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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 14th Mar 2019, 21:04
  #1381 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Helix Von Smelix View Post
Just looking at the Boeing 777-9 rollout photos. My question is, Have Boeing done a similar thing with the engine position on the 777-9 as they did with the 737-MAX? Forward and high.
They have actually lengthened the main gear legs to 16ft, the longest ever used on an airliner, but yes the diameter of the engine means that it does sit higher and farther forward.

Of course with the FBW 777 that should be less of a problem.

Trivium: the manufacturer of the 777X MLG, Héroux Devtek in Quebec, also supplied the legs for the Apollo Lunar Module.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 21:09
  #1382 (permalink)  
 
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 21:33
  #1383 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK View Post
After all, that's what the 'A' in BEA stands for.
After reading through all 12 of the AF 447 threads, I came away with the impression that some people felt that the A in BEA stood for Airbus.

For PJ2: I have an idea that there are some corporate cultures that might need to awaken to training being viewed as a necessity, rather than as an expense, or a cost center. Which corporate (or even national) entities that message needs be to be digested in I'll leave as an exercise for the reader.

For someone further up the page: off to take a look at the LionAir FDR trace, thanks for the tip.

For anyone, last question.
MTBF of AoA probes. Who is Boeing's supplier? (If the AoA prob, or its signal to the FCC, doesn't go whacky do we ever hear about any of this?)
We had a fairly long discussion about pitot tubes after AF447 went down, and commentary about Goodrich probes that AB was working on putting on their fleet versus a Thales one. Are AoA probes held to the 1 x 10^-7th hours failure criteria, or a 1 x 10 ^-9?
I don't know how good the final report on LionAir will be, but I am very interested in the prelude to that accident, in terms of what maintenance actions were and weren't taken, and how the trouble shooting logic went, and the various repairs.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 21:51
  #1384 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50 View Post
For anyone, last question.
MTBF of AoA probes. Who is Boeing's supplier? (If the AoA prob, or its signal to the FCC, doesn't go whacky do we ever hear about any of this?)
We had a fairly long discussion about pitot tubes after AF447 went down, and commentary about Goodrich probes that AB was working on putting on their fleet versus a Thales one. Are AoA probes held to the 1 x 10^-7th hours failure criteria, or a 1 x 10 ^-9?
I don't have that info, but as a general comment on sensor reliability, up-thread somewhere there is a post by a NG pilot mentioning that a bird strike took out an AoA vane on one of his recent flights. Obviously the sensor should have the highest possible MTBF, but the system as a whole needs a safe method to recover from a sensor that can be taken out that easily, and that randomly.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 21:53
  #1385 (permalink)  
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Quote:
Originally Posted by cervo77
Then there are differences, and the Pilots should have been informed about the differences. Unfortunately the lion and Ethiopian's pilots have not had this chance

Originally Posted by hawk76 View Post
Apparently the Ethopian pilots did, according to CNN:

Quote:GebreMariam said the Ethiopian Airlines pilots had received additional training on the flight procedures involving the 737 MAX 8 after the Lion Air crash.

Apologies with the mess of the quoting above but the site doesn't help you multi-quote....

Channel 4 News (UK) has just screened an interview with a "Senior Ethiopian Pilot".

Note that: the interview was voice disguised and anonymous. The pilot did not state that then flew 737 MAX-8, or if they did, what experience they had on that airframe.

In the interview the pilot stated that the MCAS had not been taught to them [by Boeing]. He went on to talk about not being able to defeat the system by pulling on the stick. He did NOT mention adjusting trim [as a means to defeat the system].

Having read from the professionals above about having to use trim wheels or cutout switches to defeat MCAS, and NOT using the stick alone, my conclusion from the interview was that the pilot had NOT been trained in the correct procedures, or surely he would have mentioned it?

Of course it might be that C4 found a pilot that hadn't flown the MAX 8, but the C4 journalists are usually pretty professional and wouldn't put this interview forward if that were the case.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 21:57
  #1386 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Photonic View Post
I don't have that info, but as a general comment on sensor reliability, up-thread somewhere there is a post by a NG pilot mentioning that a bird strike took out an AoA vane on one of his recent flights. Obviously the sensor should have the highest possible MTBF, but the system as a whole needs a safe method to recover from a sensor that can be taken out that easily, and that randomly.
100% concur on system robustness requirement.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:00
  #1387 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by WHBM View Post
You can actually find this increasingly with government Regulatory Authorities, in various countries, and with other regulators/augitors, eg for the finance industry.

Time was when the regulators were quite independent, and looked at things with true external oversight. They would need the knowledgeable personnel to work through everything. Then it slowly occurred to them that they might get the industry they were regulating to do certain of their jobs for them....<SNIP>
Yes, except that this was not something that "slowly occurred" to the regulators: it was a deliberate political decision for "light-handed regulation" and self-regulation, taken throughout Anglophonia, in the belief that the market would ensure that the regulated entities would want to keep their good reputation (for commercial reasons), and so could attend to the material aspects of regulation, without being stifled by "bureaucratic inertia." We now see the costs, in many industries, in lives that would not have been lost under the old regime.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:08
  #1388 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Peristatos View Post
.
(Two graphs of vertical speed).

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...-investigation




Interesting two graphs.
And of course the 21 second interval in vertical speed cycles, equates very nicely with 10 secs of MCAS trim input and 10 sects of manual trim resetting. Prima face evidence that MCAS was operating in this flight.

Silver
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:22
  #1389 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by TBC Retired View Post
777 was the last program I worked on at Boeing where I felt they did everything pretty much as it should be done. "Working Together" was the motto and that meant not just consulting with customers, but coordinating internally by having 'design/buil'' teams working with each other all the way rather than emerging from their individual tunnels at the end of the process to find miscommunications and things that didn't work together properly. After that program, Boeing dismantled their traditional design matrix organizations which served as checks and balances on each other, but required lots of staff. Later programs seemed to have lost that magic and each follow-on project was mandated to have a faster and cheaper design/build/test/certify cycle than the previous one. Most of the low hanging wasteful effort was eliminated long ago and it was value added activities that started being cut. I felt that trend culminated on the Max program which kicked off with a misguided dream by program leadership that they might actually be able to eliminate flight testing altogether because prediction methods and computational models were so accurate and mature. Pure hubris. Every program I ever worked on had unanticipated show stoppers which surfaced during flight testing and required panic fixes, yet that basic lesson seemed to have to be constantly relearned.
IMO, the day Alan Mulally left Boeing was the beginning of the end of "Working Together." I'm not surprised at Boeing's current situation. Look at the KC-46's being delivered with trash, and tools left in them. It's like WTF is going on? Seems like a dire situation IMO.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:24
  #1390 (permalink)  
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Lion Air was deluged with heavy raid the night before the tragedy. Yes, I'm still looking for multiple glitches, that when combined cause chaos.

Those graphs seem too similar not to be very closely connected, but the similarity might be partly caused by human interpretation and resultant handling and not entirely by glitch sequences.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:24
  #1391 (permalink)  
 
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The MCAS is there to stop the aircraft from stalling so why not call it a "stall avoidance system" ? If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it's a duck.

The B757 and B767 first flew 15 years after the B737 and are already out of production except for freighter and military versions of the B767.

The move from the B742 to B744 required an extensive redesign of the flight deck and systems, Boeing didn't just stick in a couple of TV screens in front of the pilots. The B737 should have had a similar in-depth redesign if they were going to continue with the same airframe, rather than the patchwork quilt of modifications and work arounds it ended up with.

It's a first generation jet modified into a third generation one.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:35
  #1392 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by silverstrata View Post


Interesting two graphs.
And of course the 21 second interval in vertical speed cycles, equates very nicely with 10 secs of MCAS trim input and 10 sects of manual trim resetting. Prima face evidence that MCAS was operating in this flight.

Silver
We must be careful trying to read too much into very limited data. Remember that MCAS will not come active a second time until the pilot as been off of the trim input for 5 continuous seconds. For the Lion Air event data showing pilot and MCAS trim commands has been presented in that PPRuNe thread. It would be interesting to line that up with these plots to see how that particular cycle corresponded to pilot trim inputs. Hopefully we have access to the ET data soon to do the same for that event.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:37
  #1393 (permalink)  
 
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Anyone know if Boeing has been able to duplicate the problem in flight testing?
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:43
  #1394 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Loose rivets View Post
Lion Air was deluged with heavy raid the night before the tragedy. Yes, I'm still looking for multiple glitches, that when combined cause chaos.

Those graphs seem too similar not to be very closely connected, but the similarity might be partly caused by human interpretation and resultant handling and not entirely by glitch sequences.
Unfortunately, I fear, unless you plot fifty other 737 departure vertical speed graphs, you cannot meaningfully tell anything from these. All flights may exhibit such a 20 second period. You are seeing what you hoped to see - something apparently similar. But you have no meaningful references.

-GY
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 22:54
  #1395 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by thcrozier View Post
Anyone know if Boeing has been able to duplicate the problem in flight testing?
Need to be specific about what you mean by "duplicate the problem".
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 23:29
  #1396 (permalink)  
 
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Trimming the plane for neutral stick force is part of safely trying to get back to the ground. This is a fundamental airplane flying concept since the 172 presolo days. Literally lesson one.
A lot of "progress" happened since the 172... Modern Pilots rely a lot on Autotrim, all Airbus FBW aircraft can be flown completely ignoring the trim. Maybe this even is a good idea, as it makes the life easier for the pilot and eliminates sources for error. Until some systems fail, and all of a sudden the pilot has to deal with another very powerful flight control element (actually much more powerful than the elevator for most aircraft) he completely had forgotten about...
To decouple pilot controls from aircraft control surfaces may after all not be a very clever idea.

After reading through all 12 of the AF 447 threads, I came away with the impression that some people felt that the A in BEA stood for Airbus.
Probably those people have not read all 420 pages (including the appendices). There are some subtle but very clear points which BEA addresses, that could be understood as Airbus design deficiencies. For example the missing speed stability of the airbus FBW logic or the stall warning inhibit function.

Most probably the Boeing MCAS will also be mentioned as "not so clever idea" in the final reports, without identifying it as cause or contributing factor... So those reading only that part of the report will probably claim that the B in NTSB stands for Beoeing...

Need to be specific about what you mean by "duplicate the problem".
Boeing test pilots will never be able to duplicate the problem, that the pilots do not 100% understand the MCAS logic, and are taken by surprise.
If you know what will hapen and why it happens, if you are prepared, it is a totally different scenarion.
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Old 14th Mar 2019, 23:48
  #1397 (permalink)  
 
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From The New York Times:

Boeing 737 Max Hit Trouble Right Away, Pilot’s Tense Radio Messages Show
March 14, 2019
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — The captain of a doomed Ethiopian Airlines jetliner faced an emergency almost immediately after takeoff from Addis Ababa, requesting permission in a panicky voice to return after three minutes as the aircraft accelerated to abnormal speed, a person who reviewed air traffic communications said Thursday.

“Break break, request back to home,” the captain told air traffic controllers as they scrambled to divert two other flights approaching the airport. “Request vector for landing.”

Controllers also observed that the aircraft, a new Boeing 737 Max 8, was oscillating up and down by hundreds of feet — a sign that something was extraordinarily wrong.

All contact between air controllers and the aircraft, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 to Nairobi, was lost five minutes after it took off on Sunday, the person said.

The person who shared the information, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the communications have not been publicly released, said the controllers had concluded even before the captain’s message that he had an emergency.

The account of the cockpit communications shed chilling new detail about the final minutes before the plane crashed, killing all 157 people aboard. The crash, which has led to a worldwide grounding of Max 8s, was the second for the best-selling Boeing aircraft in less than five months.

Regulatory authorities in the United States and Canada say similar patterns in the trajectories of both planes may point to a common cause for the two crashes. But they cautioned that no explanation had been ruled out yet, and said the planes might have crashed for different reasons.

The new disclosures about the last moments of Flight 302 came as pilots were discussing what they described as the dangerously high speed of the aircraft after it took off from Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport.

Pilots were abuzz over publicly available radar data that showed the aircraft had accelerated far beyond what is considered standard practice, for reasons that remain unclear.

“The thing that is most abnormal is the speed,” said John Cox, an aviation safety consultant and former 737 pilot.

“The speed is very high,” said Mr. Cox, a former executive air safety chairman of the Air Line Pilots Association in the United States. “The question is why. The plane accelerates far faster than it should.”

Ethiopian Airlines officials have said the crew of Flight 302 reported “flight control” problems to air traffic controllers a few minutes before contact was lost. The new account of communications between air traffic controllers and the pilot, Yared Getachew, who had 8,000 hours of flying experience, provides much more information about what was happening in the cockpit.

Within one minute of Flight 302’s departure, the person who reviewed communications said, Captain Getachew reported a “flight control” problem in a calm voice. At that point, radar showed the aircraft’s altitude as being well below what is known as the minimum safe height from the ground during a climb.

Within two minutes, the person said, the plane had climbed to a safer altitude, and the pilot said he wanted to stay on a straight course to 14,000 feet.

Then the controllers observed the plane going up and down by hundreds of feet, and it appeared to be moving unusually fast, the person said. The controllers, the person said, “started wondering out loud what the flight was doing.”

Two other Ethiopian flights, 613 and 629, were approaching from the east, and the controllers, sensing an emergency on Flight 302, ordered them to remain at higher altitudes. It was during that exchange with the other planes, the person said, that Captain Getachew, with panic in his voice, interrupted with his request to turn back.

Flight 302 was just three minutes into its flight, the person said, and appeared to have accelerated to even higher speeds, well beyond its safety limits.

Cleared by the controllers to turn back, Flight 302 turned right as it climbed further. A minute later, it disappeared from the radar over a restricted military zone.

The disaster drew immediate comparisons to the October crash of another Boeing 737 Max 8, operated by Lion Air, in Indonesia. Both took place soon after takeoff, and the crews of both planes had sought to return to the airport.

The possibility that the two crashes had a similar cause was central to regulators’ decision to ground all 737 Maxes, a family of planes that entered passenger service less than two years ago.

After the Indonesia crash, a new flight-control system meant to keep the jet from stalling was suspected as a cause. In both cases, pilots struggled to control their aircraft.

The investigation of the Ethiopian crash is still in its early stages, and safety regulators have noted that it is too soon to draw conclusions about the cause. The so-called black boxes, voice and flight data recorders that contain more detailed information about the Ethiopian flight’s final moments, arrived in France on Thursday for analysis.

Since the Indonesia crash, Boeing has been working on a software update for the 737 Max jets, expected by April. But the company and the Federal Aviation Administration face new questions over whether there should have been more pilot training as airlines added the new models to their fleets.

On Wednesday, the chairman of the transportation committee in the House of Representatives said he would investigate the F.A.A.’s certification of the 737 Max, including why the regulator did not require more extensive training.

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Old 15th Mar 2019, 00:07
  #1398 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by a_q View Post
Quote:
Originally Posted by cervo77
Then there are differences, and the Pilots should have been informed about the differences. Unfortunately the lion and Ethiopian's pilots have not had this chance

Quote:GebreMariam said the Ethiopian Airlines pilots had received additional training on the flight procedures involving the 737 MAX 8 after the Lion Air crash.

Apologies with the mess of the quoting above but the site doesn't help you multi-quote....

Channel 4 News (UK) has just screened an interview with a "Senior Ethiopian Pilot".

Note that: the interview was voice disguised and anonymous. The pilot did not state that then flew 737 MAX-8, or if they did, what experience they had on that airframe.

In the interview the pilot stated that the MCAS had not been taught to them [by Boeing]. He went on to talk about not being able to defeat the system by pulling on the stick. He did NOT mention adjusting trim [as a means to defeat the system].

Having read from the professionals above about having to use trim wheels or cutout switches to defeat MCAS, and NOT using the stick alone, my conclusion from the interview was that the pilot had NOT been trained in the correct procedures, or surely he would have mentioned it?

Of course it might be that C4 found a pilot that hadn't flown the MAX 8, but the C4 journalists are usually pretty professional and wouldn't put this interview forward if that were the case.
So that puts the ball in the court of Ethiopian - I assume that’s your point? Because that’s my take.

- GY
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 00:15
  #1399 (permalink)  
 
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Within one minute of Flight 302’s departure, the person who reviewed communications said, Captain Getachew reported a “flight control” problem in a calm voice. At that point, radar showed the aircraft’s altitude as being well below what is known as the minimum safe height from the ground during a climb.
We know MCAS is not operational below 1000ft and with flaps extended, so how does the report above square with this being MCAS related? It appears the root issue was evident as a flight control problem more or less from the point the aircraft took off.

Something doesn’t seem to add up here.

- GY
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Old 15th Mar 2019, 00:50
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That is interesting. Maybe a CoG problem, or misconfigured T/O trim?

Or if they had an AOA sensor fault they get a stick shaker straight away, crew are startled and arrest pitch up, a/c rapidly accelerates and flies to trim, thus creating a little porpoising. Maybe they then clean it up and MCAS finishes them off.

No idea. Very keen to see the data as and when.
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