And then there was only one
Statistics will be rolled out to ‘prove’ how safe
single pilot or autonomous pilotless aircraft will be
Not my answer, the thought is abhorrent but
I have no doubt it will happen
Single pilot airliners within 30 years and pilotless within 50
Going to be a very long, long time before pax hop on a pilotless aircraft IMHO, or even cargo ops.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3532398/ao2008070.pdf
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3532398/ao2008070.pdf
5.6 Final comments and lessons for new systems
The investigation into the in-flight upset occurrence involving QPA on 7 October 2008 was difficult and took an extensive amount of time. It covered a range of complicated issues, including some that had rarely been considered in depth by previous aircraft accident investigations (such as system safety assessments and single event effects).
Ultimately, the occurrence involved a design limitation in the flight control system that had not been previously identified by the aircraft manufacturer, and a failure mode with the ADIRU that had not been previously identified by the ADIRU manufacturer. Given the increasing complexity of such systems, this investigation has offered an insight into the types of issues that will become relevant for future investigations. It also identified a number of specific lessons or reminders for the manufacturers of new complex, safety-critical systems to consider. These include:
• System safety assessments (SSAs) and other design evaluation activities should recognise that ADIRUs and similar types of equipment can generate a wide range of patterns of incorrect data, including patterns not previously experienced.
• Failure mode effects analyses (FMEAs) have a limited ability to identify all equipment failure modes, particularly for complex, highly-integrated systems.
• Where practicable for safety-critical functions, SSA and other design evaluation activities should consider the effects of different values of system inputs in each mode of operation, particularly during transitions between modes.
• The BITE for ADIRUs and similar types of equipment should check the results of each key stage in the processing of output data.
• SEEs are a potential hazard to aircraft systems that contain high-density integrated circuits. Designers should consider the risk of SEE and include specific features in the system design to mitigate the effects of such events, especially in systems with a potentially significant influence on flight safety.
• The in-service performance records for safety-critical line-replaceable units should include all reported performance problems, not just those that result in the removal of the unit from the aircraft.
• The records for the key components within safety-critical systems should include details such as production or batch codes as well as the part number where practicable.
A broader lesson concerns the safety assessment activities needed for complex systems. In recent years there have been developments in the guidance material for system development processes and research into new approaches for SSA. However, design engineers and safety analysts also perform a safety-critical function, yet the investigation found little published research that has examined the human factors issues affecting such personnel. In other words, there has been limited research that has systematically evaluated how these personnel conduct their evaluations of systems, and how the design of their tasks, tools, training and guidance material can be improved so that the likelihood of design errors is minimised. The need for further research and development in this area will become more important as system complexity increases over time.
Ultimately, the occurrence involved a design limitation in the flight control system that had not been previously identified by the aircraft manufacturer, and a failure mode with the ADIRU that had not been previously identified by the ADIRU manufacturer. Given the increasing complexity of such systems, this investigation has offered an insight into the types of issues that will become relevant for future investigations. It also identified a number of specific lessons or reminders for the manufacturers of new complex, safety-critical systems to consider. These include:
• System safety assessments (SSAs) and other design evaluation activities should recognise that ADIRUs and similar types of equipment can generate a wide range of patterns of incorrect data, including patterns not previously experienced.
• Failure mode effects analyses (FMEAs) have a limited ability to identify all equipment failure modes, particularly for complex, highly-integrated systems.
• Where practicable for safety-critical functions, SSA and other design evaluation activities should consider the effects of different values of system inputs in each mode of operation, particularly during transitions between modes.
• The BITE for ADIRUs and similar types of equipment should check the results of each key stage in the processing of output data.
• SEEs are a potential hazard to aircraft systems that contain high-density integrated circuits. Designers should consider the risk of SEE and include specific features in the system design to mitigate the effects of such events, especially in systems with a potentially significant influence on flight safety.
• The in-service performance records for safety-critical line-replaceable units should include all reported performance problems, not just those that result in the removal of the unit from the aircraft.
• The records for the key components within safety-critical systems should include details such as production or batch codes as well as the part number where practicable.
A broader lesson concerns the safety assessment activities needed for complex systems. In recent years there have been developments in the guidance material for system development processes and research into new approaches for SSA. However, design engineers and safety analysts also perform a safety-critical function, yet the investigation found little published research that has examined the human factors issues affecting such personnel. In other words, there has been limited research that has systematically evaluated how these personnel conduct their evaluations of systems, and how the design of their tasks, tools, training and guidance material can be improved so that the likelihood of design errors is minimised. The need for further research and development in this area will become more important as system complexity increases over time.
What is worse is para 6.3 (bolding mine),
• It is very likely that the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) data-spike failure mode involved a problem with the data packaging and queuing within the ADIRU’s central processing unit module. This fault resulted in numerous data anomalies, including air data reference parameters being intermittently transmitted with the data or label of another parameter. Despite extensive testing and analysis, the exact origins of the failure mode could not be determined.
• Tests and analyses showed that the air data inertial reference unit data-spike failure mode was probably not triggered by a software bug, software corruption, hardware fault, physical environment factors (such as temperature of vibration), or from electromagnetic interference.
• The three known occurrences of the air data inertial reference unit data-spike failure mode occurred on two A330 aircraft operated by the same operator; however, no factors related to the operator’s aircraft configuration, operating practices, or maintenance practices were identified that were associated with the failure mode.
• The flight crew’s responses to the warnings and cautions, the pitch-down events, and the consequences of the pitch-down events, demonstrated sound judgement and a professional approach.
• The three known occurrences of the air data inertial reference unit data-spike failure mode occurred on two A330 aircraft operated by the same operator; however, no factors related to the operator’s aircraft configuration, operating practices, or maintenance practices were identified that were associated with the failure mode.
• The flight crew’s responses to the warnings and cautions, the pitch-down events, and the consequences of the pitch-down events, demonstrated sound judgement and a professional approach.
Also,
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24550/...503722_001.pdf
Things went downhill for the PIC, Captain Sullivan, post event, PTSD.
QF 72
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24550/...503722_001.pdf
Then there was,
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20010207-0
The difficulty in testing software, I understand, is determining ALL the possible failure modes. Pilots are here to stay.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24550/...503722_001.pdf
When the upset event occurred and the primary flight display indicated an underspeed, then an overspeed condition, as well as the slip/skid indicator showing full right deflection, the crew experienced a situation that had previously been considered not possible.
QF 72
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24550/...503722_001.pdf
Erroneous acceleration values sourced from the Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) and flagged as valid to the aircraft precipitated an in-flight upset as the aircraft climbed through FL365.......The software anomaly was not detected in the original testing and certification of the ADIRU.
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=20010207-0
Following a nighttime flight from Barcelona to Bilbao, the crew positioned the plane for a runway 30 approach and landing. During their final ILS approach, the aircraft encountered heavy turbulence at about 200 feet agl. with gusts up to 65 mph. The aircraft encountered windshear with 1.25G updraft, downdraft and a tailwind gust at just 70 feet agl. When the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) sounded, the captain called for a go-around while pulling on the sidestick, reportedly without pressing his priority control button. The combination of dynamic winds and the crew actions created a situation that triggered the airplane's alpha protection system. As the crew applied TOGA power for a go-around, with both pilots pulling back on their sidesticks, the alpha protection law reduced the elevator nose-up command. Instead of a go- around, the aircraft struck the runway with a vertical speed of approx. 1,200 fpm. The nosegear collapsed and the aircraft skidded 3,280 feet (about 1000 m) down the runway before coming to a stop.
Probable Cause:
"The cause of the accident was the activation of the angle of attack protection system which, under a particular combination of vertical gusts and windshear and the simultaneous actions of both crew members on the sidesticks, not considered in the design, prevented the aeroplane from pitching up and flaring during the landing."
Probable Cause:
"The cause of the accident was the activation of the angle of attack protection system which, under a particular combination of vertical gusts and windshear and the simultaneous actions of both crew members on the sidesticks, not considered in the design, prevented the aeroplane from pitching up and flaring during the landing."
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit
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Statistics will be rolled out to ‘prove’ how safe
single pilot or autonomous pilotless aircraft will be
single pilot or autonomous pilotless aircraft will be
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I think you're right.......................
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Originally Posted by stilton 
Statistics will be rolled out to ‘prove’ how safe
single pilot or autonomous pilotless aircraft will be
Not my answer, the thought is abhorrent but
I have no doubt it will happen
Single pilot airliners within 30 years and pilotless within 50
Statistics will be rolled out to ‘prove’ how safe
single pilot or autonomous pilotless aircraft will be
Not my answer, the thought is abhorrent but
I have no doubt it will happen
Single pilot airliners within 30 years and pilotless within 50
The world is changing rapidly
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My prediction is that it will be self driving cars that desensitise the public to having fully automatic transport. IF fully self driving cars are successful then I think that aviation might end up down the same path. I also think that fully self driving cars will not be here as soon as some are predicting.
As for when the robo cars get here, too much effort is being thrown at this for it not eventually work out in some form. The hold up is going to making machines capable enough to understand human communication. This has to happen since mixed computer and human traffic is bound to happen, or at least the programming needs to be able to understand human traffic controllers (i.e. police or school crossing guards). When computers get to the point that they can understand humans that they well, then many other professions besides pilots, cabbies, and truckers will have their prospects greatly altered.
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It will be a decision by the beancounters (as usual)..
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Personally, I doubt automated aircraft will be in operation in significant numbers before VR makes travel obsolete for most of us. I won't be making many more business trips once we have VR drones installed at our customer sites so we can move things around and install new hardware from here, without having to physically ship a body to do it.
Combine drones with things like Google Earth VR for sightseeing, and I'd say that VR and local manufacturing are the real threats to aviation jobs. And to driving jobs, for that matter.
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I heard a rumour Embraer looked into it for the E2 so it would be no surprise if Airbus were researching aswell. There's several options for how it could work, all requiring different levels of automation:
- Keep 2x pilots but reduce the PM role by increasing automated monitoring of systems and pilot inputs. This role could then be much lower-skill, more easily trained and potentially combined with other duties.
- Automate the PM role away and provide a data-link to the ground for assistance where required
- Move to a near fully-autonomous aircraft with a single pilot to monitor and provide a back-up of last resort.
IMO certification, not technology, would be the main barrier. The rules for single-pilot large transport aircraft don't really exist and re-writing them is neither simple, quick or cheap.... Retro-fitting is unlikely to work either, limiting it to new types and further delaying implementation.
In summary, I think it will happen but 2025 is optimistic in the extreme. If I was betting I'd say that the next clean-slate single-aisle (ie, MAX / NEO replacement) will be a single pilot aircraft launched around 2030.
True, but if pilots have been automated away imagine the millions of other jobs that will also have disappeared. Society as we know it wouldn't exist so there's not much point planning for it 
- Keep 2x pilots but reduce the PM role by increasing automated monitoring of systems and pilot inputs. This role could then be much lower-skill, more easily trained and potentially combined with other duties.
- Automate the PM role away and provide a data-link to the ground for assistance where required
- Move to a near fully-autonomous aircraft with a single pilot to monitor and provide a back-up of last resort.
IMO certification, not technology, would be the main barrier. The rules for single-pilot large transport aircraft don't really exist and re-writing them is neither simple, quick or cheap.... Retro-fitting is unlikely to work either, limiting it to new types and further delaying implementation.
In summary, I think it will happen but 2025 is optimistic in the extreme. If I was betting I'd say that the next clean-slate single-aisle (ie, MAX / NEO replacement) will be a single pilot aircraft launched around 2030.
The real argument here is the timescale, nothing more. Pilots now face the same "sharp end of the technological stick" that flight engineers faced 30 years ago. Didn't see a majority of pilots back then petitioning for their colleagues, but I'm sure the current generation of youngbloods will want to argue to save their own skins. The only constant in life is change...
Last edited by Private jet; 9th Aug 2018 at 20:14.
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From my airline I suspect that a good 40-50% of Captains (bear in mind that’s minimum-the ones that show the obvious signs) would not want to be anywhere near the pointy end of a commercial aircraft with all that responsibility with no First Officer to back them up. The job will totally change and I would suspect that far less pilots are going to want to do the job single handed than the jobs that are saved by single pilot operations. A manning crisis would still result. Not only that but how are you going to train captains of the future in this brave new world?
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From my airline I suspect that a good 40-50% of Captains (bear in mind that’s minimum-the ones that show the obvious signs) would not want to be anywhere near the pointy end of a commercial aircraft with all that responsibility with no First Officer to back them up. The job will totally change and I would suspect that far less pilots are going to want to do the job single handed than the jobs that are saved by single pilot operations. A manning crisis would still result. Not only that but how are you going to train captains of the future in this brave new world?
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I’m not arguing it’s not the future, I think we all know it is. But the timescale is something that people on here are wildly underestimating here. When the transition comes it’s not going to be from two pilots to one, one pilot is far more dangerous than than two regardless of technology to help mitigating errors (just look at Germanwings, Egyptair, Malaysian?), we cant even stay logged on to CPDLC for more than five minutes so how is this magical ground to air connection going to provide uninterruptible failsafe help at hand? It’s going to have to be straight to pilotless. We’re multiple decades away from that even now.
Last edited by RexBanner; 9th Aug 2018 at 23:04.
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Same argument that said Premier League grounds would be empty twenty five years ago when the new TV deal and mass televisation of football with Sky was introduced. People will still want to “be there”, you can’t replicate that feeling of being there in real life no matter how good the digital recreation is.
Where are you going to find candidates for training? The handwriting is on the wall: Pilotless aircraft are the wave of the future. Why bother pursuing this career? And now you have a self-fulfilling prophecy. The single crew flight decks will be filled by first officers already in the pipeline. So the immediate demand goes down. Trainees will have a longer wait for an opening. Soon, when this second wave of shortages catches up with the market, the airlines will need pilotless technology. Or the planes will sit on the ground. Regulators hands will be forced.
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Nice fantasy but the same discussion about pilot demise was taking place in the eighties. Thirty years later we’re still talking about pilotless aircraft and it’s still just over the horizon for some undetermined time with numerous technological challenges and impediments still in place.