G-VIIO Las Vegas
Sewushr
There’s been a change since you flew - Blinds are required to be up, the cabin crew make an announcement to that effect pre takeoff and pre landing.
I’d agree that’s tempting but I’m not sure you can do that in isolation...without wishing to sounds uncharacteristically “new age” about this you have to be a bit holistic about this and look at why the checklist wasn’t actioned correctly, not just focus “ criticism” on that fact. Yelling “yah boo, I’m criticising him/the entire Fleet/entire Airline because an evac checklist wasn’t done properly” doesn’t improve flight safety one iota.
There’s been a quite grown up debate about this accident elsewhere on Pprune..interesting observations there: possibly disruptive effect of the “heavy” (verses the sanitised two crew environment that is emulated in the sim), the checklist sequence, and the WTF /almost dislocation/disbelief factor individuals can experience when faced with a really serious emergency, something that is an emotion that you certainly will never get in the sim.
Not saying any of the above “excuses” the checklist being handled the way it was, but I can see why it happened and why similar will happen again. I’ve flown for over forty years, never had a perfect day at work, never flown with a perfect colleague.
There’s been a change since you flew - Blinds are required to be up, the cabin crew make an announcement to that effect pre takeoff and pre landing.
To me, all this kerfuffle about whether ATC told the crew about the fire, how long it took to call an evac, etc etc, are ALL overshadowed by the fact that the Captain initiated the evac without doing the most important action -........That should be the focus of any criticism here.
There’s been a quite grown up debate about this accident elsewhere on Pprune..interesting observations there: possibly disruptive effect of the “heavy” (verses the sanitised two crew environment that is emulated in the sim), the checklist sequence, and the WTF /almost dislocation/disbelief factor individuals can experience when faced with a really serious emergency, something that is an emotion that you certainly will never get in the sim.
Not saying any of the above “excuses” the checklist being handled the way it was, but I can see why it happened and why similar will happen again. I’ve flown for over forty years, never had a perfect day at work, never flown with a perfect colleague.
Last edited by wiggy; 26th Jun 2018 at 21:01.
Wiggy, trying not to be critical (and since you appear to be knowledgeable about such things), why isn't the evac check list a memory recall item? An evacuation is almost by definition an emergency, I'd think taking the time to look it up could be critical to the success (or lack there of).
Sure, it wouldn't prevent a startled crew from getting in wrong (although that's what sim training is for - to make it second nature), but the seconds it would save could well save lives.
Sure, it wouldn't prevent a startled crew from getting in wrong (although that's what sim training is for - to make it second nature), but the seconds it would save could well save lives.
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I’ve flown for over forty years, never had a perfect day at work, never flown with a perfect colleague.
1. Assess Fire Status
This should be the first checklist item after a reject or landing with engine problems once the aircraft has come to a stop.
Assessing fire status should of course include checking with cabin crew eg. "Flight attendants report airframe condition"
Assessing fire status should of course include checking with cabin crew eg. "Flight attendants report airframe condition"
I am surprised that there is no comment on the evidence that the cabin crew were trying to contact the cockpit but were ignored as the flight crew focussed on apparently more urgent things. It seems to me that was an opportunity to learn something important that was lost. Perhaps it would help if the cabin crew had a means of indicating a fire with a simple button that would show an indicator somewhere on the instrumentation, that might be more easily integrated into the thinking process while the flight crew is trying to understand a situation.
Assess Fire Status...This should be the first checklist item after a reject or landing with engine problems once the aircraft has come to a stop.
..) The indication on the Flight deck of an incoming call would have been a short chime...”bing”....(and the first one of our sensory systems that degrades under highworkload/stress is.......) and a latched “ ....call” message on the EICAS, which given the circumstances would perhaps have been one of several messages displayed, some of a more eye catching nature than others ...I can only guess the...”...call” got missed with everything else that was going on....Last edited by wiggy; 27th Jun 2018 at 10:36.
the cabin crew were trying to contact the cockpit but were ignored as the flight crew focussed on apparently more urgent things.
Wiggy, trying not to be critical (and since you appear to be knowledgeable about such things), why isn't the evac check list a memory recall item? An evacuation is almost by definition an emergency, I'd think taking the time to look it up could be critical to the success (or lack there of).
Sure, it wouldn't prevent a startled crew from getting in wrong (although that's what sim training is for - to make it second nature), but the seconds it would save could well save lives.
Sure, it wouldn't prevent a startled crew from getting in wrong (although that's what sim training is for - to make it second nature), but the seconds it would save could well save lives.
The decision to evacuate is a big one, and one advantage of using the QRH is it is considered and done correctly, rather than the rush that left an engine running in this case. Our training department’s view is that 5 seconds to get the QRH and start reading is preferable to launching passengers into a still turning and burning GE90.
I was trained elsewhere where that simply reading the condition statement on the Evacuation checklist gives you a chance to assess and confirm that you are making the correct decision (that airline had had some over-punchy initiations or needless evacuations).
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Guys......
According to the report, "While the airplane was decelerating to a stop, the fire warning bell sounded. When the airplane came to stop, the captain called for the engine fire checklist. The third item on the checklist was to move the fuel control switch on the affected side (in this case, the left side) to the cutoff position, which shuts down the respective engine."
Where I work, on this type, there are memory items for this situation which will quickly shut down the engine, cut off fuel and discharge fire bottles. Is it different at BA with only a checklist which can take significantly more seconds to perform?
According to the report, "While the airplane was decelerating to a stop, the fire warning bell sounded. When the airplane came to stop, the captain called for the engine fire checklist. The third item on the checklist was to move the fuel control switch on the affected side (in this case, the left side) to the cutoff position, which shuts down the respective engine."
Where I work, on this type, there are memory items for this situation which will quickly shut down the engine, cut off fuel and discharge fire bottles. Is it different at BA with only a checklist which can take significantly more seconds to perform?
It is called the fire engine checklist. Which is a full checklist. However the first couple of items are memory items. However to initiate the memory items the PF calls for the appropriate checklist. But that doesn't mean physically grabbing it to perform the memory items.
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It is called the fire engine checklist. Which is a full checklist. However the first couple of items are memory items. However to initiate the memory items the PF calls for the appropriate checklist. But that doesn't mean physically grabbing it to perform the memory items.
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777 QRH
FIRE ENG L, R
Condition: Fire is detected in the engine
1 A/T ARM switch (affected side) . . . . . . Confirm. . . . . . . . . . OFF
2 Thrust lever (affected side) . . . . . . Confirm. . . . . . . . . . Idle
3 FUEL CONTROL switch (affected side) . . . . . . Confirm. . . . . . . CUTOFF
4 Engine fire switch (affected side) . . . . . . Confirm. . . . . . . . . . Pull
5 If the FIRE ENG message stays shown:
Engine fire switch (affected side) . . . . . . . . . . Rotate to the stop and hold for 1 second
If after 30 seconds, the FIRE ENG message stays shown:
Engine fire switch (affected side) . . . . . . . . . .Rotate to the other stop and hold for 1 second
6 APU selector (if APU available) . . . . . . . . . . . . START, then ON
7 Transponder mode selector . . . . . . . . . . TA ONLY
8 Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport.
Continued on next page
Etc etc etc.
Obviously, this checklist assumes amongst other things that the fire is occurring whilst in flight, but the basic tenant of the memory items for an engine fire on the ground are indentical e.g. items 1 through 5.
Just to be clear, for this situation at BA one does not call for Memory Items(and then the checklist once the Memory Items are said to be complete) but instead calls for the Engine Fire checklist at which point, the first two items are performed by memory(different to what I am used to).
Blimey reading some of the above this is in danger of getting confusing..I began to wonder if I’d missed something whilst I’ve been on leave.
I don’t know what other Boeing operators do but if you want to know what the BA T7 procedure is IMHO it is the version haughtney1 has posted, and I agree with his/her comment that items 1 to 5 are done from memory.
I don’t know what other Boeing operators do but if you want to know what the BA T7 procedure is IMHO it is the version haughtney1 has posted, and I agree with his/her comment that items 1 to 5 are done from memory.
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As you can see in bullet 8, this procedure is for an engine fire in flight. Hence it is not optimized for an engine fire on ground (when fuel can collect and burn close to the fuselage, while in flight it will only affect a part of the wing and the according trailing edge devices) and not optimized to prepare for an evacuation.
Normally there should be two procedures (air/ground). And there should be an engine fire procedure (fire warning while the engine performs normally) and an "catastrophic engine failure procedure" when a bunch of warnings go off at the sime time, the engine stops producing thrust and a loud bang supplements the cockpit indications. But that would of course increase the number of procedures to an unacceplable level...
Having a 30 second wait in the procedure makes it quite unsuitable for a situation like this, when prompt decisions about an evacuation have to be taken, and preparation takes time (spool down of the other engine).
For the concorde crash the engine fire procedure was also not the best one to perform with priority... Although formally there was an engine fire warning, so formally it was the right procedure. Hard to blame the crew.
Normally there should be two procedures (air/ground). And there should be an engine fire procedure (fire warning while the engine performs normally) and an "catastrophic engine failure procedure" when a bunch of warnings go off at the sime time, the engine stops producing thrust and a loud bang supplements the cockpit indications. But that would of course increase the number of procedures to an unacceplable level...
Having a 30 second wait in the procedure makes it quite unsuitable for a situation like this, when prompt decisions about an evacuation have to be taken, and preparation takes time (spool down of the other engine).
For the concorde crash the engine fire procedure was also not the best one to perform with priority... Although formally there was an engine fire warning, so formally it was the right procedure. Hard to blame the crew.
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Just to add to what Volume is saying, the point is made by Boeing in the Checklist instructions..e.g. how to use the checklists.
So in summary, do what you need to do as even Boeing are happy to go into print to say that all things are not black or white.
Non–Normal Checklist Operation
Non–normal checklists start with steps to correct the situation. If needed, information for planning the rest of the flight is included. In the printed non-normal checklists, when special items are needed to configure the airplane for landing, the items are included in the Deferred Items section of the checklist. In the electronic checklists, deferred items are automatically added to the end of the applicable normal checklist. Flight patterns for some engine out situations are located in the Maneuvers chapter and show the sequence of configuration changes.
While every attempt is made to supply needed non–normal checklists, it is not possible to develop checklists for all conceivable situations. In some smoke, fire, or fumes situations, the flight crew may need to move between the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist and the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist. In some multiple failure situations, the flight crew may need to combine the elements of more than one checklist. In all situations, the captain must assess the situation and use good judgment to determine the safest course of action.
Non–normal checklists start with steps to correct the situation. If needed, information for planning the rest of the flight is included. In the printed non-normal checklists, when special items are needed to configure the airplane for landing, the items are included in the Deferred Items section of the checklist. In the electronic checklists, deferred items are automatically added to the end of the applicable normal checklist. Flight patterns for some engine out situations are located in the Maneuvers chapter and show the sequence of configuration changes.
While every attempt is made to supply needed non–normal checklists, it is not possible to develop checklists for all conceivable situations. In some smoke, fire, or fumes situations, the flight crew may need to move between the Smoke, Fire or Fumes checklist and the Smoke or Fumes Removal checklist. In some multiple failure situations, the flight crew may need to combine the elements of more than one checklist. In all situations, the captain must assess the situation and use good judgment to determine the safest course of action.
Controversial, moi?
As you can see in bullet 8, this procedure is for an engine fire in flight. Hence it is not optimized for an engine fire on ground (when fuel can collect and burn close to the fuselage, while in flight it will only affect a part of the wing and the according trailing edge devices) and not optimized to prepare for an evacuation. Normally there should be two procedures (air/ground).
And there should be an engine fire procedure (fire warning while the engine performs normally) and an "catastrophic engine failure procedure" when a bunch of warnings go off at the sime time, the engine stops producing thrust and a loud bang supplements the cockpit indications. But that would of course increase the number of procedures to an unacceplable(sic) level...
Essentially the initial actions are the same leading to the Fire Switch being pulled. In the Engine Severe Damage/Separation case the memory items stop at that point. i.e. the fire bottles do not get discharged.
It may have changed since I was with BA but I recall that on the ground the Engine Fire checklist is accomplished for Engine Severe Damage/Separation.