Frontier Airbus "blasted" engine...!?
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'Captain, are you absolutely sure you want to deploy the flaps and slats?'
This raises some interesting questions.
What if on approach the door detaches and takes some slats with it?
I'd rather pick a long runway and land clean..
I wonder what this crew did.
This raises some interesting questions.
What if on approach the door detaches and takes some slats with it?
I'd rather pick a long runway and land clean..
I wonder what this crew did.
Thanks, that makes sense. We don't hear much about unlatched A320 family fan cowls nowadays following the respective mods on both CFM- and IAE-powered aircraft to make the unlatched state more obvious.
The reverser doors, on the other hand, don't appear to have any such conspicuity aids and, as the photo of the aircraft back on the ground shows, they will settle in the completely closed position in the absence of any aerodynamic forces.
So my conclusion would be the same as yours - the aircraft departed with the fan cowl doors correctly latched, reverser doors closed but unlatched.
Given the damage that even the relatively light fan cowl door has previously done to the stabilizer as it departed, it's fortunate that the much heavier reverser door remained attached to the pylon.
"The engine continued to operate normally and the aircraft, an Airbus 320, landed safely," the statement reads. "Safety is our top priority at Frontier Airlines and we would like to acknowledge the professionalism of our pilots and flight attendants. We are working to get our passengers to their destinations as quickly as possible.”
The assymetric drag must have been horrendous. Kudos to the crew getting it down safe. Final approach and flare must have been tricky with changinging attitude.
Edit: I thought one could not latch the fan cowls with the c ducts unlatched. Certainly on the bigger fan engines there is a large red handle that hangs down when un latched making it impossible to close the fan cowls. Its that long since I've opened an A320's c duct.
Nope, I was wrong. CFM56 has no such 'idiot' handle.
V2500 is a bit different and also has the access panel hanging down underneath.
It also has an orange flag which hangs down if the fwd C-duct latch is not engaged. Not shown in your video, but when they engage the fwd latch, you can see a rod with a spring, that's the flag assembly.
Ah, right, i see it now.
So, this is either a huge and unknown mechanical failure of all the latches or procedures not followed, again. If the T/R is disarmed, the Slats deactivated and all the associated flags are hung in the flightdeck, then this kind of thing really should not happen. We, as certifying engineers really need to dig in and kick back against the pressures to get an on time departure or get to the next job and just follow procedures-everytime. Lives are at stake.
So, this is either a huge and unknown mechanical failure of all the latches or procedures not followed, again. If the T/R is disarmed, the Slats deactivated and all the associated flags are hung in the flightdeck, then this kind of thing really should not happen. We, as certifying engineers really need to dig in and kick back against the pressures to get an on time departure or get to the next job and just follow procedures-everytime. Lives are at stake.
Just to clarify, Frontier's A320s are CFM-powered, so no interlock or conspicuity aids on the reverser door latches unlike the IAE-powered aircraft.
Does anyone know if the latches are of the type that can be partially closed (to avoid impaling yourself on them) without the hooks engaging ?
They aren't exactly hard to see when they're fully open:
Does anyone know if the latches are of the type that can be partially closed (to avoid impaling yourself on them) without the hooks engaging ?
They aren't exactly hard to see when they're fully open:
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You may find this YouTube video interesting: 'The Airbus A320 family engine access doors case'
As well as a relevant journal article: 'The airbus A320 family fan cowl door safety modification: a human factors scenario analysis'
As well as a relevant journal article: 'The airbus A320 family fan cowl door safety modification: a human factors scenario analysis'
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The airbus A320 family fan cowl door safety modification: a human factors scenario analysis:
Purpose
The Airbus A320 family engine fan cowl doors (FCDs) safety issue is known to the industry for almost 18 years; however, it has not been addressed adequately by the aircraft manufacturer and the various operators and regulating authorities. The purpose of this paper is to examine in a systematic way the possible operational and safety implications of a new modification on the engine FCDs.
Design/methodology/approach
An array of error-prone scenarios is presented and analysed under the prism of human factors in a non-exhaustive qualitative scenario analysis.
Findings
All examined scenarios are considered more or less probable. A number of accident prevention solutions are proposed for each of the scenario examined, in view of the acceptance and implementation of this modification by operators.
Research limitations/implications
As these scenarios are neither exhaustive nor have been tested/validated in actual aircraft maintenance practice, the further analysis is necessary. A substantial follow-up survey should take place, which should include a wider array of scenarios. This would allow obtaining the necessary data for a quantitative (statistical) analysis.
Practical implications
This case study identifies issues in relation to this modification, introduced by Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which may prove problematic from the point of view of safety effectiveness and disruption of operations.
Originality/value
This case study examines a long-standing aviation safety issue and the implications of a solution proposed by the aircraft manufacturer and adopted by EASA. This can be useful in increasing the awareness around these issues and highlight the importance of a human-centric and scenario-based design of engineering modifications towards minimising error in aircraft technical operations.
Purpose
The Airbus A320 family engine fan cowl doors (FCDs) safety issue is known to the industry for almost 18 years; however, it has not been addressed adequately by the aircraft manufacturer and the various operators and regulating authorities. The purpose of this paper is to examine in a systematic way the possible operational and safety implications of a new modification on the engine FCDs.
Design/methodology/approach
An array of error-prone scenarios is presented and analysed under the prism of human factors in a non-exhaustive qualitative scenario analysis.
Findings
All examined scenarios are considered more or less probable. A number of accident prevention solutions are proposed for each of the scenario examined, in view of the acceptance and implementation of this modification by operators.
Research limitations/implications
As these scenarios are neither exhaustive nor have been tested/validated in actual aircraft maintenance practice, the further analysis is necessary. A substantial follow-up survey should take place, which should include a wider array of scenarios. This would allow obtaining the necessary data for a quantitative (statistical) analysis.
Practical implications
This case study identifies issues in relation to this modification, introduced by Airbus and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which may prove problematic from the point of view of safety effectiveness and disruption of operations.
Originality/value
This case study examines a long-standing aviation safety issue and the implications of a solution proposed by the aircraft manufacturer and adopted by EASA. This can be useful in increasing the awareness around these issues and highlight the importance of a human-centric and scenario-based design of engineering modifications towards minimising error in aircraft technical operations.
The fan cowl door mods are indeed intended to ensure that they get correctly latched and therefore cannot open of their own accord.
But even correctly latched fan cowl doors don't stand much of a chance if they are being prised open by a departing reverser door, as may well have happened in this case.
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And flags at the cowls. However, according to the training documents to the A321NEO with Leap engines i have seen, the ECAM warning only comes on if at least 2 latches are open, not for a single latch though.
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Pilots reported to ATC that the cabin crew reported the problem as an engine fire but they saw no engine problems from their instruments. With the loss of ducting should they not have lost thrust on the right side, and also the drag of the open covers should have been an indicator. Is the Airbus automation enough to compensate to the point where the pilots felt and saw no indication of a problem? As an engineer on land bound mobile equipment I remember one of our first production intent engines with FADEC controls being assembled with a timing gear assembled one tooth out of time. The FADEC compensated so it passed the factory dyno test, engine was installed in a machine, operated perfectly until at 37.3 hours valves bouncing off piston tops broke a valve head off and things went bust. New technology can cover a lot of mistakes - for awhile.
I assume you’re asking about the off-coloured section on the lower leading edge of the winglet. Could this be a structural repair?
Only half a speed-brake
The basic logic of the F/CTL system is that it will manipulate the ailerons, spoilers, elevator, stabilizer and rudder so that the path of the A/C matches what the pilot demands with his inputs on the controls. As such, in the situation presented here, the system would compensate.
We are not trained to know how far before the physical end-stop of the surfaces it will go. I.e. once the system is unable to cope and the aircraft departs the commanded trajectory, is there any more control authority available to the pilot? Hard to even speculate, it is designed very carefully.
An anecdote: during type conversion training, the 2nd lesson should be to have an engine fail on take-off. The trainee is then required to only control pitch up or down, and observe the F/CTL inherent reaction to the asymmetry. If memory serves well, she will end with about 7 degrees of bank, un-coordinated turn but climb away safely. Well, climb around.
We are not trained to know how far before the physical end-stop of the surfaces it will go. I.e. once the system is unable to cope and the aircraft departs the commanded trajectory, is there any more control authority available to the pilot? Hard to even speculate, it is designed very carefully.
An anecdote: during type conversion training, the 2nd lesson should be to have an engine fail on take-off. The trainee is then required to only control pitch up or down, and observe the F/CTL inherent reaction to the asymmetry. If memory serves well, she will end with about 7 degrees of bank, un-coordinated turn but climb away safely. Well, climb around.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 2nd Dec 2018 at 05:42.
Pilots reported to ATC that the cabin crew reported the problem as an engine fire but they saw no engine problems from their instruments. With the loss of ducting should they not have lost thrust on the right side, and also the drag of the open covers should have been an indicator. Is the Airbus automation enough to compensate to the point where the pilots felt and saw no indication of a problem? As an engineer on land bound mobile equipment I remember one of our first production intent engines with FADEC controls being assembled with a timing gear assembled one tooth out of time. The FADEC compensated so it passed the factory dyno test, engine was installed in a machine, operated perfectly until at 37.3 hours valves bouncing off piston tops broke a valve head off and things went bust. New technology can cover a lot of mistakes - for awhile.
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Asking current and experienced 320 family pilots.
What you do in this situation? I take it there's no actual procedure for this type of event, but curious as to what approach you pro pilots would take. Just throwing a few things in there as questions.
Stabilize, assess, check lists, look at ECAM for failures/warnings , speak to your tech people, send your FO back to have a look?
Deploy slat/flaps and risk further unknown effects or land flaps up?
What you do in this situation? I take it there's no actual procedure for this type of event, but curious as to what approach you pro pilots would take. Just throwing a few things in there as questions.
Stabilize, assess, check lists, look at ECAM for failures/warnings , speak to your tech people, send your FO back to have a look?
Deploy slat/flaps and risk further unknown effects or land flaps up?