control added to the need for either the system to be disabled (one hand off the control column to operate two guarded switches or selection of flaps), opposing the MCAS trim by repeated manual trim control, or all three is quite frankly an ergonomic mess!
Despite the 'it wouldn't happen in a Western/white airline' nonsense we keep hearing, as many people on here have said, MCAS operates normally most of the time and even the best forewarned crew would (and should) not immediately respond to every upset as though it was an MCAS problem. Even a very quick and efficient diagnosis of the problem could still take the same length of time as it takes for the automatics to put your aircraft in a potentially fatal nose down trim. This is not primarily a training issue, it is a systems issue which Boeing now seems to be accepting despite the 'making a very safe aircraft even safer' statement.
This is a general observation, regardless of the cause of this particular incident. As mentioned above, the best time to have an AoA sensor failure is just after take off (even at night) when there are still some visual references to help you decide whether to believe either what your instruments are telling you or what you are seeing outside the cockpit.
So if we don't get a rethink of the whole system, would putting a minimum altitude requirement for its operation pass existing certification or is MCAS protection required for all phases of clean flight? As MCAS is intended to provide protection in low energy situations a great deal of thought would need to be given to how the minimum operating altitude would be determined.
*Applicable to some, not all pilots.
Join Date: Apr 2017
Location: England
Posts: 75
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
According to the BBC news site:
Does this mean the boxes are being processed in the US?
What happens next?
The investigation will be led by Ethiopian authorities in co-ordination with teams of experts from Boeing and the US National Transportation Safety Board.
Join Date: Oct 2017
Location: Vienna
Posts: 143
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lion Air FDR has been found on Nov 2nd and read on Nov 4h - 2 days. ET recorders were found yesterday, but LOTS of parties are VERY interested in what data they have. Is it technically possible they have been read?
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: Schiphol
Posts: 475
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@22/04 ... Question is if Ethiopia will take the lead or delegate the whole or part of the investigation. There was a photo with Ethiopian CAA and other investigators going aboard a plane to the location. But their labs and technical backup will probably not be sufficient to lead this one (with all due respect).
Not quite - the EC225 suffered that fate, albeit one with the offshore industry lobby factor. Similar parallels with the UKCAA (and Norwegians) acting fairly promptly and EASA dragging its heels. The Eurocopter/Airbus strategy on dealing with that one would be a salutary lesson for Boeing.
Join Date: Nov 2010
Location: Canada
Posts: 132
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Feb 2010
Location: Thailand
Posts: 11
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Holland has joined in.
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/buit...adar-omdraaien
Is the European regulator doing this? There is also news that Turkish Airlines are grounding them (not yet confirmed).
Now confirmed: https://www.apnews.com/94c19abef66d4a0e977a1286d779ba22
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/buit...adar-omdraaien
Is the European regulator doing this? There is also news that Turkish Airlines are grounding them (not yet confirmed).
Now confirmed: https://www.apnews.com/94c19abef66d4a0e977a1286d779ba22
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Phoenix, AZ USA
Age: 66
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
RE: Comments that the pilots don't know how to fly. If this was true the issue would not be concentrated on this aircraft.
RE: Comments that flights should continue until the problem is identified. This is backwards and people who believe this obviously don't understand basic risk management. The fact that you may be a pilot is irrelevant, pilots are not trained in data analysis and risk and a lot of you seem to be allowing your personal politics and biases come into your opinions.
The correct approach is to ground the craft until faults are identified, the idea that the craft should continue flying until we discover the fault is backwards and seems to be a common line of thought nowadays amongst people who like to think that they are scientific but do not understand data analysis.
RE: Comments that flights should continue until the problem is identified. This is backwards and people who believe this obviously don't understand basic risk management. The fact that you may be a pilot is irrelevant, pilots are not trained in data analysis and risk and a lot of you seem to be allowing your personal politics and biases come into your opinions.
The correct approach is to ground the craft until faults are identified, the idea that the craft should continue flying until we discover the fault is backwards and seems to be a common line of thought nowadays amongst people who like to think that they are scientific but do not understand data analysis.
The CAA's statement is perfectly clear. It only fails to make sense if a poster arbitrarily removes part of it:
"however, as we do not currently have sufficient information from the flight data recorder we have, as a precautionary measure, issued instructions to stop any commercial passenger flights from any operator arriving, departing or overflying UK airspace."
"however, as we do not currently have sufficient information from the flight data recorder we have, as a precautionary measure, issued instructions to stop any commercial passenger flights from any operator arriving, departing or overflying UK airspace."
I thus appreciate that their remit has to do with public due care, etc. and thus the abundance of caution approach is understood.
(Plus, it has to take off again, doesn't it?)
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 12th Mar 2019 at 17:09.
Plumbum Pendular
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: Avionics Bay
Age: 55
Posts: 1,117
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
“However, the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom announced in the afternoon of March 12, 2019, that as they “do not currently have sufficient information from the flight data recorder”, a precautionary ban of the aircraft within the UK’s airspace was ordered.”
https://www.aerotime.aero/clement.ch...m_medium=email
So why isn’t every aircraft type banned after an accident until there is any idea of cause?
https://www.aerotime.aero/clement.ch...m_medium=email
So why isn’t every aircraft type banned after an accident until there is any idea of cause?