Ethiopian airliner down in Africa
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Seattle Times article
Ethiopian pilots fought the 737 MAX flight controls almost from take-off, preliminary report shows
Video at the link.
April 4, 2019 at 11:59 am Updated April 4, 2019 at 1:26 pm
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ight-controls/
Video at the link.
April 4, 2019 at 11:59 am Updated April 4, 2019 at 1:26 pm
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ight-controls/
By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
The preliminary investigation into the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 last month reveals that pilots began fighting against the Boeing 737 MAX’s new automatic flight control system barely a minute after leaving the ground, after a sensor failed immediately on take-off.
Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg issued a statement Thursday from the Renton 737 factory expressing “the immense gravity of these events across our company,” and acknowledging the role the new Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, played in the crash.
He pointed to the software fix and associated pilot training Boeing is working on.
“As pilots have told us, erroneous activation of the MCAS function can add to what is already a high workload environment. It’s our responsibility to eliminate this risk,” Muilenburg said. “We own it and we know how to do it.”
The “black box” flight recorder data shows that after MCAS swiveled the plane’s horizontal tail to push the nose sharply down three times in succession, the pilots hit the cut-off switches stopping the automatic action and tried to adjust the tail manually, according to the report by the Accident Investigation Bureau of Ethiopia’s Transport Ministry.
In doing so, they were following instructions provided by Boeing last November, following the crash of Lion Air Flight 610, on how to deal with such an inadvertent triggering of the new flight control system.
Ahead of the release of the full report, Ethiopian Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges held a news conference in the capital, Addis Ababa, that was almost entirely focused on vindicating the actions of the pilots. “The crew performed all the procedures repeatedly provided by the manufacturer but was not able to control the aircraft,” she said.
The report says that while trying to follow Boeing’s directions, about three minutes into the flight, the two pilots found that the manual system for moving the horizontal tail — also known as the stabilizer — “was not working.” This meant they couldn’t move the large stabilizer wheel in the cockpit that is connected via cables to the tail.
Flight-control experts told The Seattle Times earlier this week that was probably because the forces on the tail of the plane moving at high speed made it next to physically impossible to move the stabilizer wheel as Boeing had recommended.
All the while, the control column “stick shaker” was vibrating the control column, and various messages were telling the pilots and that their airspeed, altitude and pitch readings were unreliable. Two minutes into the flight, losing altitude, an audible warning sounded that the plane was too close to the ground: “Don’t Sink!”
About four minutes into the flight, the pilots gave up on the manual stabilizer wheel and switched the electric power to the tail back on, then used the thumb switches on the control column to pitch the nose back up.
But just five seconds later, MCAS kicked in again and once more pushed the nose sharply down.
Just 35 seconds later, six minutes after take-off, the plane rolled over before plowing into the earth in a “high energy impact” at a speed of approximately 575 miles per hour.
This sequence of events was triggered by the failure of the left angle-of-attack sensor on the outside of the fuselage, just 44 seconds after take-off, the data shows.
There are two such sensors one, either side of the aircraft, that measure the angle between the wing and the airflow. Only one is used to trigger MCAS. The data shows that both sensors showed normal readings on the ground during the take-off roll but deviated immediately after lifting off and in less than a minute were divergent by 60 degrees.
Ethiopian Airlines issued a statement Thursday backing the Flight 302 pilots, saying that they “followed the Boeing recommended and FAA approved emergency procedures to handle the most difficult emergency situation created on the airplane.”
“Despite their hard work and full compliance with the emergency procedures … they could not recover the airplane from the persistence of nose diving,” the statement added.
Boeing CEO Muilenburg said while the Ethiopian and Lion Air “tragedies continue to weigh heavily on our hearts and minds,” Boeing remains “confident in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX.”
“When the MAX returns to the skies with the software changes to the MCAS function, it will be among the safest airplanes ever to fly,” he said.
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
The preliminary investigation into the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 last month reveals that pilots began fighting against the Boeing 737 MAX’s new automatic flight control system barely a minute after leaving the ground, after a sensor failed immediately on take-off.
Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg issued a statement Thursday from the Renton 737 factory expressing “the immense gravity of these events across our company,” and acknowledging the role the new Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, played in the crash.
He pointed to the software fix and associated pilot training Boeing is working on.
“As pilots have told us, erroneous activation of the MCAS function can add to what is already a high workload environment. It’s our responsibility to eliminate this risk,” Muilenburg said. “We own it and we know how to do it.”
The “black box” flight recorder data shows that after MCAS swiveled the plane’s horizontal tail to push the nose sharply down three times in succession, the pilots hit the cut-off switches stopping the automatic action and tried to adjust the tail manually, according to the report by the Accident Investigation Bureau of Ethiopia’s Transport Ministry.
In doing so, they were following instructions provided by Boeing last November, following the crash of Lion Air Flight 610, on how to deal with such an inadvertent triggering of the new flight control system.
Ahead of the release of the full report, Ethiopian Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges held a news conference in the capital, Addis Ababa, that was almost entirely focused on vindicating the actions of the pilots. “The crew performed all the procedures repeatedly provided by the manufacturer but was not able to control the aircraft,” she said.
The report says that while trying to follow Boeing’s directions, about three minutes into the flight, the two pilots found that the manual system for moving the horizontal tail — also known as the stabilizer — “was not working.” This meant they couldn’t move the large stabilizer wheel in the cockpit that is connected via cables to the tail.
Flight-control experts told The Seattle Times earlier this week that was probably because the forces on the tail of the plane moving at high speed made it next to physically impossible to move the stabilizer wheel as Boeing had recommended.
All the while, the control column “stick shaker” was vibrating the control column, and various messages were telling the pilots and that their airspeed, altitude and pitch readings were unreliable. Two minutes into the flight, losing altitude, an audible warning sounded that the plane was too close to the ground: “Don’t Sink!”
About four minutes into the flight, the pilots gave up on the manual stabilizer wheel and switched the electric power to the tail back on, then used the thumb switches on the control column to pitch the nose back up.
But just five seconds later, MCAS kicked in again and once more pushed the nose sharply down.
Just 35 seconds later, six minutes after take-off, the plane rolled over before plowing into the earth in a “high energy impact” at a speed of approximately 575 miles per hour.
This sequence of events was triggered by the failure of the left angle-of-attack sensor on the outside of the fuselage, just 44 seconds after take-off, the data shows.
There are two such sensors one, either side of the aircraft, that measure the angle between the wing and the airflow. Only one is used to trigger MCAS. The data shows that both sensors showed normal readings on the ground during the take-off roll but deviated immediately after lifting off and in less than a minute were divergent by 60 degrees.
Ethiopian Airlines issued a statement Thursday backing the Flight 302 pilots, saying that they “followed the Boeing recommended and FAA approved emergency procedures to handle the most difficult emergency situation created on the airplane.”
“Despite their hard work and full compliance with the emergency procedures … they could not recover the airplane from the persistence of nose diving,” the statement added.
Boeing CEO Muilenburg said while the Ethiopian and Lion Air “tragedies continue to weigh heavily on our hearts and minds,” Boeing remains “confident in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX.”
“When the MAX returns to the skies with the software changes to the MCAS function, it will be among the safest airplanes ever to fly,” he said.
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Shit!
Just a few observations.
I have read a few hundred Accident reports and this one is one of the scariest!
Why did this Cpt select AP on, with stickshaker going?
Why did he retract flaps when he knew there was a 50/50 chance the MCAS would go off.
Why did he not set a reasonable pwr setting so as to not accelerate out of control?
Must have been confusing for him?
As for Boeing Max
It will never fly again without serious modifications!
Cpt B
I have read a few hundred Accident reports and this one is one of the scariest!
Why did this Cpt select AP on, with stickshaker going?
Why did he retract flaps when he knew there was a 50/50 chance the MCAS would go off.
Why did he not set a reasonable pwr setting so as to not accelerate out of control?
Must have been confusing for him?
As for Boeing Max
It will never fly again without serious modifications!
Cpt B
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Shortly after Takeoff the Captain who was pilot flying had stick shaker on his side only. Why not transfer control to the first officer at this point or at least a little while later?
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Originally Posted by Water pilot
What caused the bogus airspeed readings in that scenario?
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Originally Posted by Water pilot
As as been pointed out many times, the first officer was fairly inexperienced. So imagine that you are an experienced captain in a plane on takeoff that has a fault which you have never seen before. How quickly would you hand your life over to the greenhorn?
Another very important reason is that I am probably going to gain much greater situational awareness if I become the pilot monitoring as I can concentrate on getting a grip on the situation instead of concentrating on flying the airplane.
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Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
There are multiple reports suggesting that the deadheading pilot was a Batik Air captain. I haven't seen any that mentioned their nationality, and I note that the poster who suggested it was a Brit hasn't come back with any confirmation of that.
Investigators on Thursday confirmed there was a third, off-duty pilot in the cockpit that evening. That was not mentioned in the preliminary report because they had not interviewed the pilot at that stage as they worked to get the report out fast, Utomo said.
Reuters on Wednesday reported it was a captain at Lion Air’s full-service sister carrier Batik Air who solved the flight control problems, according to two sources.
KNKT said the pilot was qualified on the 737 MAX 8 but did not say what airline he worked for or what role he played in assisting the crew.
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Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg addresses the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 preliminary report:
Boeing: 737 MAX Update
Boeing: 737 MAX Update
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Additional software problem detected in Boeing 737 Max flight control system, officials say
BREAKING: A Boeing-led review of a stall-prevention system suspected in the deadly crashes of two of the company’s new 737 Max jetliners has detected an additional software problem that the FAA has ordered fixed before the planes are cleared to fly again, the company acknowledged Thursday. Boeing called the additional problem, which is unrelated to the stall-prevention system,“relatively minor.” Two officials familiar with the FAA investigation said the issue is nonetheless classified as critical to flight safety. Boeing said it expects to have a solution ready “in the coming weeks.”
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Let one thing be clear, we now have facts.
The crew was extremely inexperienced :
The FO had grand total 361hrs of wich 207 the last 3 months.
The captain was 29 years. Had an impressive career!
Had 8122hrs total
July 23 2010 he graduated
FO 737-800 31 jan 2011
Then FO 757/767 777 and 787.
BUT!
And here comes the problem: In 26 Okt 2017 he made Cpt 737-800 , SO less then 1.5 years Command.
There is a total of 1477hrs 738 and 103hrs Max.
Of which a lot is FO time!!
So, a low timer indeed!
This is a warning on so many levels!
The crew was extremely inexperienced :
The FO had grand total 361hrs of wich 207 the last 3 months.
The captain was 29 years. Had an impressive career!
Had 8122hrs total
July 23 2010 he graduated
FO 737-800 31 jan 2011
Then FO 757/767 777 and 787.
BUT!
And here comes the problem: In 26 Okt 2017 he made Cpt 737-800 , SO less then 1.5 years Command.
There is a total of 1477hrs 738 and 103hrs Max.
Of which a lot is FO time!!
So, a low timer indeed!
This is a warning on so many levels!
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Originally Posted by BluSdUp
Just a few observations.
I have read a few hundred Accident reports and this one is one of the scariest!
Why did this Cpt select AP on, with stickshaker going?
Why did he retract flaps when he knew there was a 50/50 chance the MCAS would go off.
Why did he not set a reasonable pwr setting so as to not accelerate out of control?
Must have been confusing for him?
As for Boeing Max
It will never fly again without serious modifications!
Cpt B
I have read a few hundred Accident reports and this one is one of the scariest!
Why did this Cpt select AP on, with stickshaker going?
Why did he retract flaps when he knew there was a 50/50 chance the MCAS would go off.
Why did he not set a reasonable pwr setting so as to not accelerate out of control?
Must have been confusing for him?
As for Boeing Max
It will never fly again without serious modifications!
Cpt B
That's the only explanation to the AP Warning they got there.
It appears they
- restored the stab trim cutout switches
- made two quick manual ANU inputs
- hit the autopilot engange button, hoping the autopilot would solve the situation for them
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Originally Posted by Brosa
It appears he tried to engage the left autopilot a fourth time, near the end at 05:43:30.
That's the only explanation to the AP Warning they got there.
It appears they
That's the only explanation to the AP Warning they got there.
It appears they
- restored the stab trim cutout switches
- made two quick manual ANU imputs
- hit the autopilot engange button, hoping the autopilot would solve the situation for them
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so now the spin begins, "they followed all the rules and it still crashed"...well, not quite, how did the elec/auto stab trim find itself functioning again, or did it turn itself back on?
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Originally Posted by OldnGrounded
Why would he "know" that?
I'm still baffled by the speed they reached. Having control issues I'd think one would instinctively try to maintain some reasonable power level. It is almost if they flew TOGA till the ground...
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''About four minutes into the flight, the pilots gave up on the manual stabilizer wheel and switched the electric power to the tail back on, then used the thumb switches on the control column to pitch the nose back up.
But just five seconds later, MCAS kicked in again and once more pushed the nose sharply down.
Just 35 seconds later, six minutes after take-off, the plane rolled over before plowing into the earth in a “high energy impact” at a speed of approximately 575 miles per hour."
Checkmate - they were damned if they did (use trim cutout switches) and damned if they didn't. Seems that at the point they shut of the system the AND trim was more than the elevators could overcome and with ever increasing speed in the dive manual trim was not an option. what would you do? try flying inverted (as with the air Alaska accident )? May explain the last minute roll .
What a mess.
But just five seconds later, MCAS kicked in again and once more pushed the nose sharply down.
Just 35 seconds later, six minutes after take-off, the plane rolled over before plowing into the earth in a “high energy impact” at a speed of approximately 575 miles per hour."
Checkmate - they were damned if they did (use trim cutout switches) and damned if they didn't. Seems that at the point they shut of the system the AND trim was more than the elevators could overcome and with ever increasing speed in the dive manual trim was not an option. what would you do? try flying inverted (as with the air Alaska accident )? May explain the last minute roll .
What a mess.
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So why has the CEO/President of Boeing, tonight, said that he now own responsibility for what happened in that cockpit as a result of the MCAS debacle thrown up by the preliminary report?
He went on to state that Boeing had a 'fix' which will/is being implemented as he speaks.
Do you honestly believe a man of this stature is going to make a carefully crafted statement such as this - without advice.
Boeing is in for some serious pain for years to come, over this. Law suits have already been lined up.
The pilots 'appear' to have been cleared of any malpractice, it seems to me.......
He went on to state that Boeing had a 'fix' which will/is being implemented as he speaks.
Do you honestly believe a man of this stature is going to make a carefully crafted statement such as this - without advice.
Boeing is in for some serious pain for years to come, over this. Law suits have already been lined up.
The pilots 'appear' to have been cleared of any malpractice, it seems to me.......
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to add a non-pilot (burn him, burn him, but sometimes the ignorant can ask relevant questions..) question to the mix.
Could the reason that on both fatal flights that we saw unexpectedly brief presses to the "trim up" pickle switch be :
because that the pilot would have expected that his pressing of the switch to cause the immediate cacophony of noise of the trim wheels spinning , and maybe they didn't due to aerodynamic loads currently on them due to the lack of authority of the electric motor due to increasing speed so they quickly released the switch ("It's not working") . This would have been then followed up by MCAS throwing in it's "i'm OK to go again jack" logic of another bucketload of nose down. And the same side effect of increasing speed could cause the inability to wind back manually leading to the desperate measure of turning the electronic back on.
I guess the question is - is there a combination of speed and nose down trim that can mean that neither the electronic trim nor the hand wind trim can counteract it. And of course if you re-enable the electronic trim to try, having manual trim try and failed, then MCAS gives you an extra dose of "nose hard down"...
Could the reason that on both fatal flights that we saw unexpectedly brief presses to the "trim up" pickle switch be :
because that the pilot would have expected that his pressing of the switch to cause the immediate cacophony of noise of the trim wheels spinning , and maybe they didn't due to aerodynamic loads currently on them due to the lack of authority of the electric motor due to increasing speed so they quickly released the switch ("It's not working") . This would have been then followed up by MCAS throwing in it's "i'm OK to go again jack" logic of another bucketload of nose down. And the same side effect of increasing speed could cause the inability to wind back manually leading to the desperate measure of turning the electronic back on.
I guess the question is - is there a combination of speed and nose down trim that can mean that neither the electronic trim nor the hand wind trim can counteract it. And of course if you re-enable the electronic trim to try, having manual trim try and failed, then MCAS gives you an extra dose of "nose hard down"...
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Rananim
Fair summary.
But it is not criminal to be one level above Your Competency Level.
It IS criminal to make such a shit aircraft and certify and sell it like Boeing does!
But it is not criminal to be one level above Your Competency Level.
It IS criminal to make such a shit aircraft and certify and sell it like Boeing does!
