Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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I'm sure this will be deleted, as a Not-A-Pilot, but ... Oversimplifying, I know, but what about a bloody great button on the coaming that disconnects all the automatics and resets all trim to neutral, and reverts to manual throttles ... and let the pilot fly the bloody thing manually? Or aren’t some Captains able to do that any more?
The kicker being, if I recall the LionAir mishap discussion, the AP disengages when the AoA goes pear shaped (or rather, the AoA signal to the system).
That linkage informs my understanding of the fix that Southwest went for.
(As I recall, we beat to death in various AF447 discussions (all now in the Tech Log forum) whether or not having an AoA gage for the pilots to refer to was a good idea or not. SW, it seems, has decided that it's a good idea at this point in time.
That linkage informs my understanding of the fix that Southwest went for.
(As I recall, we beat to death in various AF447 discussions (all now in the Tech Log forum) whether or not having an AoA gage for the pilots to refer to was a good idea or not. SW, it seems, has decided that it's a good idea at this point in time.
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(By the way a single pitot tube reading low speeds could lead to the same symptoms including stick shaker and MCAS, no?)
Suppose you have below average pilots coupled with mediocre or poor English skills who are not speaking the same mother tongue.
Disagreeing instruments, especially airspeed/AoA, become a real problem with this combination.
Handling a bogus stick shaker is probably an exercise that isn't trained enough anyway.
(Glad to be corrected on that)
Combine that with MCAS which can easily be construed as "handling difficulties" even if you could just use your trim switch to counteract the bogus trim.
(The noise and sensation of the stickshaker are probably the kicker, catching all focus and the trim wheel is ignored)
Personally i would like to see mandatory simulator training for a bogus stick shaker combined with a trim runaway.
Let's say 1 hour additional training for every pilot on type and when transitioning to type.
(Should probably mix in some genuine stick shaker events or that training might have a detrimental effect.)
Having an mandatory takeoff rejection at 80 kts if the AoA sensors disagree would also be prudent.
(Needs a new warning, but should be easy to implement in software)
On the MCAS thing i'm sure something is in the works
(limiting MCAS so it stops trimming when 20 pounds of stick force is reached might be a sufficient solution)
Last edited by wiedehopf; 11th Mar 2019 at 20:06.
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My first reply to you was deleted by the moderators.
Anyway, you should read the post following.
My post was to highlight the difference between a trim runaway and what is happening with the MCAS, and how to recognise it.
And you are welcome not to fly with me.
Personally i would like to see mandatory simulator training for a bogus stick shaker combined with a trim runaway.
Let's say 1 hour additional training for every pilot on type and when transitioning to type.
Let's say 1 hour additional training for every pilot on type and when transitioning to type.
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Good grief,
Human ergonomics 101. In all parts of the world the 'standard' will vary, therefore you manufacture your control arrangement consistently to your design. So switches 'down' is 'on' in my part of the world.
Same with lights; is a watertight door open at 'green' / 'down' or 'red' / 'up' for dangerous?
You cannot impose a standard that doesnt exist on the entire world. You do need to use a consistent and logical approach for your system.
And where the platforms differ = identifiable competencies and delivered training needs.
Human ergonomics 101. In all parts of the world the 'standard' will vary, therefore you manufacture your control arrangement consistently to your design. So switches 'down' is 'on' in my part of the world.
Same with lights; is a watertight door open at 'green' / 'down' or 'red' / 'up' for dangerous?
You cannot impose a standard that doesnt exist on the entire world. You do need to use a consistent and logical approach for your system.
And where the platforms differ = identifiable competencies and delivered training needs.
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Re: rattle and smoke - I'm very wary of eye-witness reports of anything. Case in point, you can have a simple sea-plane crash into Auckland harbour in clear daylight in full view of the city and plenty of ferries and other boats, and some saw it coming in to land and crashing, whilst others saw it taking off and crashing... in the same article on the NZ Herald...
(It was a wheels-down landing on water)...
(It was a wheels-down landing on water)...
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If I've learned anything in life, it's not to jump to conclusions, least of all based on eyewitnesses. The CVR and FDR should answer most of the questions. Mine you I still can think of no good reason why with the technology now available internal and external video recording is not also captured on all new airframes.
Whatever the ultimate reason for the crash - I currently see no reason to ignore or otherwise discount corroborated eyewitness accounts. If they all turn out to be incorrect - so be it. Choosing to ignore them now is just confirmation bias.
I am assuming the AoA installation being discussed displays respective AoA data on the left & right PFDs coming from their respective sensors, and that there would be some form of comparator and caution/warning system advising the crew of significant differences in the AoA values being produced by the sensors. Can anyone with operational knowledge of this option confirm that this is a correct understanding?
In theory, this becomes a cue to prompt corrective action. (Rather than being in a battle with the aircraft, which the crew of LionAir seemed to be). As ever, some training and crew training is the proper supplement to such a modification.
According to the Reuters report 4 witnesses were specific to sound which is historically much more accurate and telling than sight. Not with regard to specifics but abnormality. It's common for individuals to do a "double take" specific to visual clues since you tend to need to
process and double check an anomaly but we respond much more decisively to aural clues.
process and double check an anomaly but we respond much more decisively to aural clues.
With all these airlines and governments around the globe grounding their MAX fleets, I guess that they would be holding an emergency meeting at Boeing.
These global reactions may be a bit of a knee-jerk. I do understand them though. Quite a dilemma.
Where are the dfdr and cvr headed? And can they be read out with some priority? The world demands some reassurance.
These global reactions may be a bit of a knee-jerk. I do understand them though. Quite a dilemma.
Where are the dfdr and cvr headed? And can they be read out with some priority? The world demands some reassurance.
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If I've learned anything in life, it's not to jump to conclusions, least of all based on eyewitnesses. The CVR and FDR should answer most of the questions. Mine you I still can think of no good reason why with the technology now available internal and external video recording is not also captured on all new airframes.
. Obviously it's not possible to have total certainty but generically memory based on an aural cue will be stronger, especially when it's tied to a visual memory. It's somewhat similar to various "memory hacks". The fact that the primary memory is aural and that the engines didn't sound right is much more important since the witnesses have a strong recollection of what is "normal" aurally. Now it is entirely possible that what was "wrong" is simply engines at a significantly higher power output...but if all four have a clear independent recollection of sound and a visual image of white smoke associated with it then it's highly probable that there is an underlying truth....
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"American Airlines Flight Attendants Union Telling Crew They Don’t Have to Work the 737 MAX"
Posted on a couple of media sites, including memo from union president. Thanks to those who can post the links.
Posted on a couple of media sites, including memo from union president. Thanks to those who can post the links.
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Really? I'll admit to being wrong, but can you give some examples? I've done a small bit of traveling around Western and Eastern Europe (France, England, Bulgaria), and I don't remember anything about the light switches, and I feel like it would stick out in my memory as a shocking adjustment had they been down=on.
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Come and have a beer at my house. Like the rest of the UK, mainly the light switched, the kettle etc are down for on. This is sensible due to gravity.
BUT more importantly, if you want to make the point - point to the internationally recognized standard that states it.
BUT more importantly, if you want to make the point - point to the internationally recognized standard that states it.
High angle of attack
