Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

[phylosocopter]

Originally Posted by Skyjob

Good article: What is the MCAS?

Simple answer if jet behaves unexpectedly: disconnect and fly it manually!

EEEEEEEEKKKKKK this diagram is fatally WRONG! it states that DEACTIVATES when "Pilots override with manual trim" IT DOES NOT! it pauses but REMAINS ACTIVE! which is a completely different thing! If i was looking for a smoking gun this is it! If this diagram came from Boeing then they are F*****kd

[HalfMoonRising]

MAX QA test plan

Originally Posted by Joejosh999

I’d be interested to know of the QA plan, most obviously failure modes, and how it was executed and signed off.

Likewise, great comment. Pax/Ex-IT QA engr here. With all the discussion around MCAS being somewhat of a kludge to overcome an unbalanced design introduced by the heavier more forward mounted engines on the MAX, I have thought since start of this thread about necessity for a robust test script with particular emphasis on wringing out all possible failure types. Big no-no if this is engineer driven, they are notoriously focused on making stuff WORK. Proper test plan would of course pass/fail all feature/functionality stuff, but should primarily focus on making things BREAK, anticipating every possible adverse situation engineers might deem next to impossible, or so minor or rare as to be "insignificant". Testing impact of bad control inputs to MCAS seems rather a no-brainer, no?

[mini]

Originally Posted by rmac2

The key phrase is "along the lines of" , as apparently Boeing preferred not to admit to the possibility, let alone produce a procedure for it. In the absence of any guidance, what would be the quickest way to inhibit the MCAS system under pressure ? I suspect it would be to reproduce a configuration where it is inactive ?

Unfortunately it would appear that if the MCAS system has intervened due to a fault somewhere, you may be somewhat inhibited in configuring to inhibit. So to speak...

Dodgy airspeed - no AP
Flaps? not at 300Knts
High AOA? its pointing at the ground...

It seems flicking the switches is the only real option, easier said than done when you're hauling back 50Kgs amidst the disco and wondering WTF?

[Chesty Morgan]

Originally Posted by Vessbot

To be clear, which switches are you talking about? The stab cutouts? The overhead?

The overhead. I think it was the Lufthansa with the sweep up - on. Ansett was the more traditional forward - on.

[JamesT73J]

I think the intent behind the system is not unusual, but with one AOA sensor? I can't quite get my head around that.

Why not have it read from both, if they disagree, go INOP and warn via ECAM? I don't know about the feasability of retrofitting the proper solution - triplex - but it seems that this is a pretty reckless implementation.

[Vessbot]

Originally Posted by Chesty Morgan

The overhead. I think it was the Lufthansa with the sweep up - on. Ansett was the more traditional forward - on.

Thanks for the clarification -- first I thought you meant the stab cutouts, which would have been bonkers crazy stupid (in addition to making me eat my words for the second time on one page!)

[JumpJumpJump]

737 max fleet grounded by Gol in Brazil.

They use their Max fleet for direct flights from Brazil to Florida.... Routes suspended, though imagine that they will be frantically working out how to honour current schedule with a fuel stop added in either the north of Brazil or the Caribbean

[First_Principal]

Crew experience?

I see a number of comments relating to crew hours. In particular it has been said that the FO had '200 hours'. IF this is is total time, and it's correct, then by normal training methodology the FO could, at most, be a newly-minted CPL and have next to no time as a 'released to fly solo' pilot on this aircraft.

The source or veracity of this information appears to be a little hazy, however if it were correct then it would suggest to me that Ethiopian could have been operating outside of their own SOP's as outlined in s1.17.1.7 "Procedure for Flight Crew Pairing" on page 50 of the report into the ET409 accident dated 17th Jan 2012:

ET provided their procedure for crew pairing; the procedure is inserted as Appendix H of this
report. It stipulates under “Inexperience flight crews” that “Captain who has less than 300 hours
and F/O who has less than 100 hours on type should not be scheduled together.”

I offer this as information only and make no personal conclusion nor suggestion that crew experience could have contributed to this accident at this stage, particularly as, to the best of my knowledge, the source of the data is unverified.

Thus this detail from the accident report may simply call into question the veracity of the information regarding pilot hours, the training regime (FO especially), whether '100 hours on type' includes pre-CPL training or 'released to fly solo', relevance to current SOP's for the airline, or failure to follow their own procedure amongst various other possibilities.

FP.

[RoyHudd]

Firstly, I disagree about opposite switch direction. Having flown the same type with some switches ON/UP and on a different reg the same functions OFF/UP, I can tell you that many colleagues, and myself, made mistakes. Unlike the perfect people who insist on posting here.

Secondly, a question. Why did the Ethiopian B737 in this case keep accelerating? At 1000 ft AGL, in VMC, it is simple to see that the a/c is accelerating, without reference to instruments. (Maybe not for the FO, drastically inexperienced as he/she was).

I believe the training, regulatory and operating standards vary widely around our world. Just because every country has a CAA or equivalent, does not mean they are all able to adhere to the same standards. Most of us know that they do not. Most of us are just worried about the usual easily-voiced criticisms of nationalism, racism and the like, so we do not express our opinions.

Smaller, and less developed countries are unable to produce sufficient nationals to train or to operate complex jets to the same standards as the bigger, more developed countries. The accident stats bear this out.

[DaveReidUK]

Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community

Just released.

"we have not been provided data to draw any conclusions or take any actions"

[Chesty Morgan]

Originally Posted by RoyHudd

Firstly, I disagree about opposite switch direction. Having flown the same type with some switches ON/UP and on a different reg the same functions OFF/UP, I can tell you that many colleagues, and myself, made mistakes. Unlike the perfect people who insist on posting here.

Actually what I said was it didn't take much getting used to not that mistakes weren't made.

[joema]

I don't know if it's behind a paywall but NYT has a chart showing which 737 MAX operators have grounded them as of today.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...-airlines.html

Grounded - # of 737 MAX in operator's fleet
=================================
China Southern Airlines - 22
Air China - 15
SpiceJet - 13
Hainan Airlines - 11
Shanghai Airlines - 11
Xiamen Airlines - 10
Lion Air - 10
Jet Airways - 9
Shandong Airlines - 7
Shenzhen Airlines - 6
SilkAir - 6
Ethiopian Airlines - 4
China Eastern Airlines - 4
Lucky Air - 3
Cayman Airways - 2
Eastar Jet - 2
Fiji Airways - 2
Fuzhou Airlines - 2
Kunming Airlines - 2
Okay Airways - 2
9 Air - 1
Garuda Indonesia - 1
Comair - 1

Not Grounded (partial list)
====================
Southwestern Airlines - 34
Air Canada - 24
American Airlines - 24
Norwegian Air - 18
TUI fly - 15
WestJet - 13
FlyDubai - 11
Turkish Airlines - 11
Smartwings - 7
GOL Airlines - 7
Aeromexico - 6
Aerolineas Argentinas - 5
Oman air - 5
(remainder omitted for brevity)

[LiamNCL]

Originally Posted by joema

I don't know if it's behind a paywall but NYT has a chart showing which 737 MAX operators have grounded them as of today.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...-airlines.html

Grounded - # of 737 MAX in operator's fleet
=================================
China Southern Airlines - 22
Air China - 15
SpiceJet - 13
Hainan Airlines - 11
Shanghai Airlines - 11
Xiamen Airlines - 10
Lion Air - 10
Jet Airways - 9
Shandong Airlines - 7
Shenzhen Airlines - 6
SilkAir - 6
Ethiopian Airlines - 4
China Eastern Airlines - 4
Lucky Air - 3
Cayman Airways - 2
Eastar Jet - 2
Fiji Airways - 2
Fuzhou Airlines - 2
Kunming Airlines - 2
Okay Airways - 2
9 Air - 1
Garuda Indonesia - 1
Comair - 1

Not Grounded (partial list)
====================
Southwestern Airlines - 34
Air Canada - 24
American Airlines - 24
Norwegian Air - 18
TUI fly - 15
WestJet - 13
FlyDubai - 11
Turkish Airlines - 11
Smartwings - 7
GOL Airlines - 7
Aeromexico - 6
Aerolineas Argentinas - 5
Oman air - 5
(remainder omitted for brevity)

I believe GOL can go on 'Grounded' list now.

[HEMS driver]

If it's Boeing, I'm not going.

[henra]

Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem

Fuel contamination, engine problems, flight control problems, terrorism, instrument problems, birdstrike, suicide, runaway trim ? Nothing can be excluded, but ony one issue is discussed.
MCAS.

Have you looked at least to the most crude bits of information on this crash before climbing up the sope box?
Fuel contamination, engine problems => 383kts, Ultra high energy impact. Scrap it.
instrument problems: 383kts (read: no stall) and sunny, nice weather => WTF instrument should cause this??? I don't see a reasonable scenario for this.
bird strike: => why spearing along at 1000ft at ridiculous speeds after being hit by a bird??? That would be exactly opposite of what you would want to do: Higher altitude and low speed. IMHO not really supported from what we know so far.

I would accept flight control problems ( would be extremely worrying though on a just 5 month old aircraft of a new type!), suicide (but why would someone fly for so long at low altitude and high and increasing speed when he wants to commit suicide?), runaway trim (here we go -that is what has been mostly discussed and wehre there is a precedence).

So if I draw a line below your objection I still end up mostly with what is being discussed here (although I agree it is much to early to be sure it was MCAS).
Would I happily board a MAX tomorrow? Not if I could avoid it.

[Callsign Kilo]

Someone mentioned that the MCAS provides 10 secs of trim input when activated. Can that be correct/verified? 10 secs of trim input is massive on the 737. The stabiliser is a powerful secondary flight control and has known limitations - for example Boeing are explicit about overuse of stabiliser trim
during the approach to stall recovery. Positioning the stabiliser in such a sense can severely reduce elevator authority - was this not the contributing factor in the FlyDubai 738 crash in Rostov? Two separate variants, one without MCAS, but with the same concerns relating to pitch authority?

[SMYDSTS]

Big well done to Southwest Airlines Safety Department for retrofitting their Max’s with the optional head down AoA display after the Lion Air accident! I wonder how many other Safety Managers would have liked to get the budget for that too?
I read that the head down display option was an extra $60K on top of the purchase price of a new Max? Small price to pay for the extra info, although I’m not sure that more extra info is needed - the PFD is starting to look like an F1 steering wheel. Can anyone confirm if the AoA disagree warning light is also an option and was it installed on the ET fleet?

[Thomas coupling]

Phylosocopter.
Correct, the statement is incorrect - one cannot overide manually, the system stays in and you have to motor the trim fwd electronically using the system.

Happened with Lion Air.

Wouldn't like to be the CEO Boeing tonight!

Many airlines have trained their pilots to resolve this issue properly....unfortunately, others .....have not.

[oldoberon]

Can someone clear up something for me please.

I know from reading the whole thread the MCAS has a single AoA input, but some post refer to xchecking against the 2nd AoA ( which is not connected to MCAS)

However post 188 says this

post 188

At least Southwest took it's own initiative by adding an extra AOA indicator into 737 MAX for crew to cross-check erroneous data, but, shouldn't that be a Boeing responsibility and hence fitted to the worldwide fleet? I doubt Ethiopian purchased or insisted on these upgrades.

Is this extra a 3rd AoA or is there only 1 AoA and this IS the 2nd "comparison only" one.

Just to add I was horrified to read the certification is basically a grandfather one, when major changes to airframe, engine or flying controls are made it should be a new certification, loved the analogy " like putting a new dash and a 300bhp engine in a model T and saying it is safe to use!

ta

Oldoberon

[ManaAdaSystem]

Originally Posted by henra

Have you looked at least to the most crude bits of information on this crash before climbing up the sope box?
Fuel contamination, engine problems => 383kts, Ultra high energy impact. Scrap it.
instrument problems: 383kts (read: no stall) and sunny, nice weather => WTF instrument should cause this??? I don't see a reasonable scenario for this.
bird strike: => why spearing along at 1000ft at ridiculous speeds after being hit by a bird??? That would be exactly opposite of what you would want to do: Higher altitude and low speed. IMHO not really supported from what we know so far.

I would accept flight control problems ( would be extremely worrying though on a just 5 month old aircraft of a new type!), suicide (but why would someone fly for so long at low altitude and high and increasing speed when he wants to commit suicide?), runaway trim (here we go -that is what has been mostly discussed and wehre there is a precedence).

So if I draw a line below your objection I still end up mostly with what is being discussed here (although I agree it is much to early to be sure it was MCAS).
Would I happily board a MAX tomorrow? Not if I could avoid it.

Have you read what FAA says? They can’t draw any conclusions.
You obviously know better.