Boeing 737 Max Software Fixes Due to Lion Air Crash Delayed
Very, very, easy to say with weeks to think about it from the comfort of your armchair. The 'crux' of the issue is that today, with all the technology actually available and design and testing regimes that should be adhered to, no MUST be adhered to, the MAX design should never have got off the CAD drawing board. Boeing should have gone to a brand new design, but for business reasons we are all now well aware of, they decided not to. It's too easy to let the detail of procedures and switches and trimming and Christ knows what else get in the way of seeing things for what they are; look at the big picture; the very fact that systems like MCAS are necessary at all tells you all you need to know about the compromised design of the MAX.
Ask yourself; mmm, is this a good idea? I mean really, is it?
Anyone with the slightest understanding of safety and risk management will know you must design problems out from the very start, not try to overcome them with additional systems and procedures that add layers of complexity and increased room for error and so increasing risk - and catastrophic risk at that. To have non-redundant sensor input tells you what about the design. Safety first is it?
I know forums are full of mischief makers, but this constant "oh the crew could have staved the situation" narrative is a total diversion from the 'crux' of the issue. It's almost as if you forget that hundreds of PAX and crew have died appalling deaths as a result of flight crew being put in a position they should never ever have been put in. The problem is the big picture, not the setting of trim.
Ask yourself; mmm, is this a good idea? I mean really, is it?
Anyone with the slightest understanding of safety and risk management will know you must design problems out from the very start, not try to overcome them with additional systems and procedures that add layers of complexity and increased room for error and so increasing risk - and catastrophic risk at that. To have non-redundant sensor input tells you what about the design. Safety first is it?
I know forums are full of mischief makers, but this constant "oh the crew could have staved the situation" narrative is a total diversion from the 'crux' of the issue. It's almost as if you forget that hundreds of PAX and crew have died appalling deaths as a result of flight crew being put in a position they should never ever have been put in. The problem is the big picture, not the setting of trim.
Thank you RTM Boy.
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Very, very, easy to say with weeks to think about it from the comfort of your armchair. The 'crux' of the issue is that today, with all the technology actually available and design and testing regimes that should be adhered to, no MUST be adhered to, the MAX design should never have got off the CAD drawing board. Boeing should have gone to a brand new design, but for business reasons we are all now well aware of, they decided not to. It's too easy to let the detail of procedures and switches and trimming and Christ knows what else get in the way of seeing things for what they are; look at the big picture; the very fact that systems like MCAS are necessary at all tells you all you need to know about the compromised design of the MAX.
Ask yourself; mmm, is this a good idea? I mean really, is it?
Anyone with the slightest understanding of safety and risk management will know you must design problems out from the very start, not try to overcome them with additional systems and procedures that add layers of complexity and increased room for error and so increasing risk - and catastrophic risk at that. To have non-redundant sensor input tells you what about the design. Safety first is it?
I know forums are full of mischief makers, but this constant "oh the crew could have staved the situation" narrative is a total diversion from the 'crux' of the issue. It's almost as if you forget that hundreds of PAX and crew have died appalling deaths as a result of flight crew being put in a position they should never ever have been put in. The problem is the big picture, not the setting of trim.
Ask yourself; mmm, is this a good idea? I mean really, is it?
Anyone with the slightest understanding of safety and risk management will know you must design problems out from the very start, not try to overcome them with additional systems and procedures that add layers of complexity and increased room for error and so increasing risk - and catastrophic risk at that. To have non-redundant sensor input tells you what about the design. Safety first is it?
I know forums are full of mischief makers, but this constant "oh the crew could have staved the situation" narrative is a total diversion from the 'crux' of the issue. It's almost as if you forget that hundreds of PAX and crew have died appalling deaths as a result of flight crew being put in a position they should never ever have been put in. The problem is the big picture, not the setting of trim.
.
- Boeing did not make a resilient airframe in the MAX
- The training pipeline is not producing resilient flight crews
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Here is a good recent article on Boeing certification problems:
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...uding-737-max/
Fly SAFE!
God Bless, and Namaste...
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...uding-737-max/
Fly SAFE!
God Bless, and Namaste...
Boeing presumably expect the MAX to have a 20 year in service life and the fact that this would involve a 1960s master caution system and associated warning lights as the main interface between pilots and system malfunctions to persist into the 2040s is almost unbelievable.
Flightcrew training has become increasingly systemised through CBT and many modern pilots started their flying career with Microsoft rather than in a tiger moth or a C150 and they are now far more SOP and rule based in their approach to problem solving compared to when the original B737 was designed and an EICAS or ECAM is central to all modern flightdecks in order to assist with non normal ops.
Crews in future years will either be flying modern Airbus or Boeing designs or if selected for the Max, a 1960s throwback.
In my view, if the crews of the 21st century do not have an adequate warning system providing full systems information, then the aircraft is not fit for purpose.
Flightcrew training has become increasingly systemised through CBT and many modern pilots started their flying career with Microsoft rather than in a tiger moth or a C150 and they are now far more SOP and rule based in their approach to problem solving compared to when the original B737 was designed and an EICAS or ECAM is central to all modern flightdecks in order to assist with non normal ops.
Crews in future years will either be flying modern Airbus or Boeing designs or if selected for the Max, a 1960s throwback.
In my view, if the crews of the 21st century do not have an adequate warning system providing full systems information, then the aircraft is not fit for purpose.
