Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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As a former B737 driver ( some decades ago ) I followed the Ethiopian Airlines fatal accident in Beirut in 2010. The cause of the accident was pilot errors. The Lebanese accident Investigation board suggested that Ethiopian Airlines look into there crew composition ( experience ) and CRM. Being it MCAS or any other cause of this accident, as a former B737, Airbus and currently a Boeing driver I have the sneaky suspicion that crew composition and CRM played a major role in this accident.
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So either the design has to be - quite literally, fool proof - or the training has to be consistently good.
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I really am mystified that a device that arguably insidiously pitches the aircraft down even if cancelled during a potentially high workload situation and which relies of only one of two AOA sensors ever gained certification. Did the certifying authority fully understand MCAS - how explicit were Boeing in the certification process? Or am I interpreting incorrectly
Surely the STS is different - that is making small corrections both ways towards a desired situation.
Surely the STS is different - that is making small corrections both ways towards a desired situation.
Speculation is just that. All will be revealed in good time.
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Did the certifying authority fully understand MCAS ?
There has to be mutual trust for certification to take place on time. I don't know but I doubt that
the personnel of the FAA Regional Office in Renton WA are hostile to their Boeing counterparts.
There has to be mutual trust for certification to take place on time. I don't know but I doubt that
the personnel of the FAA Regional Office in Renton WA are hostile to their Boeing counterparts.
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Ironic that members here who blame the MCAS system already are switching to A320s for their flights which also have the same type angle of attack sensors along with software to prevent a stall and have received faulty see also from sensors resulting in a fatal crash before the crew could respond. It was 10 years ago the A320 with 3 sensors had 2 freeze due to maintenance, the software selected those 2 to use neglecting the third working AOA sensor because it differed, put the plane into a stall preventing dive at an altitude from which the crew could not recover before plunging into the Med. darn Boeing copying AB.
Big difference between that and an aircraft pitching uncontrollably nose down at low altitudes.
Now is probably a great time to buy Boeing shares. I have rarely seen such utter tripe talked over two accidents that look, at least at first glance, to be caused by sub standard pilots getting caught by the same tricky but surviveable system failure. Read the 3$%^&ing Boeing AD! Another reason to stop putting undertrained muppets in airline pilot seats.
P.S To ‘Rananim” a pilot of a large passenger jet will NOT be able to distinguish between a faulty sensor and a “real” stall since the aircraft is not certified to stall at all, it is never intended to be stalled, nor does it provide the physical warnings of an incipient stall. That is the reason for all those stall protection systems! That is also the reason for extensive training on systems and their failure modes.
P.S To ‘Rananim” a pilot of a large passenger jet will NOT be able to distinguish between a faulty sensor and a “real” stall since the aircraft is not certified to stall at all, it is never intended to be stalled, nor does it provide the physical warnings of an incipient stall. That is the reason for all those stall protection systems! That is also the reason for extensive training on systems and their failure modes.
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Am I right that the original triplex concept (3 computers using different microprocessors, three different OSs, three different languages and code written by three different teams who don't communicate with each other - a bug in anything means two against one, and the two win) was abandoned long ago? Maybe it should be revisited.
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Utter nonsense!
Some of the best contributions I have seen on this forum in nearly 20 years, have come from psychologists, educationalists, electronics engineers, geographers, training specialists, management theorists, data and IT engineers, physicists and chemists, manufacturing experts, metallurgists and logicians, non of whom had any aviation involvement.
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I really am mystified that a device that arguably insidiously pitches the aircraft down even if cancelled during a potentially high workload situation and which relies of only one of two AOA sensors ever gained certification. Did the certifying authority fully understand MCAS - how explicit were Boeing in the certification process? Or am I interpreting incorrectly
Surely the STS is different - that is making small corrections both ways towards a desired situation.
Surely the STS is different - that is making small corrections both ways towards a desired situation.
At present even if there was error checking based on the non-flying side, how is it validated?
Now is probably a great time to buy Boeing shares. I have rarely seen such utter tripe talked over two accidents that look, at least at first glance, to be caused by sub standard pilots getting caught by the same tricky but surviveable system failure. Read the 3$%^&ing Boeing AD! Another reason to stop putting undertrained muppets in airline pilot seats.
P.S To ‘Rananim” a pilot of a large passenger jet will NOT be able to distinguish between a faulty sensor and a “real” stall since the aircraft is not certified to stall at all, it is never intended to be stalled, nor does it provide the physical warnings of an incipient stall. That is the reason for all those stall protection systems! That is also the reason for extensive training on systems and their failure modes.
P.S To ‘Rananim” a pilot of a large passenger jet will NOT be able to distinguish between a faulty sensor and a “real” stall since the aircraft is not certified to stall at all, it is never intended to be stalled, nor does it provide the physical warnings of an incipient stall. That is the reason for all those stall protection systems! That is also the reason for extensive training on systems and their failure modes.
(pax)Was looking for the unreliable airspeed drill for the 737 and found this
737 airspeed unreliable QRH
Can I ask if the -8 differs ?
737 airspeed unreliable QRH
Can I ask if the -8 differs ?
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A aircraft with uncommanded trim does not pitch uncontrollably nose down. As the trim motor adds nose down trim up elevator can compensate until the stabilizer overpowers the elevator. At that point the nose will start down. Normally it’s a smooth progression unless the aircraft is on autopilot. The autopilot disengaging with a out of trim condition will cause a more violent pitching moment. Prior to that however there should be several warning signs. The fix takes about 1 second to activate and the flight should be able to continue with manual trim. Had it happen on a 727. It was a non issue. Trim ran away nose down, trim disconnected and flight continued.
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- The Clearly Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who should pass the exam with minimal to no preparation;
- The Minimally Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who should pass the exam with some preparation. Some will pass with high marks, while some will score the cut-score or just above;
- The Not Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who lacks the proficiency to pass the exam and should fail;
Any system that you design should be built to the specs of the Minimally Acceptable Candidate: someone who is unfamiliar with the matter (let's say, a pax) does not necessarily need to understand the system. However, those who are trained and licensed to fly should be able to understand the system without much difficulties. If one needs to be an expert on the system itself in order to use it, it is by definition unusable.
Similar to the big internet. Everyone reading this uses the internet, but I doubt more than 1% will even remotely know what a BGP community is. And that's fine, because this system was designed for the "average" user.
When I passed my Private's checkride, I had a reasonable understanding of the 172 I was flying. Engine, electrical systems, flight controls, instruments; the lot. I even understood the workings of the shimmy dampener (it does help if you fly an aircraft with a broken shimmy for a change). Any airman should be able to understand MCAS, or any other flight system for that matter, even on a bad day. If not, then either the system is too complex and risky to introduce, or the airman should not have received their license and rating(s).
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Now is probably a great time to buy Boeing shares. I have rarely seen such utter tripe talked over two accidents that look, at least at first glance, to be caused by sub standard pilots getting caught by the same tricky but surviveable system failure. Read the 3$%^&ing Boeing AD! Another reason to stop putting undertrained muppets in airline pilot seats.
P.S To ‘Rananim” a pilot of a large passenger jet will NOT be able to distinguish between a faulty sensor and a “real” stall since the aircraft is not certified to stall at all, it is never intended to be stalled, nor does it provide the physical warnings of an incipient stall. That is the reason for all those stall protection systems! That is also the reason for extensive training on systems and their failure modes.
P.S To ‘Rananim” a pilot of a large passenger jet will NOT be able to distinguish between a faulty sensor and a “real” stall since the aircraft is not certified to stall at all, it is never intended to be stalled, nor does it provide the physical warnings of an incipient stall. That is the reason for all those stall protection systems! That is also the reason for extensive training on systems and their failure modes.
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Has anyone considered the idea that MCAS was activated appropriately and the crew fought through it even though it was trying to “help” them? ie- they were in a nose high, low airspeed condition. I believe in the Colgan Dash-8 crash, the Captain pulled through the shaker and pusher not believing the aircraft had stalled but (speculation) perhaps believed he was in a tailplalne stall.
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In technical certifications, we create three standard candidates for the test we're about to write:
- The Clearly Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who should pass the exam with minimal to no preparation;
- The Minimally Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who should pass the exam with some preparation. Some will pass with high marks, while some will score the cut-score or just above;
- The Not Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who lacks the proficiency to pass the exam and should fail;
Any system that you design should be built to the specs of the Minimally Acceptable Candidate: someone who is unfamiliar with the matter (let's say, a pax) does not necessarily need to understand the system. However, those who are trained and licensed to fly should be able to understand the system without much difficulties. If one needs to be an expert on the system itself in order to use it, it is by definition unusable.
Similar to the big internet. Everyone reading this uses the internet, but I doubt more than 1% will even remotely know what a BGP community is. And that's fine, because this system was designed for the "average" user.
When I passed my Private's checkride, I had a reasonable understanding of the 172 I was flying. Engine, electrical systems, flight controls, instruments; the lot. I even understood the workings of the shimmy dampener (it does help if you fly an aircraft with a broken shimmy for a change). Any airman should be able to understand MCAS, or any other flight system for that matter, even on a bad day. If not, then either the system is too complex and risky to introduce, or the airman should not have received their license and rating(s).
- The Clearly Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who should pass the exam with minimal to no preparation;
- The Minimally Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who should pass the exam with some preparation. Some will pass with high marks, while some will score the cut-score or just above;
- The Not Acceptable Candidate: this is a candidate who lacks the proficiency to pass the exam and should fail;
Any system that you design should be built to the specs of the Minimally Acceptable Candidate: someone who is unfamiliar with the matter (let's say, a pax) does not necessarily need to understand the system. However, those who are trained and licensed to fly should be able to understand the system without much difficulties. If one needs to be an expert on the system itself in order to use it, it is by definition unusable.
Similar to the big internet. Everyone reading this uses the internet, but I doubt more than 1% will even remotely know what a BGP community is. And that's fine, because this system was designed for the "average" user.
When I passed my Private's checkride, I had a reasonable understanding of the 172 I was flying. Engine, electrical systems, flight controls, instruments; the lot. I even understood the workings of the shimmy dampener (it does help if you fly an aircraft with a broken shimmy for a change). Any airman should be able to understand MCAS, or any other flight system for that matter, even on a bad day. If not, then either the system is too complex and risky to introduce, or the airman should not have received their license and rating(s).
Like nuclear engineering or medicine, procedure is king. However, the operator needs sufficient knowledge to understand "What's it doing? Why is it doing it? Do I need to stop it? How do I stop it? What else does stopping it do?". It's a bit sad to see some sentiment that the crew are just trained to watch the computers (see the old pilot and dog in the cockpit joke) and follow the QRH, otherwise they might be overwhelmed. I really doubt it, in most cases. Aviation got to where it is because of these practices, via some extremely tough lessons.