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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

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Ethiopian airliner down in Africa

Old 21st Mar 2019, 18:58
  #2261 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Cows getting bigger View Post
Wot Gums says. ^^^^^^
Yes. Exactly that.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:07
  #2262 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Longtimer View Post
". . . The planemaker will include a warning light in the new 737 Max planes and retrofit all existing ones, according to the report."
But an AoA indicator will continue to be an option:

Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety Features That Company Sold Only as Extras

From the above article:

The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy. Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded.

“They’re critical, and cost almost nothing for the airlines to install,” said Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at the aviation consultancy Leeham. “Boeing charges for them because it can. But they’re vital for safety.”
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:08
  #2263 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Longtimer View Post
March 21, 2019 / 8:34 AM / Updated an hour ago

Boeing to add extra safety alarm in 737 MAX jets: FT

(Reuters) - Boeing Co will install an extra safety alarm in the cockpits of all its 737 MAX aircraft after intense criticism in the wake of two fatal crashes, the Financial Times reported on Thursday.
The planemaker will include a warning light in the new 737 Max planes and retrofit all existing ones, according to the report.The light will tell pilots if two key sensors do not agree, the FT reported, citing a person familiar with the situation.

Boeing did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Shares of the company were down about 1 percent at $372.49 in morning trade

Yea, so that's going to work, so at point of rotation, we get a vane split, and MCAS will still do its stuff while the crew are fumbling for the checklist.
But hey, we're Boeing and we've given you guys a little light.
From what others before have described, its still a sub-system reliant on its on-side sensor only, with no automatic cut out if the off-side sensor is in disagreement.

Ttfn
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:13
  #2264 (permalink)  
 
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[QUOTE=Tunkurman;10425639]Have you seen this 737 runaway stabilizer training on YouTube? OMG when that stab wheel is running there is not much time to react. Very scary. Look at the first officer trainee's reaction when the warning signals turn on and the plane dips. After seeing this I am so sad to see that these easy to access STAB TRIM switches could have saved both planes.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co

Thanks Tunkurman. Sort of proves what I have been saying all along. Notice that within 12 seconds the stabiliser is disabled by STAB OFF switches. The runaway STAB drill which is a memory checklist says
Condition "STAB TRIM RUNS CONTINUOUSLY" but if you note in this video, if is off after 12 seconds and before the plane can even begin to become unstable. The guys did not even spill their coffee and the remainder of the flight was very calm.
The word "CONTINUOUSLY" has always meant to me and I am sure thousands of 737 pilots to mean running in a manner not expected because in normal use it just moves in small increments either up or down. The moment it runs for more than a few seconds, that is a runaway.
If we are to start analysing every word in the Boeing QRH for its hidden meaning then the whole thing becomes a farce. During training we are shown that a stabiliser running is a very dangerous situation that needs instant memory action. It is this training that instills the knowledge of how to react - not a single word in a checklist.
There is a difference in the Lion Air in that there may have been stick shaker activity as well but multiple failures are a fact of life when flying and then QRH makes this very clear. "This document does not cover multiple failures.........." which must be dealt with by airmanship. No document could ever cover multiple failures.
Yanrair.


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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:18
  #2265 (permalink)  
 
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BOEING QRH ADVICE ON NON NORMAL CHECKLISTS
Non–Normal Checklist Operation

Non–normal checklists start with steps to correct the situation. If needed, information for planning the rest of the flight is included. When special items are needed to configure the airplane for landing, the items are included in the Deferred Items section of the checklist. Flight patterns for some non–normal situations are located in the Maneuvers chapter and show the sequence of configuration changes.

While every attempt is made to supply needed non–normal checklists, it is not possible to develop checklists for all conceivable situations. In some smoke, fire or fumes situations, the flight crew may need to move between the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist and the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist. In some multiple failure situations, the flight crew may need to combine the elements of more than one checklist. In all situations, the captain must assess the situation and use good judgment to determine the safest course of action.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:25
  #2266 (permalink)  
 
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yanrair, you're really not getting it. By your line of argument, everything should be flying again in the morning, no changes and life moves on - "Nothing to see here". So, when the next crew creates another smoking hole are we just going to roll-out 'airmanship' again or are we going to do the SENSIBLE thing and identify/remove/mitigate the risk?
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:31
  #2267 (permalink)  
 
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[QUOTE=yanrair;10425972]
Originally Posted by Tunkurman View Post
Have you seen this 737 runaway stabilizer training on YouTube? OMG when that stab wheel is running there is not much time to react. Very scary. Look at the first officer trainee's reaction when the warning signals turn on and the plane dips. After seeing this I am so sad to see that these easy to access STAB TRIM switches could have saved both planes.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co

Thanks Tunkurman. Sort of proves what I have been saying all along. Notice that within 12 seconds the stabiliser is disabled by STAB OFF switches. The runaway STAB drill which is a memory checklist says
Condition "STAB TRIM RUNS CONTINUOUSLY" but if you note in this video, if is off after 12 seconds and before the plane can even begin to become unstable. The guys did not even spill their coffee and the remainder of the flight was very calm.
The word "CONTINUOUSLY" has always meant to me and I am sure thousands of 737 pilots to mean running in a manner not expected because in normal use it just moves in small increments either up or down. The moment it runs for more than a few seconds, that is a runaway.
If we are to start analysing every word in the Boeing QRH for its hidden meaning then the whole thing becomes a farce. During training we are shown that a stabiliser running is a very dangerous situation that needs instant memory action. It is this training that instills the knowledge of how to react - not a single word in a checklist.
There is a difference in the Lion Air in that there may have been stick shaker activity as well but multiple failures are a fact of life when flying and then QRH makes this very clear. "This document does not cover multiple failures.........." which must be dealt with by airmanship. No document could ever cover multiple failures.
Yanrair.
So to sum up. In the same situation with a Stab Trim repeatedly trimming nose down, you would NOT switch off the Stab Trim at the cut out switches because the NNC says 'continuous' and this is 'repeated' - really?
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:40
  #2268 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by ivor toolbox View Post
Yea, so that's going to work, so at point of rotation, we get a vane split, and MCAS will still do its stuff while the crew are fumbling for the checklist.
But hey, we're Boeing and we've given you guys a little light.
From what others before have described, its still a sub-system reliant on its on-side sensor only, with no automatic cut out if the off-side sensor is in disagreement.

Ttfn
No. At rotation flaps would be extended. MCAS does not engage with the flaps extended.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:46
  #2269 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by OldnGrounded View Post
But an AoA indicator will continue to be an option:

Doomed Boeing jets lacked 2 safety features that company only sold as extras

From the above article:
That's like BMW (other manufacturers are available) saying your car is the safest in class, you have 10 airbags installed but its £1000 to connect them up and use them. Surely the negative publicity and 300 people that have lost their lives should be more than enough to convince them to fit them.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 19:57
  #2270 (permalink)  
 
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I think, we have gone far to far down the road of automation & the idea that the computer knows better than the Flight Crew.
As helpful as automatics & computerised technology etc are in aviation & other modes of transport, often the decision making & more importantly, the ability to carry out any subsequent action, is taken away from the Flight Crew.
The buck stops with the Pilots, give them the final authority & ability to `fly the aeroplane.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 20:34
  #2271 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by gums View Post
Salute!
My fear is that some lurking here will think that we lost two planes and 300 passengers because incompetent crews did not simply turn off two switches within seconds of raising flaps at normal altitude and speed with the stall warning system telling them they were stalling and their airspeed was FUBAR.

Gums...
Why would a competent crew raise the flaps & try to continue the flight with a continuous stick shaker? Once the startle factor subsides & you realize the airplane is flying normally, just return & land. You could try adding more flap if it would make you feel better about stall margin. A little common sense goes a long way & MCAS never is activated.

Last edited by BobM2; 21st Mar 2019 at 23:05.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 20:50
  #2272 (permalink)  
 
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The fundamental problem is the location of the engines relative to the wings, not MCAS.

And the ethics of a once great company that thought a band aid (MCAS) on an open wound was OK.

And a regulator that abrogated it’s responsibility.

it will take more than a software patch and a little light to convince me the Max is safe.

What other design features did they self certify that should have been stillborn?
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 21:27
  #2273 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Longtimer View Post
March 21, 2019 / 8:34 AM / Updated an hour ago

Boeing to add extra safety alarm in 737 MAX jets: FT

(Reuters) - Boeing Co will install an extra safety alarm in the cockpits of all its 737 MAX aircraft after intense criticism in the wake of two fatal crashes, the Financial Times reported on Thursday.
The planemaker will include a warning light in the new 737 Max planes and retrofit all existing ones, according to the report.The light will tell pilots if two key sensors do not agree, the FT reported, citing a person familiar with the situation.

Boeing did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Shares of the company were down about 1 percent at $372.49 in morning trade
I wonder whether they might also thought about retrofitting potties in all the seats but decided on more woopsie noises instead.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 21:30
  #2274 (permalink)  
 
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You won't be missed

Originally Posted by SLF3 View Post
The fundamental problem is the location of the engines relative to the wings, not MCAS.

And the ethics of a once great company that thought a band aid (MCAS) on an open wound was OK.

And a regulator that abrogated it’s responsibility.

it will take more than a software patch and a little light to convince me the Max is safe.

What other design features did they self certify that should have been stillborn?
I'll be happy to get on it as soon as they release it and won't miss the company of the likes like you and others that believe this was an intentional act on Boeings part.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 21:34
  #2275 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by JLWSanDiego View Post

I'll be happy to get on it as soon as they release it and won't miss the company of the likes like you and others that believe this was an intentional act on Boeings part.
It was not a single overt act. The genesis of this issue is more fundamentally systemic and that is the point to which the poster alluded.

Normalisation of deviance is an incremental and slow process.

The MCAS relationship to this systemic multiple failure is the symptom. How we as an industry, as a society with supposed regulatory checks and balances got here is the point.

That is why Diane Vaughan's book is such an insight into systemic issues.
If only it were so blatant and simple to characterise the evolution of process as intentional.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 21:39
  #2276 (permalink)  
 
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But an AoA indicator will continue to be an option
This is nothing short of baffling. It would seem to be an extremely useful instrument to have in any aircraft. And given the current context around the 737MAX not to make a free upgrade is... well word really fail me
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 21:42
  #2277 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by JLWSanDiego View Post
. . .you and others that believe this was an intentional act on Boeings part.
I don't think anyone believes that Boeing is intentionally crashing airplanes. OTOH, the implementation of MCAS (and its apparent increase in authority, late in the game), and the failure to document it or even to tell airlines and crews about it, were certainly intentional acts. And the fairly-obvious intent was to get the MAX flying without making the customers bear the cost burden of significant training.

It will probably be quite safe to fly the MAX aircraft again, once it's released -- especially because that's not likely to happen without a deep dive into the circumstances and decisions that led to the current situation and until the FAA, the DOT inspector general, the FBI and the relevant federal grand jury, international regulators and the airlines all sign off. And until pax are willing to board, of course.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 22:06
  #2278 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by SLF3 View Post
The fundamental problem is the location of the engines relative to the wings, not MCAS.

And the ethics of a once great company that thought a band aid (MCAS) on an open wound was OK.

And a regulator that abrogated it’s responsibility.


Well, let's see, the BAC 111 & DC-9, probably VC-10 & many other designs had some sort of stick pusher or mechanism to improve behavior at or near the stall. Were they equally unsafe designs? The Brits even required a stick pusher on 727 for a period of time, but later removed the requirement. Was it unsafe with or without the pusher? If one of these pushers activated at rotation due to malfunction, wouldn't that be a potentially worse failure than MCAS which does nothing until flaps are retracted at a decent height. The big point is flaps should never be retracted with a continuous stick shaker going off. The last thing you want is to remove your high lift devices. Just maintain configuration & return to land. I am sure Boeing never envisioned a crew cleaning up & trying to complete the flight with a continuous stick shaker.

Last edited by BobM2; 21st Mar 2019 at 23:09.
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 22:15
  #2279 (permalink)  
 
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Ignorant question: What is the practical use of a "disagree light"?? I suppose it means watch your workload increase as you continually assess your pitch attitude vis-à-vis the airflow in an aircraft with a natural tendency to pitch up markedly when power is applied.

Wouldn't it be smarter to have THREE AoA indicators (same principle as three attitude indicators) and have the system stick with the two that are agreeing?
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Old 21st Mar 2019, 22:27
  #2280 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by VFR Only Please View Post
Ignorant question: What is the practical use of a "disagree light"?? I suppose it means watch your workload increase as you continually assess your pitch attitude vis-à-vis the airflow in an aircraft with a natural tendency to pitch up markedly when power is applied.

Wouldn't it be smarter to have THREE AoA indicators (same principle as three attitude indicators) and have the system stick with the two that are agreeing?
The use is to know that something is up with the*sensor*itself, and to be especially skeptical of the output from other flight computers that factor in its data (ADIRU).*
The problem with adding more indicators (3, 4, 5...?) is that sometimes 2 of them get erroneous data and 1 is left with correct and it gets voted out (AF447).
There is no perfect system.

To others saying why not add the AoA indicator, in the B737 you could actually just use the difference between the FPV and the pitch angle to figure out your AoA if you wanted to (assuming, again, the data input into these is valid).
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