Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
Join Date: Oct 2017
Location: Tent
Posts: 398
Originally Posted by formulaben
I am not rude and I asked 3 times...thank you for finally answering that you have no clue how much more training is required.
All we do know is that MCAS was the option Boeing decided to use to get the MAX certified - now "the fix" servery decreases the MCAS to be active. So the question is how can it still operate in the certification limits?
After that what training (or other limits) are required. ???
It seems possible to remove MCAS requirement by a minimum weight limit and/or a AFT C of G limit - but they have never been mentioned as part of the "fix".
Join Date: Dec 2014
Location: Nz
Posts: 312
This whole 737 Max debacle is a result of the executive management MO industry wide, Manufacturers, Airlines, Maintenance Organisations, Regulators, Training Organisations.......They are all run by people who gain financially when costs are cut, and who don’t really understand the risks they are charged with mitigating.
It’ll be addressed one day but only when jets are falling out of the sky at twice the rate they are now.
It’ll be addressed one day but only when jets are falling out of the sky at twice the rate they are now.
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: The woods
Posts: 1
Silent witnesses
Originally Posted by edmundronald
Rumors concerning whistleblower reports about the AoA sensor are emerging.
"One whistleblower reported to the FAA that they had seen damage to the electrical wiring connected to the plane’s angle of attack sensor from a foreign object, which feeds data to the MCAS system so it can determine whether it needs to engage to prevent the plane from stalling. "
https://interestingengineering.com/b...roblems-to-faa
Edmund
"One whistleblower reported to the FAA that they had seen damage to the electrical wiring connected to the plane’s angle of attack sensor from a foreign object, which feeds data to the MCAS system so it can determine whether it needs to engage to prevent the plane from stalling. "
https://interestingengineering.com/b...roblems-to-faa
Edmund
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: The woods
Posts: 1
Alternative
Specifically: Boeing designed and placed into service an airplane with an active control system that had unilateral control over the horizontal stabilizer, with enough authority to place the airplane in an unrecoverable state if just a single component failed. Further this system gave no indication to the pilots that it was operating, or when malfunctioning that it was operating in error. Additionally this system, which was created solely to increase the amount of force required to pitch up the aircraft at high AOA used the most critical part of the airframe to do this minimal task, instead of using a passive system that had no control authority
Yep. So it is. And still they are faffing around with MCAS to get it recertified.
The only honest way out of this, and it isn’t cheap, is a dedicated feel augmentation within the control run. Can be a spring, or a feel unit mod, as suggested way back, but not yet more tampering with the stabiliser.
I never liked the STS on the 300 and since then B have made use of stab tinkering for other sorts of cases - tankers etc. When we did a max fuel transfer on the Victor, we had to keep both of the aircraft in trim - and we did this by trimming as required, without some background programme interfering.
I guess the most important phrase here is isn’t cheap.
These days that is enough reason for not doing the honest solution.
Yep. So it is. And still they are faffing around with MCAS to get it recertified.
The only honest way out of this, and it isn’t cheap, is a dedicated feel augmentation within the control run. Can be a spring, or a feel unit mod, as suggested way back, but not yet more tampering with the stabiliser.
I never liked the STS on the 300 and since then B have made use of stab tinkering for other sorts of cases - tankers etc. When we did a max fuel transfer on the Victor, we had to keep both of the aircraft in trim - and we did this by trimming as required, without some background programme interfering.
I guess the most important phrase here is isn’t cheap.
These days that is enough reason for not doing the honest solution.
Join Date: Sep 2017
Location: Uk
Posts: 62
Originally Posted by HundredPercentPlease
Gums,
As I understand it, when designing the A320 Airbus toyed with the idea of reduced stability, citing FBW as the "excuse". The whole world raised a regulatory eyebrow and Airbus designed a fully stable aircraft.
Ironically, Boeing designed a less than stable aircraft with a bit of bolt on, undocumented FBW, and the world continued to rotate, until two crashed.
As I understand it, when designing the A320 Airbus toyed with the idea of reduced stability, citing FBW as the "excuse". The whole world raised a regulatory eyebrow and Airbus designed a fully stable aircraft.
Ironically, Boeing designed a less than stable aircraft with a bit of bolt on, undocumented FBW, and the world continued to rotate, until two crashed.
Most of the mods carried out on the 737 since it was introduced were to increase its profitability not safety. In fact it could be argued that some of the mods have even reduced its safety. Im sure Boeing are now wishing theyd developed a completely new aircraft instead.
Last edited by Sucram; 27th Apr 2019 at 10:49.
Join Date: Dec 2015
Location: Cape Town, ZA
Age: 58
Posts: 413
Originally Posted by bill fly
Specifically: Boeing designed and placed into service an airplane with an active control system that had unilateral control over the horizontal stabilizer, with enough authority to place the airplane in an unrecoverable state if just a single component failed. Further this system gave no indication to the pilots that it was operating, or when malfunctioning that it was operating in error. Additionally this system, which was created solely to increase the amount of force required to pitch up the aircraft at high AOA used the most critical part of the airframe to do this minimal task, instead of using a passive system that had no control authority
Yep. So it is. And still they are faffing around with MCAS to get it recertified.
The only honest way out of this, and it isn’t cheap, is a dedicated feel augmentation within the control run. Can be a spring, or a feel unit mod, as suggested way back, but not yet more tampering with the stabiliser.
I never liked the STS on the 300 and since then B have made use of stab tinkering for other sorts of cases - tankers etc. When we did a max fuel transfer on the Victor, we had to keep both of the aircraft in trim - and we did this by trimming as required, without some background programme interfering.
I guess the most important phrase here is isn’t cheap.
These days that is enough reason for not doing the honest solution.
Yep. So it is. And still they are faffing around with MCAS to get it recertified.
The only honest way out of this, and it isn’t cheap, is a dedicated feel augmentation within the control run. Can be a spring, or a feel unit mod, as suggested way back, but not yet more tampering with the stabiliser.
I never liked the STS on the 300 and since then B have made use of stab tinkering for other sorts of cases - tankers etc. When we did a max fuel transfer on the Victor, we had to keep both of the aircraft in trim - and we did this by trimming as required, without some background programme interfering.
I guess the most important phrase here is isn’t cheap.
These days that is enough reason for not doing the honest solution.
I previously pointed out that any system that takes a small input such as AOA, and produces a large output (whether feel or trim), is inherently undesirable and unpredictable. MCAS creates a semblance of smoothness by applying trim over a 10 second interval. Applying such a delay into elevator feel would create all kinds of feedback lags, and the solution could be worse than the problem.
The cost issue with any non-software change is how many years that would take to design, test and certify, and what production would be done in the meantime? Boeing have painted themselves into a corner, and the only way out seems to be double or quits (to mix metaphors).
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Herts, UK
Posts: 736
Originally Posted by PerPurumTonantes
I'm an engineer and a pilot. The responsibility is with Boeing/FAA, no question. Yes the ET302 crew could have done a few things different. But they had 6 minutes. In a little box in the sky, where the wrong answer meant death, with alarms going off, and not just useful alarms but alarms telling them to do the opposite of what they needed.
You train pilots to trust in safety systems, trust in automation, follow the checklists, follow the SOPs. They do this every day successfully for years. Then you expect them to instantly drop this and distrust all the safety systems and automation, work out which one is faulty and what to do about it, while simultaneously hand flying an aircraft that's behaving like they have never experienced before in any of the hand flying they've done.
Boeing had plenty of time, in nice safe offices that weren't about to crash into the ground, to get this right.
You train pilots to trust in safety systems, trust in automation, follow the checklists, follow the SOPs. They do this every day successfully for years. Then you expect them to instantly drop this and distrust all the safety systems and automation, work out which one is faulty and what to do about it, while simultaneously hand flying an aircraft that's behaving like they have never experienced before in any of the hand flying they've done.
Boeing had plenty of time, in nice safe offices that weren't about to crash into the ground, to get this right.
'Good' engineers really shouldn't abrogate their responsibilities nor discharge them to other professionals working in a much less benign environment
However, one does feel a strong sense of 'modern management' involvement, possibly even interference.
All the good wartime and post war management methodologies seem to have been thrown out the window since the 90s and this fundamentally US trend of ignoring rhe importance of 'Domain Knowledge' has long since corrupted the UK and I assume, elsewhere. I understand Japanese industry were taught good disciplines postwar and hopefully have resisted the worst trends of Managementitis coming I imagine, from US academia and unwisely encouraged by shareholder pressure.
Apologies for waxing philosophic.. .but I cannot divorce an innate sense of betrayal over the years from what I see through this MCAS lens, though MCAS is only a sympton.
Last edited by HarryMann; 27th Apr 2019 at 12:10.
Join Date: Feb 2015
Location: The woods
Posts: 1
Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape
A feel augmentation system that takes AOA as input, what could possibly go wrong? I'm sure others can give scenarios where this would be a bad idea...
I previously pointed out that any system that takes a small input such as AOA, and produces a large output (whether feel or trim), is inherently undesirable and unpredictable. MCAS creates a semblance of smoothness by applying trim over a 10 second interval. Applying such a delay into elevator feel would create all kinds of feedback lags, and the solution could be worse than the problem.
The cost issue with any non-software change is how many years that would take to design, test and certify, and what production would be done in the meantime? Boeing have painted themselves into a corner, and the only way out seems to be double or quits (to mix metaphors).
I previously pointed out that any system that takes a small input such as AOA, and produces a large output (whether feel or trim), is inherently undesirable and unpredictable. MCAS creates a semblance of smoothness by applying trim over a 10 second interval. Applying such a delay into elevator feel would create all kinds of feedback lags, and the solution could be worse than the problem.
The cost issue with any non-software change is how many years that would take to design, test and certify, and what production would be done in the meantime? Boeing have painted themselves into a corner, and the only way out seems to be double or quits (to mix metaphors).
Although I didn’t mention AoA as an input in that post, if you need to know AoA in order to correct elevator feel, then clearly you have to measure it. Done properly (dual input and monitor) and maintained correctly it is a valid measurement as used for years on many aircraft.
You could also ask what could possibly go wrong with a pitot system. There are probably more examples of failure in that system and yet it is universally used.
At some point you have to trust something for your data, so make it as reliable as you can and maintain it well.
As for feedback lags and delays, a spring is a wonderful reliable input which can be linearly or dynamically calibrated, and is used in many control run applications. The ten second interval used by MCAS would not apply - as long as the condition remained, the spring would stay compressed. As the condition decreased, so would the spring force. Qed. There are other force generators available, based on hydraulics or pneumatics although a spring is simple and less reliant on other systems.
Main thing is to have the force generated within the control run rather than by potentially powerful MCAS stab. movement (which still needs AoA input).
B
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Originally Posted by Bend alot
You do understand MCAS is a requirement for flight within certification requirements?
With MCAS disabled (due now to any of a number of reasons) - how is flight within certification requirement limits meet?
Nothing at all to do with any trim event (Important you understand that) but what is flight like outside the certifiable limits?
With MCAS disabled (due now to any of a number of reasons) - how is flight within certification requirement limits meet?
Nothing at all to do with any trim event (Important you understand that) but what is flight like outside the certifiable limits?
There are are a whole lot of systems that can and have failed on numerous aircraft that technically put that aircraft out of its limits for certification. You would never depart with failed engines, failed hydraulic systems, failed tires, etc. However, they do and have failed, and we have procedures in place to deal with those failures.
To your specific question of how one could possibly fly the 737 with a known MCAS failure once they fix the runaway stab thingy....., well how about staying away from the edge of the envelope and not stalling the aircraft?
Last edited by 737 Driver; 27th Apr 2019 at 19:44.
Join Date: Oct 2017
Location: Tent
Posts: 398
Originally Posted by 737 Driver
Point of order.
There are are a whole lot of systems that can and have failed on numerous aircraft that technically put that aircraft out of its limits for certification. You would never depart with failed engines, failed hydraulic systems, failed tires, etc. However, they do and have failed, and we have procedures in place to deal with those failures.
To your specific question of how one could possibly fly the 737 with a known MCAS failure once they fix the runaway stab thingy....., well how about staying away from the edge of the envelope an not stalling the aircraft?
There are are a whole lot of systems that can and have failed on numerous aircraft that technically put that aircraft out of its limits for certification. You would never depart with failed engines, failed hydraulic systems, failed tires, etc. However, they do and have failed, and we have procedures in place to deal with those failures.
To your specific question of how one could possibly fly the 737 with a known MCAS failure once they fix the runaway stab thingy....., well how about staying away from the edge of the envelope an not stalling the aircraft?
Just no mention of it in the fix.
As you are vocal and seems a very competent 737 pilot (certainly seems that way by your posts)
Can you detail how the/you cockpit would have responded after take off of the ET flight with you as Captain and with the 2-300 hr FO - who's job was who's when and why ?
Not a trap question just very interested.
Starting from the first warning you get and when you would accept it as a warning or a failure.
Thanks for detailed answers in reply (others let him reply and answer - he is clearly a very competent pilot on type)
Join Date: Dec 2015
Location: Cape Town, ZA
Age: 58
Posts: 413
Originally Posted by bill fly
Hi Gordon,
Although I didn’t mention AoA as an input in that post, if you need to know AoA in order to correct elevator feel, then clearly you have to measure it. Done properly (dual input and monitor) and maintained correctly it is a valid measurement as used for years on many aircraft.
You could also ask what could possibly go wrong with a pitot system. There are probably more examples of failure in that system and yet it is universally used.
At some point you have to trust something for your data, so make it as reliable as you can and maintain it well.
As for feedback lags and delays, a spring is a wonderful reliable input which can be linearly or dynamically calibrated, and is used in many control run applications. The ten second interval used by MCAS would not apply - as long as the condition remained, the spring would stay compressed. As the condition decreased, so would the spring force. Qed. There are other force generators available, based on hydraulics or pneumatics although a spring is simple and less reliant on other systems.
Main thing is to have the force generated within the control run rather than by potentially powerful MCAS stab. movement (which still needs AoA input).
B
Although I didn’t mention AoA as an input in that post, if you need to know AoA in order to correct elevator feel, then clearly you have to measure it. Done properly (dual input and monitor) and maintained correctly it is a valid measurement as used for years on many aircraft.
You could also ask what could possibly go wrong with a pitot system. There are probably more examples of failure in that system and yet it is universally used.
At some point you have to trust something for your data, so make it as reliable as you can and maintain it well.
As for feedback lags and delays, a spring is a wonderful reliable input which can be linearly or dynamically calibrated, and is used in many control run applications. The ten second interval used by MCAS would not apply - as long as the condition remained, the spring would stay compressed. As the condition decreased, so would the spring force. Qed. There are other force generators available, based on hydraulics or pneumatics although a spring is simple and less reliant on other systems.
Main thing is to have the force generated within the control run rather than by potentially powerful MCAS stab. movement (which still needs AoA input).
B
An analogy which I drafted in my comment (but then deleted), explains part of the situation: Imagine a motor vehicle driving down a potholed road, with all the irregularities transmitted to the steering wheel. Normally there is some kind of damper to prevent harsh feedback forces to the driver. Imagine that kind of instantaneous feel in the control column while trying to fly an aircraft?
Given the need for some kind of smoothing of AOA, by definition it would involve a delay or lag between pilot inputs and the feel forces. From a control systems theory viewpoint, delay lags are never a good thing, since they can lead to pilot induced oscillation, and other side-effects.
The opposite scenario, of full-force applied when over a threshold, is harsh and equivalent to a stick-pusher, with its own side-effects, training requirements, and type certification issues.
AFAIK MCAS was designed to avoid both scenarios, by being slow and unilateral. It fulfilled the criteria of not being harsh, nor could it induce short-period oscillations.
Sorry, if I took your comment and ran it to a logical absurdity, but IMO it would not be a simple fix. It really can be hard to explain complex control systems feedback, and I'm sure others can do it better,
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Reading, UK
Posts: 10,894
Originally Posted by GordonR_Cape
I am not an expert on flight instrumentation, but everything I have read about AOA vanes on the B737 in this thread, indicates that it is not a particularly well suited input parameter for direct command of flight controls.
However I'm not aware of any stick-pusher that acts on the input of a single sensor, with no redundancy.
Stick-Pusher Philosophy
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Originally Posted by wonkazoo
When I shared what I did last night it wasn't to expiate the guilt of the crews, but instead to try and get people to realize that "blaming" people who are no longer here to defend themselves is a bit disingenuous, and equally it distracts us from the very real root causes of the two incidents.
There is one huge difference between my position and that expressed most recently by 737 Driver, and that is to the responsibility for the outcome of what happened. Note that I say responsibility and not blame.
The result of this sad effort was a system that, if it failed, would basically try to kill the pilot and everyone on board. I say again: MCAS will try to kill everyone on board if it fails.
I simply cannot recall (but am inviting others here to fill in the blanks if you can) another system on a transport category aircraft with a failure mode that defaulted to "I'm going to try to fly the airplane into the ground.
These incidents, indeed the entirety of MCAS' existence are a failure of corporate responsibility aided and abetted by a complete abrogation of regulatory responsibility. All in the pursuit of profits for shareholders..........Those are the responsible parties, and that is what I hope people will look carefully at. It starts with the airplane. Build a safe one and operators will still find a way to muck things up, and crews will still make mistakes. But step one, the most important step, is build an effing safe airplane.
This is a forum for professional pilots. Yes, we could sit back, point fingers, and opine about how badly someone else screwed up. Or we could take a hard look at our profession and ask why multiple crews had such difficulty and/or reluctance in applying some very basic airmanship techniques to resolve an aircraft malfunction that, while being unique and baffling, ultimately did not render the aircraft unflyable.
Last edited by 737 Driver; 27th Apr 2019 at 13:08.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Reading, UK
Posts: 10,894
Originally Posted by wonkazoo
I simply cannot recall (but am inviting others here to fill in the blanks if you can) another system on a transport category aircraft with a failure mode that defaulted to "I'm going to try to fly the airplane into the ground.
Safety Recommendations from the investigation report:
Boeing should improve the reliability of the radio altimeter system.
The FAA and EASA should ensure that the undesirable response of the autothrottle and flight management computer caused by incorrect radio altimeter values is evaluated and that the autothrottle and flight management computer is improved in accordance with the design specifications.
The FAA and EASA should ensure that the undesirable response of the autothrottle and flight management computer caused by incorrect radio altimeter values is evaluated and that the autothrottle and flight management computer is improved in accordance with the design specifications.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 480
Originally Posted by wonkazoo
Boeing designed and placed into service an airplane with an active control system that had unilateral control over the horizontal stabilizer, with enough authority to place the airplane in an unrecoverable state if just a single component failed. Further this system gave no indication to the pilots that it was operating, or when malfunctioning that it was operating in error. Additionally this system, which was created solely to increase the amount of force required to pitch up the aircraft at high AOA used the most critical part of the airframe to do this minimal task, instead of using a passive system that had no control authority.
The result of this sad effort was a system that, if it failed, would basically try to kill the pilot and everyone on board. I say again: MCAS will try to kill everyone on board if it fails.
I simply cannot recall... another system on a transport category aircraft with a failure mode that defaulted to "I'm going to try to fly the airplane into the ground. If you line up all the dots and pull two switches at the right moment I will let you live. Otherwise you die... Oh, and BTW I'm also going to fail concurrently with three or four other systems, which actually will alert you to their issues, unlike me, who will sit here quietly winding your trim forward until you get to the point where you cannot wind it back. Sorry about that!!" (It's also worth noting here that the Emergency AD that was put out only gave instruction on what was essentially an enhanced trim runaway. There is no actual way (that I have seen) for a pilot to actually determine if MCAS is malfunctioning. At best you are to stop the resultant (trim runaway) and remain in ignorance over the state of MCAS. WTF?? A system with complete authority over the horizontal stab and you have no way of knowing anything about it. Failure modes, operational status, errors, nothing. Just "If the airplane is trimming down (for whatever reason) and you don't want it to pull the console switches." Really??)
These incidents, indeed the entirety of MCAS' existence are a failure of corporate responsibility aided and abetted by a complete abrogation of regulatory responsibility.... {But} in the end, the only entity who both could have designed a safe airplane, and who not only failed but by all appearances worked to conceal their failure through omission, was Boeing. And the agency that looked the other way was the FAA.
Those are the responsible parties, and that is what I hope people will look carefully at. It starts with the airplane. Build a safe one and operators will still find a way to muck things up, and crews will still make mistakes. But step one, the most important step, is build an effing safe airplane.
Warm regards,
dce
The result of this sad effort was a system that, if it failed, would basically try to kill the pilot and everyone on board. I say again: MCAS will try to kill everyone on board if it fails.
I simply cannot recall... another system on a transport category aircraft with a failure mode that defaulted to "I'm going to try to fly the airplane into the ground. If you line up all the dots and pull two switches at the right moment I will let you live. Otherwise you die... Oh, and BTW I'm also going to fail concurrently with three or four other systems, which actually will alert you to their issues, unlike me, who will sit here quietly winding your trim forward until you get to the point where you cannot wind it back. Sorry about that!!" (It's also worth noting here that the Emergency AD that was put out only gave instruction on what was essentially an enhanced trim runaway. There is no actual way (that I have seen) for a pilot to actually determine if MCAS is malfunctioning. At best you are to stop the resultant (trim runaway) and remain in ignorance over the state of MCAS. WTF?? A system with complete authority over the horizontal stab and you have no way of knowing anything about it. Failure modes, operational status, errors, nothing. Just "If the airplane is trimming down (for whatever reason) and you don't want it to pull the console switches." Really??)
These incidents, indeed the entirety of MCAS' existence are a failure of corporate responsibility aided and abetted by a complete abrogation of regulatory responsibility.... {But} in the end, the only entity who both could have designed a safe airplane, and who not only failed but by all appearances worked to conceal their failure through omission, was Boeing. And the agency that looked the other way was the FAA.
Those are the responsible parties, and that is what I hope people will look carefully at. It starts with the airplane. Build a safe one and operators will still find a way to muck things up, and crews will still make mistakes. But step one, the most important step, is build an effing safe airplane.
Warm regards,
dce
It counters the apologists' excuses for Boeing's abominable design, and it should silence the criticisms of those who repeatedly try to blame the pilots of those 2 condemned flights / aircraft.
I am sad that it has taken so long for 'dce', 'wonkazoo' to come here to sum this up so perfectly, along with the important lessons for everyone from sharing such a vivid and honest account of their own '***** or bust' moment all those years ago. It takes a special mind to admit to failings with such openness and honesty, and we are all the richer for it. The question is, when will Boeing and the FAA similarly dig deep enough to find similar humility and honesty, and to redress the very clear failings?
Thank you, 'dce' - respect!
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Originally Posted by Bend alot
Can you detail how the/you cockpit would have responded after take off of the ET flight with you as Captain and with the 2-300 hr FO - who's job was who's when and why ?
Not a trap question just very interested.
Starting from the first warning you get and when you would accept it as a warning or a failure.
Not a trap question just very interested.
Starting from the first warning you get and when you would accept it as a warning or a failure.
In the case of Ethiopian, however, the answer is quite straightforward. After Lion Air, the existence and potential failure modes of MCAS were made public. This was a very hot topic around my airline as we operated the MAX. We have our own internal message board (not unlike PPRuNe), and different thoughts were kicked around. While there were some pilots who said they would refuse to fly the MAX until a more permanent fix was in place, the general consensus was that there were some basic techniques that could be used to mitigate the threat.
Since MCAS was inhibited by either the A/P or the flaps extended, the primary defense was to make sure you had one or the other. That is, on takeoff one would engage the A/P first and then retract the flaps. On landing, keep the A/P on until some amount of flaps were extended. If during takeoff, but before A/P engagement, you were to experience anything that looked like a failed AOA or unreliable airspeed, then don't retract the flaps. By applying these techniques, MCAS would never have an opportunity to activate. Whether these kind of discussions occurred at Ethiopian is currently unknown, but the information was available to process.
A better question would have been, "How would you have handled this malfunction as a Lion Air pilot who had no knowledge of MCAS?"
I think by now you may have gathered that I'm a hands-on type of pilot, so the answer is pretty much the same one I've been giving all along. Fly the aircraft.
By the numbers then: Stick shaker. WTF?! Check my power (increase as necessary), check my attitude, check my configuration. Is it flying or is it wallowing? If it is wallowing, keep the nose down and accelerate. If its flying, probably a false indication, continue the climb, call for the gear. Cross check instruments. I've got my hands full, so ask my FO to read off what he sees on all three airspeeds. At 400 feet check my roll mode, have FO ask for straight ahead if appropriate and declare emergency. If by now I've determined we have unreliable airspeed, memory items except I'm going to keep takeoff power and 15 degrees pitch until 1000' where I set 10 degrees and 80% N1.
Now I do absolutely nothing except climb to a safe altitude with flaps hanging. Once at a safe altitude, we proceed slowly and methodically through the NNC for Airspeed Unreliable. Quite frankly, I don't know if I would ever retract my flaps in this scenario (and hence no MCAS issue) because I'm going to return to the departure airport for landing.
If I ever did retract the flaps, it would only be after I had a stabilized aircraft. If MCAS then kicked in, I seriously doubt I would let the trim run continuously for 9 seconds before I did something about it. When you do a fair amount of hand-flying, trimming is like breathing. You hardly think about it. Controls get heavy, trim. Apply thrust, trim. Reduce thrust, trim. Enter a turn, trim. Rollout of turn, trim. If MCAS activated, it would probably take a few cycles of back and forth before I realized that something was amiss, but I have never been reluctant to trim as necessary. Eventually I would have made my way to the runaway trim NNC, but would have done so from an in-trim state.
This is not to say that everything would have been executed flawlessly (i.e. good chance I would forget to call for gear initially), but then that's why you want an experienced First Officer to back you up. Personally, I feel that the Ethiopian Airline policy of placing low-time pilots in the right seat of a passenger airline borders on the criminally negligent.
So, to flog the topic one more time..... When presented with an undesired and/or unexpected aircraft state, it is absolutely crucial for the pilot flying to be prepared to revert to basic airmanship skills. Set the pitch. Set the power. Trim the aircraft. Monitor the performance. Adjust as necessary. Get to a safe altitude. Stabilize the aircraft. And then work the problem.
None of this requires "sky god" or "test pilot" level of skill. It simply requires making the conscience decision that you are going to fly the aircraft with the tools that are readily available.
Join Date: Apr 2019
Location: USA
Posts: 217
Fly the damn aircraft...
Originally Posted by maxter
737 driver: Do you not train for those failures in a sim. I think that was what was being suggested for MCAS failure, not just an Ipad brief
Over the years and through several different organizations, I have seen different variations and phraseology of these basic principles, but every single one of them started with the same first step - FLY THE AIRCRAFT. This is so fundamental and so important that at one previous employer we used to say that the first three steps of any emergency was 1) Fly the aircraft, 2) Fly the aircraft, and 3) Fly the aircraft.
Sadly, this concept has to be repeated frequently because, for various reasons, pilots keep forgetting this touchstone principle. FLY THE AIRCRAFT. First, last, and always.
Join Date: Mar 2013
Location: France
Age: 34
Posts: 93
Hello all.
i just checked one of the previous aircraft I used to fly, equipped with a stick pusher system, this is what I found :
The push force felt at the control column is approximately 80 lbs, which is adequate for stall
correction, but can still be overpowered by the pilot in the event the system cannot be
disabled.
NOTE: The number 1 and number 2 computer must both agree to push before the stick
pusher can be activated.
The stick pusher will activate when all of the following conditions are met:
• #1 STALL SYST FAIL, #2 STALL SYST FAIL and PUSHER SYST FAIL caution lights are
OFF.
• The airplane is airborne.
• The airplane altitude is greater than 400 feet AGL.
• The airspeed is less than 200 -
4 KEAS.
• The stick shakers have been activated by both systems.
The only thing I have difficulty to understand is why Boeing in the first place didn't connect the MCAS system to both AOA, exactly as stick pusher was in my previous aircraft.
now, not writing as long post about it, but the mcas issue is not only a design problems ... We can clearly see a tendency in the world of pilot to loose confidences in manual and basic flying skill in the modern aviation world. I would like to believe authority will not only react to fix the MCAS and that it, it is applicable to all the aviation world and instead of have more and more automation because pilot are more and more crap, we should maybe put back the pilot in the center of the loop and ask / help / train them to have their skill up to the task.
i just checked one of the previous aircraft I used to fly, equipped with a stick pusher system, this is what I found :
The push force felt at the control column is approximately 80 lbs, which is adequate for stall
correction, but can still be overpowered by the pilot in the event the system cannot be
disabled.
NOTE: The number 1 and number 2 computer must both agree to push before the stick
pusher can be activated.
The stick pusher will activate when all of the following conditions are met:
• #1 STALL SYST FAIL, #2 STALL SYST FAIL and PUSHER SYST FAIL caution lights are
OFF.
• The airplane is airborne.
• The airplane altitude is greater than 400 feet AGL.
• The airspeed is less than 200 -
4 KEAS.
• The stick shakers have been activated by both systems.
The only thing I have difficulty to understand is why Boeing in the first place didn't connect the MCAS system to both AOA, exactly as stick pusher was in my previous aircraft.
now, not writing as long post about it, but the mcas issue is not only a design problems ... We can clearly see a tendency in the world of pilot to loose confidences in manual and basic flying skill in the modern aviation world. I would like to believe authority will not only react to fix the MCAS and that it, it is applicable to all the aviation world and instead of have more and more automation because pilot are more and more crap, we should maybe put back the pilot in the center of the loop and ask / help / train them to have their skill up to the task.
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: UK
Posts: 2,190
Originally Posted by 737 Driver
some very basic airmanship technique
We get it. You think they were sub-standard. You would have used your greater "airmanship" to keep the basic parameters in line and therefore the aircraft flying.
Your lack of appreciation of human factors in a real scenario with real line pilots in the real world is what you should address. After-the-event-heroism is ever so easy.
My suggestion is to slice the event up into small time slices. In each slice - look at the information presented, the probable solution, the required actions and the workload. Then in the next slice, base your model on a modification of the previous slice - increasing or decreasing the factors, and extrapolating the data flows. So if it starts with a stall indication, then keep the "it's a stall" flowing, until (given the workload estimate) the information is sufficient to demonstrate to the pilots that it's not a stall. Doing this, you will discover that the pilot with reduced workload will process new information earlier.
In my model, the captain wanted to get the thing cleaned up, then reduce the workload, then work out what was wrong. They cleaned up - he used the a/p to reduce the workload, and as they were starting to diagnose the aircraft bit them. His workload reduced his SA (along with the stick shaker) to a critical point. The pilot failed due to excess workload, not due to lack of "airmanship".
