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Convair 340 (C-131D) ZS-BRV crash Pretoria, South Africa

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Convair 340 (C-131D) ZS-BRV crash Pretoria, South Africa

Old 4th Sep 2018, 18:02
  #441 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by megan
John was the check and trainer on the CAF's big pistons, C-131, B-24, Connie, C-46, B-29 to name a few, and flew a few WWII single engine fighters, including the Zero. Had extensive C-46 experience in Asia early in his career with Air America. At time of retirement was the worlds highest time 747 driver.
But I'd sure listen Chris, and of course context, aircraft type etc may be influencers. Light twins have had the wing fail as a result of engine fire impacting spar integrity, no fire bottles to help.
FWIW I've read John Deakin's expanded emergency checklist for the C-131 (CV-340) and, admittedly from my perspective of zero experience on type, it looks to be an excellent contribution.

Some posters seem to have inferred that, following any in-flight fire, Mr Deakin's policy is to force-land on land or water regardless of the outcome of the fire drill. This, however, is what he has written - as previously quoted by climber314:

"For ANY fire in-flight, the first thought must be to GET DOWN. Major fires in these old airplanes can cause structural failures in less than 60 seconds (there is film to prove it), and it will take not less than three minutes to get this airplane down to sea level from 9,000 feet or so. If the fire is brought under control, it's easy enough to stop the descent, and then evaluate the options.
With a serious fire on board, DO NOT attempt to "stretch" the flight to some airport that is even a short distance away. Put the airplane down in the water, or anywhere, under control.
Even without fire, water is by far the best bet for an emergency landing. With a fire, you're carrying a major fire to the scene, where fuel tanks are very likely to burst. A water landing can only help."


Note that he is addressing the event of a "major" or "serious" fire. Well, I think we would agree that ANY fire is a serious matter. His advice to descend immediately is to cover the case in which, subsequently, the fire cannot be extinguished. At the same time, he emphasises the need not to rush the engine fire drill:
"Both crewmembers should agree that the failure warrants a shutdown, and should confirm with each other which engine it is. It is far better to take it slowly, than to get it wrong."

His advice not to "stretch" the flight to the nearest airport evidently refers to the case where the fire has not been promptly extinguished and/or there is reason to suspect the airframe is structurally compromised. Otherwise:
"If the fire is brought under control, it's easy enough to stop the descent, and then evaluate the options."

Returning to the case in question, IMHO we do not yet have sufficient information to explain either why the crew of ZS-BRV apparently decided to leave the #1 engine running on fire, or why they decided to stay airborne as long as they did. Mr Deakin's preferred option of a landing on water was not available.

Hi gcal,
Yes, the shocking fate of many of the 18 who survived the Viscount forced-landing to which I referred is well documented, and I felt it was not relevant to this thread.

Last edited by Chris Scott; 4th Sep 2018 at 19:16. Reason: Correcting ambiguity in first sentence. Penultimate para extended.
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Old 4th Sep 2018, 23:55
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The mention of Viscount and fire brings to mind Viscount VH-RMI, in cruise at FL175 reported "on emergency descent" with fire warnings on both #1 and #2 engines, one was "out" and they were unable to feather the other engine (#2). Caused by the break up of the rotor in the No. 2 cabin pressurisation blower, which then ignited the lubricating oil. Airflow through the wing caused a breach in the No. 2 fuel tank and the fuel fed fire was directed by airflow to the spar upper boom. At 4,000' on descent to the airport the wing failed. 24 died. Entire process encompassed 15 minutes.
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Old 7th Sep 2018, 19:58
  #443 (permalink)  
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They had valid Australian licenses which had not been fully validated for the SA registered aircraft. A paperwork issue.
Knowing that they were both (clearly) trained on type, you are focusing on easily the most irrelevant and insignificant aspect of this tragedy, paperwork on the day wouldn't have stopped what happened from happened. For what purpose or agenda remains to be seen.
I don't think anyone here is really over-exercised about the paperwork - licenses, validations, certificates... we know these guys could fly the plane, and we know they know that their careers depend on them following the rules of Air Law.
I am not too much bothered about the paperwork shortcomings as I don't think it had much of an impact on the final outcome.
None of you maybe concerned about the paperwork but the lawyers and insurance companies sure are ...
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Old 8th Sep 2018, 14:05
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Originally Posted by PAXboy
None of you maybe concerned about the paperwork but the lawyers and insurance companies sure are ...
As well as the maimed and the families of the dead. If the pilots were not legal to fly (no matter that some dismiss it as trivial paperwork) then there may arise issues of personal liability for the pain, suffering, loss and ongoing care for anyone who was disabled. Much will depend on the jurisdiction and whether insurers are willing to overlook what some regard as technicalities. But insurers rarely pay out what could be huge settlements if there were wrongful acts or omissions unless that coverage was purchased. Signed waivers may not be valid in such circumstances.
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Old 8th Sep 2018, 14:40
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Of course it matters before and after the fact, and surely there will be expensive consequences if the paperwork wasn't correct. I won't speak for anyone else, but what I meant was simply that in the moment of managing the crisis, the paperwork wasn't relevant.
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Old 9th Sep 2018, 07:29
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"For ANY fire in-flight, the first thought must be to GET DOWN. Major fires in these old airplanes can cause structural failures in less than 60 seconds (there is film to prove it), and it will take not less than three minutes to get this airplane down to sea level from 9,000 feet or so. If the fire is brought under control, it's easy enough to stop the descent, and then evaluate the options.
With a serious fire on board, DO NOT attempt to "stretch" the flight to some airport that is even a short distance away. Put the airplane down in the water, or anywhere, under control.
Even without fire, water is by far the best bet for an emergency landing. With a fire, you're carrying a major fire to the scene, where fuel tanks are very likely to burst. A water landing can only help."


Outstanding guidance, albeit, second nature to every professional aviator on here (hopefully).

There is an old early CRM video of the Nimrod ditching in the Moray Firth (uncontained engine fire) which depicts this exact scenario perfectly...the skipper (who I knew well) stuck it in the oggin, even though the runway was a few minutes away. Structural analysis later showed that ballsy call saved all onboard. Well played AS.

And as for the document/insurance thing...check out why Damien Hill (the racing driver) grew up poor.
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Old 9th Sep 2018, 11:49
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Damon Hill.
Wikipedia Graham Hill
Wikipedia Graham Hill plane crash

Last edited by PAXboy; 9th Sep 2018 at 12:13.
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Old 9th Sep 2018, 15:15
  #448 (permalink)  
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With a fire, you're carrying a major fire to the scene, where fuel tanks are very likely to burst. A water landing can only help.
I can't agree that a water landing with a fire is preferable. Of course, no landing with fire is good, and you gotta do what you gotta do, but... considering occupant safety as the primary objective, a water landing will introduce more hazards. If there is a choice between water and decent land for an on fire crash landing, I'd take the land. My reasons: You have a better chance of maintaining control of an intact aircraft to the stop on land, than on water, there is no risk of drowning, if it's been a fuel fed fire, the fuel will spread the fire over a larger area on water than land, and people can't run away from it in the water, it'll be easier for emergency services to reach you on land, a person's injuries will be more likely to become infected in the water, than on land.

I have more experience with this that I would like to have had.
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Old 10th Sep 2018, 17:38
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Originally Posted by Pilot DAR
I can't agree that a water landing with a fire is preferable. Of course, no landing with fire is good, and you gotta do what you gotta do, but... considering occupant safety as the primary objective, a water landing will introduce more hazards. If there is a choice between water and decent land for an on fire crash landing, I'd take the land. My reasons: You have a better chance of maintaining control of an intact aircraft to the stop on land, than on water, there is no risk of drowning, if it's been a fuel fed fire, the fuel will spread the fire over a larger area on water than land, and people can't run away from it in the water, it'll be easier for emergency services to reach you on land, a person's injuries will be more likely to become infected in the water, than on land.

I have more experience with this that I would like to have had.
Can't say I disagree Pilot DAR. All good points. In fact, my original comment was deleted for some reason, but remains quoted in another post?
Quote from climber314:
"You run the [fire] checklist and put it down in an open field ASAP.
Statistically speaking, that would result in fewer/less severe injuries than (partially) controlled flight into overhead wires and a ground structure and vehicles."

Perhaps the water landing reference had/has something to do with the specific type/age of the plane in question? IDK. I'm going to leave the final analysis to the experts and John Deakin is certainly one of the few remaining. Further, I am hoping that the surviving pilots are able to shed some light on their thoughts and intents.
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Old 11th Aug 2019, 07:25
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Final Report or Update

Does anyone know when the final report will be released? Is there any news on the investigation?

WFD
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Old 11th Aug 2019, 07:41
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Will be released when ready. Seriously!

These investigations take time and this one is probably not the easiest while not the most urgent (there are not that many Convair 340 in service). I wouldn't be surprised to wait a few more years to get the final report.
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Old 11th Aug 2019, 09:47
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SACAA usually aim to get a final report published in around a year but this is not an easy case so it could take a while longer.
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Old 28th Aug 2019, 09:44
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Apparently the report has been obtained by the Dutch museum that purchased the Convair. I've been trying to look for it but can;t see it officially published on the SACAA website yet. link to a dutch newspaper article http://www.omroepflevoland.nl/nieuws/173635/piloten-mochten-crashtoestel-aviodrome-niet-besturen
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Old 28th Aug 2019, 11:08
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http://www.caa.co.za/Accidents%20and...ports/9722.pdf
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Old 28th Aug 2019, 12:19
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Not a good read for both the flight and maintenance crews.

3.4. Contributory Factors:
3.4.1 Pre-existing damage to the cylinder No 13 piston and ring pack deformation and, most probably, the cylinder No 7’s fractured exhaust valve head that were not detected during maintenance of the aircraft.
3.4.2 Substandard maintenance for failing to conduct compression tests on all cylinders during the scheduled maintenance prior to the accident.
3.4.3 Misdiagnosis of the left engine manifold pressure defect as it was reported twice prior to the accident.
3.4.4 The crew not aborting take-off at 50kts prior to reaching V1; manifold pressure fluctuation was observed by the crew at 50kts and that should have resulted in an aborted take-off.
3.4.6 Lack of crew resource management; this was evident as the crew ignored using the emergency checklist to respond to the in-flight left engine fire.
3.4.7 Lack of recency training for both the PF and PM, as well as the LAME.
3.4.8 Non-compliance to Civil Aviation Regulations by both the crew and the maintenance organisation.
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Old 28th Aug 2019, 13:42
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Originally Posted by Cloudee
Not a good read for both the flight and maintenance crews
Pretty damning indeed.
And they actually wanted to fly this aircraft to the Netherlands!? Amazing.

Do we have any news of the recovery of the survivors?
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Old 28th Aug 2019, 14:51
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Hmmm, reeks like, let's get this crate flying again as soon and as cheap as possible, then send it off to NL, who will (probably) use it only as a non-flying piece of static display. Possibly the price was already hammered, meaning in flying condition. So not much eagerness for extra costs from the side of the vendor.
And who takes a load full of pax with You during a test flight with old stuff, after "maintenance" and a long idle period. And only ONE test flight was planned due to possibly a few time constraints. Like the return flight was already planned, with all that comes with it.
I wonder how much the pilots were pressed to accept the conditions as they were. But OK, finally they made the decision to accept it as presented.

I love to see those old planes fly but long time ago I decided not to fly them myself, however I was and am still active in GA.
There is just too many accidents with those old planes. I flew 18.000plus hours on heavy metal, most of it 3 and 4 holers. NEVER lost ONE engine (mostly GE CF6)

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Old 28th Aug 2019, 16:11
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As suspected earlier, neither one of these so-called 'professional pilots' was legal to fly a ZS registered Convair.

1.5.1.2 The PF’s validation of his foreign licence, which was valid until 5 May 2021, was only limited to Single Engine Land aircraft with the following aircraft types: C150, C172, C182 and PA 28 A/B. This information is based on his foreign licence validation application and skills test report dated 9 May 2016.

1.5.1.3 The PF was not authorised to operate a South African registered Convair 340/440, as he had not done a skills test on a Convair 340/440 as required by CAR 2011, Part 61.01.13.
1.5.2.3 The PM’s validation of his foreign licence, which was valid until 5 May 2021, was only limited to a Single Engine Land aircraft with the following aircraft types: C150, C172, C182 and PA 28 A/B. This information is based on his foreign licence validation application and skills test report dated 6 May 2016.

1.5.2.5 The PM was not authorised to operate a South African registered Convair 340/440 as he had not done a skills test on a Convair 340/440 as required by CAR 2011, Part 61.01.13.

Last edited by Airbubba; 28th Aug 2019 at 21:05.
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Old 28th Aug 2019, 18:57
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To be honest the licensing part of this mess is relatively minor when put into the perspective of the glaring mistakes and negligences otherwise comited.
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Old 28th Aug 2019, 23:04
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Originally Posted by atakacs
To be honest the licensing part of this mess is relatively minor when put into the perspective of the glaring mistakes and negligences otherwise comited.
I guess you are right, these 'senior QF check pilots' apparently never did a checklist or fired an extinguisher bottle with the left engine on fire. I'm sure some will call this 'technique'.

1.1.14 Throughout the flight, the left engine was on fire. The cockpit GoPro video recording
showed that the left engine’s revolutions per minute (RPM) indicator was fluctuating
and, later, the left engine’s fire master caution light illuminated and an audible
warning sound came on confirming that the left engine was on fire. The GoPro
video recording also showed that prior to impact, the control wheel was being
deflected to the right by the PF and he indicated that they had lost aileron control.
He also requested the PM (first officer) for the rudder input.

1.1.15 The GoPro video recording further showed that the PF was not sure if they had
retracted the landing gears as he could be heard asking the PM if the gears were
retracted or not. Moreover, the video recording revealed that although the crew was
informed of the left engine being on fire by one of the passengers, they were still not
sure which engine was on fire. At no stage did the crew discuss or attempt to
extinguish the fire in the left engine. As a result, the left engine fire extinguishing
system was never activated and the left engine remained operating and on fire until
the aircraft impacted the building.
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