Air Niugini Aircraft crash, Truk Lagoon
Yes indeed, but remember one was a planned ditching, meaning Sully intended to ditch in the Hudson (albeit he had few viable options). Air Niugini was not intending to hit the water (we hope...). So the configurations (including gear down for Air Niugini, gear up for Sully) and speeds at impact would have been sufficiently different to account for damage and injuries.
Interesting details in the Preliminary Report regarding the cockpit crew rest prior to duty. 10.3 hours off duty and reported sleep of 5.5 and 6.6 hours. Not ideal and barely legal.
Captain appears to have a respectable amount of time in the aircraft. All in the left seat. F.O. has decent total time, with very little in the 737.
Interesting that the CVR found its way out of its rack and out of a substantially undamaged fuselage and on to the sea floor. Where is it located in the aircraft? Is it designed to drop out?
“The SSFDR was located on its rack within the aircraft and was recovered by local divers.
The SSCVR was recovered from the seabed by US Navy divers about 440 feet (135 metres) back along the flight path from the 04 threshold, in the area ahead of the first point of water impact.”
“The SSFDR was located on its rack within the aircraft and was recovered by local divers.
The SSCVR was recovered from the seabed by US Navy divers about 440 feet (135 metres) back along the flight path from the 04 threshold, in the area ahead of the first point of water impact.”
He was too careful in his descriptions, not what I would expect from a traumatic experience.
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Yes indeed, but remember one was a planned ditching, meaning Sully intended to ditch in the Hudson (albeit he had few viable options). Air Niugini was not intending to hit the water (we hope...). So the configurations (including gear down for Air Niugini, gear up for Sully) and speeds at impact would have been sufficiently different to account for damage and injuries.
I'm a bit surprised that there hasn't been an attempt to raise it yet. JA2 was up in 55 hours (yes this is not SF but really, a month?).
Doubt that they lift it at all. Remote location without heavy lift gear nearby. All parts of the plane are a total write off in sea water. I assume that they leave it as dive spot. What relevant additional information do you expect by lifting the plane, which you can not get by a nice clear warm water dive in the tropics?
Hope they do lift it. It is about 50 tons of alien materials that don't belong in that fragile ecosystem. We have enough trouble with illegal waste dumping around this region. Must be removed.
Going by the below bit in the prelim I'd hazard a guess the gear was down.
The initial examination of video taken by the divers showed that the main landing gear separated from the aircraft during the water impact. The rear fuselage behind the wing had fractured during the impact sequence.
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Interesting details in the Preliminary Report regarding the cockpit crew rest prior to duty. 10.3 hours off duty and reported sleep of 5.5 and 6.6 hours. Not ideal and barely legal.
Captain appears to have a respectable amount of time in the aircraft. All in the left seat. F.O. has decent total time, with very little in the 737.
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True. Heaven forbid that the airplane contaminate the wreckage of the 10 Japanese warships and 30 merchant ships already at the bottom of the lagoon.
If for no other reason, raising it would answer this question:
That aside, I don't believe for a moment that it will be allowed to remain submerged indefinitely.
The aircraft sank upright, and is resting on the floor of the lagoon, so the underside of the rear fuselage isn't readily accessible, even to a diver.
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Reading the Milburns' comments above all I can say is that if I stopped flying with every airline which has had an accident, I guess I wouldn't be doing much flying today! I appreciate that accidents can be attributed to poor training etc., but many more can be attributed to a multitude of other causes which can happen to any airline. One fatality in 45 years is pretty good going and it would certainly not put me off flying with Air Niugini today.
It is important to factor in the number of flights done over that time. Big airlines with a thousand or more flights per day would have an accident every month at the same accident rate.
The Space Shuttle program had an accident rate of about 1%, that would mean about 10 crashes per day at the place I work at...
Appalling report
I hope these guys never fly again. That is the most appalling report I have ever read. Six Sink Rate, seven Glideslipe warnings and two Pull Up warnings and they ignored them and talked over them. "The crew had experienced these before and considered them nuisance alerts"- astonishing!! At 300 feet they were descending at 1530 fpm. They continued past the missed approach point and entered IMC. Just unbelievable. Same crew, previous day flew below the glide and got 28 Glideslope alerts and ignored them. Speechless.
Last edited by Maisk Rotum; 18th Jul 2019 at 07:30.
Well, we knew it would be disappointing reading.
OM policy presented in the report doesn't appear to include discussion on conditions required to descend below DA/MDA, however the Jepp review part of the OM notes actions for undertaking an MAP. As the same crew had studiously avoided response to a similar number of EGPWS/GPWS alerts on the prior flight into the same airport, that would appear to be an area of reinforcement training worth some effort by the company. Any discussion on criteria to continue an approach below DA(H)/MDA appears to be missing.
The images show that the VNAV and LNAV was properly displayed all the way to the water landing. FPV was not displayed in any PFD, but is available... The comments of P18 state that the pilot disconnected the AP when it commenced a pitch up for the GA... which doesn't gel with the function of the APFD of the displayed VNAV, and the altitude selected in the first cockpit image, however, what happened at that point is important to understand as to why the plane ended up out of sorts. The CVR transcript, and the DFDR would indicate what altitude was set on the MCP, and when it was set/reset to the MAP height. The change to VNAV mode that happened at the point that the AP was disconnected suggests that the aircraft did capture the MDA, and the images are of the MDA reset to the MAP alt. The importance of that is the fact it ensures that the aircraft would be destabilised by an ALT CAP at MDA, which sets up the wild ride thereafter. The "raw" data remains valid, the crew just end up throwing away a "stable" approach at relatively low level, disconnecting AP, losing FD, and going to manual thrust, which appears to have been reduced promptly.
The volume of recommendations looks great, but seems to have weight rather than relevance to recommendations on how to stop crew disregarding EGPWS/GPWS alerts and warnings, or continuing a descent to impact, well below MDA, without having a piece of concrete in front of them. The comments on the PAPI comes up before the visibility went bad due to the rain shower. Thereafter, having to turn on the windscreen wipers to get the seaweed off so that you can see the barnacles and oysters on the submerged rocks would make it unlikely that a PAPI was being followed.
At "100" is there any expectation that there should be a threshold clearly visible and a runway with all of the pretty markings and lights etc, somewhere near the window? If not needed at "100" when the MDA was some 20 seconds earlier, then at what point would the crew get a bit uncomfortable with the waves under their window.
Little in the recommendations appear to work on the underlying problem, continuing an approach below minima without seeing the runway, lights, PAPI etc.
GPWS is not installed just to increase the ZFW.
Maisk Rotum, #277 ‘appalling report’
Alternatively a well considered, thorough report identifying significant issues within our industry.
If the ‘appalling’ interpretation relates to human performance, then why is this misappropriation any different (in principle) to any human performance, including reading, interpreting and commenting on a report.
We have yet another opportunity for learning, but what and how.
Alternatively a well considered, thorough report identifying significant issues within our industry.
If the ‘appalling’ interpretation relates to human performance, then why is this misappropriation any different (in principle) to any human performance, including reading, interpreting and commenting on a report.
We have yet another opportunity for learning, but what and how.