Boeing 737 Max Software Fixes Due to Lion Air Crash Delayed
Originally Posted by SMT Member
Not quite correct. They've estimated a loss of 1BN due to reduced deliveries of 737 frames only. And that's just the losses 'so far', they may well escalate if the grounding is extended. Then comes all the recertification costs, as well as the court cases they are facing from families of survivors, and investors.
It's also worth noticing that Boeing hasn't logged a single order for any aircraft type since the 737 Max was grounded.
It's also worth noticing that Boeing hasn't logged a single order for any aircraft type since the 737 Max was grounded.
Court costs are somewhat limited for most due to I think the Warsaw Convention - that allows for Boeing to take a few risks on life as it is a very small figure per death.
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Coast to Coast...
Posts: 190
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes TUI alone estimate the cost to their operation at 300 million euros. Norwegian probably the same if not more. Money they will want to get back soon before they (Norwegian) go bankrupt.
Originally Posted by Andrewgr2
SMT Member - Why would families of survivors have a court case against Boeing? ��
If that flight was in USA full of Americans, I expect a few family survivor cases would already have been lodged with the courts - even prior the final report.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: back of beyond
Posts: 115
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The STS seems to work primarily through the active FCC which should only be using the airspeed on the selected side.
Flashes from the Archives of Oblivion
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: 03 ACE
Age: 72
Posts: 981
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
http://www.travelweekly.co.uk/articl...urn-to-service
Pretty.much in line with expections !
El Grifo
Pretty.much in line with expections !
El Grifo
Join Date: Aug 2017
Location: UK
Posts: 204
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think so long as you leave it at Flaps1 until 19’999ft there won’t be any issues.
Boeing have said that the real challenge will be to regain customer trust and that pilots trust in the aircraft with crucial to achieving that objective.
As for the lack of orders, why would a company risk its share price by announcing a purchase at this stage?
The MAX will recover from this( pardon the pun)
Boeing have said that the real challenge will be to regain customer trust and that pilots trust in the aircraft with crucial to achieving that objective.
As for the lack of orders, why would a company risk its share price by announcing a purchase at this stage?
The MAX will recover from this( pardon the pun)
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 58
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dave
What surprises me more is that FAA is allowed to be in this Group as they are clearly the incompetent Authority.
With FAA possibly leading this Group, in principle it invalidates it as an independent and neutral critic of the process and end product.
And were is Russia , surely more competent Authority then UAE !
Just an observation.
Regards
Cpt B
With FAA possibly leading this Group, in principle it invalidates it as an independent and neutral critic of the process and end product.
And were is Russia , surely more competent Authority then UAE !
Just an observation.
Regards
Cpt B
Join Date: Dec 2018
Location: Florida
Posts: 186
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Doesn't the FAA have to give its approval for the aircraft to resume flying in and to the USA? Or do you expect the FAA to accept the approval of the other aviation authorities? 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: USA
Posts: 484
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-...r-consultation
Boeing 737 MAX Changes: FAA Targets May 23 Regulator Consultation
Apr 24, 2019 Sean Broderick | Aviation Daily
WASHINGTON—FAA is targeting May 23 for a meeting of global regulators to discuss finalized updates to Boeing’s 737 MAX flight control system, the agency confirmed to Aviation Week.
While much remains up in the air, the gathering is expected to include regulators from around the world, a source with knowledge of the agency’s plans said. Invitations to regulators are in the process of going out, and most—including representatives from Brazil, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Europe, and Indonesia—are expected to participate.
“The FAA is inviting the directors general of civil aviation authorities around the world to discuss the agency’s activities toward ensuring the safe return of Boeing 737 MAX to service,” an agency spokesperson told Aviation Week Apr. 24. “The meeting is intended to provide participants the FAA’s safety analysis that will inform its decision to return the 737 MAX fleet to service in the U.S. when the decision is made. Also, the FAA will provide safety experts to answer any questions participants have related to their respective decisions to return the fleet to service.”
A source with knowledge of the FAA’s thinking said the agency views the meeting as part of an effort to build global consensus to remove flight restrictions put in place, but not part of its own process to determine whether the MAX should return to U.S. skies.
Using the meeting to spotlight the MAX changes hinges on FAA approving Boeing’s updated maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) software and related training. FAA is preparing to conduct certification test flights of the proposed final software configuration—the follow-on to Boeing’s Apr. 16 engineering demonstration flight. If FAA signs off on the system’s performance, the next steps would include approving the complete software package, including documentation. FAA has not received the final package.
Training that accompanies the new configuration also must be approved. An FAA-organized Flight Standardization Board (FSB) has recommended computer-based training to explain MCAS—which was added to the MAX’s speed trim system as a flight-stability function to make the new model handle like the 737 Next Generation—to pilots. But some airlines and regulators are expected to push for a minimum amount of simulator training. One possibility being floated: a compromise that mandates simulator training within a certain timeframe, but not as a precursor to flying the MAX. This would allow airlines to work MCAS scenarios into planned simulator training sessions, minimizing training disruption. Public comments on the FSB are due at the end of April, and are expected to be considered during production of a final report, which would set the MAX’s minimum training standards.
If approval of the modified MCAS’s functionality, underlying software, and related training minima is in place before the May meeting, FAA is not expected to wait long after the session to remove its MAX ban. FAA issued its ban Mar. 13—three days after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, the second 737 MAX 8 accident in five months, and after all non-U.S. MAX operations were prohibited by other regulators. The moves left all 370 in-service MAXs grounded until further notice.
MCAS and how pilots responded to the system’s erroneous operation are at the center of each probe. Boeing determined MCAS, which commands automatic stabilizer trim, needed modifications following the first accident, the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610.
Most airlines with MAXs have removed them from flight schedules well into the summer, opting for a predictable schedule that does not include MAXs over a tentative one that cancels flights as the grounding drags on. Meanwhile, Boeing is working to build a consensus among operators—some of which grounded the aircraft voluntarily. The key constituency being targeted: pilots.
“We think a key voice in all of this will be the pilots for our airlines,” Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg said on the company’s first-quarter earnings call Apr. 24. “We’re working with our airline customers and those pilot voices to ensure that we can build on that going forward. To that end, we hosted multiple sessions around the world; more than 90% of our 50-plus MAX operators to date have had pilots in our simulator sessions with the new software ... I can tell you with those series of sessions that we’ve had around the world, the pilot feedback from the simulator sessions has been excellent.”
While most airlines and pilot groups continue to express general confidence in Boeing and the MAX, specific reactions to the updates have been more reserved. “United pilots have a seat at the table and will closely monitor these changes to ensure they fully and effectively mitigate all identified risks and meet the needs of our pilots to regain full confidence in the MAX,” the airline’s master executive council told its pilots following a meeting at FAA earlier this month.
For Boeing, winning pilots over will mean convincing them that the company has learned from how MCAS’s introduction was handled. While Boeing insists it did not hide MCAS—the system was included in high-level technical briefings to operators, for instance—the flight-control law’s existence was not proactively communicated to pilots. Boeing expected it to operate in the background, and only if certain areas of the flight-envelope were encountered. MCAS was not explained in flight manuals, nor was it covered in MAX-specific training.
The sequence in each MAX accident exposed a failure mode that triggered MCAS with one source of inaccurate data, pushing the aircraft’s nose down and forcing the crew to counter with nose-up inputs to keep it airborne. The sequences also suggested that all flight crews were not sufficiently prepared to a failure scenario linked to the system. Boeing did not proactively explain MCAS and highlight the existing emergency procedure to manage it—executing the stabilizer runaway checklist—until after the Lion Air accident.
“Boeing will, and should, continue to face scrutiny of the ill-designed MCAS and initial non-disclosure of the new flight control logic,” Southwest Airlines Pilots Association President Jon Weaks said in a message to pilots following the Apr. 12 FAA meeting.
Boeing says its software upgrades reduce the likelihood of an erroneous activation, while training and manual updates will shed more light on MCAS.
“Both accidents were a chain of events. One link in that chain of events was the activation of the MCAS system with erroneous angle-of-attack data,” Muilenburg said. “We understand how to address that link. That’s our responsibility. We own that and that’s what the software update does.”
Apr 24, 2019 Sean Broderick | Aviation Daily
WASHINGTON—FAA is targeting May 23 for a meeting of global regulators to discuss finalized updates to Boeing’s 737 MAX flight control system, the agency confirmed to Aviation Week.
While much remains up in the air, the gathering is expected to include regulators from around the world, a source with knowledge of the agency’s plans said. Invitations to regulators are in the process of going out, and most—including representatives from Brazil, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Europe, and Indonesia—are expected to participate.
“The FAA is inviting the directors general of civil aviation authorities around the world to discuss the agency’s activities toward ensuring the safe return of Boeing 737 MAX to service,” an agency spokesperson told Aviation Week Apr. 24. “The meeting is intended to provide participants the FAA’s safety analysis that will inform its decision to return the 737 MAX fleet to service in the U.S. when the decision is made. Also, the FAA will provide safety experts to answer any questions participants have related to their respective decisions to return the fleet to service.”
A source with knowledge of the FAA’s thinking said the agency views the meeting as part of an effort to build global consensus to remove flight restrictions put in place, but not part of its own process to determine whether the MAX should return to U.S. skies.
Using the meeting to spotlight the MAX changes hinges on FAA approving Boeing’s updated maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) software and related training. FAA is preparing to conduct certification test flights of the proposed final software configuration—the follow-on to Boeing’s Apr. 16 engineering demonstration flight. If FAA signs off on the system’s performance, the next steps would include approving the complete software package, including documentation. FAA has not received the final package.
Training that accompanies the new configuration also must be approved. An FAA-organized Flight Standardization Board (FSB) has recommended computer-based training to explain MCAS—which was added to the MAX’s speed trim system as a flight-stability function to make the new model handle like the 737 Next Generation—to pilots. But some airlines and regulators are expected to push for a minimum amount of simulator training. One possibility being floated: a compromise that mandates simulator training within a certain timeframe, but not as a precursor to flying the MAX. This would allow airlines to work MCAS scenarios into planned simulator training sessions, minimizing training disruption. Public comments on the FSB are due at the end of April, and are expected to be considered during production of a final report, which would set the MAX’s minimum training standards.
If approval of the modified MCAS’s functionality, underlying software, and related training minima is in place before the May meeting, FAA is not expected to wait long after the session to remove its MAX ban. FAA issued its ban Mar. 13—three days after the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, the second 737 MAX 8 accident in five months, and after all non-U.S. MAX operations were prohibited by other regulators. The moves left all 370 in-service MAXs grounded until further notice.
MCAS and how pilots responded to the system’s erroneous operation are at the center of each probe. Boeing determined MCAS, which commands automatic stabilizer trim, needed modifications following the first accident, the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610.
Most airlines with MAXs have removed them from flight schedules well into the summer, opting for a predictable schedule that does not include MAXs over a tentative one that cancels flights as the grounding drags on. Meanwhile, Boeing is working to build a consensus among operators—some of which grounded the aircraft voluntarily. The key constituency being targeted: pilots.
“We think a key voice in all of this will be the pilots for our airlines,” Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg said on the company’s first-quarter earnings call Apr. 24. “We’re working with our airline customers and those pilot voices to ensure that we can build on that going forward. To that end, we hosted multiple sessions around the world; more than 90% of our 50-plus MAX operators to date have had pilots in our simulator sessions with the new software ... I can tell you with those series of sessions that we’ve had around the world, the pilot feedback from the simulator sessions has been excellent.”
While most airlines and pilot groups continue to express general confidence in Boeing and the MAX, specific reactions to the updates have been more reserved. “United pilots have a seat at the table and will closely monitor these changes to ensure they fully and effectively mitigate all identified risks and meet the needs of our pilots to regain full confidence in the MAX,” the airline’s master executive council told its pilots following a meeting at FAA earlier this month.
For Boeing, winning pilots over will mean convincing them that the company has learned from how MCAS’s introduction was handled. While Boeing insists it did not hide MCAS—the system was included in high-level technical briefings to operators, for instance—the flight-control law’s existence was not proactively communicated to pilots. Boeing expected it to operate in the background, and only if certain areas of the flight-envelope were encountered. MCAS was not explained in flight manuals, nor was it covered in MAX-specific training.
The sequence in each MAX accident exposed a failure mode that triggered MCAS with one source of inaccurate data, pushing the aircraft’s nose down and forcing the crew to counter with nose-up inputs to keep it airborne. The sequences also suggested that all flight crews were not sufficiently prepared to a failure scenario linked to the system. Boeing did not proactively explain MCAS and highlight the existing emergency procedure to manage it—executing the stabilizer runaway checklist—until after the Lion Air accident.
“Boeing will, and should, continue to face scrutiny of the ill-designed MCAS and initial non-disclosure of the new flight control logic,” Southwest Airlines Pilots Association President Jon Weaks said in a message to pilots following the Apr. 12 FAA meeting.
Boeing says its software upgrades reduce the likelihood of an erroneous activation, while training and manual updates will shed more light on MCAS.
“Both accidents were a chain of events. One link in that chain of events was the activation of the MCAS system with erroneous angle-of-attack data,” Muilenburg said. “We understand how to address that link. That’s our responsibility. We own that and that’s what the software update does.”
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 58
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lake
The way I see it it is to approve or disapprove whatever Boeing and FAA has cooked up this time.
After all it was China EASA and Canada that grounded the Max and not the FAA.
Having the FAA in the group invalidates anything the Group finds.
The Question with a big Q is can we trust FAA?
Answer is: Not for now.
So as Canada put it bluntly: Whatever FAA certify , we will also have to certify independently!
No more trusting the FAA, for now.
I would also add that there is such a practical pressure. ( What if it is permanently grounded?)
And economical/political pressure . ( Boeing existence, ultimately!)
That leads me to think this so-called group is rather a joke.
After all it was China EASA and Canada that grounded the Max and not the FAA.
Having the FAA in the group invalidates anything the Group finds.
The Question with a big Q is can we trust FAA?
Answer is: Not for now.
So as Canada put it bluntly: Whatever FAA certify , we will also have to certify independently!
No more trusting the FAA, for now.
I would also add that there is such a practical pressure. ( What if it is permanently grounded?)
And economical/political pressure . ( Boeing existence, ultimately!)
That leads me to think this so-called group is rather a joke.
Join Date: Feb 2019
Location: shiny side up
Posts: 431
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A noticeable exception - The Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority.
These aviation groups, it is really little difference in ICAO/EASA with Airbus and Thales keeping it all contained.
Looking at that group, I see very little consensus in a 90 day timeframe. After being involved in the RNAV/RNPAPCH/RNPAR aircraft validation/certification issues with ICAO vs FAA, this is just not going to go smoothly.
It's also worth noticing that Boeing hasn't logged a single order for any aircraft type since the 737 Max was grounded.
In yesterdays Boeing guidance call, they stated this, noting actual sales/cancellations are counted now, (instead of simply adjusting backlog or offsetting new order counts) so their net loss is 200 orders for 737 and 10 787 so far for the year, while Airbus net loss so far is 58...Same as before, just a different way to account for things.
Last edited by Smythe; 25th Apr 2019 at 14:06.
Originally Posted by Smooth Airperator
Yes TUI alone estimate the cost to their operation at 300 million euros. Norwegian probably the same if not more. Money they will want to get back soon before they (Norwegian) go bankrupt.
No doubt there may be applied pressure by US Govt on some countrys to reduce the claim but if Boeing doesn't pay then you will lose orders for a number of years and Boeing will be discounting like crazy to get rid of the planes.
Max is toxic and believe we will be lucky to see any flying and carrying passengers by Christmas.
Originally Posted by BluSdUp
The way I see it it is to approve or disapprove whatever Boeing and FAA has cooked up this time.
After all it was China EASA and Canada that grounded the Max and not the FAA.
Having the FAA in the group invalidates anything the Group finds.
The Question with a big Q is can we trust FAA?
Answer is: Not for now.
So as Canada put it bluntly: Whatever FAA certify , we will also have to certify independently!
No more trusting the FAA, for now.
I would also add that there is such a practical pressure. ( What if it is permanently grounded?)
And economical/political pressure . ( Boeing existence, ultimately!)
That leads me to think this so-called group is rather a joke.
After all it was China EASA and Canada that grounded the Max and not the FAA.
Having the FAA in the group invalidates anything the Group finds.
The Question with a big Q is can we trust FAA?
Answer is: Not for now.
So as Canada put it bluntly: Whatever FAA certify , we will also have to certify independently!
No more trusting the FAA, for now.
I would also add that there is such a practical pressure. ( What if it is permanently grounded?)
And economical/political pressure . ( Boeing existence, ultimately!)
That leads me to think this so-called group is rather a joke.
Years ago, we had roughly a week of meetings with the Indonesians (in Everett) to get their approval of the 747-400 after Garuda bought some. Several years later another Indonesian operator picked up some used 747-400s (Lion Air IIRC) and they came back to approve 'the differences' since Garuda had bought CF6-80C2, and the used 747s had PW4000s (although I suspect the PW4000 differences meeting was really more about their having an expense paid trip to the US to do some shopping than any real concern over the differences between the GE and Pratt engines).
Join Date: Feb 2013
Location: 60 north
Age: 58
Posts: 17
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
tdracer
Indeed, this is the process.
FAA and EASA certifying in parallel and close cooperation.
That trust has now been broken, if not practically , most certainly on a PR level towards PAX.
I see the usefulness of a " Group" but my main concern is that I would rather not ever see such a preliminary report as with Lion and Ethiopian.
I am extremely concerned of Boeing having taken the MAX a step to fare.
I do appreciate You correcting me , and I hope the MAX will be flying soon.
BUT there better not be any even astronomically remote booby-traps in that old airframe when it takes to the air again, as it is MY fat ass and a 340hr FO that is the testpilots for the next event!!
So
Lets hope Boeing has a plan B if the Group says NO!
I dont much care, I love the 737-800, She can bark and she bites if You are not careful.
But if it is going to be on the same Type with only 2 hrs on a iPad it better be the same!!
I have done enough stalls and spin in smaller planes to respect that corner of the envelope on a transport jet.
I hope FAA and EASA also realize that this system will come back to haunt them, if not done properly.
Lastly I would like to say that flight testing is not a democratic Parliament exercise, so that is why I look upon this latest " Group" as rather a strange thing.
I will try to keep an open mind, but I would be much more happy with a redesign of the tail so that the aircraft was 100% stable inside the flight envelope. Like the 737-800
Sincerely
Cpt B
FAA and EASA certifying in parallel and close cooperation.
That trust has now been broken, if not practically , most certainly on a PR level towards PAX.
I see the usefulness of a " Group" but my main concern is that I would rather not ever see such a preliminary report as with Lion and Ethiopian.
I am extremely concerned of Boeing having taken the MAX a step to fare.
I do appreciate You correcting me , and I hope the MAX will be flying soon.
BUT there better not be any even astronomically remote booby-traps in that old airframe when it takes to the air again, as it is MY fat ass and a 340hr FO that is the testpilots for the next event!!
So
Lets hope Boeing has a plan B if the Group says NO!
I dont much care, I love the 737-800, She can bark and she bites if You are not careful.
But if it is going to be on the same Type with only 2 hrs on a iPad it better be the same!!
I have done enough stalls and spin in smaller planes to respect that corner of the envelope on a transport jet.
I hope FAA and EASA also realize that this system will come back to haunt them, if not done properly.
Lastly I would like to say that flight testing is not a democratic Parliament exercise, so that is why I look upon this latest " Group" as rather a strange thing.
I will try to keep an open mind, but I would be much more happy with a redesign of the tail so that the aircraft was 100% stable inside the flight envelope. Like the 737-800
Sincerely
Cpt B
Originally Posted by Andrewgr2
SMT Member - Why would families of survivors have a court case against Boeing? ��
To be clear, strictly speaking in most cases based on bilateral agreement, FAA certifies US products and EASA validates the FAA certification as having found compliance with EASA CS25 and then EASA issues a Type Certificate. There are variations for aspects which EASA chooses to retain compliance finding, and there can be many meetings between authorities to resolve certification issues. It would not surprise me at all, that all that EASA and the certification authorities of non-EU countries will opt to retain compliance finding for the "fix." Wouldn't surprise me if the authorities meeting on May 23, hosted by FAA, has this very point on the agenda.
Join Date: Oct 2002
Location: London UK
Posts: 7,328
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
One possibility being floated: a compromise that mandates simulator training within a certain timeframe, but not as a precursor to flying the MAX. This would allow airlines to work MCAS scenarios into planned simulator training sessions, minimizing training disruption
I can't see any certification body, other than the FAA, regarding such an approach with anything other than complete ridicule.
