Convair 340 (C-131D) ZS-BRV crash Pretoria, South Africa
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Germany
Posts: 80
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There might be countries in Africa where no one really cares about rules and legislation - that does not apply to South Africa, though. CAA works pretty good as one can see reading preliminary report.
BMEP gauges are simply torquemeters. For whatever reason Pratt&Whitney decided to lable them as psi of Brake Mean Effective Pressure, an abstract theoretical quantity representing the average pressure in the cylinders during the power stroke
Sorry, it doesn't work that way.
As someone who went through the process of getting a South African validation some years ago, the SA CAA don't work it like that.
A validation is basically an authorisation to use a foreign licence, and its included ratings and endorsements, as if it were a local licence. Type ratings must be included in a licence, and then a validation allows you to use them on a local aircraft. You can't include a new type rating on a validation,its only an approval certificate for another CAA's qualification.
Getting a little perturbed by those who are rushing in to defend the pilots with "Oh they work for Q... therefore they knew what they were doing".
1. These are senior heavy jet drivers, used to flying aircraft that are immaculately maintained. The potential of failure is significantly less in a modern airliner, and when it does happen the flight profile of an A330 with an engine out on take-off is better than the normal flight profile of the CV. Then consider the automation of modern jet systems in the event of a failure - versus the almost complete lack thereof (autofeather if it works) in the CV. The GoPro footage reveals an almost complete lack of CRM, maybe tied to a lack of familiarity with flying a big piston, versus a modern jet.
Just because you're a superdooper jet jockey doesn't mean you can fly a vintage airliner, especially on a test flight after heavy maintenance with passengers on board.
2. Coming from Oz where pedantic bureaucracy in pilot licensing is the normal, it is inconceivable that either pilot could not understand if they did not have the correct licences/validations/type-ratings to legally fly the aircraft on the ZS- register. To hold a validation certificate that allows flight of PPL, single-engine only, and then go blasting off in the CV beggars belief. Couple this with the fact that there were fatalities, if this had been in Oz with a South African pilot the media and Australian CAA would be baying for blood.
As someone who went through the process of getting a South African validation some years ago, the SA CAA don't work it like that.
A validation is basically an authorisation to use a foreign licence, and its included ratings and endorsements, as if it were a local licence. Type ratings must be included in a licence, and then a validation allows you to use them on a local aircraft. You can't include a new type rating on a validation,its only an approval certificate for another CAA's qualification.
Getting a little perturbed by those who are rushing in to defend the pilots with "Oh they work for Q... therefore they knew what they were doing".
1. These are senior heavy jet drivers, used to flying aircraft that are immaculately maintained. The potential of failure is significantly less in a modern airliner, and when it does happen the flight profile of an A330 with an engine out on take-off is better than the normal flight profile of the CV. Then consider the automation of modern jet systems in the event of a failure - versus the almost complete lack thereof (autofeather if it works) in the CV. The GoPro footage reveals an almost complete lack of CRM, maybe tied to a lack of familiarity with flying a big piston, versus a modern jet.
Just because you're a superdooper jet jockey doesn't mean you can fly a vintage airliner, especially on a test flight after heavy maintenance with passengers on board.
2. Coming from Oz where pedantic bureaucracy in pilot licensing is the normal, it is inconceivable that either pilot could not understand if they did not have the correct licences/validations/type-ratings to legally fly the aircraft on the ZS- register. To hold a validation certificate that allows flight of PPL, single-engine only, and then go blasting off in the CV beggars belief. Couple this with the fact that there were fatalities, if this had been in Oz with a South African pilot the media and Australian CAA would be baying for blood.
Both the PF and PNF went through the same process with the same SA instructor. I’d suggest the table on page 13 of the report is corrrect, the PNF did hold a valid licence and type rating to operate the aircraft.
id suggest this is an error in the report or CAA licencing records system.
The following extract from SA news report supports this understanding:
Aviation expert Karl Jenson strongly repudiated the report’s preliminary finding that the Convair co-pilot was not licensed.
“A friend who trained him on the aircraft refutes this claim vehemently,” he told The Citizen. “The Sacaa report is preliminary only and there are glaring omissions and claims which cannot possibly be substantiated,” Jenson said.
“A friend who trained him on the aircraft refutes this claim vehemently,” he told The Citizen. “The Sacaa report is preliminary only and there are glaring omissions and claims which cannot possibly be substantiated,” Jenson said.
Last edited by roundsounds; 14th Aug 2018 at 02:16.
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Alaska, PNG, etc.
Age: 60
Posts: 1,550
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No, he's saying that if you don't have the type rating on your foreign license, you can't then *add* it to your certificate of validation of that license.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Without being too simplistic, is it possible that this aircraft was past it's use by date? No matter what inspection or maintenance showed or was performed some other mechanical gremlin was about to surface.
From FAA AC 120-104:
3. WHY DO YOU NEED AN LOV? If you properly maintain an airplane, theoretically you could operate it indefinitely. But structural maintenance tasks for an airplane are not constant with time. Tasks are typically added to the maintenance program as the airplane ages. It is reasonable to expect, then, that the current structural maintenance tasks may not, at some future point, be sufficient for continued operation. Maintenance tasks for a particular airplane can only be determined based on what is known about that airplane model at any given time—from analyses, tests, service experience, and teardown inspections.
Join Date: May 2010
Location: UK
Age: 79
Posts: 1,086
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The report states that the P2 had a type endorsement rather than a type rating.
An endorsement requires type specific training signed off by a suitably qualified instructor whereas a type rating requires a specially designated examiner. Such examiners would be hard or impossible to find for such an old type.
An endorsement requires type specific training signed off by a suitably qualified instructor whereas a type rating requires a specially designated examiner. Such examiners would be hard or impossible to find for such an old type.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Netherlands
Age: 71
Posts: 165
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Without any pointing to the crew, which is hopefully recovering, we may discuss the playing field in which they had to operate and make decisions. Not to blame, but to learn from it.
All pilots have been in situations where they were "forced" to fly, and after many years concluded how in the world they'd accepted that then. But got away with it with luck. At least I had my share.
Initially I thought the flight was one of a series of flight testing and at one moment they decided to load the contributors of the restoration.
What I read in the report is that de bird did not fly any more since beginning of 2018, that means it did not fly for about half a Year before the accident flight. And was repainted shortly before. That really scared me. There is also no indication if it was sitting outside or hangared during those months.
Given all the other factors I mentioned earlier, this long idle time is a grave one. Even well maintained airliners, if they were parked outside for a week, You could come across some strange defects, mostly electrical/electronic though.
For a while I was a company test F/O for the flight(s) after heavy maintenance (D check) that also included a repaint job. The capt was also a dedicated test pilot, so normal cockpit structures ruled. We were specially trained for it, including non-STD manoeuvres and operations. And were expecting anything out of the ordinary, anytime.
The number of items we found were sometimes "countless", although many/most were minor. Add to that we sometimes were flying airliners from other carriers that had completely different instrument setups, different engines, etc. It took its toll on cockpit operations. But we were in the position to have "unlimited" time available to complete all tests, the flight took around 5-6 hours. That is longer than a test flight Boeing does on a new plane. If needed we redid a shorter test flight till all were satisfied. The first flight only mechanics/specialists that had some task to do in flight were allowed.
The Convair was sold under the "as is" condition. That leaves little room for the seller to spend a lot on test flying (fuel and other costs) and/or costly repairs.
That must have weighed heavily in the crew's decision process.
In all I do not envy the flight crew that was faced with so many contributing factors. You can only guess at what time one personally would have called it quits. IF you would have done.
All pilots have been in situations where they were "forced" to fly, and after many years concluded how in the world they'd accepted that then. But got away with it with luck. At least I had my share.
Initially I thought the flight was one of a series of flight testing and at one moment they decided to load the contributors of the restoration.
What I read in the report is that de bird did not fly any more since beginning of 2018, that means it did not fly for about half a Year before the accident flight. And was repainted shortly before. That really scared me. There is also no indication if it was sitting outside or hangared during those months.
Given all the other factors I mentioned earlier, this long idle time is a grave one. Even well maintained airliners, if they were parked outside for a week, You could come across some strange defects, mostly electrical/electronic though.
For a while I was a company test F/O for the flight(s) after heavy maintenance (D check) that also included a repaint job. The capt was also a dedicated test pilot, so normal cockpit structures ruled. We were specially trained for it, including non-STD manoeuvres and operations. And were expecting anything out of the ordinary, anytime.
The number of items we found were sometimes "countless", although many/most were minor. Add to that we sometimes were flying airliners from other carriers that had completely different instrument setups, different engines, etc. It took its toll on cockpit operations. But we were in the position to have "unlimited" time available to complete all tests, the flight took around 5-6 hours. That is longer than a test flight Boeing does on a new plane. If needed we redid a shorter test flight till all were satisfied. The first flight only mechanics/specialists that had some task to do in flight were allowed.
The Convair was sold under the "as is" condition. That leaves little room for the seller to spend a lot on test flying (fuel and other costs) and/or costly repairs.
That must have weighed heavily in the crew's decision process.
In all I do not envy the flight crew that was faced with so many contributing factors. You can only guess at what time one personally would have called it quits. IF you would have done.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: what U.S. calls ´old Europe´
Posts: 941
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Convair was sold under the "as is" condition. That leaves little room for the seller to spend a lot on test flying (fuel and other costs) and/or costly repairs.
That must have weighed heavily in the crew's decision process.
That must have weighed heavily in the crew's decision process.
As the mechanic was expected to join the trip, I would expect him to make damn sure everything is working fine. I can not believe in enough "adventure spirit" to start the long trip without spending anything it takes to make it safe.
If the report is right, it is really hard to understand why they never bothered to address the engine fire...
the BMEP gauges are simply torquemeters.
DOUBLEBACK
the a/c was not yet officially 'sold' - it was still maintained by Rovos Rail the owners and registered keeper - it was (the a/c) to be handed over once at the Museum in Holland.
it had just had A B and C checks and this was its first flight post this mx.
Rovos Rail's LAME was as you know, on board the test (scenic) flight and would accompany the a/c to Holland on its delivery flight
There is a thread about the 2 QF crew members welfare on the Ozzie pages - and these chaps were involved in flying with the HARS heavy piston fleet for some years
the a/c was not yet officially 'sold' - it was still maintained by Rovos Rail the owners and registered keeper - it was (the a/c) to be handed over once at the Museum in Holland.
it had just had A B and C checks and this was its first flight post this mx.
Rovos Rail's LAME was as you know, on board the test (scenic) flight and would accompany the a/c to Holland on its delivery flight
There is a thread about the 2 QF crew members welfare on the Ozzie pages - and these chaps were involved in flying with the HARS heavy piston fleet for some years
The autofeather system is armed by raising the guard and then the switch under it found at the center of the pedestal aft of the prop controls. There is one green light to the left of the switch that indicates the system is armed. When the throttles are advanced to a point that equates to ~45 inches MAP and the BMEP drops below ~70 for more than one second a solenoid pulls the feather button in and the prop feathers as if the feather button was pushed. The system also then disarms to prevent autofeathering the other prop.
This preliminary report does not discuss the background to the captain's statement that the "auto-feather light was not illuminating" [1.1.12]. That begs a few questions, some or all of which may be answered by the Go-Pro recording.
Was this light failure revealed during some kind of pre-take-off test of the auto-feathering system?
Was the light failure simply due to a defective bulb, which presumably could have been quickly changed by the LAME, or did it imply a fault in the system?
Was any pre-take-off check made of the manual feathering system on the #1 (L/H) engine?
Mach E Avelli rightly points out that, on jets, the first action on receipt of any fire warning is normally to retard the throttle to idle, which action may in itself put the fire out. In this case, that action would immediately inhibit auto-feathering, as well as creating a lot of drag from a propellor in full-fine pitch.These were jet pilots but, fortunately, the Go-Pro recording should settle that argument.
What I really have a hard time accepting is that during the whole flight they apparently did not communicate about the situation developing. I for sure would have engaged my fellow crew members about our options. Be it the LAME (captain, are you intentions? Should I do something about that engine fire?) or the pilots (and don't think the PIC ever communicated want he wanted to do, apparently a return to base).
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Wingham NSW Australia
Age: 83
Posts: 1,343
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Grizzly, your comments are inappropriate, certainly at this time I think, before anything more than a preliminary report with contradictions within is all we have to inform us.
Both pilots are still critically ill, neither has been able to relate their side of this story and we do not know the full extent of the problems they encountered. Hasty
condemnation of the crew is unwise and unfair, in my view. At least have the decency to wait until the full and final report is available before being so willing to
crucify the crew. I note you do not give any hint as to your qualifications, if any, to make such judgments.
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Phoenix, AZ USA
Age: 66
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Grizzly, your comments are inappropriate, certainly at this time I think, before anything more than a preliminary report with contradictions within is all we have to inform us.
Both pilots are still critically ill, neither has been able to relate their side of this story and we do not know the full extent of the problems they encountered. Hasty
condemnation of the crew is unwise and unfair, in my view. At least have the decency to wait until the full and final report is available before being so willing to
crucify the crew. I note you do not give any hint as to your qualifications, if any, to make such judgments.
Both pilots are still critically ill, neither has been able to relate their side of this story and we do not know the full extent of the problems they encountered. Hasty
condemnation of the crew is unwise and unfair, in my view. At least have the decency to wait until the full and final report is available before being so willing to
crucify the crew. I note you do not give any hint as to your qualifications, if any, to make such judgments.
I do think that it is within reason to assume that had the PIC declared an emergency and stated both his intentions and instructions it would be noted in the report. Without question the engine failure itself is simply fate but the PIC's apparent
failure to exercise command is something entirely different. Had he announced his intentions to return to both and then instructed the LAME to deal with the engine/fire and the PM to handle the radio/look for alternative spots to ditch this flight might have had a different outcome...
At least for the unfortunate souls on the ground who perished. With command comes responsibility and regardless of all the other variables involved it appears that the PIC failed to meet this burden....again it's a harsh subjective (at this point) but not unreasoned observation. More so
if in fact there was no clear prefight brief for mechanic or other emergencies....
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: schermoney and left front seat
Age: 57
Posts: 2,438
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't think the comments are inappropriate or unfounded in any way specific to what we know. Without question the preliminary report is by it's nature both incomplete and does not paint an entirely accurate picture....however.
I do think that it is within reason to assume that had the PIC declared an emergency and stated both his intentions and instructions it would be noted in the report. Without question the engine failure itself is simply fate but the PIC's apparent
failure to exercise command is something entirely different. Had he announced his intentions to return to both and then instructed the LAME to deal with the engine/fire and the PM to handle the radio/look for alternative spots to ditch this flight might have had a different outcome...
At least for the unfortunate souls on the ground who perished. With command comes responsibility and regardless of all the other variables involved it appears that the PIC failed to meet this burden....again it's a harsh subjective (at this point) but not unreasoned observation. More so
if in fact there was no clear prefight brief for mechanic or other emergencies...
I do think that it is within reason to assume that had the PIC declared an emergency and stated both his intentions and instructions it would be noted in the report. Without question the engine failure itself is simply fate but the PIC's apparent
failure to exercise command is something entirely different. Had he announced his intentions to return to both and then instructed the LAME to deal with the engine/fire and the PM to handle the radio/look for alternative spots to ditch this flight might have had a different outcome...
At least for the unfortunate souls on the ground who perished. With command comes responsibility and regardless of all the other variables involved it appears that the PIC failed to meet this burden....again it's a harsh subjective (at this point) but not unreasoned observation. More so
if in fact there was no clear prefight brief for mechanic or other emergencies...
Your words: if, might , regardless of all other variables, appears....
Can I ask, does anyone have the details of how the BMEP indicator system on the Convair operated? I understand the function of the BMEP indication but, I have drawn a blank on what parameters the indicator or the system used to calculate the BMEP that was displayed. Thanks for any detail or reference. 
OAP
OAP
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Phoenix, AZ USA
Age: 66
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
1) At no point did the PIC declare an emergency to the other two
2) At no point did he assign tasks or ask for the appropriate checklist
3) At no time did he clearly state his intentions
Given the apparent detail specific to the video recording that was disclosed any of these would seem merit a mention.
We do not know if the above actions would have changed the outcome, and we do not know if the LAME did or did not act unilaterally in managing the engine fire
but we do know that the report does not mention a single specific command action from the PIC....so either you have a gross misrepresentation of events or there
simply was not an expected appropriate response to the engine fire....
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Alaska, PNG, etc.
Age: 60
Posts: 1,550
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Can I ask, does anyone have the details of how the BMEP indicator system on the Convair operated? I understand the function of the BMEP indication but, I have drawn a blank on what parameters the indicator or the system used to calculate the BMEP that was displayed. Thanks for any detail or reference.
OAP
OAP
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Alaska, PNG, etc.
Age: 60
Posts: 1,550
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The autofeather system is armed by raising the guard and then the switch under it found at the center of the pedestal aft of the prop controls. There is one green light to the left of the switch that indicates the system is armed. When the throttles are advanced to a point that equates to ~45 inches MAP and the BMEP drops below ~70 for more than one second a solenoid pulls the feather button in and the prop feathers as if the feather button was pushed. The system also then disarms to prevent autofeathering the other prop.
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Alaska, PNG, etc.
Age: 60
Posts: 1,550
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
How does this fit the current replacement/repair of one of them? For me the report sounds like they suspect some sort of leak in the MAP sensor line as contributing factor for the power loss/fire, but maybe I misunderstand that point.
I'm not sure I understand what you're asking. There are shops which specialize in repairing and overhauling obsolete gauges, just like there are still engine shops which overhaul R-2800's
Bear in mind, there was no mention of BMEP in the report, it's only been a point of discussion in this thread.