Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

[22/04]

UK CAA ban now. Probably no choice given unease of TUI pax. Social media drives the world!

[EIFFS]

Unreliable airspeed is a memory item on the 737

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Originally Posted by xetroV

Boeing seems to think differently, judging from the Runaway Stabilizer checklist, which includes the following additional step after switching off the cutout switches: "If the runaway continues: stabilizer trim wheel - grasp and hold".

That statement isn't there for "erroneous MCAS". If the MCAS has "gone crazy" due to either faulty inputs and/or internal fault in whatever box drives it, then you can assume that the stab drive itself is healthy and just getting nonsense commands. So the cut-out switches will work.

the "if it still moves" is to cover something like a fault downstream of the cutout switches - maybe a short in the motor driving it regardless of command. In such a failure case, the motor will run regardless of the cutouts, so hanging on to the wheel is the last resort.

The chances of having a simultaneous MCAS (or other command system) fault AND an internal stab motor fault are insanely remote.

The procedure isn't just for MCAS, it has to cover all the various uncommanded stab scenarios.

[cessna729]

From the CAA website: www.caa.co.uk/News/Boeing-737-MAX-Aircraft

A spokesperson for the UK Civil Aviation Authority said: "Our thoughts go out to everyone affected by the tragic incident in Ethiopia on Sunday."The UK Civil Aviation Authority has been closely monitoring the situation, however, as we do not currently have sufficient information from the flight data recorder we have, as a precautionary measure, issued instructions to stop any commercial passenger flights from any operator arriving, departing or overflying UK airspace."The UK Civil Aviation Authority's safety directive will be in place until further notice.

"We remain in close contact with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and industry regulators globally."

-ENDS-There are currently five 737 MAX aircraft registered and operational in the United Kingdom. A sixth is planned to commence operations later this week.

[rightstuffer]

CAA Max Ban

[QUOTE=_pudknocker_;10415002]

MAX to be stopped flying in UK airspace according to sky

Who foots the bill for this decision? (Just asking)

[22/04]

The wide range of views on here is something I applaud - rather I am concerned by some people who do not live in the real world - this one here.

MPLs are a fact of life- I fly EasyJet and Ryanair and the FOs often look like they should still be at school. Same on SpiceJet and Go-Air in India. I don't see them going away. The US seems to be out of step if anything by still insisting on more experience- I am surprised commercial pressure hasn't led to the same there.

Aeroplanes must be built such that they can be flown by these crews - safely operated all over the world. As I said yesterday, I am not sure certification bodies are doing their duty here.

[Toruk Macto]

Is it as simple as flicking a switch ? The crews that have survived a MACS event got the switch off in time the one(s) who did not could not for some reason identify or react quickly enough to disable the system and perished ?

[SigWit]

Norwegian also suspended their 737 MAX operations: https://media.en.norwegian.com/pressreleases/norwegian-temporarily-suspends-flights-with-the-boeing-737-max-following-recommendations-by-european-aviation-authorities-2846615

[cooperplace]

Originally Posted by fox niner

Re: captain had 8000 flt hours@ 28 years of age:

That sounds hardly believable.
18 out of high school
20 out of flight school with 200 hours
that means 1000 hours per year for every 8 years.
I dont buy it. Must be false.

quite an accusation; maybe he finished high school at 17, maybe he flew a lot in his teens, so maybe 7000 hrs in 9 years, say 15 hrs/week. Obviously not common, but impossible?

[Sucram]

Originally Posted by Escape Velocity

​Here's the truth - none of them could fly an airplane. Plain and simple. No exaggeration, just the plain truth. ​​​​​​

Thats a pretty unfair and sweeping statement

[Intrance]

Originally Posted by oldoberon

"With electrical power to the FCCs maintained, the unit that provides MCAS changes between flights"

I am assuming by flights you mean airborne not one continuous flight number with multiple stops I e multiple take off/landing. I believe a flight from A to B stopping at C,D and E keeps the same flight number right through all legs. To meet your conditions of continuous power, on landing either the engines are kept running, APU is started or ground power applied, so how does the system know when next flight starts, Is there a weight on switch on the UC, or does it monitor engine power/aircraft speed to determine next flight has started.. What happens if all power is turned off how does it know which FCC to use.next time.

Why would the system do this switch over? On landing crew report any defects to ground crew for rectification, you land a perfectly serviceable a/c but the not in use AoA sensor had developed a fault , you don't know that ( unless you have the red light upgrade), next crew takes off and oops they have problems because the now in use AoA is faulty, Confusion reigns cant be AoA problem none were reported or even more likely it is the same crew on a multi hop flight so they know it was working. I would expect that system to at least tell them which FCC/AoA was supplying power to controls.

It is quite common for all kinds of systems to switch like that between flights. Usually by weight on wheels. If power is lost, it simply starts with a predetermined default source. If you'd always be using the same input, you'd never notice if the other one went INOP. Suddenly the always used source goes unserviceable and the backup has been unserviceable for ages but was never used so not noticed. As long as this behavior is documented in the FCOM it is absolutely not an issue. And no one simply dismisses a possible source of problems just because the previous crew didn't have any issues.

[John R81]

UK CAA now issued SD-2019-001

SD-2019-001: Boeing 737-8 "MAX" and Boeing 737-9 "MAX" Limitation of Operations due to a Fatal Accident in Ethiopia on 10 March 2019

This SD is made in the interests of safety of operation and to protect the public following the accident of an Ethiopian Airlines Boeing Model 737-8 "MAX" aircraft on 10 March 2019. External reports are drawing similarities between this accident and Lion Air flight 610 on 29 October 2018 involving the same type of aircraft. Given the similarity of the two accidents, it has been decided that as a precautionary measure that all Boeing 737-8 "MAX" and Boeing 737-9 "MAX" operations in the United Kingdom, whether by UK AOC holders or foreign AOC holders and carriers, should stop until appropriate safeguards are in place.

[derjodel]

Originally Posted by Cows getting bigger

UK CAA Statement and associated OSD http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SD2019001.pdf

They are mostly doing it to shield TUI, but nice to see someone had the balls. Specially due to the importance of the future US-UK relations.

[lpfflyer]

TK595 IST - NKC looks like it's turning around and returning to base so guessing Turkey is next with the grounding

EDIT: all outbound TK flights on the MAX look like they're turned around.

[El Bunto]

Originally Posted by derjodel

They are mostly doing it to shield TUI, but nice to see someone had the balls. Specially due to the importance of the future US-UK relations.

It's a complete inversion of the DC-10 grounding in 1979, when the FAA withdrew its cert but the CAA protested that it was an over-reaction.

Just realised that was nearly 40 years ago, 6 June 1979. Where did the time go?!

[Ian W]

Originally Posted by Brake Fan

It's looking like we are witnessing the first aircraft to be killed by social media since the Hindenburg.

My thoughts entirely.

There is also similarity to the Osprey - now the safest rotary flown by the US Military.

[Cows getting bigger]

My view is that the UK CAA haven’t jumped-the-gun. They have clearly tried to get as much information as possible and either don’t have that information or are troubled by some of the responses.

One thing I admire about the UK CAA is that they almost always play with a straight bat; it seems so here.

[quentinc]

but G-TUMB is still flying on. Clearly TUI know what they are doing, but to a casual reader, the CAA directive looks pretty clear.

[meleagertoo]

Originally Posted by nebojsar

And what qualification for you is enough for someone to have privilege to step in b737 cockpit?

When I did my 737 type rating some years ago the vastly experienced CFI told us that Boeing's original design philosophy on the type was that it could be safely and efficiently operated by an experienced Captain and a third-world PPL. I think they pretty much succeeded. Of course the P2's experience counts but if he's been properly trained he's more than capable of backing up an experienced Captain who was always assumed to take the controls immediately an emergency occurred, though not necessarily to keep them if the situation warranted that course of action. Captain fly, boy do. It works.

I find it very surprising that anyone on this variant wouldn't have MCAS malfunctions so close to the front of his mind that the slightest extra clank of the trim didn't shock him alert in an instant, grabbing the trim wheel and reaching (or calling) for either Flap1 or the Stab Trim Cutout switches. How anyone on-type could fly 6 long minutes with trim problems and not tumble to the nature of the malfunction simply beggars belief.

For that reason alone I wouldn't be at all surprised if this particular duck turns out to be a goose.

[SLFinAZ]

Originally Posted by Sucram

Thats a pretty unfair and sweeping statement

Actually it's a factual statement in the sense that the vast majority of newer commercial pilots have very little hand flying experience in a line environment. SOP for just about every airline globally involves positive rate, gear up, AP on as quickly as possible. As a general rule AP disconnect on landing also occurs very late in the process. The result is that most pilots with no experience prior to the "glass cockpit" era have significantly underdeveloped intuitive capabilities.

Ebbatson (2009) found that pilots who had significant experience flying traditional, non-glass cockpit aircraft, developed robust mental models of performance characteristics during different phases of flight. These heuristics allowed experienced pilots to quickly and accurately predict and anticipate exactly how the aircraft would perform, thus reducing the high processing demands imposed by closed-loop processing. These pilots developed their own schema for the operation of the aircraft based upon experience with power settings, descent profiles, and rules of thumb. They no longer had to perform 14 complex mathematical calculations to determine when to begin a descent; rather they could simply apply the heuristic model for that situation. Less experienced pilots, lack these heuristics and quickly become saturated, resulting in poor aircraft control and planning. Over-dependence on automated systems exacerbates this issue and further inhibits the ability to develop the required mental models for manual flight.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=5108&context=etd_theses



The simple truth is that while the planes themselves are infinitely safer the pilots are not. Obviously that is a harsh blanket statement but the truth is that if you can't practice your craft you won't maintain proficiency.