Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: Nz
Posts: 415
At some point somebody is going to have to check in the sim how effective the Boeing procedures are in practice, and how many AoA sensor failures out of a hundred would end up underground.
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Florida
Posts: 5,415
Originally Posted by gums
Salute MJB !!
..... snip
A pure FBW control system has all the "protections" and limits/warnings and such as part of the basic design. But no FBW commercial airliner has failed to meet the basic aerodynamic requirements for stability and control if they all had ropes, levers, pulleys, cables, torque tubes, etc to move the ailerons, rudder and elevator. They are not the military or utility platforms and do not haul 200 folks about to visit aunt Clara.
So Boeing adds another thingie besides the STS speed stability doofer to meet Part 25 requirements and it gets signed off. Most of we pilots would handle the new thingie if and a BIG IF we knew it was added AND we were told what possibel failure indications existed AND we practiced a bit. GASP!! None of that was done.
My experience was in military planes and before each flight we had to sign off every little notice, directive and change and such before flying. On some mods we had to fly with an instructor before being cleared "solo". The MCAS mod required none of those things, and I have problems with not having seen a revolt by a thousand 737 pilots that only discovered MCAS after Lion 610 pranged.
'nuff bitching, and I close for now
Gums
..... snip
A pure FBW control system has all the "protections" and limits/warnings and such as part of the basic design. But no FBW commercial airliner has failed to meet the basic aerodynamic requirements for stability and control if they all had ropes, levers, pulleys, cables, torque tubes, etc to move the ailerons, rudder and elevator. They are not the military or utility platforms and do not haul 200 folks about to visit aunt Clara.
So Boeing adds another thingie besides the STS speed stability doofer to meet Part 25 requirements and it gets signed off. Most of we pilots would handle the new thingie if and a BIG IF we knew it was added AND we were told what possibel failure indications existed AND we practiced a bit. GASP!! None of that was done.
My experience was in military planes and before each flight we had to sign off every little notice, directive and change and such before flying. On some mods we had to fly with an instructor before being cleared "solo". The MCAS mod required none of those things, and I have problems with not having seen a revolt by a thousand 737 pilots that only discovered MCAS after Lion 610 pranged.
'nuff bitching, and I close for now
Gums
You point to a problem which i whole heartedly agree.
Now can you also point to a solution in commercial service among the various nations flying these aircraft?
Join Date: Aug 2001
Location: The wrong time zone...
Posts: 716
Originally Posted by 73qanda
Easier said than done. To get a realistic idea you would have to choose pre rostered Capt/FO combinations from all sorts of different training backgrounds and they would have to have no idea what was about to happen.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: PARIS
Posts: 11
BFU, Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung, repeat afer me !
It seems that the German bureau of accident analysis refuses to receive the CVR/FDR from request of Etiopia... (BFU, Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung, repeat afer me !)
So, the french BEA (= AAIB or NTSB or ATSB) will take care of this...
I'm not authorized to post a link/url, but search for :
francetvinfo.fr crash-aerien-en-ethiopie-les-boites-noires-seront-analysees-en-france on Google...
So, the french BEA (= AAIB or NTSB or ATSB) will take care of this...
I'm not authorized to post a link/url, but search for :
francetvinfo.fr crash-aerien-en-ethiopie-les-boites-noires-seront-analysees-en-france on Google...
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Seattle
Posts: 379
Originally Posted by positiverate20
I agree with you on the sensor problem, but entirely disagree with the perception that a failure of the system would have minimal risk to the aircraft.
In the scenario given, hundreds of feet above ground, stick shaker, the captain is in a pretty tough situation and is trouble shooting- does stab memory item, switches stab cut-out. Alarms off, and thanks to yoke and increased thrust returns to some form of climb. At this stage, despite your argument that the pilot should be able to return trim to normal, he has just followed the procedures that Boeing themselves have instructed. Checklist complete, some stability back and now focus on safely trying to get back to ground.
Now, throughout this next phase, with the stab having X° nose down, it may not present itself as a problem due to the additional engine power, because, at increased thrust, as you've explained, the Max set-up has a tendency toward a higher AoA, which is why MCAS is required in the first place! So, in a sense, the characteristics of the MAX set-up will be masking the trim. MCAS is required for certification to counteract the increasing rotation around the CG caused by the both the thrust moment and aerodynamic behaviour of the engine cowling of the Max engine. So, in this precise stage of the hypothetical flight the PIC may not actually notice the plane being out of trim, and if he does, will surely not realise just how much out of trim he actually is. Any other time in normal MAX operation the autotrim or the MCAS trim would be operating anyway. MCAS, as you've said, is a certification requirement for MAX aircraft because of it's specific aerodynamic characteristics. What I'm portraying in this scenario is that if the pilot functioned perfectly during the emergency at 190, but in doing so cut-off the trim at X° nose down. That trim hasn't changed and the checklists didnt require the crew to make any manual trim wheel changes. By the time he actually realises how out of trim he is, he's doing 350, and despite the stab still being at the same X° nose down since cut-out, the forces have multiplied. Now if there is any nose down attitude or reduction in power then there's absolutely no chance to recover.
Obviously all hypothetical, an airspeed disagree on takeoff could lead to circumstances similarly, or a multitude of other possible reasons, however, in the situation that I've hypothesized, it would almost certainly always end in a similar steep nose down attitude.
In the scenario given, hundreds of feet above ground, stick shaker, the captain is in a pretty tough situation and is trouble shooting- does stab memory item, switches stab cut-out. Alarms off, and thanks to yoke and increased thrust returns to some form of climb. At this stage, despite your argument that the pilot should be able to return trim to normal, he has just followed the procedures that Boeing themselves have instructed. Checklist complete, some stability back and now focus on safely trying to get back to ground.
Now, throughout this next phase, with the stab having X° nose down, it may not present itself as a problem due to the additional engine power, because, at increased thrust, as you've explained, the Max set-up has a tendency toward a higher AoA, which is why MCAS is required in the first place! So, in a sense, the characteristics of the MAX set-up will be masking the trim. MCAS is required for certification to counteract the increasing rotation around the CG caused by the both the thrust moment and aerodynamic behaviour of the engine cowling of the Max engine. So, in this precise stage of the hypothetical flight the PIC may not actually notice the plane being out of trim, and if he does, will surely not realise just how much out of trim he actually is. Any other time in normal MAX operation the autotrim or the MCAS trim would be operating anyway. MCAS, as you've said, is a certification requirement for MAX aircraft because of it's specific aerodynamic characteristics. What I'm portraying in this scenario is that if the pilot functioned perfectly during the emergency at 190, but in doing so cut-off the trim at X° nose down. That trim hasn't changed and the checklists didnt require the crew to make any manual trim wheel changes. By the time he actually realises how out of trim he is, he's doing 350, and despite the stab still being at the same X° nose down since cut-out, the forces have multiplied. Now if there is any nose down attitude or reduction in power then there's absolutely no chance to recover.
Obviously all hypothetical, an airspeed disagree on takeoff could lead to circumstances similarly, or a multitude of other possible reasons, however, in the situation that I've hypothesized, it would almost certainly always end in a similar steep nose down attitude.
From your mention of "autotrim" I get the sense that you may not realize that when flying the 737 manually the automatic stabilizer control functions that are active (STS and MCAS) tend to drive the stabilizer away from trim thus making the pilot trim workload higher than it would be without them. The automatic stabilizer control is not there to "automatically trim the stabilizer". It is in fact there to "automatically untrim the stabilizer" such that the pilot has to provide column in the opposite direction yielding handling qualities and awareness that are dictated by the FARs.
Join Date: Sep 2016
Location: USA
Posts: 629
Originally Posted by positiverate20
I agree with you on the sensor problem, but entirely disagree with the perception that a failure of the system would have minimal risk to the aircraft.
In the scenario given, hundreds of feet above ground, stick shaker, the captain is in a pretty tough situation and is trouble shooting- does stab memory item, switches stab cut-out. Alarms off, and thanks to yoke and increased thrust returns to some form of climb. At this stage, despite your argument that the pilot should be able to return trim to normal, he has just followed the procedures that Boeing themselves have instructed. Checklist complete, some stability back and now focus on safely trying to get back to ground.
In the scenario given, hundreds of feet above ground, stick shaker, the captain is in a pretty tough situation and is trouble shooting- does stab memory item, switches stab cut-out. Alarms off, and thanks to yoke and increased thrust returns to some form of climb. At this stage, despite your argument that the pilot should be able to return trim to normal, he has just followed the procedures that Boeing themselves have instructed. Checklist complete, some stability back and now focus on safely trying to get back to ground.
Now, throughout this next phase, with the stab having X° nose down, it may not present itself as a problem due to the additional engine power, because, at increased thrust, as you've explained, the Max set-up has a tendency toward a higher AoA, which is why MCAS is required in the first place!
So, in a sense, the characteristics of the MAX set-up will be masking the trim. MCAS is required for certification to counteract the increasing rotation around the CG caused by the both the thrust moment and aerodynamic behaviour of the engine cowling of the Max engine. So, in this precise stage of the hypothetical flight the PIC may not actually notice the plane being out of trim, and if he does, will surely not realise just how much out of trim he actually is.
Any other time in normal MAX operation the autotrim or the MCAS trim would be operating anyway. MCAS, as you've said, is a certification requirement for MAX aircraft because of it's specific aerodynamic characteristics. What I'm portraying in this scenario is that if the pilot functioned perfectly during the emergency at 190, but in doing so cut-off the trim at X° nose down. That trim hasn't changed and the checklists didnt require the crew to make any manual trim wheel changes.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: Paris
Age: 71
Posts: 275
Before the damages trials for Indonesian and Ethiopian take place, someone is going to have to run through a bunch of these scenarios in the sim, and see in what percentage of a few hundred trials of AoA sensor faults the pilots manage to survive even if they apply all recommended Boeing procedures.
Edmund
Edmund
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Seattle
Posts: 379
Originally Posted by jimtx
Just trying glean what flight regime MCAS needs to protect. So, they didn't want the column cutout switch to work because they envisioned pulling hard and not trimming. Trimming would normally return the column to neutral. Two things come to mind. Windshear escape in the clean config and steep turns with guys that don't trim. I (having the T-38 training mantra embedded, "trim trim trim") would trim during steep turns so that would not be a problem for me or MCAS. Of course steep turns are a simulator exercise so not really relevant. Again I ask why put out the original AD and not caution about being careful when pulling with the loss of MCAS.
On a side note I have always been told that trimming into a steep turn maneuver is a recipe for trouble. When you trim into a maneuver you increase your available control power in the direction of the maneuver, but reduce the available control power in the opposite direction. If you trim into a steep turn with a forward CG airplane you may find that you have to push like crazy when you exit the maneuver and level out. If, by bad luck, your trim device (horizontal stabilizer in the case of a 737) were to get stuck in the position to which it was moved to trim into a maneuver you might find it hard to get home. On all commercial transports that I know of the elevator is sized to provide continued safe flight and landing starting from any normally encountered stabilizer position, but that assurance would not be preserved if it were routine practice to trim into maneuvers.
Join Date: Sep 2018
Location: Laredo, TX
Posts: 129
Originally Posted by FCeng84
Handling qualities regulations require starting from a wings level, trimmed condition and then demonstrating flying to high AOA (both by slowing and by executing a wind-up turn at constant speed) and showing that the stick force throughout the maneuver (flown without trimming) increases monotonically (i.e., the required pull does not decrease throughout the maneuver). These maneuvers involve insertion of enough aft column to go past the column cutout switch and thus MCAS must be able to continue to add airplane nose down stabilizer with the column pulled past the position of this switch.
On a side note I have always been told that trimming into a steep turn maneuver is a recipe for trouble. When you trim into a maneuver you increase your available control power in the direction of the maneuver, but reduce the available control power in the opposite direction. If you trim into a steep turn with a forward CG airplane you may find that you have to push like crazy when you exit the maneuver and level out. If, by bad luck, your trim device (horizontal stabilizer in the case of a 737) were to get stuck in the position to which it was moved to trim into a maneuver you might find it hard to get home. On all commercial transports that I know of the elevator is sized to provide continued safe flight and landing starting from any normally encountered stabilizer position, but that assurance would not be preserved if it were routine practice to trim into maneuvers.
On a side note I have always been told that trimming into a steep turn maneuver is a recipe for trouble. When you trim into a maneuver you increase your available control power in the direction of the maneuver, but reduce the available control power in the opposite direction. If you trim into a steep turn with a forward CG airplane you may find that you have to push like crazy when you exit the maneuver and level out. If, by bad luck, your trim device (horizontal stabilizer in the case of a 737) were to get stuck in the position to which it was moved to trim into a maneuver you might find it hard to get home. On all commercial transports that I know of the elevator is sized to provide continued safe flight and landing starting from any normally encountered stabilizer position, but that assurance would not be preserved if it were routine practice to trim into maneuvers.
Last edited by jimtx; 14th Mar 2019 at 16:17.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Hadlow
Age: 57
Posts: 593
Originally Posted by silverstrata
i have had some dealings with transponders, and the rule of thumb is that.
Mode-c gives 1013 baro altitude.
Mode-s gives 1013 baro altitude.
Ads-b also gives 1013 baro altitude, to be compatible with the above.
Flarm and paw give gps altitude.
As far as i know, fr24 is simply picking up ads-b 1013 pressure altitudes, so you will need to know the qnh of the day, and the altitude of the airport, to calculate the true height of the aircraft. Transponders were designed for seperation on airways, not for separation with terrain, so the older units all used 1013 baro, and ads-b follows suit.
(if ads-b used gps alt, then atc would not be comparing like with like. However, newer systems like flarm and paw can happily use gps alt, because they all use gps, so they are comparing like with like.)
silver
Airfield elevation 2,334m / 7,625 ft
Last edited by Super VC-10; 14th Mar 2019 at 05:35. Reason: + airfield elevation
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: PARIS
Posts: 11
Crash in Ethiopia: Germany can not analyze black boxes
http http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/crash-...noires-1651600 . html
http http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/crash-...noires-1651600 . html
Join Date: Dec 2013
Location: Weltschmerz-By-The-Sea, Queensland, Australia
Posts: 945
Originally Posted by Condor99
Crash in Ethiopia: Germany can not analyze black boxes
http http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/crash-...noires-1651600 . html
http http://www.bfmtv.com/economie/crash-...noires-1651600 . html
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: PARIS
Posts: 11
Originally Posted by Australopithecus
Dead link, but the gist of a google search using those terms is that Germany currently lacks the ability to assess this new version of the FDR. I do hope that there is a non-US avenue for analysis. I never used to feel that way, but lately I get to feeling a bit queasy getting between Americans and money.
France (BEA) will be in charge to try to read these black boxes...
Not the best choice IMHO, but...
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: PRM, AA Prelature
Posts: 2
Originally Posted by Condor99
Just add ".html" to the link (I'm not yet authorized to post a link/url).
France (BEA) will be in charge to try to read these black boxes...
Not the best choice IMHO, but...
France (BEA) will be in charge to try to read these black boxes...
Not the best choice IMHO, but...
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 1,437
Originally Posted by FCeng84
STS is subject to column cutout such that large column motion in opposition to STS stabilizer command will stop STS command. Not true with MCAS. This is an important differnce between these two automatic stabilizer control functions.
On top of that, STS trims on all departures, not only in the light aircraft, high thrust aft CG situation.
It’s a weird system that I could do without.
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Heidelberg
Posts: 5
After 1000 feet I noticed a decrease in aircraft performance. I picked up that the autothrottles were not moving to commanded position even though they were engaged. I'm sure they were set properly for takeoff but not sure when the discrepancy took place. My scan wasn't as well developed since I've only flown the MAX once before. I manually positioned the thrust levers ASAP. This resolved the threat, we were able to increase speed to clean up and continue the climb to 3000 feet.
Shortly afterwards I heard about the (other carrier) accident and am wondering if any other crews have experienced similar incidents with the autothrottle system on the MAX? Or I may have made a possible flying mistake which is more likely. The FO (First Officer) was still on his first month and was not able to identify whether it was the aircraft or me that was in error.
Shortly afterwards I heard about the (other carrier) accident and am wondering if any other crews have experienced similar incidents with the autothrottle system on the MAX? Or I may have made a possible flying mistake which is more likely. The FO (First Officer) was still on his first month and was not able to identify whether it was the aircraft or me that was in error.
