Convair 340 (C-131D) ZS-BRV crash Pretoria, South Africa
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1.5.1.3 The PF (and PM) ..... had not done a skills test on a Convair 340/440 as required
Mariner is absolutely correct in his statement. However, it should be remembered that this aircraft was being operated as a private aircraft on a private flight. It was not being operated as a public transport category flight, Therefore, "PPL" rules applied. (You could fly a 747 on a PPL if you could find someone to insure you). By the way, I hear that one of the pilots has made a reasonable recovery but has no memory of the accident. The other still has serious medical problems.
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Even if the plane is operated privately the type rating is only valid for one year.
There are no operational requirements like a line check but the validity of the TR is the same.
There are no operational requirements like a line check but the validity of the TR is the same.
It occurs to me to ask: How does one do a check ride on a type when there are no flying instances of that type in the country, and possibly no examiner rated on the type?
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I suspect that the answer to the last questions are to be answered by the fact that the sister ship to the accident aircraft is currently operating in Australia and both pilots may be the normal crew on the Australian aircraft???
If the accident report says that they hadn't flown a Convair for 17 months ,then it seems wrong. Maybe not an SA registered Convair?
In the world of rare historic aircraft operations, its normal for crews to keep recent on foreign aircraft. I know that both the Swiss Connie and Lufthansa 1649 crews kept recent on the HARS Connie.
Wunwing
If the accident report says that they hadn't flown a Convair for 17 months ,then it seems wrong. Maybe not an SA registered Convair?
In the world of rare historic aircraft operations, its normal for crews to keep recent on foreign aircraft. I know that both the Swiss Connie and Lufthansa 1649 crews kept recent on the HARS Connie.
Wunwing
Last edited by Wunwing; 7th Sep 2019 at 02:46.
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Learned contributors,
Wasn’t it a similar engine fire that finally closed Air Atlantique’s efforts to put a Convair twin on to the U.K. register G-CONV was I believe a CV-440?
Is this a known problem on Convair CV-340/440 aircraft?
Be lucky
David
Wasn’t it a similar engine fire that finally closed Air Atlantique’s efforts to put a Convair twin on to the U.K. register G-CONV was I believe a CV-440?
Is this a known problem on Convair CV-340/440 aircraft?
Be lucky
David
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Sorry to trouble you
David
Is this a known problem on Convair CV-340/440 aircraft?
I suspect that the answer to the last questions are to be answered by the fact that the sister ship to the accident aircraft is currently operating in Australia and both pilots may be the normal crew on the Australian aircraft???
If the accident report says that they hadn't flown a Convair for 17 months ,then it seems wrong. Maybe not an SA registered Convair?
In the world of rare historic aircraft operations, its normal for crews to keep recent on foreign aircraft. I know that both the Swiss Connie and Lufthansa 1649 crews kept recent on the HARS Connie.
Wunwing
If the accident report says that they hadn't flown a Convair for 17 months ,then it seems wrong. Maybe not an SA registered Convair?
In the world of rare historic aircraft operations, its normal for crews to keep recent on foreign aircraft. I know that both the Swiss Connie and Lufthansa 1649 crews kept recent on the HARS Connie.
Wunwing
3.2.4 Both pilots last flew the Convair 340/440 aircraft 17 months prior to the accident flight, therefore, none of the crew complied with the 12-month competency check.
But in the flight crew information section contradictory information is given; the PFs logbook indicated 5.9 hours on type in the last 90 days (the PM's logbook wasn't found). But the same section also says According to the PF’s logbook, the PF last flew the Convair 340/440 on 27 February 2017. ??
Still, none of this takes away from the fact that the pilots were fully aware the left engine was on fire but took no actions to deal with it. They had observed that the engine had low MAP before V1 but elected to continue. Once the fire was obvious, the LAME handed the PM the AFM QRH but the PM "ignored it", to quote the report. It must be said though that the LAME was manipulating the engine controls, not the pilots. The fire melted out the rivets securing the left wing's aileron cable pulleys which resulted in the cable going slack and the left aileron rising, as seen in the video. They lost roll control & lift, on top of the drag of the burning engine which they never feathered or secured.
The engine caught fire because the LAME didn't service it properly, missing that no. 7 cylinder's exhaust valve was cracked and partly missing its head. The cylinder head cooling fins softened and failed and the combustion flame escaped the engine. No 13's piston rings had also failed and were no longer sealing; that didn't cause the fire but it and no. 7's damaged exhaust valve did drop the MAP.
The programmed maintenance performed a few days before the flight called for compression testing of each cylinder on both engines but the LAME patently didn't do this.
The engine had been showing low MAP on two previous flights but the LAME removed the gauge each time and sent them to another AMO, who both times recorded that it was blocked with carbon deposits and cleaned it out, rather than compression testing the engine.
Still, none of this takes away from the fact that the pilots were fully aware the left engine was on fire but took no actions to deal with it. They had observed that the engine had low MAP before V1 but elected to continue. Once the fire was obvious, the LAME handed the PM the AFM QRH but the PM "ignored it", to quote the report. It must be said though that the LAME was manipulating the engine controls, not the pilots.
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Very odd response by two experienced aviators. I would look into what may have been known about the port engine prior to departure. Speculating but if they knew it was down on power that might go some way to explain lack of response initially.
Shame that a gracious old lady had to be so miss handled to cause her demise.
Shame that a gracious old lady had to be so miss handled to cause her demise.
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During my airline years we were drilled to call ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE, LOUD and clear. This was to "reset" the crew (including Yrself) to start one's memory items/actions, whatever You were doing otherwise. More or less the same effect You will see when calling "Mayday 3X" , it will get anyone's attention (ATC and other A/C) and get everyone into high gear and do the job one was trained for.
It looks like this was not done here, plus the presence of the LAME had eroded the strict 2-man crew operation. It was NOT a three man crew with a fully trained FE, notwithstanding his knowledge of the engines. The LAME did probably all his best from a technical standpoint, but did not fit into CRM at that moment.
The pilots were leaning (too)heavily on his presence/actions.
For ones who might wonder why the aileron went upwards, when the aileron control cables break the pressure difference below and above the wing will force it upward. Possibly, when speed would be rising, it would blow back into a more trailing position, but if the net result would be the same rollrate, I have no cue. Anyone here to have an idea?
In this case they were already trading height for minimum speed, for not getting the prop into feathering, and there was no more energy to accelerate. Getting more speed would have given them more control, like with the rudder to assist in roll.
Nevertheless, as with many other accidents, not a scenario I'd like to be in and play hero. And I do have mixed feelings talking about the subject with the crew still recovering, But that is aviation.
And wishing them all the best.
It looks like this was not done here, plus the presence of the LAME had eroded the strict 2-man crew operation. It was NOT a three man crew with a fully trained FE, notwithstanding his knowledge of the engines. The LAME did probably all his best from a technical standpoint, but did not fit into CRM at that moment.
The pilots were leaning (too)heavily on his presence/actions.
For ones who might wonder why the aileron went upwards, when the aileron control cables break the pressure difference below and above the wing will force it upward. Possibly, when speed would be rising, it would blow back into a more trailing position, but if the net result would be the same rollrate, I have no cue. Anyone here to have an idea?
In this case they were already trading height for minimum speed, for not getting the prop into feathering, and there was no more energy to accelerate. Getting more speed would have given them more control, like with the rudder to assist in roll.
Nevertheless, as with many other accidents, not a scenario I'd like to be in and play hero. And I do have mixed feelings talking about the subject with the crew still recovering, But that is aviation.
And wishing them all the best.
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During my airline years we were drilled to call ENGINE FAILURE/FIRE, LOUD and clear. This was to "reset" the crew (including Yrself) to start one's memory items/actions, whatever You were doing otherwise. More or less the same effect You will see when calling "Mayday 3X" , it will get anyone's attention (ATC and other A/C) and get everyone into high gear and do the job one was trained for.
It looks like this was not done here, plus the presence of the LAME had eroded the strict 2-man crew operation. It was NOT a three man crew with a fully trained FE, notwithstanding his knowledge of the engines. The LAME did probably all his best from a technical standpoint, but did not fit into CRM at that moment.
The pilots were leaning (too)heavily on his presence/actions.
For ones who might wonder why the aileron went upwards, when the aileron control cables break the pressure difference below and above the wing will force it upward. Possibly, when speed would be rising, it would blow back into a more trailing position, but if the net result would be the same rollrate, I have no cue. Anyone here to have an idea?
In this case they were already trading height for minimum speed, for not getting the prop into feathering, and there was no more energy to accelerate. Getting more speed would have given them more control, like with the rudder to assist in roll.
Nevertheless, as with many other accidents, not a scenario I'd like to be in and play hero. And I do have mixed feelings talking about the subject with the crew still recovering, But that is aviation.
And wishing them all the best.
It looks like this was not done here, plus the presence of the LAME had eroded the strict 2-man crew operation. It was NOT a three man crew with a fully trained FE, notwithstanding his knowledge of the engines. The LAME did probably all his best from a technical standpoint, but did not fit into CRM at that moment.
The pilots were leaning (too)heavily on his presence/actions.
For ones who might wonder why the aileron went upwards, when the aileron control cables break the pressure difference below and above the wing will force it upward. Possibly, when speed would be rising, it would blow back into a more trailing position, but if the net result would be the same rollrate, I have no cue. Anyone here to have an idea?
In this case they were already trading height for minimum speed, for not getting the prop into feathering, and there was no more energy to accelerate. Getting more speed would have given them more control, like with the rudder to assist in roll.
Nevertheless, as with many other accidents, not a scenario I'd like to be in and play hero. And I do have mixed feelings talking about the subject with the crew still recovering, But that is aviation.
And wishing them all the best.
Depending on the way the cables are connected the other side will move up as well. That would keep things symmetrical with no roll rate. However, roll control would be very limited or lost altogether.
the presence of the LAME had eroded the strict 2-man crew operation. It was NOT a three man crew with a fully trained FE
Did the accident aircraft have brake mean effective power gauges? More than MAP + RPM, BMEP shows a direct torque (and hence h.p.) output. I have a very few long-ago hours on CV440, and am no expert on the R-2800, hence I probably would defer to the superior technical knowledge of the engineer when it came to nuances. Once you do that though it might be too easy to rely on that knowledge past the point of (operational, pilot sh*t) prudence.
I think the US Navy crashed a 440 in similar circumstances in the 70’s. Engines mounted in the wing present fire-related issues that we moderns have not had to consider for several generations of aircraft.
I think the US Navy crashed a 440 in similar circumstances in the 70’s. Engines mounted in the wing present fire-related issues that we moderns have not had to consider for several generations of aircraft.